History for ready reference, Volume 6

by J. N. Larned

receiving more than that sum are often charged with functions
and duties scarcely inferior in dignity and importance to
those of diplomatic agents, and it was therefore thought best
to continue their selection in the discretion of the Executive
without subjecting them to examination before a board.
Excluding seventy-one places with compensation at present less
than $1,000, and fifty-three places above the maximum in
compensation, the number of positions remaining within the
scope of the order is one hundred and ninety-six. This number
will undoubtedly be increased by the inclusion of consular
officers whose remuneration in fees, now less than $1,000,
will be augmented with the growth of our foreign commerce and
a return to more favorable business conditions. In execution
of the Executive order referred to, the Secretary of State has
designated as a board to conduct the prescribed examinations
the Third Assistant Secretary of State, the Solicitor of the
Department of State, and the Chief of the Consular Bureau, and
has specified the subjects to which such examinations shall
relate.
"It is not assumed that this system will prove a full measure
of consular reform. It is quite probable that actual
experience will show particulars in which the order already
issued may be amended, and demonstrate that, for the best
results, appropriate legislation by Congress is imperatively
required. In any event these efforts to improve the consular
service ought to be immediately supplemented by legislation
providing for consular inspection. This has frequently been a
subject of Executive recommendation, and I again urge such
action by Congress as will permit the frequent and thorough
inspection of consulates by officers appointed for that
purpose or by persons already in the diplomatic or consular
service. The expense attending such a plan would be
insignificant compared with its usefulness, and I hope the
legislation necessary to set it on foot will be speedily
forthcoming.
"I am thoroughly convinced that in addition to their salaries
our ambassadors and ministers at foreign courts should be
provided by the Government with official residences. The
salaries of these officers are comparatively small and in most
cases insufficient to pay, with other necessary expenses, the
cost of maintaining household establishments in keeping with
their important and delicate functions. The usefulness of a
nation's diplomatic representative undeniably depends upon the
appropriateness of his surroundings, and a country like ours,
while avoiding unnecessary glitter and show, should be certain
that it does not suffer in its relations with foreign nations
through parsimony and shabbiness in its diplomatic outfit.
These considerations and the other advantages of having fixed
and somewhat permanent locations for our embassies, would
abundantly justify the moderate expenditure necessary to carry
out this suggestion."
Message of the President
(54th Congress, 1st Session,
House Documents, volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895 (December).
Message of President Cleveland on the boundary dispute
between Great Britain and Venezuela.
Prompt response from Congress.
On the 17th of December, 1895, the country was startled and
the world at large excited by a message from President
Cleveland to Congress, relating to the disputed boundary
between British Guiana and Venezuela, and the refusal of the
British government to submit the dispute to arbitration.
See, (in this volume),
VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895 (DECEMBER).
The tone in which the President recommended the appointment of
a commission to ascertain the "true divisional line" between
Venezuela and British Guiana, with a view to determining the
future action of the United States, was peremptory and
threatening enough to awaken all the barbaric passions which
wait and watch for signals of war; and Congress, in both
branches, met the wishes of the President with the singular
alacrity that so often appears in the action of legislative
bodies when a question arises which carries the scent of war.
The House refused to wait for any reference of the matter to
its Committee on Foreign Relations, but framed and passed at
once (December 18) without debate or division, an act
authorizing the suggested commission and appropriating
$100,000 for the expenses of its work.
{558}
In the Senate there were some voices raised against needless
and unseemly haste in the treatment of so grave a proposition.
Senator Teller, of Colorado, was one who spoke to that effect,
saying: "I do not understand that our great competitor in
commerce and trade, our Great English-speaking relative, has
ever denied our right to assert and maintain the Monroe
doctrine. What they claim is that the Monroe doctrine does not
apply to this case. Whether it applies to this case depends upon
the facts, which are unknown to us, it appears. If I knew what
the facts were, as an international lawyer I would have no
difficulty in applying the law. As a believer in the American
doctrine of the right to say that no European power shall
invade American soil, either of North or South America, I
should have no trouble in coming to a conclusion. Is it an
invasion of American soil? I do not know that. I repeat, I
thought I did. I have found that I do not.
"If the President of the United States had said that in the
Department of State they had determined what was the true line
between the British possessions and Venezuela, and if he had
said, 'We are confident that the British Government, instead
of attempting to arrange a disputed line, is attempting to use
this disputed line as a pretense for territorial acquisition,'
no matter what may be the character of the Administration,
whether Democratic or Republican, I would have stood by that
declaration as an American Senator, because there is where we
get our information upon these subjects, and not from our own
judgment. We must stand by what the Department says upon these
great questions when the facts are ascertained by it. The
President says that he needs assistance to make this
determination. We are going to give it to him. Nobody doubts
that. The only question is, how shall we give it to him? I am
as firm a believer in the Monroe doctrine as any man who
lives. I am as firm a believer as anyone in the maintenance of
the honor of the American people, and do not believe it can be
maintained if we abandon the Monroe doctrine.
"Mr. President, there is no haste in this matter. The dispute
is one of long standing. Great Britain is not now taking any
extraordinary steps with reference to the control of the
territory in dispute. They took, it is said, five months to
answer our Secretary's letter of July 20. Mr. President, the
time was not excessive. It is not unreasonable in diplomatic
affairs that there should be months taken in replying to
questions of so much importance. We may properly take months,
if we choose, to consider it before we plant ourselves upon
what we say are the facts in this case. I repeat, so far as
the American people are concerned, the Monroe doctrine is not
in dispute, is not in doubt, whatever may be the doubt about
the facts in this case. If the facts are not ascertained, we
must, before we proceed further, ascertain them.
"This is a very important question. It is not a question of
party politics. It is not a question that any political party
ought to take advantage of to get votes. The political party
that attempts to make capital out of this question will find
that it is a loser in the end. The American people will not be
trifled with on a question of this kind. If the other side of
the Chamber, or the Administration, or anybody, attempts to
make capital out of it they will find that they will lose in
the end, as we should lose on our side if we should be foolish
enough, as I know we are not, to attempt to make capital out
of it in any way. … This question is of so much importance
that I do not care myself if the bill goes to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and lies there a month. You will not impress
the world with our solidarity and solidity on this question by
any haste in this body. Let this proceeding be a dignified
proceeding. Let the bill go to the committee. Let the
committee take their time on it. Let them return it here and
say what is the best way by which we can strengthen the hands
of the President of the United States in his efforts to
maintain this American doctrine.
