CHAPTER XV.
Capture of the Umm esh Shert Ford.
As the date fixed for the great advance of the Army in Palestine drew near, certain parts of the Jordan Valley began to look very comical. Here and there would be seen a battery of artillery parked, or a cavalry regiment, with its horses tethered in neat and orderly array, in the most approved army style, but on closer inspection both horses and guns were found to be merely dummies! Great camps were pitched, but there was not a soldier in them; fires were lighted all over the place at dusk, as if a mighty army were bivouacked round about, and every conceivable kind of bluff was put up in order to deceive the Turks and make them think that the long expected attack was to be made through Gilead, to effect a junction with the Arab Army of the Hedjaz. The Jewish Battalion was even ordered to march and counter march from Jericho to the Dead Sea by some wight at G.H.Q. who still remembered us, but General Chaytor scotched this stunt, for of course he knew it was quite impossible for us to guard our front throughout the night and march some forty miles by day as well in that terrific heat.
There were really very few troops in the Valley, if one considers the enemy force that could have been concentrated against us. According to General Allenby's despatch, there were some 6,000 rifles, 2,000 sabres, and 74 guns facing us in the Jordan Valley.
General Allenby in his despatch of the 31st October, 1918, writes:—
"By reducing the strength of the troops in the Jordan Valley to a minimum," etc., and "To prevent the decrease in strength in the Jordan Valley being discovered by the enemy I ordered Major General Sir Edward Chaytor, K.C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C., to carry out with the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, the 20th Indian (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade, the 38th and 39th Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment a series of demonstrations with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that an attack East of the Jordan was intended, either in the direction of Madeba or Amman.
"The enemy was thought to be anticipating an attack in these directions and every possible step was taken to strengthen his suspicions."
On the 15th September the 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, under the command of Colonel Margolin, D.S.O., arrived in the Jordan Valley, and took up its position on the Auja in support of the 38th Battalion in the line.
A couple of days before the big offensive which began on the 18th September, General Allenby visited my Headquarters, where I presented to him all the officers not on duty. He took me a little apart and asked me if I was sure I could trust the men to fight, and I assured him that he need have no anxiety on that score, for the men were all right and would respond to any call when it was made.