Large bodies of cavalry having shown themselves in our front, a reconnaissance was made on the 3rd August, covered, in the absence of cavalry, not yet landed, by infantry and by two French 8-pounder guns, the only artillery disembarked. We discovered that our polite enemy had left the causeway unoccupied, and that his force held no position nearer than 8 miles from the town we were in. The Chinese pickets opened fire upon our troops, but were speedily driven back. The reconnaissance effected, our force returned to Pehtang unmolested.
Meanwhile the Admirals had set to work, landing troops, horses, guns, materiel, and stores. The navy worked famously; and as everything had to be brought into the river either in, or in tow of, the gunboats, whose movements depended upon the tides, the work, under the active superintendence of Captain Borlase, C.B., continued without regard to any arbitrary distinction between day and night. During four or five of the ten days spent in this tedious operation, the rain fell in torrents; and as the interior of Pehtang is below high water-mark, the streets were knee-deep in mud, composed, in addition to the usual impurities pertaining to that substance, of flour, wardrobes, Tartar-hats, field rakes, coal, shutters, oil-cake, chaff, china-cups, matting, beer-bottles, tin cans, and kittens, being chiefly the contents of the dwellings of the townspeople, which were successively turned out of windows to make room for our troops. The cavalry and artillery horses were picketed in the streets, where alone space was available; and how they and we and everybody escaped death from typhus fever or plague, Heaven only knows. The sanitary officer was outraged by the result. During this time, water for the use of the troops was obtained in boats filled by the navy in the river above the influence of the tide, and towed to Pehtang, where the contents were landed in barrels for distribution.
On the 12th August, after a delay of a day on account of the French, who at first were unwilling to advance till the season changed, we moved out to attack the enemy’s position; General Michel with the 1st Division and the French, along the causeway against the enemy’s front, General Napier, with the 2nd Division and cavalry, by a track which diverged from the causeway to the right at a short distance from Pehtang, with the view of turning the enemy’s left.
It will not be easy for those who were not present to realise the difficulties of this march, or to do justice to the troops who performed it. The gun-waggons sank literally axle-deep, and their hinder parts had to be left behind; the heavy cavalry were greatly distressed in struggling through the mud, and it occupied the troops six hours to traverse four miles, during which time the enemy remained in his position.
Napier’s division having reached moderately firm ground, advanced upon the open Tartar flank and rear; whilst the Allied left cannonaded his front, which was covered by a formidable intrenchment. The Tartar cavalry came out in great numbers to meet Napier, who opened on them with Armstrong guns. At first the Tartars seemed puzzled, but not disturbed; presently, seeing they were losing men, they rapidly extended, and in a few minutes the 2nd Division stood enveloped in a grand circle of horsemen, advancing from all points towards the centre. Napier’s infantry were speedily deployed, his cavalry let loose, and artillery kept going; and though the heavy ground was rendered more difficult for our cavalry by ditches broad and deep, whose passages were known to the enemy alone, yet, within a quarter of an hour of their advance, the Tartar force was everywhere in retreat. Not, however, till a body of their horsemen, which had charged Sterling’s battery, had been gallantly met and beaten by a party of Fane’s Horse, inferior in number, under Lieutenant Macgregor, who was severely wounded.
The Allied left then advanced along the causeway, and occupied the lines of the intrenchments about Senho, which the enemy deserted on the success of our right.
Amongst some papers found after the action, was a copy of a report from the Tartar General San-ko-lin-tzin to the Emperor, setting forth that the physical difficulties in the way of our landing at Pehtang, and of advancing thence across a country which never is dry, rendered it unnecessary to dispute our disembarkation on that river; and even if a landing should be effected, and our troops could be got under weigh, the general considered that nothing would be easier than to destroy us with his hordes of cavalry, so soon as we got entangled in the marshes.
At Senho the Allied forces rested their right on the Peiho river. The Taku Forts are about six miles lower down. Mid-way between Senho and the northernmost or nearest fort on the left bank, stands the town of Tungkoo, surrounded by a very long intrenchment, consisting of a formidable rampart and a parapet, covered in all its length by a double wet ditch.
General de Montauban proposed to attack this town the afternoon we reached Senho, but Sir Hope Grant would not consent to do so until he had acquired some knowledge of the position.
The French Commander-in-Chief thereon determined to take the place at once without the aid of our troops. The French troops were led along the causeway communicating between Senho and Tungkoo, which appeared to be the only means of approach; but so considerable a fire was developed from the ramparts as to deter our Allies from attempting a coup-de-main, and they returned to camp after cannonading the place for half an hour.