A History of England, Period III. Constitutional Monarchy

by J. Franck Bright

But, in spite of this relaxation, this year forms in the opinion of the great historian of the war its most critical period. For Wellington was miserably supplied from home, and sickness was rife among his troops, so that he could not bring more than 8000 men into the field, while the Portuguese Government, quarrelling with him, frequently refused supplies, and so starved their own troops, that instead of 40,000 soldiers who had been available on Massena's advance, only 19,000 badly-fed men were now with the army, and against this weakened force a new combination of the French had been arranged. The battle of Albuera had been followed by a renewal of the siege of Badajos. Want of proper material rendered the progress of the siege slow, and Marmont, who had succeeded Massena in command of the army of Portugal, was ordered to co-operate with Soult coming from the south to relieve it. Their junction was effected and the siege was raised. To all appearance therefore the battle of Albuera had been a French victory, and two armies instead of one appeared to threaten Portugal by the southern line. Wellington had brought his troops down and The French refuse the battle at Caya. June, 1811. offered the combined generals battle upon the Caya. But, ignorant of the weakness of the English, and imposed upon by the confident front which Wellington with astonishing boldness showed them, the battle, which might easily have been decisive of the fate of the Peninsula, was refused by the French generals, and Soult moved southward, while Marmont returned to occupy the valley of the Tagus.

This critical year of 1811 was a bitter disappointment to Wellington. He had hoped that his period of inactivity was over, that the defensive might have been changed to an offensive warfare. The blunders of his subordinates, the wretched jealousies of the Portuguese regency, and the poor support he received from home, had rendered his efforts futile. He still found himself when the year closed obliged to be contented with preserving his defensive attitude in Portugal. It was even worse than this. The French had succeeded in completing the conquest of the east of Spain, and the army of Suchet had advanced as far as Valencia; while in the north Asturias and Galicia had again fallen into their hands. Some gleam of success had indeed been visible in the south, where Hill had checked Drouet in Estremadura, and where Soult had been beaten off in his attack upon the little fortress of Tarifa. But the reorganization of the French army (especially of the great army of the centre), and the threatened reappearance of Napoleon upon the scene, rendered the close of the year one of gloom and despair.

Threatened war between France and Russia.

Yet events were occurring in Europe which allowed Wellington still to hope. Already, as early as the beginning of 1810, the appropriation by Napoleon of the estates of the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Alexander, had induced the Czar to declare his freedom from the Continental System. It had become evident to him that, sooner or later, war would be forced upon him, and he had entered into open preparations. Under one pretext or another Napoleon had also been strengthening his troops upon the eastern frontier of his dominions, and though the forms of friendship were still kept up, it was plain that before long the two empires would be plunged into hostilities. During the whole of 1811 remonstrances and recriminations had passed between the courts. Alexander had at first intended to re-establish the kingdom of Poland, where the influence of Napoleon was still great, and to begin offensive movements. The success of Wellington at Torres Vedras is said to have suggested to him and to his counsellors the more prudent method of attracting the French into the heart of Russia, and of allowing the weather and the natural difficulties of the country to have their full force as his allies. He knew that, in spite of the marriage of the Austrian archduchess with Napoleon, he could rely upon the friendship of the Court of Vienna should any opportunity arise of successful opposition to France. Prussia likewise, since the battle of Jena, had undergone a complete though silent revolution; feudalism had been almost destroyed, the peasants given a share in the property of the land, and bourgeois and peasant alike endowed with self-government; the people and the government were absolutely at one. While ostensibly restricted to the treaty number of 42,000, the army had been practically increased to 150,000 men; and, by an extraordinary effort of patience and good administration, the broken nation had been re-established. There, too, it was certain that any successful effort to check Napoleon would be hailed with delight. But Napoleon, observing that Russia did not take the initiative, and seeing that both Austria and Prussia were to all appearance still at his service, forgetting the lesson which he should have learnt from Spain, that the enmity of the people is more to be feared than the enmity of the government, seemed irresistibly led to the war which was to complete his ruin. In August 1811 there took place another of those scenes which had so frequently preluded war. At a public meeting of ministers in the Tuileries the Russian ambassador had to undergo a violent attack from the Emperor. From that moment all Europe knew that the war with Russia was determined on. It was upon the certainty of the approach of this event and the nature of the French warfare in Spain that Wellington rested his hopes.

Wellington's plan for the campaign of 1812.

