A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy

by J. Franck Bright

The assault which Wellington had been long preparing to resist was now to come. The ministers in England—in part despairing of his success, in part unable to comprehend the greatness of his schemes—distinctly told him that he must rely upon himself. But, with extraordinary steadfastness and courage, he undertook the task. Ever since the October of the preceding year he had foreseen what would happen; he had known that in all probability his troops would be outnumbered, and that he should be unable to make head against the vast armies which Napoleon might set at motion against him. He had therefore designed a great defensive scheme, so that if the worst came to the worst he might still have some place to which to retire and avoid the necessity of evacuating Lisbon. He had therefore turned the promontory between the Tagus and the sea into a vast fortification. During the time of his delay on the Wellington fortifies the Lisbon promontory. 1810. Guadiana, and while wintering near Almeida, thousands of Portuguese workmen were turning the hills into impregnable fortresses. This great work, known as the lines of Torres Vedras, was threefold. The outer line, twenty-nine miles in length, extended from Alhandra on the Tagus to the mouth of the little river Zizandra close to Torres Vedras. The second, twenty-four miles in length, and which was intended originally to be the strongest of the two, was from six to ten miles in rear of the first, reaching from the Tagus at Quintella to the mouth of the St. Lorenza. In addition to this, a small fortification was erected to cover an embarkation in case the other two lines were forced. It enclosed an entrenched camp and Fort St. Julian, and was two marches in rear of the first line. Time had allowed Wellington so to strengthen the first line that it subsequently proved sufficient for all purposes. The General's great cares during the winter had been,—first, to instruct the Portuguese authorities to insist upon the inhabitants destroying all villages, mills, and crops in the course of the invading force when it should appear; secondly, to get the half-trained militia of the country over which he held command employed in such a manner as to oblige the French to act in a mass and prevent detailed fighting; and thirdly, so to arrange his troops that while spread abroad, for greater ease in procuring provisions, they should yet be within easy distance for concentration. He thus waited, fully prepared to carry out his great scheme when Massena should think fit to strike the first blow. So determined was he to adopt a waiting policy, that he even allowed the great fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, the key of that part of Spain, to be taken before his eyes. Meanwhile he had to listen calmly to the assertions of the Opposition in Parliament, that no British soldier would leave the Peninsula but as a prisoner, and to see the City of London addressing the throne to inquire into his conduct, and protesting against conferring honours and distinctions on a general who had exhibited nothing but useless valour.

Massena advances against him. Sept. 1810.

Ciudad Rodrigo fell on the 11th of July. It was not till September that the great attack began. Then Massena, with an army of 65,000 men, set forward towards Lisbon by the valley of the Mondego, having been informed by friendly Portuguese that the road was easy, and that there was no important position between him and Coimbra, where he believed he could forestall Wellington. An accident lost the English commander the advantage that any opposition from the fortress of Almeida might have given him. The explosion of a magazine rendered the capitulation of the fortress necessary almost immediately. In spite of Massena's attempts to deceive him as to the road he intended to pursue, in spite of the distance at which some of the English troops were stationed, Wellington contrived to collect his army and to place it between Massena and Coimbra. Down the valley of the Mondego the march was continued. The orders for the destruction of the property were carried out as far as possible, and crowds of wretched fugitive peasants accompanied the army. A panic began to spread in Portugal. The intriguing regency did not carry out the orders for destruction with sufficient activity. There was yet enough food left between Mondego and the lines to supply the French during the ensuing winter. To raise the temper of the country, and to excite the people to the voluntary destruction of Battle of Busaco. Sept. 29, 1810. their property, Wellington was compelled (in entire opposition to his original plans) to fight a great battle with the advancing French. He selected the ridge of Busaco, which almost closes the valley of the Mondego, just north of Coimbra, as his battlefield. The English and Portuguese there stood at bay, and the French were completely defeated. The moral effect was all that could be desired—the Portuguese troops thenceforward became fitting comrades for the English, and the waning trust of the people was restored; but as a military operation it effected nothing. Massena found a pass through the hills upon his right, through which he withdrew with his beaten forces, and Wellington, not attempting to attack him, fell back, giving orders to the Portuguese militia to close upon the French rear. Thus harassed in his progress, Massena arrived before the famous lines (of the existence of which he had only heard five days before), only to find them thoroughly occupied by the English troops. Against the works he could do nothing; his operations were in fact reduced to a blockade. Massena's object, therefore, was to feed his army till reinforcements arrived, Wellington's, by closing up the Portuguese militia behind Massena retreats. Nov. the French army, rapidly to reduce it to starvation. The expected reinforcements did not come, and on the 14th of November Massena, who had lost upwards of 30,000 men since he had entered Portugal, was obliged to draw off his army and begin a regular retreat. He moved leisurely, hoping to strike another blow before he finally withdrew, but when reinforcements arrived for the English he proceeded with some haste to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. The operations were closed by the combat of Sabugal (April 3, 1811), where Massena was again worsted, and after which he finally withdrew from Portugal.

