Makers of Japan

by J. Morris

Marquis Oyama was in part educated in France, and after the Restoration had been accomplished and the existing Mei-ji era of Enlightenment had been inaugurated, he was sent to Paris as Military Attache, and was in Europe throughout the Franco-German War, his sympathies, no doubt from early association, having been keenly aroused in favour of France. Naturally he was greatly disappointed with the result of the campaign, and there can be no doubt that he laid to heart the lessons which the failure of the French arms in this gigantic struggle were well calculated to impress upon his receptive mind. Immediately on his return to Japan he received a command in the army, and he had opportunities at this comparatively early period of turning to account the knowledge that he had acquired of Occidental systems of warfare, though as yet he held no position of paramount responsibility that admitted of his putting his ideas into actual practice. The ball was not yet at his feet: his consummate ability was yet to be manifested.

The year 1877 is especially memorable in the annals of Japan as being that in which clan dissensions, despite the genuine endeavours of able statesmen, culminated in a disastrous internecine strife. It is not necessary to enter into a consideration of all the events which led to that deplorable result, for they have been set forth at length in connection with the life story of Marshal Saigo Takamori, elsewhere recorded in these pages, and it is only necessary for the moment to refer to the part which Marshal Oyama took in the suppression of the rebellion. He was despatched to Kiushiu at the outbreak of hostilities and his division was conspicuous among the Imperial forces that landed at Hakata, the chief town of the province of Chiku-zen, in March, some five weeks after the Satsuma men had marched out of Kagoshima 12,000 strong. An ardent believer in the efficacy of military training, and a most enthusiastic supporter of the principles of universal military service, as the sole security of a nation against foreign aggression, Oyama now found himself, by the force of circumstances, compelled to take the field against one to whom he was closely related, and who had been the consistent upholder of an identical policy, if not, indeed, its originator,—as far as Japan was concerned,—and who had himself occupied the post of Minister of War in the first State Council of the Meiji era.

General Oyama, as he was then, distinguished himself in connection with many engagements at Minami-no-seki (South Barrier), Takase (High Rapids), Kawajiri (River’s end), and Kumamoto (Bear’s origin), and on other fields of battle, being present at the final scene at Kagoshima, late in the year 1877, when the remnants of Saigo’s troops were annihilated and their leader met a soldier’s death, fighting to the last.

At the close of this regrettable civil war General Oyama was sent to Europe specially to study the working of the military systems then in operation, and he visited the principal capitals and made himself master in every instance of the needful details. He spent much time in Berlin during this later visit to Europe, for the German system had been definitely adopted in Japan as the most suitable to the needs of the nation. But he did not wholly dissociate himself from his former friends in France, and in the course of his stay took opportunity more than once to pass a day or two in Paris, combining pleasure with profit, for he continued to find in the methods of the French most valuable features, admirable from every point of view, but especially so when applied under given circumstances to the peculiar needs of the Japanese army. It was designed that the studies to which he had to devote himself in Berlin should be of a character to enable him to render Marquis Yamagata the maximum of assistance in the grand work of reorganising the army and providing adequately for military education. When, therefore, his mission in Europe was deemed sufficiently accomplished he was recalled to Tokio and made Chief of the Staff under General Yamagata, and when in 1890 Marquis Yamagata was the Minister-president of State in the First Cabinet formed after the proclamation of the New Constitution, Marshal Oyama, as he had by that time become, held the portfolio of Minister for War. That administration lasted until April 1901, and was followed by the Matsukata and Ito Cabinets, in both of which Oyama Iwao was War Minister, and when in 1894 the great conflict with China began, he begged to be relieved of his post in the administration with all speed in order that he might be able to take part in the actual fighting in Manchuria. He was given the command of the Second Army Corps, Marshal Yamagata being at the time with the First Army in Liao-tung, and while the preparations for despatching the Second Army over-sea to the capture of Port Arthur were in progress, the Commander of it dwelt at the town of Hiroshima, in south-west Japan, close to the port of embarkation, named Ujina. While organising the expedition he took up his quarters in a very unpretending little shop in Hiroshima, and there the final arrangement of the campaign was planned in company with the late General Kawakami, by common consent esteemed the greatest of Japan’s strategists.

The Second Army consisted of the First Division, and a mixed brigade of the Sixth, with a siege train, and it was despatched in part at the end of September 1894, to Chemulpo, and partly to the Ping Yang inlet in the middle of October, the Japanese fleet being there already, keeping watch on the movements of the Chinese squadron and reconnoitring the coasts of the Liao-tung peninsula for a suitable landing-place for Marshal Oyama’s force. There was little cause to apprehend interference from the vessels of Admiral Ting’s fleet after its defeat at the mouth of the Yalu in September, however, and on the evening of the 23rd October the first convoy of sixteen ships steamed over from the Ping Yang inlet to a point on the coast at the mouth of the river Hwa-yuan. Ten Japanese men-of-war acted as escort, but the Chinese made no attempt to interfere with the landing of the troops. At this time the Chinese held Ta-lien-wan and the adjacent walled city of Kinchau with some 6000 men, and Port Arthur was garrisoned with 10,800 men after the 6th of November.