"Mr. President, I am not one of those who want war. I do not
believe in war. I believe in this case Great Britain made a
great mistake when she said she would not arbitrate, and I
have faith enough in the love of justice and right that
pervades the people of Great Britain to believe that on second
sober thought they will submit this question to arbitration,
as many of their representative men have declared they are
willing to submit all questions of this character. … Let this
bill go to the committee. Let it be considered. If the
committee wants a week, ten days, or two weeks, or a month,
let the committee take it. Nothing will be lost. Great Britain
will not misunderstand our attitude. She does not misunderstand
it now. She knows just as well how we feel upon these subjects
as she will when we pass this bill. She has had it dinned in
her ears again and again from nearly every Secretary of State
that we were not willing to abandon the Monroe doctrine, nor
view with indifference the improper interference of any
European power with any existing American Government, whether
such interference is a violation of the Monroe doctrine or
not."
Congressional Record,
December 19, 1895, page 246.
Senator Call made a similar appeal, saying: "As to all this
talk about war, in my opinion there is no possibility of war.
There can be, and ought to be, no possibility of it. The
enlightened sentiment of the nations of the world would forbid
that there should be a war between this country and England
upon this question. Nevertheless, it would be the duty of this
country to maintain by force of arms the proposition that
there shall be no forcible establishment of European
institutions and European Governments over any portion of this
territory. Who can entertain the idea that war can be made
with Great Britain, and that the people of the British Empire
will permit that Government to engage in war upon a question
of boundaries which is not sustained by the facts of the case,
but a mere aggression, and that the peace of mankind shall be
disturbed by it. …
"I agree with the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman] that there
is no necessity for haste in this action and that it comports
better with the dignity of Congress for the Senate of the
United States and the House of Representatives to declare that
this Government will firmly maintain, as a definite proposition,
that Venezuela shall not be forced to cede any portion of her
territory to Great Britain or to recognize a boundary line
which is not based upon the facts of history and upon clear
and ascertained proof.
{559}
It seems to me, Mr. President, that all this discussion about
war should not have place here, but that we should make a bold
and independent and firm declaration as to the proper policy
of this Government, and vote the President of the United
States the money necessary, in his judgment, to carry out that
declaration so far as obtaining information which may be
desired. …
"The possibility that war between these two nations will be
the result of our defending the right of Venezuela to the
integrity of her territory against its forced appropriation by
England should not be entertained. These two nations, the
United States and Great Britain, are the main pillars of the
civilization of the world, neither can afford to demand of the
other anything that is wrong or any injustice to the other.
Great Britain recognizes the supremacy of the United States in
the Western Hemisphere, and it is sufficient for them to know
that we will maintain this with all the power of the Republic,
and that this is not an idle menace.
"This is my view of the situation. The President has done his
duty. He has recommended that the traditional policy of this
country to protect all people who establish governments of
their choice against forcible intervention by European powers,
under whatever pretense, whether by claiming fictitious
boundaries and enforcing their claim, or by any other means,
and that we will be the judge of this, but that we are ready
to submit the facts to the judgment of a fair arbitration. It
is sufficient for us to sustain this declaration and for us to
provide the means of obtaining the information necessary for
an intelligent judgment on the question. It will suffice for
the able statesman who represents the Government of Great
Britain to know and to inform his Government that the people
of the United States are united in the determination to
maintain and defend this policy with all their power, and a
peaceable settlement of the question will be made."
Congressional Record,
December 20, 1895, page 264.
The Senate was persuaded to refer the House Bill to its
Committee on Foreign Relations, but the Committee reported it
on the following day (December 20), and it was passed without
division.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895-1896 (December-January).
The feeling in England and America over the
Venezuela boundary dispute.
Happily President Cleveland's Message did not provoke in
England the angry and combative temper that is commonly roused
by a demand from one nation upon another, made in any
peremptory tone. The feeling produced there seemed to have in
it more of surprise and regret than of wrath, revealing very
plainly that friendliness had been growing of late, much
warmer in English sentiment toward the American Republic than
in American sentiment toward England. Within the past thirty
years there had been what in France would be called a
"rapprochement" in feeling going on between the two peoples;
but the rate of approach had been greater on one side than on
the other, and neither had understood the fact until it was
brought home to them by this incident. There seems to be no
doubt that the English people were astonished and shocked by
the sudden prospect of a serious quarrel with the United
States, and that Americans were generally surprised and moved
by the discovery of that state of feeling in the English mind.
The first response in the United States to the President's
message came noisily from the more thoughtless part of the
people, and seemed to show that the whole nation was fairly
eager for war with its "kin beyond sea." But that was a
short-lived demonstration. The voices that really speak for
the country soon made themselves heard in a different
tone,—anxious to avert war,—critical of the construction that
had been given to the Monroe doctrine by President Cleveland
and his Secretary of State,—earnestly responsive to the
pacific temper of the English public,—and yet firm in
upholding the essential justice of the ground on which their
government had addressed itself to that of Great Britain. The
feeling in the two countries, respectively, at the beginning
of 1896, appears to have been described very accurately by two
representative writers in the "North American Review" of
February in that year. One was Mr. James Bryce, the well-known
English student of American institutions—author of "The
American Commonwealth"—who wrote:
"Those Englishmen who have travelled in America have of course
been aware of the mischief your school-books do in teaching
young people to regard the English as enemies because there
was war in the days of George III. Such Englishmen knew that
as Britain is almost the only great power with which the
United States has had diplomatic controversies, national
feeling has sometimes been led to regard her as an adversary,
and displays of national feeling often took the form of
defiance. Even such travellers, however, were not prepared for
the language of the President and its reception in many
quarters, while as to Englishmen generally, they could
scarcely credit their eyes and ears. 'Why,' they said, 'should
we be regarded as enemies by our own kinsfolk? No territorial
dispute is pending between us and them, like those we have or
have lately had with France and Russia. No explosions of
Jingoism have ever been directed against them, like those
which Lord Beaconsfield evoked against Russia some twenty
years ago. There is very little of that commercial, and none
of that colonial, rivalry which we have with France and
Germany, for the Americans are still chiefly occupied in
developing their internal resources, and have ample occupation
for their energy and their capital in doing so. Still less is
there that incompatibility of character and temper which
sometimes sets us wrong with Frenchmen, or Russians, or even
Germans, for we and the Americans come of the same stock,
speak the same language, read the same books, think upon
similar lines, are connected by a thousand ties of family and
friendship. No two nations could be better fitted to
understand one another's ideas and institutions. English
travellers and writers used no doubt formerly to assume airs
of supercilious condescension which must have been offensive
to Americans. But those airs were dropped twenty or thirty
years ago, and the travellers who return now return full of
gratitude for the kindness they have received and full of
admiration for the marvellous progress they have witnessed. We
know all about the Irish faction; but the Irish faction do not
account for this.
