The battles of the world

by J. Douglas Borthwick

Means having been afterwards found of approaching Tungkoo with a large front on firm ground, the 1st British Division and the French captured the place on the 14th August. It was exclusively an affair of artillery; the enemy’s guns in position on the ramparts were silenced by our Armstrong and 9-pounder guns, and the rifled 24-pounder of the French, gradually advanced, covered by infantry, to successive positions, as the enemy’s fire became weaker. The Allies had forty-two guns in the field. We found about fifty guns of all sorts in the ramparts, which the enemy, abandoned as our infantry advanced under cover of the guns. The British headed by the 60th Rifles, turned the right of the ditch, and entered the works a quarter of an hour before the French, who made their entry at the gate.

After taking Tungkoo, the 1st Division (British) returned to its camp in front of Senho, and the 2nd Division, which had been in reserve, occupied the town.

The view from General Napier’s house-top was not encouraging. As far as the eye could reach, we were surrounded by salt marshes, intersected by very numerous and wide canals, which carry sea-water into the salt-pans.

It was in contemplation to attack the north and south forts simultaneously, with a force operating on each side of the Peiho, and a bridge of boats was in course of construction across the river at Senho. But as all the materials of the bridge, save boats, had to be conveyed overland from Pehtang, its progress could not be rapid. Meanwhile, by dint of most laborious reconnaissance, General Napier had discovered that open ground near the north fort could be reached by artillery, on the completion of a line of causeway which he had commenced over the inundated ground within the town of Tungkoo, and by establishing crossing-places at certain points on five or six canals. He urged an immediate attack on the north forts only; and, having obtained permission to throw out a picket towards them, on the 19th, made so good a use of it, that in one night the passages of the canals were completed, and the Commander-in-chief was conducted next morning within five hundred yards of the nearest fort. Seeing all obstacles to the approach of the forts overcome, Sir Hope Grant frankly consented to General Napier’s scheme, and intrusted its execution to his division. The French commander was very averse to the plan proposed. He formally protested against it, but General Grant maintained his determination; and, devoting the night of the 20th to the construction of batteries, the attack was made upon the upper north fort at daylight of the 21st August. The fire of thirty-one pieces of British and six of French ordnance gradually subdued the enemy’s artillery; their magazine was exploded by one of our shells; shortly before, that of the further north fort, which supported it, was blown up by a shell from one of the gunboats, which were rendering such assistance as they could give at a range of two thousand yards, the distance imposed by the stakes and booms which were laid across the river. On the advance of the infantry, the French crossed the ditches, upon scaling-ladders laid flat. Our engineers, who trusted to pontoons, were less successful, and the French had reared their ladders against the ramparts for a quarter of an hour, before our infantry, some by swimming and scrambling, others by following the French, had struggled across the ditches and reached the berme. But so active was the defence that no French soldier got into the place by the ladders, though several bravo men mounted them; an entrance was eventually made by both forces at the same time through embrasures, which were reached by steps hewn out of the earthen rampart with axes, bayonets, and swords.

When the attack was delivered General de Montauban was absent from the field, the French army being represented by General Collineau and his brigade.

It had been intended to breach the rampart near the gate, and so secure an entrance to the fort actually taken by assault; but our gallant Commander-in-Chief became impatient of the process, and the more speedy means of escalade was resorted to. It is highly probable that the rapidity of our success, and the tremendous loss inflicted on the garrison of the first fort, who had no time for escape in any large numbers, conduced to the surrender of the second fort and to the prompt abandonment of the position. Our loss amounted to two hundred and three British killed and wounded; the French loss was somewhat less. That of the Tartars was estimated at two thousand men, large numbers of whom became inmates of our hospitals.

The attack was gallant, so was the defence, and the success was perfect. The enemy immediately surrendered the further northern fort into our hands, with two thousand prisoners; and before the evening the entire position on the Peiho, covering an area of six square miles, and containing upwards of six hundred guns, was abandoned by its defenders.

The attack on the forts had only been deferred until provisions and munitions of war could be drawn from Pehtang, which we had quitted on the 12th August, in as light marching order as possible. Since our arrival at Senho, our tents, packs, kits, ammunition, and baggage, had gradually been brought through the mud to the front as speedily as the limited means of transport would permit, but in the process many of the beasts of burden perished. The state of the country would alone account for this; but further, as none of the commissariat waggons were at this time disembarked, it was necessary that everything should be carried upon the backs of transport animals, many of which having just landed from Manilla, Japan, and Bombay in sorry condition, were quite unfit for this service. At this juncture the Chinese Coolie Corps, composed of men recruited at Canton, became the only reliable means of transport. They were very hard worked, but they performed their duty very cheerfully and well.

From the first landing at Pehtang until after the capture of the forts, the army was entirely dependent on sea-borne provisions, brought from the fleet in gunboats and carried across from Pehtang; fresh meat rations were therefore rare. No sooner were the forts surrendered than the Chinese peasantry hastened to establish markets; and fruit, poultry, eggs and sheep were offered for sale in profusion, at such moderate prices, that on the march from Tungkoo to Tientsin, spatchcock fowls, savoury omeletes, and stewed peaches became the staple food of the British soldier. On the 22nd of August, the day after the forts were captured, Admiral Hope, with a squadron of gunboats, had pushed up the Peiho river to Tientsin. He met with no opposition, and the townspeople threw themselves at his feet. The Ambassador, Commander-in-Chief, and a portion of our troops, speedily followed in gunboats; the remainder of the force by land, so soon as transport could be organized. The last of our regiments reached Tientsin, distant thirty-five miles from Taku, on the 5th of September.