William Pitt and national revival

by J. Holland Rose

From the outset Pitt and his colleagues realized that the question of peace or war depended largely on France. Had that Power been in a condition to fight, the Bourbon States would certainly have contested England’s claim, and in that case she might have been for ever excluded from the Pacific Coast of America. Fitzherbert therefore stayed a few days at Paris (an indisposition afforded a pretext for delay) in order to fathom those turbid waters. The foreign policy of France was still nominally in the hands of Montmorin; but that Minister, never strong, had been almost cowed by events. Fitzherbert found him most gracious, but he could not explain away the recent order for equipping fourteen sail of the line at Brest. The most threatening symptom, however, was the warlike attitude of the royalist side of the National Assembly, which on 20th May he thus described to the Duke of Leeds:

... I can plainly perceive that many other members of the aristocratical faction are anxious to avail themselves of the opportunity to bring on a war, in the hope that the general distress and confusion which must almost inevitably follow, might ultimately tend to the re-establishment of the royal authority upon its former footing. Many strong indications of this design have appeared in the insidious language which they have held of late, speaking of Great Britain both in the National Assembly and without doors. However, their opponents begin to be aware of their drift, and it seems to have been principally with a view of guarding against such designs that the latter have chosen the present time for carrying into execution their plan of transferring the power of making War and Peace from the Crown to the National Assembly. It also appears highly probable that, when this question shall be disposed of, it will be followed up by some motion tending to invalidate, if not entirely to annul, the Family Compact.

How curiously the wheels of human action act and interact! The outrage on British sailors on the dimly known coast of Vancouver Island furnished French democrats with a potent motive for driving another nail into the coffin of the old monarchy. In any case the right of Louis XVI to declare war and make peace would have been challenged—for how can Democracy allow a Sovereign wholly to control its policy at the most important of all crises—but now the need was overwhelming. If the old prerogative held good, the rusty link that bound together the fortunes of France and Spain would compel free Frenchmen to fight their English neighbours whenever a Spanish captain thought fit to clap in irons British voyagers to the Pacific.

The question aroused gusts of passion at Paris. Enormous crowds waited outside the Tuileries while the deputies hard by were debating this question (16th and 22nd May). To the surprise of the people the royal prerogative was upheld by Mirabeau. The great orator descanted forcibly on the need of energy and secrecy in the diplomacy of a great nation, and reminded those who ascribed all wars to the intrigues of Courts that popular assemblies had often declared war in a fit of passion. He remarked that members had all applauded a speaker who advocated war against England if she attacked Spain, and the expenditure of their last man and their last crown in reducing London.[926] Few of Mirabeau’s speeches were more convincing. Nevertheless, on coming forth from the Chamber he was threatened with violence; and a pamphlet, “Great Treason of Count Mirabeau” was hawked about the streets. His reasoning, however, ensured the carrying of a compromise on 22nd May. The right of declaring war and making peace was vested in the King: and war was to be decided only by a decree of the Legislature, on “the formal and necessary proposition of the King, and afterwards sanctioned by him.”[927] The position was thus left far from clear; and Camille Desmoulins, referring to the ups and downs of the debate, summarized it thus: “The question was decided, firstly, in favour of the nation, secondly, in favour of the King; thirdly, in favour of both.” The royalists were highly displeased. Their best speaker, Cazalès, declared that nothing was now left to the monarchy—an exclamation which probably revealed his disgust at the passing away of the opportunity of a war with England.

Meanwhile Pitt had worked hard to array his allies, Prussia and Holland, against Spain. In this he succeeded. In particular, he offered to the Dutch a considerable subsidy for arming a squadron as if for war. To this topic he referred in a letter of 18th May 1790, to Auckland. After informing him that the tellership of the Exchequer would be reserved for him, or one of his sons, besides a pension of £2,000 a year on retirement, he continued thus:

I cannot help adding how much satisfaction I have felt in your account of everything at The Hague. You have done us a most essential service in bringing the States into a disposition to act at the present moment with a dispatch so unusual to them. This messenger carries instructions to you to engage for the expenses which you have stated to be likely to be incurred for fitting out ten sail-of-the-line. You will, I am sure, take care that the expense shall not be swelled beyond what is really necessary; but, if even a greater sum should be really wanting, we shall not scruple to give it; and, if you find that they can go on to prepare a still greater number of ships, it will be so much the better. I can hardly form at present a conjecture of the event of our preparations, as I can hardly conceive either that the Spaniards will ultimately persist, or that they can have gone so far without a determination not to recede. I hope we shall be able to send an answer about the commercial treaty very soon.[928]

Pitt’s economy is here seen to be far removed from the pennywise and pound-foolish kind. If necessary, he was prepared to lavish subsidies on the Dutch, and on Prussia as well, in order to overawe Spain. The Duke of Leeds and he were of one mind as to the need of the most energetic measures. On 2nd June the Duke wrote to him that the Spanish proposals were quite inadmissible, and that Great Britain could not possibly accept “any measure short of a direct and unqualified satisfaction for the insult.” Spain of course would refuse, and therefore war must follow: it could not be avoided without disgrace to one side or the other.[929] This rigid attitude prepares us for the part which the Duke played in the dispute with Russia nine months later.

In this case Pitt agreed with him, apparently because the point at issue concerned our interests and our honour far more nearly. Indeed the tone of the Spanish replies left small hope of peace. Count Floridablanca protested against the British demand that full reparation must be made to the victims of Captain Martinez, before the Spanish claims could be considered. “The Spanish Minister,” wrote Merry from Madrid on 24th May, “is persuaded that we have at all events taken the resolution of breaking with this country.... Our tone of language to this Court he represents as insufferable, and while on his part he still wishes to preserve peace, he seems to think that Spain will unavoidably be driven to the necessity of defending herself.” Spain, he adds, was arming twenty-five warships, and had already two squadrons at sea.[930]

Her pretensions appear in the despatch of the Spanish Governor of Mexico, dated Mexico, 11th May 1790. After stating that he had released the “Argonaut” and “Princess Royal” in order to maintain harmony with England, he remarked that Martinez had “acted agreeably to the laws and royal ordinances, which not only absolutely prohibit any kind of navigation, establishment, or commerce of foreigners on our South Sea Coasts of both Americas, but moreover strictly command they be looked upon as declared enemies, without considering such treatment a breach of national faith or contravention of the treaties of peace.” Whence it followed that Martinez might with impunity have hanged Meares, Colnett, and their crews on his yardarms. These claims were thus endorsed in the Spanish circular note of 4th June, which based them on the Treaty of Utrecht (1713):

It also appears that, in spite of the attempts of some adventurers and pirates of various nations on the Spanish coasts of the said South Sea and the adjacent islands, Spain has continued her possession, recovering what has been endeavoured to be usurped from her, and performing for this purpose the necessary reconnoitres and voyages, by the means of which and of repeated acts she has preserved her dominion, of which she has always established and left signs, which reach to places the nearest to the Russian establishments in that part of the world.