{560}
So we quite understand that resentment was caused in the North
and West of America by the attitude of our wealthy class
during the Civil War. But that attitude was not the attitude
of the British nation. … Our press, whose tone often
exasperates Continental nations, is almost uniformly
respectful and friendly to America. What can we have done to
provoke in the United States feelings so unlike those which we
ourselves cherish?'
"In thus summing up what one has been hearing on all sides in
Britain during the last fortnight, I am not exaggerating
either the amazement or the regret with which the news of a
threatened breach between the two countries was received. The
average Englishman likes America far better than any foreign
nation; he admires the 'go,' as he calls it, of your people,
and is soon at home among you. In fact, he does not regard you
as a foreign nation, as any one will agree who has noticed how
different has been the reception given on all public occasions
to your last four envoys, Messrs. Welsh, Lowell, Phelps, and
Lincoln (as well as your present ambassador) from that
accorded to the ambassadors of any other power. The educated
and thoughtful Englishman has looked upon your Republic as the
champion of freedom and peace, has held you to be our natural
ally, and has even indulged the hope of a permanent alliance
with you, under which the citizens of each country should have
the rights of citizenship in the other and be aided by the
consuls and protected by the fleets of the other all over the
world. The sentiments which the news from America evoked were,
therefore, common to all classes in England. … Passion has not
yet been aroused, and will not be, except by the language of
menace."
J. Bryce,
British Feeling on the Venezuelan Question
(North American Review, February, 1896).
The writer who described American feeling, or opinion, in the
same magazine, was Mr. Andrew Carnegie, who said: "In the
United States, East, West, North and South, from which
divergent voices were at first heard, there is but one voice
now. Public opinion has crystallized into one
word—arbitration. In support of that mode of settlement we now
know the nation is unanimous. The proofs of this should not
fail to carry conviction into the hearts of Britons. The one
representative and influential body in the United States which
is most closely allied with Britain not only by the ties of
trade, but by the friendships which these ties have created,
is the Chamber of Commerce of New York. If that body were
polled by ballot, probably a greater proportion of its members
than of any other body of American citizens would register
themselves as friendly to England. So far did the feeling
extend in this body, that a movement was on foot to call a
meeting to dissent from the President's Message. Fortunately,
wiser counsels prevailed, and time was given for an
examination of the question, and for members to make up their
minds upon the facts. The result was that at the crowded
meeting subsequently held, there was passed a resolution, with
only one dissenting voice, in favor of a commission for
arbitration. In the whole proceedings there was only one
sentiment present in the minds of those assembled: 'this is a
question for arbitration.' …
"Every nation has its 'Red Rag,' some nations have more than
one, but what the 'Right of Asylum' is to Great Britain, the
Monroe Doctrine is to the United States. Each lies very deep
in the national heart. Few statesmen of Great Britain do not
share the opinion of Lord Salisbury, which he has not feared
to express, that the 'Right of Asylum' is abused and should be
restricted, but there has not arisen one in Britain
sufficiently powerful to deal with it. The United States never
had, and has not now, a statesman who could restrain the
American people from an outburst of passion and the extreme
consequences that national passion is liable to bring, if any
European power undertook to extend its territory upon this
continent, or to decide in case of dispute just where the
boundary of present possessions stand. Such differences must
be arbitrated. …
"In his speech at Manchester Mr. Balfour said he 'trusted and
believed the day would come when better statesmen in
authority, and more fortunate than even Monroe, would assert a
doctrine between the English-speaking peoples under which war
would be impossible.' That day has not to come, it has
arrived. The British Government has had for years in its
archives an invitation from the United States to enter into a
treaty of arbitration which realizes this hope, and Mr.
Balfour is one of those who, from their great position, seem
most responsible for the rejection of the end he so ardently
longs for. It is time that the people of Great Britain
understood that if war be still possible between the two
countries, it is not the fault of the Republic but of their
own country, not of President Cleveland and Secretary of State
Olney, but of Prime Minister Salisbury, and the leader of the
House of Commons, Mr. Balfour, who do not accept the offered
treaty which would banish war forever between the two nations
of our race. This invitation was sent by the same President
Cleveland, who is now denounced as favoring war. … It was my
office to introduce to Mr. Cleveland, then President of the
United States, as he is now, the delegation from the British
Parliament urging arbitration. In the conferences I had with
him previous to his receiving the deputation, I found him as
strong a supporter of that policy as I ever met. I do not
wonder at his outburst, knowing how deeply this man feels upon
that question; it is to him so precious, it constitutes so
great an advance over arbitrament by war that—even if we have
to fight, that any nation rejecting it may suffer—I believe he
feels that it would be our duty to do so, believing that the
nation which rejects arbitration in a boundary dispute
deserves the execration of mankind."-
A. Carnegie,
The Venezuelan Question
(North American Review, February, 1896).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895-1896 (December-February).
The gold reserve in the Treasury again imperilled.
Refusal of any measures of relief by the Senate.
In his annual Message to Congress, December 2d, 1895,
President Cleveland described at length the stress of
circumstances under which in the previous February, the
Secretary of the Treasury had contracted with certain bankers
and financiers to replenish and protect the reserve of gold in
the Treasury for redemption of United States notes (see above),
and added: "The performance of this contract not only restored
the reserve, but checked for a time the withdrawals of gold
and brought on a period of restored confidence and such peace
and quiet in business circles as were of the greatest possible
value to every interest that affects our people.
{561}
I have never had the slightest misgiving concerning the wisdom
or propriety of this arrangement, and am quite willing to
answer for my full share of responsibility for its promotion.
I believe it averted a disaster the imminence of which was,
fortunately, not at the time generally understood by our
people. Though the contract mentioned stayed for a time the
tide of gold withdrawal, its good results could not be
permanent. Recent withdrawals have reduced the reserve from
$107,571,230 on the 8th day of July, 1895, to $79,333,966. How
long it will remain large enough to render its increase
unnecessary is only matter of conjecture, though quite large
withdrawals for shipment in the immediate future are predicted
in well-informed quarters. About $16,000,000 has been
withdrawn during the month of November. The foregoing
statement of events and conditions develops the fact that
after increasing our interest-bearing bonded indebtedness more
than $162,000,000 to save our gold reserve we are nearly where
we started, having now in such reserve $79,383,966 as against
$65,488,377 in February, 1894, when the first bonds were
issued.