While Massena was attacking Portugal, Soult had been vigorously prosecuting the siege of Cadiz, and had there made dispositions which would probably have ended in its capture, when he was ordered to assist Massena, for the Emperor was more anxious to put an end to the regular warfare in Portugal than to complete his conquests in Spain. Portugal is assailable either by the northern line from Salamanca, which Massena had already followed, a line covered by the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, or by a line south of the Tagus through Estremadura and Alemtejo, which is covered by Badajos and Elvas. In this latter direction Soult had marched; the fruit of his operations were the victory of Gebora (Feb. 19), where the Spaniards were completely defeated, and the capture of Badajos. The two great frontier fortresses between Spain and Portugal were thus in the hands of France. But the departure of Soult from Cadiz encouraged Graham, who commanded the English in that fortress, to attempt to drive Victor, who was left in command, from his lines. A combined force of about 12,000 men sailed from Cadiz southward, intending to march upon the back of the French lines. Victor, marching out to defend them, was defeated at Barosa (March 5) by the vigour and generalship of Graham, La Peña, the Spanish commander, as usual, adding nothing to the victory, and failing when the victory was won to put it to any use. The battle was however so severe a threat that Soult, not wishing to lose all the fruit of his former arrangements, withdrew from his attack on Portugal. Yet, as both Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo were in the hands of the French, in the following campaign there were two scenes of operation of which those fortresses were the centres.

Wellington's great plans.