On that date the Japanese captured Kinchau and next day Ta-lien-wan forts fell into their hands, and the port was thenceforward their base of operations against the fortress at the extremity of the “Regent’s Sword.”

Marshal Oyama’s army remained in the region of the Talienwan isthmus until the 18th, and then the advance towards Port Arthur was commenced. On the 20th the Marshal issued orders for the attack to be made at daylight the next day, his whole force at that time numbering 25,700 combatants. The Chinese had 4050 men in the coast forts in addition to the 10,800 men before mentioned in the various land forts which formed the semicircle of the defences, of about two and a half miles radius. These land forts were armed with a great variety of ordnance, including Krupp, mountain, field and siege guns, 40-pounder Armstrongs, 10-barrelled Gatlings, and even Chinese pieces of antique design. Long before daylight on the 21st November the assailants were on the move, and had reached their assigned positions by 7 A.M. without encountering the least opposition. The famous Itsushan forts were taken in the first onset, and General Hasegawa, commanding the mixed brigade, speedily took the positions on the Two-dragons’ hill and adjacent heights, the fighting being practically over by noon. At 3 P.M. the Japanese were in possession of the town, and though the coast forts continued to fire at the fleet, which took no notice of them, the positions were evacuated during the night, and Marshal Oyama, with the headquarters of the First Division, returned to Kinchau.

The Chinese fleet lay at Wei-hai-wei, a danger to any expedition which might cross the gulf of Pechili, and as it was part of the Japanese plan to march to the Chinese capital, the capture or destruction of the ships became imperative. It was therefore resolved that Marshal Oyama should lead his army to the assault of the Shantung fortress. For this purpose it was decided to reinforce him to the extent in all of 24,000 combatants, and the fleet of transports with the men on board left Ujina early in January 1895, and steamed to Talienwan, where the bulk of the troops which had been victorious at Port Arthur were likewise embarked and the whole expedition set sail for Yung-cheng Bay, at the extreme north-east point of the Shantung peninsula, which was reached on the early morning of the 20th January. By degrees all the men were landed, with provisions for six weeks. From Yung-cheng the advance was made by two roads, six days after the landing was commenced, and the ridges to the south of the harbour were carried without any difficulty on the 30th. It was part of the Japanese plan to turn the guns of the Chinese land forts, as soon as they could be taken, against the men-of-war in harbour commanded by Admiral Ting, and it is to this officer’s credit that he had foreseen this and had even begun to dismantle the eastern forts in good time, but he was over-ruled, and the guns replaced in their positions in obedience to peremptory orders from Tien-tsin. So confident was Marshal Oyama that he would be able to turn these heavy guns to account that he had brought bluejackets with him to man them, with sundry stores and fittings from Port Arthur to replace similar articles which it was thought probable the Chinese would either remove or destroy. There was somewhat hard fighting on the 1st of February, but next day the Japanese forces entered Wei-hai-wei unopposed, and it was found that the guns in the western defences had been rendered useless. The cold was at this time so intense that the ships were covered with ice, and blocks of ice three inches thick were frozen into the muzzles of the guns. Marshal Oyama’s army had, however, completed the work assigned to it, and it only remained for the fleet to bring about the reduction of the forts on the island of Liu-kung-tao, and the destruction or surrender of the Chinese vessels. It was effected by a series of daring torpedo-boat attacks, in the first week of February, followed by a systematic bombardment of the island positions, and the surrender of Admiral Ting took place on the 12th of that month.

Having captured Wei-hai-wei and removed the danger to the Peking expedition which the presence of a Chinese fortress on its flank would have created, the next step of the Japanese was to prepare for the march to the Chinese capital itself. Marshal Oyama returned to Talienwan, and the troops were disposed between there and Port Arthur, or at the fortress itself, in readiness for the final concentration.

On the 14th of April the Guard and the Fourth Division passed through the Straits of Shimonoseki in fifty transports on their way to Talienwan to unite with the troops under Marshal Oyama. Prince Komatsu accompanied them as Commander-in-chief of the Land and Sea Forces, intending to set up his headquarters in Port Arthur. The entire Japanese forces now included seven divisions, and the Chinese had massed practically an equal number between Shanhaikwan and Peking, in addition to the army they still had in Manchuria. But on the 17th of April the treaty of peace was signed, and an armistice established until the 8th of May, when ratifications were exchanged at Chifu and the war of 1894-5 was at an end.