"Though the amount of gold drawn from the Treasury appears to
be very large as gathered from the facts and figures herein
presented, it actually was much larger, considerable sums
having been acquired by the Treasury within the several
periods stated without the issue of bonds. On the 28th of
January, 1895, it was reported by the Secretary of the
Treasury that more than $172,000,000 of gold had been
withdrawn for hoarding or shipment during the year preceding.
He now reports that from January 1, 1879, to July 14, 1890, a
period of more than eleven years, only a little over
$28,000,000 was withdrawn, and that between July 14, 1890, the
date of the passage of the law for an increased purchase of
silver, and the 1st day of December, 1895, or within less than
five and a half years, there was withdrawn nearly
$375,000,000, making a total of more than $403,000,000 drawn
from the Treasury in gold since January 1, 1879, the date
fixed in 1875 for the retirement of the United States notes.
"Nearly $327,000,000 of the gold thus withdrawn has been paid
out, on these United States notes, and yet everyone of the
$346,000,000 is still uncanceled and ready to do service in
future gold depletions. More than $76,000,000 in gold has
since their creation in 1890 been paid out from the Treasury
upon the notes given on the purchase of silver by the
Government, and yet the whole, amounting to $155,000,000,
except a little more than $16,000,000 which has been retired
by exchanges for silver at the request of the holders, remains
outstanding and prepared to join their older and more
experienced allies in future raids upon the Treasury's gold
reserve. In other words, the Government has paid in gold more
than nine-tenths of its United States notes and still owes
them all. It has paid in gold about one-half of its notes
given for silver purchases without extinguishing by such
payment one dollar of these notes.
"When, added to all this, we are reminded that to carry on
this astounding financial scheme the Government has incurred a
bonded indebtedness of $95,500,000 in establishing a gold
reserve, and of $162,315,400 in efforts to maintain it; that
the annual interest charge on such bonded indebtedness is more
than $11,000,000; that a continuance of our present course may
result in further bond issues, and that we have suffered or
are threatened with all this for the sake of supplying gold
for foreign shipment or facilitating its hoarding at home, a
situation is exhibited which certainly ought to arrest
attention and provoke immediate legislative relief.
"I am convinced the only thorough and practicable remedy for
our troubles is found in the retirement and cancellation of
our United States notes, commonly called greenbacks, and the
outstanding Treasury notes issued by the Government in payment
of silver purchases under the act of 1890. I believe this
could be quite readily accomplished by the exchange of these
notes for United States bonds, of small as well as large
denominations, bearing a low rate of interest. They should be
long-term bonds, thus increasing their desirability as
investments, and because their payment could be well postponed
to a period far removed from present financial burdens and
perplexities, when with increased prosperity and resources
they would be more easily met. …
"Whatever is attempted should be entered upon fully
appreciating the fact that by careless easy descent we have
reached a dangerous depth, and that our ascent will not be
accomplished without laborious toil and struggle. We shall be
wise if we realize that we are financially ill and that our
restoration to health may require heroic treatment and
unpleasant remedies.
"In the present stage of our difficulty it is not easy to
understand how the amount of our revenue receipts directly
affects it. The important question is not the quantity of
money received in revenue payments, but the kind of money we
maintain and our ability to continue in sound financial
condition. We are considering the Government's holdings of
gold as related to the soundness of our money and as affecting
our national credit and monetary strength. If our gold reserve
had never been impaired; if no bonds had ever been issued to
replenish it; if there had been no fear and timidity
concerning our ability to continue gold payments; if any part
of our revenues were now paid in gold, and if we could look to
our gold receipts as a means of maintaining a safe reserve,
the amount of our revenues would be an influential factor in
the problem. But unfortunately all the circumstances that
might lend weight to this consideration are entirely lacking.
In our present predicament no gold is received by the
Government in payment of revenue charges, nor would there be
if the revenues were increased. The receipts of the Treasury,
when not in silver certificates, consist of United States
notes and Treasury notes issued for silver purchases. These
forms of money are only useful to the Government in paying its
current ordinary expenses, and its quantity in Government
possession does not in the least contribute toward giving us
that kind of safe financial standing or condition which is
built on gold alone.
{562}
"If it is said that these notes if held by the Government can
be used to obtain gold for our reserve, the answer is easy.
The people draw gold from the Treasury on demand upon United
States notes and Treasury notes, but the proposition that the
Treasury can on demand draw gold from the people upon them
would be regarded in these days with wonder and amusement; and
even if this could be done there is nothing to prevent those thus
parting with their gold from regaining it the next day or the
next hour by the presentation of the notes they received in
exchange for it. The Secretary of the Treasury might use such
notes taken from a surplus revenue to buy gold in the market.
Of course he could not do this without paying a premium.
Private holders of gold, unlike the Government, having no
parity to maintain, would not be restrained from making the
best bargain possible when they furnished gold to the
Treasury; but the moment the Secretary of the Treasury bought
gold on any terms above par he would establish a general and
universal premium upon it, thus breaking down the parity
between gold and silver, which the Government is pledged to
maintain, and opening the way to new and serious
complications. In the meantime the premium would not remain
stationary, and the absurd spectacle might be presented of a
dealer selling gold to the Government and with United States
notes or Treasury notes in his hand immediately clamoring for
its return and a resale at a higher premium.
"It may be claimed that a large revenue and redundant receipts
might favorably affect the situation under discussion by
affording an opportunity of retaining these notes in the
Treasury when received, and thus preventing their presentation
for gold. Such retention to be useful ought to be at least
measurably permanent; and this is precisely what is
prohibited, so far as United States notes are concerned, by
the law of 1878, forbidding their further retirement. That
statute in so many words provides, that these notes when
received into the Treasury and belonging to the United States
shall be 'paid out again and kept in circulation.'"
United States, Message and Documents (Abridgment),
1895-1896, page 27.
