“There are in Arabia Petræa three narrow defiles, through which the caravans pass on their way from Egypt into Asia. One of these defiles is on the right, when we are coming from Egypt, and leads to the eastern shores of the Red Sea; another passage is on the left, on the shores of the Mediterranean,—it leads into Palestine and Syria; the third, situated between the two preceding ones, comes out at Mount Horeb, and at the monastery of St. Catherine. The two first passages lead into Arabia, where no army could penetrate without great difficulty. There only remains then the third route, which goes from Egypt into Palestine, across Idumea. But this passage is so narrowed on one side by the Mediterranean Sea, and on the other by the foot of the mountains of Arabia Petræa, that the sultan of Egypt would easily have expelled the army of Selim from his country, if he had taken care to secure the passage between Syria and Cilicia: it was by neglecting this precaution that Darius very much facilitated the conquest of Asia by Alexander. If the sultan of the Mamelukes, abandoning Palestine, had taken up a position in the narrow strait near Gaza, or near Sihor (called in Scripture the river of Egypt), which is a species of hollow ravine, running from the mountains to the sea, and if he had there awaited his enemy, it is certain that in that position, 30,000 men would have been able to resist hundreds of thousands.
“Suppose the Turks were able to force not only the passage of Alexandretta, but likewise that of Gaza, they yet could not recover Egypt; for, in this case, our army would keep in its rear the Nile and a very fertile country, whilst the enemy would have nothing in their rear but the deserts of Arabia. And if, in this position, we were to avoid a pitched battle, which would be easy from the nature of the country, the Turkish army would necessarily waste away, and would be forced, by want of provisions, to retire into Syria, and leave us in the tranquil enjoyment of our conquests.”
Leibnitz brings several historical facts to the support of his opinion; he proves that the Turks are much less formidable, less warlike, less numerous than they formerly were; he enters into details upon the seraglio, the revenues, and the military and maritime establishments of the Ottoman empire.
The author assigns reasons for hoping that, after the first news of the success of Louis XIV., there would ensue partial revolts, and then a general insurrection of the pachas, the civil functionaries, the soldiers, the Christians, and finally of the whole people. “I venture to affirm,” says he, “that all the subjects of the Ottoman empire are unhappy, discontented, anxious for change, and that at this moment they are only restrained by the disheartening remembrance of their former attempts to throw off the yoke.
“A French author, very well acquainted with the affairs of Turkey, and who is surprised that an empire so constituted subsists so long, forms the conjecture that God, who does everything for the best, had raised and sustained this powerful nation for the good of his Church, and to punish Christians for their sins and vices;’ but I,” continues Leibnitz,—“I am convinced that the time approaches in which the Omnipotent will visit his people, in which the fury of barbarians will be at an end, in which a far happier epoch will open on the Christian world. Much might be said with regard to prophecies; upon periods in human affairs; upon the inevitable catastrophes of empires; even upon the traditions of the Turks themselves, which make them look for their destruction from a country between two seas. This prediction has been commonly applied to Constantinople, and sometimes to the Morea; but no one has hitherto thought of Egypt.
“Let us, however, without presuming to penetrate the secrets of destiny, draw our conclusions from the ordinary course of affairs. It is notorious that the Sultan has entirely lost, in the opinion of his subjects, his character of inviolability, and this circumstance must necessarily facilitate his defeat.”
All that follows this is but a picture of the disorder which reigns in the political organization of the Turkish empire. Therefore, Leibnitz thinks that the conquest of Egypt would shake the Port to its foundation. He adds: “Audaciter dico, flagrabit Turcia seditionibus, si volumus; and if the Port were at the same time engaged in a war with Poland or Hungary, jam ruina ipsa,” says he, “et totius corporis paralysis universalis indubitata est.”
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No. 39.