The culmination was reached when news arrived in Japan that a large reinforcement of the Chinese army in Korea was on the eve of being sent from Tientsin, and that foreign vessels had been chartered to convey the troops across the Yellow Sea to points on the Korean littoral. The bargain had been that neither Japan nor China was to increase its strength in the peninsula without giving due notice to the other interested power, for Korea, under the existing agreement, was independent, though China still insisted on claiming a rather shadowy suzerainty. Japan ordered her fleet to intercept the Chinese vessels, and hostilities began when the Naniwa Kan, a cruiser at that time commanded by the now famous Admiral Togo, fired upon and sank a British-owned steamer which had been chartered for the express purpose of carrying Chinese soldiers to the vicinity of the Korean port of Chemulpo. Admiral Togo’s orders were to prevent a landing, and when he had taken on board the Naniwa Kan all the foreign officers of the transport, the Chinese on board refused to surrender, in spite of fair warning, so he considered that he had no alternative but to put an effectual stop to the vessel’s career. Already large numbers of Chinese had been thrown into Korea, and a first collision between the rival forces took place at Asan, a port to the south of Chemulpo, in the Nam-yang or Empress Gulf. The decisive battle of the 15th September 1894, at Ping-Yang, north of Seoul, at which spot Hideyoshi had fought the Chinese at the end of the sixteenth century, settled the question of the supremacy on Korean soil, and the Chinese withdrew in haste beyond the river Yalu frontier. Marshal Yamagata at this stage arrived from Japan to take command in person of the Japanese army in Manchuria, in the campaign on which it was now about to enter, and a second army, under the command of Marshal Oyama, was called out for the invasion of the peninsula known as the “Regent’s Sword,” at the extremity of which lay Port Arthur, for until this fortress should be captured the Chinese fleet could not be said to have been rendered absolutely useless, whilst its possession would give Japan the control of the Gulf of Pechili and enable her to interrupt communications with the Chinese ports in those waters.
At the end of 1893 the strength of the Japanese army was as follows:—
| Peace Establishment | 70,892 |
| First Reserve | 92,252 |
| Second Reserve | 106,020 |
| Yeso colonists | 4,104 |
| 273,268 |
The peace establishment and the First Reserve constitute the First Line on a war footing, so that the forces which Japan was able under Marshals Yamagata and Oyama to place in the field were 163,144 in all. Roughly the peace strength of a Japanese division is 9000, but in time of war its total rises to about 27,000 men, all told. In the Japan and China war, under the arrangements which Marshal Yamagata had made, each division was a complete unit in itself, and, comprised 2 infantry brigades, 1 artillery regiment, 1 engineer battalion, 1 cavalry battalion, 1 train battalion, a medical corps, and an intendant, accountant, veterinary and legal staff.
Each infantry brigade had 2 regiments, and each regiment 3 battalions,—(save in the Guards, which had 2 battalions to a regiment)—a battalion at war strength averaging 800 rifles. The weapon was the Murata rifle of the 1889 pattern (embodying the improvements effected in the original type which was the invention of Captain Murata, as he was then, of the Japanese army, in the early years of the Meiji era,—he is now General Murata) the rifle being a single-loading breech-loader of 8 millimetres calibre. Each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition, and there were 80 rounds per man in the battalion transport and ammunition column. A new magazine rifle—since brought to great perfection—had then just been issued to the Guards and to the Osaka (4th) division. An artillery regiment comprised 6 batteries of 6 guns each, and a cavalry battalion consisted of 2 squadrons of 100 sabres each. The engineer battalion had 2 field companies of about 200 combatants each, and also furnished the bridging and telegraph sections. The train battalion supplied the personnel, ponies, and so forth for all regimental and divisional transport, a pack pony being able to carry about 250 lbs., but during the campaign great use was made of hand-carts, each drawn by 3 coolies, and conveying about 350 lbs. Each division had 3 supply columns and 5 ammunition columns, and in all 8 days’ rations were carried. The medical corps formed 2 bearer companies and 6 field hospitals. The men of the First Reserve formed depots for each corps and augmented the units from peace to war strength, whereas the Second Reserve, on territorial mobilisation, formed additional units for garrison work, and for the preservation of the lines of communication for the army in the field.
It is needful to supply these details in order to show how Marshal Yamagata had taken cognisance, in his scheme, of the requirements of modern warfare, and that the confidence with which Japan entered on the contest with China was thoroughly well based. By Yamagata’s efforts the army of Japan had already been brought to a high standard of efficiency, and it more than fulfilled the expectations that he had been led to form of its capabilities in the field. Its discipline was from the first perfect. Had they been needed, there was a vast reserve of men in Japan who, given medical fitness, were liable to be called out, if between the ages of seventeen and forty, for service in the National Army, but up to that period no demand had ever been made on them, and they had not been organised into a fighting force.
The Japanese headquarter staff, at the beginning of the war, removed from Tokio to Hiroshima, in the south-west, and thence directed operations. The Emperor went likewise to Hiroshima and took up his residence in the barracks without the ancient castle of the former daimio of Aki province, as Dai-Gen-Sui, or Supreme Commander-in-chief of Army and Navy. At his Majesty’s side were Prince Komatsu, Chief of Staff for the army, with General Kawakami, as his assistant, and Admiral Kabayama, as Chief of Staff for the Navy.
It was noted by military critics of the campaign that “the conduct of the war by the Japanese was marked by a very complete decentralisation.” The commanders of armies or detached forces were given definite objectives (one at a time), and then allowed a free hand in carrying out their work, the same system being followed within the armies or their divisions.
The telegraph, of which Japan had learned the value during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was turned to the best account in the war of 1894-5, for orders were sent by cable from Japan to Fusan, and thence by telegraph through Korea to Marshal Yamagata, and for the Second army they were sent by wire to Ping-Yang and thence by steamer to the Liao-Tung peninsula. After the end of December 1894 the line of telegraph was built around the coast to the vicinity of Port Arthur, so that Marshal Oyama was also in direct touch with the imperial headquarters at Hiroshima.