Instances of such improvised organization may be found in most British campaigns of the past two centuries, and of late years in the Expeditionary Forces sent by France to Madagascar, by the United States to Cuba, and by Germany to South-West Africa.
States and Returns
War Establishments by no means represent the real strength during a war. It may happen that the Army engages in the war without its war establishment being completed. But even if each unit were at its correct war establishment when entering on the campaign, this will not long represent its actual strength. Sick and stragglers waste the ranks daily. After fighting, the missing, wounded, and dead have to be deducted. From time to time reinforcements are added in irregular numbers.
Besides the wastage of units, the whole force at the front is apt to become reduced by detachments being taken to guard communications, to escort prisoners or convoys, to garrison fortresses, or to undertake sieges. Napoleon considered that out of every 8 men in an army, only 5 could be counted on as available for the decisive battle of the war.
It is, however, essential for every Commander to be kept informed of the state of his Command for fighting purposes, which the Establishments do not show. This information is supplied by every Commanding Officer of a Unit in a document called a State, rendered, as a rule, daily. The State shows the fighting condition of the unit, its strength in officers, men, horses, and guns, the amount of ammunition in hand, as well as any other points affecting its fighting efficiency. A State may be rendered by telegraph, or even verbally, to ensure its prompt arrival.
Returns of strength are also made by every Commanding Officer. These differ from States in being rendered at longer intervals, so that they can be more deliberately and accurately made out. They are used for purposes of record and accounting.
Reinforcements
The importance of keeping up the effective strength of the Army cannot be exaggerated. Drafts of reinforcements should be prepared at the outset, and the supply continuously maintained. There is no principle of organization more clear than the necessity of keeping the existing units up to strength, and not reinforcing with new units, even if the numbers added to the Army be the same in both cases. New units are not so efficient as the weak old ones reinforced by fresh men. They will soon become mere skeletons like the old units, after which the Army will consist of a great number of very weak units—a state of things very detrimental to Command and force of action.
The wastage of war falls mainly on the Infantry, whose losses in battle and sufferings on the march exceed those of other Arms. Far more losses are incurred on the march than in the fighting. Marching is the rule of the soldier’s life in war, fighting the exception. Infantry wastes away like snow in the sun, as it marches; footsore men fall out, and fatigue and privations cause illness. The statistics of the diminution of the two finest of the Prussian Corps in 1870 are most striking. The Third Corps, which fought so well at Spicheren on the 6th August, and magnificently at Vionville on the 16th, losing in these battles 350 men per battalion, dropped 200 per battalion on the road. The Guards, who entered France with 30,000 Infantry, had only 13,000 rifles after Sedan, a month later, and 8,000 when they reached Paris, their loss in battle being only 8,350. The battalions therefore had lost 300 men on the road, apart from fighting, during the first six weeks of the war.
In a hard campaign it seems likely, therefore, that a loss of at least 100 men per battalion per month must be expected during hard marches, besides losses in fighting which may amount to more. Some Prussian Regiments lost from 300 to 500 men per battalion during one day’s fighting in 1870.