[533]. See for instance the passages quoted in the note on Clem. Rom. 2 τὰ παθήματα αὐτοῦ.
[534]. The unguarded language of Justin for instance illustrates the statement in the text. On the one hand Petavius, Theol. Dogm. de Trin. ii. 3. 2, distinctly accuses him of Arianism: on the other Bull, Def. Fid. Nic. ii. 4. 1 sq., indignantly repudiates the charge and claims him as strictly orthodox. Petavius indeed approaches the subject from the point of view of later Western theology and, unable to appreciate Justin’s doctrine of the Logos, does less than justice to this father; but nevertheless Justin’s language is occasionally such as no Athanasian could have used. The treatment of this father by Dorner (Lehre I. p. 414 sq.) is just and avoids both extremes.
[535]. The references to the patristic quotations in the following pages have all been verified. I have also consulted the Egyptian and Syriac Versions in every case, and the Armenian and Latin in some instances, before giving the readings. As regards the MSS, I have contented myself with the collations as given in Tregelles and Tischendorf, not verifying them unless I had reason to suspect an error.
The readings of the Memphitic Version are very incorrectly given even by the principal editors, such as Tregelles and Tischendorf; the translation of Wilkins being commonly adopted, though full of errors, and no attention being paid to the various readings of Boetticher’s text. Besides the errors corrected in the following pages, I have also observed these places where the text of this version is incorrectly reported; ii. 7 ἐν αὐτῇ not omitted; ii. 13 the second ὑμᾶς not omitted; ii. 17 the singular (ὅ), not the plural (ἅ); iii. 4 ὑμῶν, not ἡμῶν; iii. 16 τῷ Θεῷ, not τῷ Κυρίῳ; iii. 22 τὸν Κύριον, not τὸν Θεόν; iv. 3 doubtful whether δι’ ὅ or δι’ ὅν; and probably there are others.
[536]. In this passage B (with some few other authorities) has τοῦ Θεοῦ for τοῦ Χριστοῦ, thus substituting a commoner expression (ii. 2, 1 Cor. iv. 1, Rev. x. 7; comp. 1 Cor. ii. 1, v.l.) for a less common (Ephes. iii. 4).
[537]. It is true that in the text (Spicil. Solesm. I. p. 123, Rab. Maur. Op. VII. p. 539, Migne) he is credited with the later Latin reading ut cognoscat quæ circa vos sunt, but his comment implies the other; ‘Quoniam omnia vobis nota faciet Tychicus illa quæ erga me sunt, propterea a me directus est cum Onesimo fratre qui a vobis venerat, ut nota vobis faciant quæ erga nos sunt [= γνῶτε τὰ περὶ ἡμῶν] et oblectent vos per suum adventum [= καὶ παρακαλέσῃ τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν], omnia quæ hic aguntur manifesta facientes vobis.’ See Spicil. Solesm. l.c.; the comment is mutilated in Rab. Maur. Op. l.c.
[538]. In the text; but in the commentary he is made to write ἵνα γνῷ γάρ, φησί, τὰ περὶ ἡμῶν, an impossible reading.
[539]. More probably the latter. In Rom. xvi the terminations -α and ᾶς for the feminine and masculine names respectively are carefully reproduced in the Harclean Version. In ver. 15 indeed we have Julias, but the translator doubtless considered the name to be a contraction for Julianus. The proper Syriac termination -a seems only to be employed for the Greek -ας in very familiar names such as Barnaba, Luka.
[540]. The meaning of this word πλήρωμα is the subject of a paper De vocis πλήρωμα vario sensu in N. T. in Storr’s Opusc. Acad. I. p. 144 sq., and of an elaborate note in Fritzsche’s Rom. II. p. 469 sq. Storr attempts to show that it always has an active sense ‘id quod implet’ in the New Testament. Fritzsche rightly objects to assigning a persistently active sense to a word which has a directly passive termination: and he himself attributes to it two main senses, ‘id quod impletur’ and ‘id quo res impletur’, the latter being the more common. He apparently considers that he has surmounted the difficulties involved in Storr’s view, for he speaks of this last as a passive sense, though in fact it is nothing more than ‘id quod implet’ expressed in other words. In Rom. xiii. 10 πλήρωμα νόμου he concedes an active sense ‘legis completio’, h. e. ‘observatio’.
[541]. The English word complement has two distinct senses. It is either (i) the complete set, the entire quantity or number, which satisfies a given standard or cadre, as e.g. the complement of a regiment; or (ii) the number or quantity which, when added to a preexisting number or quantity, produces completeness; as e.g. the complement of an angle, i.e. the angle by which it falls short of being a complete right angle. In other words, it is either the whole or the part. As a theological term, πλήρωμα corresponds to the first of these two senses; and with this meaning alone the word ‘complement’ will be used in the following dissertation.