He then asked me if there was any other point I should like to bring to his notice: I told him that malaria was daily becoming more prevalent and I was losing 200 men a week from this cause alone: I also pointed out that I did not think that the medical arrangements for the evacuation and care of the men were all that they should be. The General made a note of this in his book.
The only result was that I got an irate letter from the Deputy Adjutant-General asking me for a full report as to why I had misinformed the Commander-in-Chief about my sick, and about medical matters generally, so that on the morning of the 23rd September, the day we were ordered to pursue the enemy, when I should have been solely devoted to the leading of my men and all the problems pertaining thereto, I had to sit down and smooth the ruffled feathers of the Deputy Adjutant-General.
I not only proved my case to the hilt, but emphasized it by giving further evidence which I had not troubled the Commander-in-Chief by recounting.
General Chaytor specially warned us that, during the offensive on our left, we were to increase our patrols and harry the enemy as much as possible, to keep him in his lines and to prevent, if possible, any large force of Turks crossing from the East of the Jordan to reinforce their armies holding the line from the Jordan to the sea.
This is how the official report runs:—"Chaytor's force in the Jordan Valley had so far confined itself to vigorous patrolling to insure that the enemy could make no move without their knowledge. The rôle of this composite force was to secure the right flank of the army and the Jordan crossings, to keep in close touch with the enemy and take advantage of any withdrawal on their part, but to run no risk of being involved with a more powerful foe too early in the battle. This difficult task was admirably carried out."
During the nights of the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st September we made demonstrations against the Turkish positions along our front. Parties would crawl out into favourable positions, such as a fold in the ground, and open fire all down the line. This always made the Turks nervy, and their trenches would be manned and every individual would blaze away for all he was worth.
On the 19th and 20th they got so "windy" that they called on their artillery to put down a barrage to prevent us from making an assault. Each time the barrage was put down our men were well clear, and lay snug and safe until the enemy had uselessly expended hundreds of rounds, when they quietly returned to camp, not a whit the worse for all the cannonading. There was very little sleep on these nights for anyone, and the Jewish Battalion certainly did all that in it lay to further the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief by holding every Turk in the neighbourhood of the Jordan closely to his lines.
On the 20th we pushed well up against the Turkish trenches, found them all manned, and again drew heavy rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire. We had a few men wounded in this affair. Why we had not a heavy casualty list on these occasions is a mystery to me, for the men had to advance in the open over a stretch of ground as level as a billiard table.
Number 6 Trench Mortar Battery R.A. was under my command in the Mellahah, and I ordered this battery to open fire on the Turkish position round Umm esh Shert, if we should find difficulty in ousting the enemy from this important place.
I had arranged to attack this position on the 22nd September, but at midnight on the 21st my Intelligence Officer sent me news that the enemy's resistance in the trenches opposite Umm esh Shert Ford was weakening.