The strength of Head-Quarters of Commands, and of Administrative Services, remains fairly constant during a campaign, as does the number of guns. Mounted men waste less than Infantry, as they do not become footsore, and do not carry the weight of their equipment, which rests on the horse.
To remedy the wastage of war, the British organization provides for each Unit proceeding to the theatre of operations a Reserve, extra to its Establishment, amounting to 10 per cent. of its number of rank and file. These men are at first retained at the Base, so as to be readily available, and are called the “First Reinforcements.” It is calculated that subsequent reinforcements, amounting to some 60 per cent. of the total strength of the Force, but mainly required for the Infantry, are likely to be sufficient to replace the wastage of the first year of a war. For the British Expeditionary Force of 153,000 in the Field the strength of First Reinforcements is 14,000 and that of subsequent Reinforcements will probably be about 2,700 officers and 75,000 men.
Evils of Improvised Organizations
It might be considered that the larger formations of all Arms need not be permanently organized, but might be improvised for War. This was formerly the system in all armies, and persisted in the British Service until a few years ago; while in the United States there is even now no higher unit than the Regiment. But improvised bodies of troops are not so efficient as permanent formations. This could be shown by many examples from history. The force defeated at Majuba was formed of Companies of several Regiments, and in 1870 the working of the German Cavalry Divisions, which were formed only on mobilization, left much to be desired.
There are several advantages in assembling troops, in permanent Commands. In the first place, the training together of all Arms, and of their various units, creates confidence throughout the force. It can be easily seen how they will learn to know each other’s methods of action, and to rely on their mutual co-operation. For instance, it has been found how much better Artillery supports the other troops of its own Division, whom it has been accustomed to work with.
In the second place, where Staff Officers work constantly together, and understand each other, their work will be better and more rapidly done. Also, when troops are accustomed to work with the same Staff, Orders can be short and concise, and therefore more quickly drafted, and better understood. All this saves time, and much increases the mobility on which depends success in manœuvring.
In the third place, it is most desirable that the Chief should know his Staff and still more his Subordinate Commanders. He will thus be able to apportion to each officer a task suited to his qualifications. This tends to efficiency in Command.
The Administration, too, of improvised units always leaves much to be desired. The Administrative Services of each portion may be permanent and adequate, but additional ones will be required for the new Unit, as well as improvised Head-Quarters. MacMahon’s failure at Wörth was partly due to his having to command a detached Army with only the Staff of his own Army Corps.
Importance of Preserving Original Organization
The organization of a force regulates the conditions of its command and administration, and should be altered during the war only if it be absolutely necessary to do so. Any alteration interrupts the accustomed channel for Orders, necessitates changes in Commanders and Staff, and disorganizes the system of Supply. An improvised unit, it has already been shown, is never so efficient as a permanent one, and to form one will rob some existing units to provide the new Commander and Staff. Change in organization, therefore, makes control less effective, and tends to confusion in administration, and to general diminution of efficiency in the Force.