Makers of Japan

by J. Morris

The establishment comprised 36 regiments including artillery, 22 battalions, 20 companies, 12 corps (inclusive of colonial troops in Yeso, and the gendarmerie), 228 General and Field officers, 2267 officers, 484 cadets, 5835 sub-officers, and 54,555 rank and file. Total 63,369.

These were the figures of the standing army at the end of 1893, and at that time the nominal strength of the reserve rank and file was 193,949 of all arms, made up of 107,222 infantry, 1923 cavalry, 10,182 artillery, 4373 engineers, 2035 commissariat, and 68,214 miscellaneous, including transport-soldiers, firemen, ambulance attendants, etc.: all these passing into the “landsturm” or national army on the expiration of their 12 years with the colours or in the reserves.

By the ordinance of July 1894, a divisional regiment consists of 3 battalions or 12 companies, each company comprising 136 officers and men. A Bodyguard regiment has only 8 companies. The cavalry battalion is of 3 companies, each of 159 officers and men. A Field artillery regiment includes 693 officers and men in a division, or 465 if of the Bodyguard.

In time past only the “Samurai” of Japan were entitled to bear arms, and as the sum-total of these “Samurai” families was comparatively small, it was evidently impossible in 1871 to create a large army of this class alone. Thus it became needful as a first step to throw open the ranks of Japan’s new military organisation to “heimin” as well as to the “ancient warrior caste,” if what was in reality the knighthood of the realm may properly be so designated. The “heimin” were complimented by such a direct recognition of their ability to wield weapons of war, and flocked to the standards; the nucleus of a huge fighting machine was speedily formed, and the necessary steps were taken to provide tuition for its officers and competent instruction for the rank and file. At first the intention was to take France as the model, as it had already been determined to copy Britain in all matters naval. But France having come somewhat badly out of the war of 1870 it was in the end decided to base the system chiefly on that of Germany. The Household Troops were at first an exception to this rule and held more or less for a time to the French system.

Yamagata’s ambition did not extend very far at first, for the army was to consist of only 20,000 men, all told. But it was intended that these should be well drilled, with additions to their ranks later on, and in gaining proficiency in military exercises they served to leaven the whole mass of the male population, and imbue it with a notion of the high standard of efficiency which defenders of the realm were expected to attain. Not until after the war with China, however, which will be referred to in detail in its proper place, was the Japanese army really formidable in point of numbers. But under the plan for which Marshal Yamagata was directly responsible, there grew up an enormous reserve, far in excess of anything for which the rest of the world was prepared to give Japan credit. Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that even down to the end of 1904 the tremendous strength which Japan is able to put forth had not, save in a very limited circle, been in the faintest degree appreciated, and least of all, perhaps, in Russia.

At the time of the outbreak of war in the island of Kiushiu in 1877 General Yamagata was at headquarters in Tokio, and it may well be comprehended that there was some anxiety in his mind concerning the behaviour of the new army when confronted by the redoubtable swordsmen of the great southern clan. The heimin of whom the imperial army was largely composed were comparatively unaccustomed to the use of weapons of warfare, and it remained to be seen how they would comport themselves in the face of a peculiarly strong and agile foe. The Satsuma onslaught was famed for its irresistible vigour and determination. It was at least open to question if the men who had only recently begun to handle the bayonet would with it be a match for swordsmen whose tactics were to come to close quarters on every occasion and to some extent despised musketry as an art unworthy of their knightly training. But the outcome of the struggle justified the sanguine anticipations which the military authorities at Tokio had formed regarding the value of the new force, and increased confidence was felt in its future development. It was not the first trial that it had undergone in actual warfare, for some regiments had been through a rather severe campaign,—not in respect of the fighting that they had to do, but in regard to the climate and the character of the country—in the island of Formosa three years before the contest with Satsuma occurred, yet the civil war in Kiushiu was a test of a far more rigorous nature, and one on which the fate of the Government’s scheme of reform in no small degree depended. Suffice it to say that the confidence Yamagata had placed in his military system was amply warranted by events, and as references are to be found elsewhere to the incidents of the campaign it would be superfluous to enter into detail concerning them here.

By 1883 the available strength of the imperial army had risen to some 105,110 men, of all arms, not counting non-combatants, and at the end of the year 1888 there were 150,000 drilled men, with 120 guns, and a cavalry force of 500 sabres, ready for service at short notice, and a serviceable army of 25,000 troops could have been sent away to Korea or China at any time, on three days’ notice being given to the War Department.

In December 1889 Marshal Yamagata, as he had now become,—having previously held the office of Nai-mu-kio or Home Minister, in the Cabinet, was called upon, owing to the resignation of Count Okuma, to form a Ministry, and he continued to fill the post of Minister-President of State until April 1891, when he gave way to Count Matsukata, who had held under him the portfolio of Finance.

The following year, the Marquis Ito having meanwhile become head of the Ministry, a very extensive scheme of army extension and reorganisation was brought forward, encountering no inconsiderable opposition from the Radical party in the House of Representatives, and the year ended with stormy debates in Parliament on questions of military and naval expenditure. Marshal Yamagata was of course mainly responsible for the project as far as it related in detail to the enlargement of the nation’s military resources, but that it had the entire approval and support of the Crown was clear from the imperial rescript which appeared in 1893, when matters had reached a deadlock in the Diet owing to the obstacles placed in the Cabinet’s path by the irreconcilable elements of the Opposition. In the course of his message to the Diet the Emperor declared that “the progressive force of various countries of the world becomes more apparent day by day: at this period if time is squandered in disputes and ultimately the great objects in view become neglected, so that the opportunities of promoting the nation’s welfare and extending its influence are lost, the desire that we cherish in view of meeting the spirits of our ancestors will be frustrated, and the way to reap the fair result of constitutional government will be missed. The items of expenditure referred to in the 67th Article of the Constitution are already guaranteed by the terms of those articles, and therefore must not be a matter of dispute now. As to the military defences of the State, a single day’s neglect may result in a hundred years’ regret. We shall Ourselves economise in the expenditure of Our household, and We call on Our officers to do the same....” His Majesty’s efforts brought about a temporary understanding, and in the meantime affairs in Korea were assuming so threatening a shape that all the energies of the War Office were directed into the channel of urgent and complete preparation for what it was feared could not long be averted, namely, a desperate struggle with China, whose policy had been growing more and more inimical to Japan’s interests in the adjacent peninsula.