“After the port of Alexandria shall have been taken by a coup-de-main (which cannot fail of succeeding), the coasts of Syria, as well as the isles of Cyprus and Candia, will necessarily fall, provided that the Turks are not able to undertake anything by sea to oppose it.”
The memorial of Leibnitz then rejects all fear of the insalubrity of the climate of Egypt; he expatiates upon the healthy qualities of the waters of the Nile, gives dietic rules, recommends abstinence from wine, and points out the variations in the weather in the different months of the year.
Then he speaks of the saltpetre which Egypt produces in such abundance, and continues: “The means of the natural defences of Egypt are the deserts and seas that surround it, and the Nile; its artificial means are its castles and its cities. The sea and the Nile, far from injuring, facilitate the employment of naval forces, and the deserts will interrupt communications with the other parts of the Ottoman empire, and will prevent the Turks from throwing imposing succours into the Egyptian territory. The strong places are either upon the Red Sea or upon the Mediterranean.” Here Leibnitz describes Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta, with the Bozag, pointing out the weakness of these places. “The coast of the Red Sea is still more neglected, and would fall quickly into the power of a Portuguese fleet, acting in concert with a French force from Madagascar;” for Leibnitz supposes that the Portuguese would be more disposed to second the views of the French than to oppose them.
The memorial describes very minutely the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Bab-el-Mandel; he affirms that all places on the coast want fortifications; he speaks particularly of Suez, Cossier, Souakem, and at length of Cairo, which would not offer, any more than the rest, a strong resistance.
“Could the resistance of Cairo,” says Leibnitz, “alone prevent France from raising itself above all glory past or present? It would be disgraceful for so powerful a nation, when engaged in such a mighty enterprise, to entertain a moment’s doubt of final success in presence of this last obstacle. For France would not be fighting then for either Dunkirk or Gravelines, or for Maëstricht; but for the dominion of the seas, for the empire of the East, for the overthrow of the Port, and for universal supremacy;—all results from the conquest of Egypt.”
Then follow some geographical details upon the coast of Syria, and the ports and cities of that country; that is to say, El-Aresch, Byblos, Tripoli, Alexandretta, Aleppo, and Damascus.
“Alexandretta commands the defiles of Cilicia. By the possession of this place, an army marching from Asia Minor upon Palestine could be forced to make a long and painful circuit, across a country half desert, and across portions of Cilicia, Armenia, and Mesopotamia.
“Aleppo and Damascus are the only cities capable of resisting for a moment our ulterior operations after the reduction of Cairo. Although they are distant from the sea, they must be secured, since then we shall command all the country on this side of Mount Amanus.
“The Turks may, it is true, if they are warned, place reinforcements in Egypt, and even fortify Alexandria and render Egypt nearly inaccessible. It will therefore be essential to preserve the most profound secrecy upon the project, and accelerate the departure of the armament for its destination. When the expedition shall be once made, it will be no longer in the power of the Turks to place an obstacle in the way of its success, since the departure of so formidable a fleet will give alarm for the seat of government itself. Under this point of view it will be even useful to spread a report that it is in fact destined against Constantinople, in order that the Port should unite and concentrate, for the protection of the capital, its divided forces, and thus render the distant provinces the weaker. The French army being thus suddenly thrown into Egypt, it would require six months for the Turks to assemble an equal force, or even a much longer time, if Turkey were at the same time engaged in a Polish or Hungarian war. Moreover, as soon as the expedition should have succeeded, Persia, which cannot declare itself upon our promises alone, will not fail to rise likewise. And if the expedition took place in that season of the year which, according to the opinion of experienced persons, would appear the most suitable, it would be absolutely impossible for the Turks to arrive in any useful time, if even they had 100,000 disposable forces; because Egypt would be then inundated with the waters of the Nile, in which our fleet would dominate; and because the Turkish army could not set out on its march before the following winter, &c.
“Suppose now that Egypt should be in our power, and, which is not at all improbable, the Turks should find themselves at peace with all their neighbours, that there should be no trouble among themselves, and that they should be in a condition to advance with 100,000 effective men; suppose, on the other side, that we were only able to oppose this force with 30,000 men, since we must leave 20,000 behind, to maintain our position in Egypt, and reduce the places not yet subdued: I affirm that these 30,000 men would be sufficient to repulse the Turks: let us add, that if measures be well taken, there is no doubt that considerable reinforcements might arrive from Europe, and that the Christian subjects of the Port, as well as the natives, would flock eagerly to range themselves under our Banners. But suppose our force did not exceed 30,000 men, this troop would be perfectly in a state to resist the Turks by two different manœuvres, whether by waiting for them in the plains of Egypt, between Suez and Cairo; or whether in marching forward to meet them in Arabia Petræa, between Gaza and the mountains, or in Syria between Alexandretta and Mount Amanus, called now the mount of Scanderoun, or El Lucan.