"The difficulty which had been anticipated in keeping gold in
the treasury became acute as a result of the president's
Venezuelan message of December 17. The 'war scare' which was
caused by that document was attended by a panic on the London
Exchange, which communicated itself to the Continental
exchanges and produced at once serious consequences in New
York. Prices fell heavily, some failures were reported, and
the withdrawal of gold from the treasury assumed great
proportions. On the 20th the reserve had gone down to
$69,650,000, ten millions less than three weeks earlier, with
future large reductions obviously near at hand. The president
accordingly on that day sent to Congress a special message,
stating the situation, alluding to the effect of his recently
announced foreign policy, and declaring that the result
conveyed a 'warning that even the patriotic sentiment of our
people is not an adequate substitute for a sound financial
policy.' He asked Congress to postpone its holiday recess
until something had been done to reassure the apprehensive
among the people, but declared that in any case he should use
every means in the power of the executive to maintain the
country's credit. The suggestion was acted upon. …
"On December 26 two bills were introduced in the House of
Representatives by Chairman Dingley of the ways and means
committee. Adopting the view maintained by the Republicans,
that the chief cause of the difficulty in maintaining the gold
reserve was the deficiency in the revenue, he proposed first a
bill 'to temporarily increase the revenues.' This provided
that until August 1, 1898, the customs duties on most
varieties of wool and woolen goods and on lumber, should stand
at 60 per cent of those imposed by the McKinley Act of 1890,
and that the duties in all the other schedules of the tariff,
except sugar, should, with slight exceptions, be increased by
15 per cent over those of the existing law. This bill passed
the House on the 27th by a party vote of 205 to 81. On the
following day the second bill, 'to maintain and protect the
coin redemption fund,' was passed by 170 to 136,—47
Republicans in the minority. This bill authorized the
secretary of the treasury to procure coin for redeeming
legal-tenders by the sale of three-per-cent five-year bonds,
and to provide for temporary deficiencies by the issue of
three-year three-per-cent certificates of indebtedness in
small denominations. The administration was as little
satisfied with this bill as with that changing the tariff, and
proceeded with the bond issue. …
"The failure of the bills in the Senate was foreseen, but the
precise form in which it was manifested excited some surprise.
On February 1, [1896], the bond bill was transformed by the
adoption of a substitute providing for the free coinage of
silver, and this was passed by a vote of 42 to 35. On the 14th
the House refused, by 215 to 90, to concur in the Senate's
amendment, and the whole subject was dropped. Meanwhile the
Senate finance committee had reported a free-coinage
substitute for the House tariff bill also. But after this
further exhibition of their strength the silver senators
refused to go further, and on February 25 joined with the
Democrats in rejecting, by 33 to 22, a motion to take up the
bill for consideration. This vote was recognized as finally
disposing of the measure."
Political Science Quarterly,
June, 1896.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1895-1896 (December-December).
Plans for coast defense.
In his annual report to the President, 1895, the Secretary of
War wrote as follows of pending plans for coast defense, and
of the progress of work upon them:
"In your annual message transmitted to Congress in December,
1886, attention was directed to the urgent necessity for
seacoast defense in these words: 'The defenseless condition of
our seacoast and lake frontier is perfectly palpable; the
examinations made must convince us all that certain of our
cities should be fortified and that work on the most important
of these fortifications should be commenced at once.' … Since
that time the condition of these defenses has been under grave
consideration by the people and by this Department. Its
inadequacy and impotency have been so evident that the
intelligence of the country long since ceased to discuss that
humiliating phase of the subject, but has addressed itself to
the more practical undertaking of urging more rapid progress
in the execution of the plan of defense devised by the
Endicott Board in 1886, with subsequent slight modifications.
That plan contemplated a system of fortifications at 27 ports
(to which Puget Sound was subsequently added), requiring 677
guns and 824 mortars of modern construction, at a cost of
$97,782,800, excluding $28,595,000 for floating batteries. By
an immediate appropriation at that time of $21,500,000 and an
annual appropriation of $9,000,000 thereafter, as then
recommended, the system of land defenses could have been
completed in 1895.
{563}
"The original plan contemplated an expenditure of $97,782,800
by the end of the present year. The actual expenditures and
appropriations for armament and emplacements have, however,
been but $10,631,000. The first appropriation for guns was
made only seven years ago and the first appropriation for
emplacements was made only five years ago. The average annual
appropriations for these two objects has been less than
$1,500,000. The work has therefore been conducted at about
one-seventh the rate proposed. If future appropriations for
the manufacture of guns, mortars, and carriages be no larger
than the average authorized for the purpose since 1888, it
will require twenty-two years more to supply the armament of
the eighteen important ports for which complete projects are
approved. If the appropriations for the engineer work are to
continue at the rate of the annual appropriations since 1890,
it will require seventy years to complete the emplacements and
platforms for this armament for the ports referred to."
Report of the Secretary of War, 1895,
page 19 (54th Congress, 1st Session,
House Document volume 1).
In his Message of the following year, the subject was touched
upon by the President, as follows:
"During the past year rapid progress has been made toward the
completion of the scheme adopted for the erection and armament
of fortifications along our seacoast, while equal progress has
been made in providing the material for submarine defense in
connection with these works. … We shall soon have complete
about one-fifth of the comprehensive system, the first step in
which was noted in my message to the Congress of December 4,
1893. When it is understood that a masonry emplacement not
only furnishes a platform for the heavy modern high-power gun,
but also in every particular serves the purpose and takes the
place of the fort of former days, the importance of the work
accomplished is better comprehended. In the hope that the work
will be prosecuted with no less vigor in the future, the
Secretary of War has submitted an estimate by which, if
allowed, there will be provided and either built or building
by the end of the next fiscal year such additional guns,
mortars, gun carriages, and emplacements, as will represent
not far from one-third of the total work to be done under the
plan adopted for our coast defenses—thus affording a prospect
that the entire work will be substantially completed within
six years. In less time than that, however, we shall have
attained a marked degree of security. The experience and
results of the past year demonstrate that with a continuation
of present careful methods the cost of the remaining work will
be much less than the original estimate. We should always keep
in mind that of all forms of military preparation coast
defense alone is essentially pacific in its nature."
Message of the President, 1896
(54th Congress, 2d Session, House Document, volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (January).
Admission of Utah to the Union.
See (in this volume)
UTAH: A. D. 1895-1896.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (January-February).
Appointment of commission to investigate the
Venezuela boundary.
Re-opening of discussion with Great Britain on the
arbitration of the dispute.
See (in this volume)
VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (February).
New treaty with Great Britain for arbitration of
Bering Sea claims.
See (in this volume)
BERING SEA QUESTIONS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (February).
Weyler made Governor of Cuba.
His Concentration Order.
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (March).
Removal of Confederate disabilities.
The following enactment of Congress, which may, with
propriety, be styled an "Act of Oblivion," was approved by the
President on the 31st of March, 1896:
"That section twelve hundred and eighteen of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, as amended by chapter forty-six
of the laws of 1884, which section is as follows: 'No person
who held a commission in the Army or Navy of the United States
at the beginning of the late rebellion, and afterwards served
in any capacity in the military, naval, or civil service of
the so-called Confederate States, or of either of the States
in insurrection during the late rebellion, shall be appointed
to any position in the Army or Navy of the United States,' be,
and the same is hereby, repealed."
