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[← ] ὀργήν, θυμόν, κακίαν, βλασφημίαν, αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τοῦ στόματος ὑμῶν· 9μὴ ψεύδεσθε εἰς ἀλλήλους· ἀπεκδυσάμενοι [ →]
ὀργήν, θυμόν] ‘anger, wrath’. The one denotes a more or less settled feeling of hatred, the other a tumultuous outburst of passion. This distinction of the two words was fixed chiefly by the definitions of the Stoics: Diog. Laert. vii. 114 ὁ δὲ θυμός ἐστιν ὀργὴ ἀρχομένη. So Ammianus θὺμος μέν ἐστι πρόσκαιρος, ὀργὴ δὲ πολυχρόνιος μνησικακία, Greg. Naz. Carm. 34 (II. p. 612) θυμὸς μέν ἐστιν ἀθρόος ζέσις φρενός, ὀργὴ δὲ θυμὸς ἐμμένων. They may be represented in Latin by ira and furor; Senec. de Ira ii. 36 ‘Ajacem in mortem egit furor, in furorem ira’, and Jerome in Ephes. iv. 31 ‘Furor incipiens ira est’: see Trench N. T. Syn. § xxxvii, p. 123 sq. On other synonymes connected with θυμός and ὀργή see the note on Ephes. iv. 31.
κακίαν] ‘malice’, or ‘malignity’, as it may be translated in default of a better word. It is not (at least in the New Testament) vice generally, but the vicious nature which is bent on doing harm to others, and is well defined by Calvin (on Ephes. iv. 31) ‘animi pravitas, quæ humanitati et æquitati est opposita’. This will be evident from the connexion in which it appears, e.g. Rom. i. 29, Eph. iv. 31, Tit. iii. 3. Thus κακία and πονηρία (which frequently occur together, e.g. 1 Cor. v. 8) only differ in so far as the one denotes rather the vicious disposition, the other the active exercise of it. The word is carefully investigated in Trench N. T. Syn. § xi. p. 35 sq.
βλασφημίαν] ‘evil speaking, railing, slandering’, as frequently, e.g. Rom. iii. 8, xiv. 16, 1 Cor. iv. 13 (v.l.), x. 30, Ephes. iv. 31, Tit. iii. 2. The word has the same twofold sense, ‘evil speaking’ and ‘blasphemy’, in classical writers, which it has in the New Testament.
αἰσχρολογίαν] ‘foul-mouthed abuse’. The word, as used elsewhere, has two meanings: (1) ‘Filthy-talking’, as defined in Clem. Alex. Pæd. ii. 6 (p. 189 sq.), where it is denounced at length: comp. Arist. Pol. vii. 17, Epict. Man. 33, Plut. Mor. 9, and so commonly; (2) ‘Abusive language’, as e.g. Polyb. viii. 13. 8, xii. 13. 3, xxxi. 10. 4. If the two senses of the word had been quite distinct, we might have had some difficulty in choosing between them here. The former sense is suggested by the parallel passage Ephes. v. 4 αἰσχρότης καὶ μωρολογία ἤ εὐτραπελία; the second by the connexion with βλασφημία here. But the second sense is derived from the first. The word can only mean ‘abuse’, when the abuse is ‘foul-mouthed’. And thus we may suppose that both ideas, ‘filthiness’ and ‘evil-speaking’, are included here.
9. ἀπεκδυσάμενοι κ.τ.λ.] ‘putting off’. Do these aorist participles describe an action coincident with or prior to the ψεύδεσθε? In other words are they part of the command, or do they assign the reason for the command? Must they be rendered ‘putting off’, or ‘seeing that ye did (at your baptism) put off’? The former seems the more probable interpretation: for (1) Though both ideas are found in St Paul, the imperative is the more usual; e.g. Rom. xiii. 12 sq. ἀποθώμεθα οὖν τὰ ἐργα τοῦ σκότους, ἐνδυσώμεθα δὲ τὰ ὅπλα τοῦ φωτός ... ἐνδύσασθε τὸν Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, Ephes. vi. 11 ἐνδύσασθε τὴν πανοπλίαν with ver. 14 στῆτε οὖν ... ἐνδυσάμενοι κ.τ.λ., 1 Thess. V. 8 νήφωμεν ἐνδυσάμενοι κ.τ.λ. The one exception is Gal. iii. 27 ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε, Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε. (2) The ‘putting on’ in the parallel passage, Ephes. iv. 24, is imperative, not affirmative, whether we read ἐνδύσασθαι or ἐνδύσασθε. (3) The participles here are followed immediately by an imperative in the context, ver. 12 ἐνδύσασθε οὖν, where the idea seems to be the same. For the synchronous aorist participle see Winer § xlv. p. 430. St Paul uses ἀπεκδυσάμενοι, ἐνδυσάμενοι (not ἀπεκδύομενοι, ἐνδύομενοι), for the same reason for which he uses ἐνδύσασθε (not ἐνδύεσθε), because it is a thing to be done once for all. For the double compound ἀπεκδύεσθαι see the notes on ii. 11, 15.
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