“It is evident that the Turkish empire might be overthrown by the attacks of the Germans and the Poles, if the germs of rebellion, which are there now forming, were developed generally; and there is no doubt that Muscovy and Persia would take advantage of that circumstance. Then, the most valuable portion of that monarchy would fall to France; which, becoming thus mistress of the Mediterranean, would reëstablish the Eastern empire. From Egypt it would extend its empire over the ocean, and would take, without difficulty, possession of the Red Sea, and the isles near Madagascar. It would not be long in gaining the Sea of Ethiopia, the Persian Gulf, and the isle of Ormuz, which commands it.
“The conquest of Egypt would likewise be followed by great and important changes in Europe. The king of France could then, by incontestable right, and with the consent of the pope, assume the title of emperor of the East; he could add to his title of eldest son, that of patron (advocatus) of the Church, and by the great advantages procured to the Holy See, hold the pontiffs much more in his power than if they resided at Avignon. Italy and Germany would be definitively delivered from the fear of the Turks, and Spain from that of the Moors. The commerce of the world would be shared between France and the house of Austria; at length, the reconciliation between the most powerful families would be cemented to the satisfaction of both, France having for its share the East, and Spain the West.[178] And if they should wish to be united by the indissoluble tie of their common interest, they would gain the object which the wisest of ministers have endeavoured to attain in the conferences of the Pyrenees; they would become the arbitrators between other powers; they would prepare the happiness of the human race, and they would create an everlasting reverence for the memory of the great king, to whom so many miracles were due.
“With Egypt, the Dutch might easily be deprived of the commerce of India, upon which great part of their power depends, and they would by that be more directly and necessarily injured than by the most brilliant success in an open war. The Christian religion would again flourish in Asia; the world would obey the same laws, and the whole human race would be united by the same ties; so that, with the exception of the philosopher’s stone, I know nothing that can be imagined of more importance than the conquest of Egypt.”
When discussing the facility of the execution, Leibnitz considers siders—“The forces to be employed—the means of transporting the troops—the climate of the country—its fortifications and military strength—the manner of making war there—the interior troubles of Egypt—the dispositions of the neighbouring nations—and the allies and auxiliaries, as well of the aggressors as of the invaded country.”
With respect to the forces of France, Leibnitz refers to Louis, who must be better acquainted with their numbers than he; he however believes that there is in fact already more strength than would be required.
Francis, duke of Urbino, demanded 50,000 men to overturn the Ottoman empire. For the conquest of Egypt, thirty thousand picked men would be sufficient. Emanuel the Wise, king of Portugal, flattered himself that he could succeed with a much smaller number. “There is no doubt,” adds Leibnitz, “that our numbers would prodigiously increase in a short time, by the accession of Arabs and Numidians, whilst the Turkish forces in that province must be very inconsiderable.
“But suppose,” continues Leibnitz, “we were compelled to embark 50,000 men; that is a force which France would easily provide. For, although I am persuaded that 20,000 would amply suffice to occupy and guard the coast of Egypt, it would be prudent to draw advantage from the forces now assembled, and to effect by one stroke, by one vigorous operation, the conquest of the whole of Egypt.” Leibnitz further advises that the troops should be encouraged by speeches, indulgences, rewards, honours, &c. &c.; thinks it of much less importance to employ a great number of troops than it is to select them well.
“Some persons are averse to the transporting of large armies by sea; but wiser persons are of a contrary opinion, and think that the trifling inconveniences of this mode of transport are more than compensated by very great advantages. The first inconveniences to which they are subject on board, are neither dangerous nor of long duration; they may be considered even as evacuations favourable to health. Scorbutic affections appear only in long voyages, and acute diseases are occasioned by intemperance, which discipline may prevent, or by a change of climate, which cannot be experienced in the Mediterranean. No mutiny need be apprehended, because the soldiers are in some sort in the power of the sailors.”
The memorial of Leibnitz here presents an historical summary of the armies embarked at different periods, from the Punic wars to the last conquests made in Asia and America, by the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the English, &c.; and whilst recommending that the vessels should not be too heavily laden as regards troops, he remarks that the navigation of the Mediterranean has, for a long time, become familiar to French sailors, and that there could be no danger, if proper attention were paid to seasons. French and Venetian vessels constantly visit Candia, and from that island to Egypt the passage is not difficult. Let us add, that the isle of Malta is a secure station for the fleet, that isle being united to France by an infinite number of ties, since the major part of the knights and the grand master of the order are French.