United States of America, Statutes at Large,
volume 29, page 84.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (May).
Extension of civil service rules by President Cleveland.
See (in this volume)
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: A. D. 1893-1896.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (June-November).
The Presidential election.
The silver question at issue.
Party Platforms and Nominations.
A national conference held at Washington, in March, 1895, may
be looked upon as the beginning of a widely and powerfully
organized movement to force the demand for a free and
unlimited coinage of silver, on equal terms, as legal tender
money, with gold, into the front of the issues of the
presidential canvass of 1896. The agitation then projected was
carried on with extraordinary ardor and skill and had
astonishing success. It was helped by the general depression
of business in the country, and especially by the long
continued ruling of low prices for the produce of the
farms,—for all of which effects the gold standard of values
was held to be the one relentless cause. In both political
parties the free silver propaganda was pushed with startling
effect, and there seemed to be doubt, for a time, whether the
controlling politicians in either would take an opposing
stand. Southern influences proved decisive of the result in
the Democratic party; eastern influences in that of the
Republicans. The ranks of the former were swept rapidly into
the movement for free silver, and the party chiefs of the
latter were driven to a conflict with it, not wholly by
convictions or will of their own. During the spring and early
summer of 1896, the Democratic Party in State after State
became committed on the question, by declarations for the
unlimited free coinage of silver, at the ratio of 16 to 1;
until there was tolerable certainty, some weeks before the
meeting of the national convention, that its nominee for
President must be one who represented that demand. How
positively the Republican Party would champion the gold
monetary standard was somewhat less assured, though its stand
on that side had been taken in a general way.
{564}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Republican Platform and Nominations.
The Republican national convention was held at St. Louis, on
the 16th, 17th and 18th of June. The "platform" reported by
the committee on resolutions was adopted without amendment on
the last named date. Its declarations were as follows:
"The Republicans of the United States, assembled by their
representatives in National Convention, appealing for the
popular and historical justification of their claims to the
matchless achievements of the thirty years of Republican rule,
earnestly and confidently address themselves to the awakened
intelligence, experience, and conscience of their countrymen
in the following declaration of facts and principles:
"For the first time since the civil war the American people
have witnessed the calamitous consequences of full and
unrestricted Democratic control of the Government. It has been
a record of unparalleled incapacity, dishonor, and disaster.
In administrative management it has ruthlessly sacrificed
indispensable revenue, entailed an unceasing deficit, eked out
ordinary current expenses with borrowed money, piled up the
public debt by $262,000,000 in time of peace, forced an
adverse balance of trade, kept a perpetual menace hanging over
the redemption fund, pawned American credit to alien
syndicates, and reversed all the measures and results of
successful Republican rule.
"In the broad effect of its policy it has precipitated panic,
blighted industry and trade with prolonged depression, closed
factories, reduced work and wages, halted enterprise, and
crippled American production while stimulating foreign
production for the American market. Every consideration of
public safety and individual interest demands that the
Government shall be rescued from the hands of those who have
shown themselves incapable to conduct it without disaster at
home and dishonor abroad, and shall be restored to the party
which for thirty years administered it with unequalled success
and prosperity, and in this connection we heartily endorse the
wisdom, patriotism, and the success of the administration of
President Harrison.
"We renew and emphasize our allegiance to the policy of
protection as the bulwark of American industrial independence
and the foundation of American development and prosperity.
This true American policy taxes foreign products and
encourages home industry; it puts the burden of revenue on
foreign goods; it secures the American market for the American
producer; it upholds the American standard of wages for the
American workingman; it puts the factory by the side of the
farm, and makes the American farmer less dependent on foreign
demand and price; it diffuses general thrift, and founds the
strength of all on the strength of each. In its reasonable
application it is just, fair, and impartial; equally opposed
to foreign control and domestic monopoly, to sectional
discrimination, and individual favoritism.
"We denounce the present Democratic tariff as sectional,
injurious to the public credit, and destructive to business
enterprise. "We demand such an equitable tariff on foreign
imports which come into competition with American products as
will not only furnish adequate revenue for the necessary
expenses of the Government, but will protect American labor
from degradation to the wage level of other lands. We are not
pledged to any particular schedules. The question of rates is
a practical question, to be governed by the conditions of the
time and of production; the ruling and uncompromising
principle is the protection and development of American labor
and industry. The country demands a right settlement, and then
it wants rest.
"We believe the repeal of the reciprocity arrangements
negotiated by the last Republican administration was a
national calamity, and we demand their renewal and extension
on such terms as will equalize our trade with other nations,
remove the restrictions which now obstruct the sale of
American products in the ports of other countries, and secure
enlarged markets for the products of our farms, forests, and
factories.
See, in volume 5,
TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES):
A. D. 1890, and 1894.
"Protection and reciprocity are twin measures of Republican
policy and go hand in hand. Democratic rule has recklessly
struck down both, and both must be re-established. Protection
for what we produce; free admission for the necessaries of
life which we do not produce; reciprocity agreements of mutual
interests which again open markets for us in return for our
open markets to others. Protection builds up domestic industry
and trade and secures our own market for ourselves; reciprocity
builds up foreign trade and finds an outlet for our surplus.
We condemn the present administration for not keeping faith
with the sugar producers of this country. The Republican party
favors such protection as will lead to the production on
American soil of all the sugar which the American people use,
and for which they pay other countries more than $100,000,000
annually. To all our products—to those of the mine and the
fields as well as to those of the shop and the factory—to
hemp, to wool, the product of the great industry of sheep
husbandry, as well as to the finished woollens of the mill—we
promise the most ample protection.
"We favor restoring the early American policy of
discriminating duties for the upbuilding of our merchant
marine and the protection of our shipping in the foreign
carrying trade, so that American ships—the product of American
labor, employed in American shipyards, sailing under the Stars
and Stripes, and manned, officered, and owned by Americans—may
regain the carrying of our foreign commerce.
"The Republican party is unreservedly for sound money. It
caused the enactment of the law providing for the resumption
of specie payments in 1879; since then every dollar has been
as good as gold. We are unalterably opposed to every measure
calculated to debase our currency or impair the credit of our
country. We are, therefore, opposed to the free coinage of
silver except by international agreement with the leading
commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to
promote, and until such agreement can be obtained the existing
gold standard must be preserved. All our silver and paper
currency must be maintained at parity with gold, and we favor
all measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations
of the United States and all our money, whether coin or paper,
at the present standard, the standard of the most enlightened
nations of the earth.