Marmont's army had been moved for the sake of procuring food into the valley of the Tagus, which was thus called upon to support two armies, that of the centre and that of Portugal. Wellington did not believe that it could do this for long, but while the armies were there barring the valley of the Tagus offensive movements of any importance were impossible, as Soult and Drouet occupied the south, and the northern army in Asturias, capable of being reinforced by Marmont, prevented action in the valley of the Douro. But meanwhile Ciudad Rodrigo was not itself within immediate reach of the covering army; a sudden attack and capture of this fortress would almost certainly bring Marmont northward to save the neighbouring country and to relieve the valley of the Tagus. Even a weak army covered by the fortress would probably be able to make good its position, while Wellington himself marching southward might also capture Badajos, and thence defeat Soult and Drouet in Andalusia. With infinite pains to avoid discovery he ripened his plan; preparations were secretly made at Almeida and at Elvas for the two sieges, and the first rapid blow was successfully struck, and Ciudad Rodrigo captured (Jan. 19). It had the effect expected; Marmont collected his troops at Salamanca, the scattered detachments of the French were everywhere drawn in, Hill's southern army was moved towards the north, and Wellington was sufficiently strong to fight a battle if necessary. Marmont for the present resigned the fortress and again distributed Capture of Rodrigo and Badajos. his troops. Wellington then proceeded to strike his second blow. Leaving one division behind him, with some Spanish troops and Portuguese militia, he moved southward, and at length succeeded in storming Badajos also, though with fearful loss (April 6). He acted with unusual skill, and the charge against him of having foolishly wasted life in the siege proves upon examination to be utterly groundless; for it was the extreme rapidity with which the fortress was captured which prevented Soult from coming to its relief. But again the fruits of his success were snatched from him; he was unable to follow out his plan of driving Soult from Estremadura, for he was badly seconded by the troops he had left in the north; Marmont, though somewhat slowly, had begun to carry out Napoleon's orders to regain Ciudad Rodrigo and to invade Portugal, and Wellington had to make all haste back to re-establish his affairs there. His rapid appearance from the south on Marmont's flank compelled that general to retreat, but the opportunity of a southern war was over, and the English army was again spread along the whole line of Portugal, but with this important advantage that the two key fortresses of Spain were now in its hands.

Wellington's attack on the northern army.

It was as yet only the spring, Wellington had to choose in which direction he would arrange the ensuing campaign. He determined to make his attack on the northern line; a victory over Marmont would throw open the road to Madrid, and Soult would either have to retire from the south or be cut off from his communications. A portion of his army might indeed be sent to assist Marmont; but the harvest in the valley of the Douro is considerably later than in the south, and it was impossible that a large additional number of troops should be subsisted for at least a fortnight to come. Thus for a while he could act against Marmont alone. Further to secure his position, he strengthened the army under Hill in the south, planned and executed an extraordinary capture of the French lines of communication at Almaraz, thus rendering the intercourse between the two armies lengthy, and at the same time re-established the bridge of Alcantara, close to the Portuguese frontier, by which his own communications with Hill were rendered ten days nearer. It was thus against an army of about equal numbers with his own, but isolated for the present at all events from reinforcements, that Wellington advanced. Salamanca and its forts were captured, and Marmont fell back before him.

But his advance was not all triumphant, Marmont succeeded in turn in obtaining the ascendant. By a series of clever movements he compelled Wellington to retire, and moving towards the Battle of Salamanca. July 22, 1812. right flank of the English, seemed to threaten the communications between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, while he kept himself in communication with the central army under the king. Wellington saw that retreat was necessary, and he intended to return to Portugal. But Marmont was not contented with this success. He was eager to fight before his junction with the king, and brought on a battle beyond the Tormes, just south of Salamanca. The English occupied a sort of basin in a loop of the river; about the centre was a hill called the Arapiles; round the southern edge was a ridge which led to the point where the road by which the English must retreat ran. Marmont, hoping to envelop the English, sent forward his left along the ridge. Wellington saw the advantage thus offered. Holding the Arapiles with his left, he fell on the flank of the advancing column, while Pakenham faced it upon the ridge. The French left was thus entirely destroyed, their attacks upon the central hill were unsuccessful, their confusion was increased by the loss of their commander, who was wounded early in the day, and it was only because a Spanish garrison which should have cut off their retreat across the Tormes at Alba had been withdrawn without Wellington's knowledge that their army escaped destruction. As it was, Clausel, who had succeeded Marmont, was able to bring off the greater part of his troops in safety.