[818] Lejalde, Segunda Prob., in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., ii. 424. For carrying the royal treasures ‘les dió siete cauallos heridos, y cojos, y vna yegua, y muchos Indios Tlascaltecas, que segun dixeron, fueron mas de ochenta.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 106.
[819] Bernal Diaz, for instance, states that he had hardly taken the four chalchiuites for his share, from a collection in a mat, when Cortés gave orders to his mayordomo to secure it. loc. cit. His penchant for appropriating large shares to himself is well known. Greed of gold was not now his motive, however, but rather a prudential care to secure means for his plans, and he could hardly neglect them when taking so great care of the royal portion. Martyr, Gomara, and Herrera estimate the treasure at 700,000 ducats, chiefly in bulky jewels according to Gomara. Bernal Diaz reckons in pesos, which may mean pesos de oro. Peter Martyr assumes it to have been the general fund, from which the royal fifth had been set apart only at the last moment, but not apportioned. dec. v. cap. vi. Solis assumes that 700,000 pesos remained after the king’s portion had been deducted. Hist. Mex., 174-5. One witness estimates that over 2,000,000 pesos were lost during that night. Cortés, Residencia, ii. 414. The Carta del Ejército reduces the loss to 400,000 pesos de oro. Another witness states that 300,000 castellanos remained when the soldiers were told to help themselves; afterward the general compelled them to surrender what had been thus given, only to keep it for himself. Cortés, Residencia, i. 241-2. ‘Lo demás ... lo dimos y repartimos por los españoles para que lo sacasen,’ says Cortés, Cartas, 135, which may be interpreted as either giving or intrusting. Whatever may have been left after the Spaniards had taken their loads was gleaned by the allies. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 159.
[820] Bernal Diaz gives Sandoval 100 young unmarried soldiers, with Francisco de Acevedo, the dandy, Ordaz, Tapia, and eight or nine of Narvaez’ men, captains on his staff. To Cortés he gives 50 men, and adds B. V. de Tapia to his staff. Hist. Verdad., 105. This author is contradictory, however. Herrera places Antonio de Quiñones as Sandoval’s chief aid, and Olid and Ordaz in the rear. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi.; Gomara, Hist. Mex., 160; Cortés, Cartas, 134; Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 30 et seq.
[821] Herrera adds a brother of Montezuma, and Sahagun names two sons. Hist. Conq., 33. So does Vetancurt, although he assumes that one was saved. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 142-3. Ixtlilxochitl gives a longer list, including two sons of Montezuma, and two sons and four daughters of Nezahualpilli, of Tezcuco. One of the daughters escaped, but it was not the beloved of Cortés, who had been baptized and named Juana. Cacama is not included in the list, because he is assumed to have been stabbed to death before the fort was evacuated. Hist. Chich., 302; Relaciones, 390. With the prisoners’ division went Marina, the interpreter, the Tlascaltec princesses Luisa and Elvira, and some other women, protected, says Bernal Diaz, by 30 soldiers and 300 Tlascaltecs.
[822] This date is based on Cortés’ letter, wherein he places the arrival on Tlascala’s border on Sunday, July 8th, after giving a clear account of the intermediate days. Any doubt about this date is removed by the testimony in Lejalde, Segunda Probanza, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 423, wherein the leading captains state that the siege lasted six days. This testimony also clears up the only doubtful point in Cortés’ account of the siege operations, where he disposes of the wounding and death of Montezuma in one sentence, and then resumes the description of the fighting in a manner that has assisted to mislead Gomara and many others into extending the stay in Mexico till July 10th. Ixtlilxochitl adopts this date, yet in the Relaciones, 390, 412-13, he states that the siege lasted only seven days. Bernal Diaz places the eve of the departure on a Thursday, July 10th [with Cortés it is Saturday], yet he dates the battle of Otumba just one week later than Cortés. Hist. Verdad., 105, 108. This latter date induces Zamacois to change the date of flight to July 8th. Hist. Méj., iii. 406-7. ‘La notte del 1 Luglio,’ says Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 135, but his reasons for the date are wrong, and the term he uses may apply also to the night following that adopted in the text.
[823] The Spaniards recognized this as a favoring shield direct from God, says Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 473-4.
[824] Ojeda was instructed to see that no somnolent or sick person was left. He found one man asleep on the roof and roused him. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi. Gomara takes the trouble to deny the statement of Cano that 270 men, ignorant of Cortés’ departure, were left behind to perish. Oviedo, iii. 551. A later note will explain the cause of this rumor.
[825] The ravaging sallies of the preceding days, which had involved the destruction of houses in the vicinity and along the approaches to Tlacopan, had evidently obliged the enemy to retire from these streets and seek shelter elsewhere for the night. Oviedo assumes that Cortés led the way, but Diaz and Herrera let him advance only when the first troops are guided into Tlacopan.
[826] ‘Pasaron cuatro acequias, y antes que pasasen las demas salió vna muger á tomar agua y viólos.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 32. ‘A devil, without doubt,’ adds Camargo, who describes her as a keeper of an eating-house, and indicates exactly the location of her house. Hist. Tlax., 167. Cortés states that the alarm was given by the guard at the first breach held by the Mexicans, where the portable bridge was laid down. Cartas, 136.
[827] Sahagun names this Mictlantonco, and the next two Tlantecayocan and Petlacalco. In another place he names the first Tecpantzinco, and the second or third Tolteacali. Hist. Conq., loc. cit., and [ed. 1840] 121-2. Torquemada gives the second breach of the causeway the latter name. The names should probably be written Tecpantzinco, Tolteca-Acalulco, and Petlacalco.