{565}
"The veterans of the Union Army deserve and should receive
fair treatment and generous recognition. Whenever practicable,
they should be given the preference in the matter of
employment, and they are entitled to the enactment of such
laws as are best calculated to secure the fulfillment of the
pledges made to them in the dark days of the country's peril.
We denounce the practice in the Pension Bureau, so recklessly
and unjustly carried on by the present administration, of
reducing pensions and arbitrarily dropping names from the
rolls as deserving the severest condemnation of the American
people.
"Our foreign policy should be at all times firm, vigorous, and
dignified, and all our interests in the Western Hemisphere
carefully watched and guarded. The Hawaiian Islands should be
controlled by the United States, and no foreign power should
be permitted to interfere with them; the Nicaraguan Canal
should be built, owned, and operated by the United States; and
by the purchase of the Danish Islands we should secure a
proper and much needed naval station in the West Indies.
"The massacres in Armenia have aroused the deep sympathy and
just indignation of the American people, and we believe that
the United States should exercise all the influence it can
properly exert to bring these atrocities to an end. In Turkey
American residents have been exposed to the gravest dangers
and American property destroyed. There and everywhere American
citizens and American property must be absolutely protected at
all hazards and at any cost.
"We reassert the Monroe doctrine in its full extent, and we
reaffirm the right of the United States to give the doctrine
effect by responding to the appeal of any American State for
friendly intervention in case of European encroachment. We
have not interfered with and shall not interfere with the
existing possessions of any European power in this hemisphere,
but those possessions must not on any pretext be extended. We
hopefully look forward to the eventual withdrawal of European
powers from this hemisphere and to the ultimate union of all
the English-speaking parts of the continent by the free
consent of its inhabitants.
"From the hour of achieving their own independence the people
of the United States have regarded with sympathy the struggles
of other American people to free themselves from European
domination. We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic
battle of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression,
and our best hopes go out for the full success of their

determined contest for liberty. The Government of Spain having
lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property
or lives of resident American citizens, or to comply with its
treaty obligations, we believe that the Government of the
United States should actively use its influence and good
offices to restore peace and give independence to the island.
"The peace and security of the Republic and the maintenance of
its rightful influence among the nations of the earth demand a
naval power commensurate with its position and responsibility.
We therefore favor the continued enlargement of the navy and a
complete system of harbor and seacoast defenses.
"For the protection of the quality of our American citizenship
and of the wages of our workingmen against the fatal
competition of low-priced labor, we demand that the
immigration laws be thoroughly enforced and so extended as to
exclude from entrance to the United States those who can
neither read nor write.
"The civil-service law was placed on the statute book by the
Republican party, which has always sustained it, and we renew
our repeated declarations that it shall be thoroughly and
honestly enforced and extended wherever practicable.
"We demand that every citizen of the United States shall be
allowed to cast one free and unrestricted ballot, and that
such ballot shall be counted and returned as cast.
"We proclaim our unqualified condemnation of the uncivilized
and barbarous practice, well known as lynching or killing of
human beings suspected or charged with crime, without process
of law. We favor the creation of a National board of
arbitration to settle and adjust differences which may arise
between employers and employed engaged in interstate commerce.
"We believe in an immediate return to the free-homestead
policy of the Republican party, and urge the passage by
Congress of a satisfactory free-homestead measure such as has
already passed the House and is now pending in the Senate.
"We favor the admission of the remaining Territories at the
earliest practicable date, having due regard to the interests
of the people of the Territories and of the United States. All
the Federal officers appointed for the Territories should be
selected from bona fide residents thereof, and the right of
self-government should be accorded as far as practicable.
"We believe the citizens of Alaska should have representation
in the Congress of the United States, to the end that needful
legislation may be intelligently enacted.
"We sympathize with all wise and legitimate efforts to lessen
and prevent the evils of intemperance and promote morality.
"The Republican party is mindful of the rights and interests
of women. Protection of American industries includes equal
opportunities, equal pay for equal work, and protection to the
home. We favor the admission of women to wider spheres of
usefulness, and welcome their co-operation in rescuing the
country from Democratic and Populist mismanagement and
misrule.
"Such are the principles and policies of the Republican party.
By these principles we will abide and these policies we will
put into execution. We ask for them the considerate judgment
of the American people. Confident alike in the history of our
great party and in the justice of our cause, we present our
platform and our candidates in the full assurance that the
election will bring victory to the Republican party and
prosperity to the people of the United States."
Before the adoption of this platform, a motion to amend its
currency "plank," by substituting a declaration in favor of
"the use of both gold and silver as equal standard money," was
laid on the table by a vote of 818½ to 105½. A protest from
delegates representing Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Montana
and South Dakota was then read, and twenty-two withdrew from
the convention, as a sign of secession from the party.
{566}
Immediately following the adoption of the platform, the
Honorable William McKinley, ex-Governor of Ohio, and of fame
in his connection with the tariff act of 1890, was nominated
on the first ballot for President of the United States, by
661½ votes against 240½ divided among several opposing
candidates, and the nomination was then made unanimous. For
Vice President, the Honorable Garret A. Hobart, of New Jersey,
was named, and similarly by the first voting.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.
Democratic Platform and Nominations.
The Democratic national convention was held in Chicago, July
7-11. The delegates who came to it from the southern States,
and from most of the States west of Ohio, were arrayed with a
close approach to solid ranks for free silver; while those
from New England and the Middle States opposed them in a
phalanx almost equally firm. The "Gold Democrats" or "Sound
Money Democrats," as the latter were called, ably led by
ex-Governor Hill, of New York, fought hard to the end, but
without avail. The financial resolution they strove to place
in the platform was the following:
"We declare our belief that the experiment on the part of the
United States alone of free-silver coinage, and a change in
the existing standard of value independently of the action of
other great nations, would not only imperil our finances, but
would retard or entirely prevent the establishment of
international bimetallism, to which the efforts of the
government should be steadily directed. It would place this
country at once upon a silver basis, impair contracts, disturb
business, diminish the purchasing power of the wages of labor,
and inflict irreparable evils upon our nation's commerce and
industry.