The ministry in England had at last begun to feel some confidence in their general, but they would have been content with the successful defence of Portugal. Not so Wellington; his mind was full of great projects for the relief of Spain. The two points on which the French pressure was strongest were Catalonia and Cadiz; and Wellington, believing that Massena, although his troops had been again raised to 50,000 men, would not be in a fit state for immediate action, had it now in his mind either to invest Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, betake himself with much of his army to Badajos, unite with the English and Portuguese troops there, and assault Soult in Andalusia; or to engage in a still more magnificent plan,—to march his army right across Spain, taking Madrid on the way, which would cut off the resources of Soult's army and oblige it to withdraw, and then upon the eastern coast to enter into communications with the English troops at that time in Sicily, and, working from a new base of operations, to attack the French in Catalonia. In either case the capture of Badajos was necessary, as its possession by the French was a constant threat to the Spaniards in Cadiz and to the southern provinces of Portugal. Wellington therefore, leaving the blockade of Almeida in the hands of Spencer, went to Elvas to arrange with Marshal Beresford, who commanded the troops in that direction, for the siege of Badajos. Before his arrangements were completed he was hastily summoned again to the north, where Massena had unexpectedly shown signs of activity, and was moving to relieve Almeida. Wellington was in time to check him at the hard-fought battle of Fuentes Onoro (May 5), which was followed by the evacuation of the fortress. He then returned to superintend the more important Battle of Albuera. May 16, 1811. operation of the siege of Badajos. But before he arrived the operations had been interrupted. Soult had advanced to succour his late prize, and Beresford had thought it necessary to fight a battle with him at Albuera. This battle, one of the bloodiest ever fought, took place on the 16th of May. The English and their allies had about 30,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, but of these only 7000 were English, and the Spaniards were not to be trusted. Soult had with him only 19,000 good infantry and 4000 cavalry, but Beresford's faulty arrangements almost neutralized the superiority in forces. The English position was a ridge, in front of which ran the Albuera river. In the centre were the village and bridge of Albuera, through which ran the road to Valverde over the ridge. This road being Beresford's only line of retreat, he regarded a hill in the centre which defended it as the key of his position, and there put his best troops, intrusting the right to the Spaniards under Blake. He also neglected to place any troops across the river, and the enemy's movements were entirely hidden by the wooded heights on that side. For a direct attack Beresford's dispositions were correct, but upon his right a tableland stretched so far back as to command the Valverde road and to look along the back of the English position. Soult saw that by mastering this height he would cut off the English from retreat, oblige them to form a wholly new front, and in all probability destroy them. He therefore secretly, under cover of the hills, massed his troops upon his own left, and while a sufficiently important assault was made upon the bridge to attract Beresford's attention, the bulk of the French army rapidly proceeded to place itself at right angles to the English position upon the tableland. The main point of the battle was in the struggle for the possession of this vantage-ground. In vain Beresford entreated Blake to change his front and cover the right. The Spanish general insisted that the real attack was upon the village. Beresford himself took the command of the Spanish troops, the change of front was effected, but even then they could scarcely be induced to move. At length the English second division moved from the centre and mounted the hill. But, brought too recklessly into action, they suffered much. Scarcely a third of the regiments remained standing, and Beresford was already thinking of retreat when Colonel Hardinge induced Cole with the fourth division, and Abercrombie with the third brigade of the second division, neither of whom had been much engaged, to advance to the rescue. At the head of 6000 men Hardinge advanced to cover the hill. The crowded formation of the French, who were in column, impeded their movements, and the advance of the English was so irresistible, that at length, unable to open out, they gave ground, and in the words of Napier, "slowly and with a horrid carnage were pushed by the incessant vigour of the attack to the furthest edge of the hill," and at length "the mighty mass, breaking off like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep; the rain flowed in streams discoloured with blood, and 1800 unwounded men, the remnant of 6000 unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill." In four hours nearly 7000 of the allies and 8000 French were struck down. The victory was however won, and after occupying a threatening position during the 17th, on the 18th Soult marched away. The advantages of this bloody battle were little or none.

Critical position of the French.

Yet though the battles of Fuentes Onoro and Albuera produced little result, although the French continued their successes in Catalonia, and Spain seemed entirely at their disposal, their position was by no means wholly prosperous. The broken armies of the Spanish had formed themselves into guerilla bands, their useless generals were superseded by daring partisan commanders, and troops wholly untrustworthy in pitched battles proved masters of the art of wild irregular warfare. It was only in large masses that the French were safe; yet, as Napoleon always acted on the principle that war should support war, and allowed only £80,000 for the maintenance of his armies in Spain, which at that time amounted to more than 300,000 men, the dispersion of the forces was an absolute necessity in order that food might be procured. No courier could be despatched except under escort; letters to Paris were guarded at first by 1400 dragoons, subsequently by 3000. Moreover, Joseph, and the Emperor were not at one. The Spanish King did not wish to rule only as the agent of his brother in a conquered country, and at length the vexatious tyranny of Napoleon pressed so heavily upon him, that he went to Paris and resigned his crown. He was induced to take it back again, but the mere fact of his visit, coupled with Wellington's success and the late victories, which were complete if not decisive, raised the spirits of the patriots and increased the energy and number of the guerillas. Moreover, affairs in Europe were beginning to take a turn which compelled Napoleon to act with less vigour in the Peninsula. His marriage with the Austrian archduchess was a deadly insult to the Czar, for a princess of whose house he had previously been negotiating; the Continental System was becoming almost unbearable, coupled as it was with the French occupation of the northern ports of Germany; and the addition of territory to the Duchy of Warsaw seemed to threaten a restoration of the Polish kingdom, and to be a violation of the Treaty of Tilsitt. The estrangement of the Czar was becoming so evident that Napoleon's mind began to turn more and more towards an expedition against Russia. The number of troops in Spain was lessened, and first-rate soldiers withdrawn to give place to new conscripts.

Position of Wellington.