"Until international co-operation among leading nations for
the coinage of silver can be secured, we favor the rigid
maintenance of the existing gold standard as essential to the
preservation of our national credit, the redemption of our
public pledges, and the keeping inviolate of our country's
honor. We insist that all our paper currency shall be kept at
a parity with gold. The democratic party is the party of hard
money, and is opposed to legal-tender paper money as a part of
our permanent financial system; and we therefore favor the
gradual retirement and cancellation of all United States notes
and treasury notes, under such legislative provisions as will
prevent undue contraction. We demand that the national credit
shall be resolutely maintained at all times and under all
circumstances. "
This resolution was rejected by 626 votes against 303. Another
resolution from the same source, commending "the honesty,
economy, courage and fidelity" of the "democratic national
administration" of President Cleveland, was voted down by 564
to 357. Resolutions to protect existing contracts against a
change of monetary standard, and to provide for a suspension
of silver free coinage, at the ratio of 16 to 1, after trial
for one year, if it failed to maintain parity between silver
and gold, were similarly voted down. The declarations then
adopted, for the "platform" of the party, were as follows:
"We, the Democrats of the United States, in National
Convention assembled, do reaffirm our allegiance to those
great essential principles of justice and liberty upon which
our institutions are founded, and which the Democratic party
has advocated from Jefferson's time to our own—freedom of
speech, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, the
preservation of personal rights, the equality of all citizens
before the law, and the faithful observance of constitutional
limitations.
"During all these years the Democratic party has resisted the
tendency of selfish interests to the centralization of
governmental power, and steadfastly maintained the integrity
of the dual scheme of government established by the founders
of this Republic of republics. Under its guidance and
teachings the great principle of local self-government has
found its best expression in the maintenance of the rights of
the States and in its assertion of the necessity of confining
the General Government to the exercise of the powers granted
by the Constitution of the United States.
"Recognizing that the money question is paramount to all
others at this time, we invite attention to the fact that the
Federal Constitution names silver and gold together as the
money metals of the United States, and that the first coinage
law passed by Congress under the Constitution made the silver
dollar the monetary unit, and admitted gold to free coinage at
a ratio based upon the silver-dollar unit.
"We declare that the act of 1873 demonetizing silver without
the knowledge or approval of the American people has resulted
in the appreciation of gold and a corresponding fall in the
prices of commodities produced by the people; a heavy increase
in the burden of taxation and of all debts, public and
private; the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and
abroad; prostration of industry and impoverishment of the
people.
"We are unalterably opposed to gold monometallism, which has
locked fast the prosperity of an industrial people in the
paralysis of hard times. Gold monometallism is a British
policy, and its adoption has brought other nations into
financial servitude to London. It is not only un-American but
anti-American, and it can be fastened on the United States
only by the stifling of that spirit and love of liberty which
proclaimed our political independence in 1776 and won it in
the war of the Revolution.
"We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and
silver at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one, without
waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand
that the standard silver dollar shall be a full legal tender,
equally with gold, for all debts, public and private, and we
favor such legislation as will prevent for the future the
demonetization of any kind of legal-tender money by private
contract.
"We are opposed to the policy and practice of surrendering to
the holders of the obligations of the United States the option
reserved by law to the Government of redeeming such
obligations in either silver coin or gold coin.
"We are opposed to the issuing of interest-bearing bonds of
the United States in time of peace, and condemn the
trafficking with banking syndicates which, in exchange for
bonds and at an enormous profit to themselves, supply the
Federal Treasury with gold to maintain the policy of gold
monometallism.
{567}
"Congress alone has the power to coin and issue money, and
President Jackson declared that this power could not be
delegated to corporations or individuals. We therefore demand
that the power to issue notes to circulate as money be taken
from the National banks, and that all paper money shall be
issued directly by the Treasury Department, be redeemable in
coin, and receivable for all debts, public and private.
"We hold that the tariff duties should be levied for purposes
of revenue, such duties to be so adjusted as to operate
equally throughout the country and not discriminate between
class or section, and that taxation should be limited by the
needs of the Government honestly and economically
administered.
"We denounce, as disturbing to business, the Republican threat
to restore the:McKinley law, which has been twice condemned by
the people in national elections, and which, enacted under the
false plea of protection to home industry, proved a prolific
breeder of trusts and monopolies, enriched the few at the
expense of the many, restricted trade, and deprived the
producers of the great American staples of access to their
natural markets. Until the money question is settled we are
opposed to any agitation for further changes in our tariff
laws, except such as are necessary to make the deficit in
revenue caused by the adverse decision of the Supreme Court on
the income tax.
"There would be no deficit in the revenue but for the
annulment by the Supreme Court of a law passed by a Democratic
Congress in strict pursuance of the uniform decisions of that
court for nearly 100 years, that court having sustained
constitutional objections to its enactment which had been
overruled by the ablest judges who have ever sat on that
bench. We declare that it is the duty of Congress to use all
the constitutional power which remains after that decision, or
which may come by its reversal by the court, as it may
hereafter be constituted, so that the burdens of taxation may
be equally and impartially laid, to the end that wealth may
bear its due proportion of the expenses of the Government.
"We hold that the most efficient way to protect American labor
is to prevent the importation of foreign pauper labor to
compete with it in the home market, and that the value of the
home market to our American farmers and artisans is greatly
reduced by a vicious monetary system, which depresses the
prices of their products below the cost of production, and
thus deprives them of the means of purchasing the products of
our home manufacture.
"We denounce the profligate waste of the money wrung from the
people by oppressive taxation and the lavish appropriations of
recent Republican Congresses, which have kept taxes high,
while the labor that pays them is unemployed, and the products
of the people's toil are depressed in price till they no
longer repay the cost of production. We demand a return to
that simplicity and economy which best befit a Democratic
Government and a reduction in the number of useless offices,
the salaries of which drain the substance of the people.
"We denounce arbitrary interference by Federal authorities in
local affairs as a violation of the Constitution of the United
States and a crime against free institutions, and we
especially object to government by injunction as a new and
highly dangerous form of oppression, by which Federal judges,
in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of citizens,
become at once legislators, judges, and executioners, and we
approve the bill passed at the last session of the United
States Senate, and now pending in the House, relative to
contempts in Federal courts, and providing for trials by jury
in certain cases of contempt.
"No discrimination should be indulged by the Government of the
United States in favor of any of its debtors. We approve of
the refusal of the Fifty-third Congress to pass the Pacific
Railroad funding bill, and denounce the effort of the present
Republican Congress to enact a similar measure.
"Recognizing the just claims of deserving Union soldiers, we
heartily endorse the rule of the present Commissioner of
Pensions that no names shall be arbitrarily dropped from the
pension roll, and the fact of an enlistment and service should
be deemed conclusive evidence against disease or disability
before enlistment.
"We extend our sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic
struggle for liberty and independence.
"We are opposed to life tenure in the public service. We favor
appointments based upon merit, fixed terms of office, and such
an administration of the civil-service laws as will afford
equal opportunities to all citizens of ascertained fitness.
"We declare it to be the unwritten law of this Republic,
established by custom and usage of 100 years, and sanctioned
by the examples of the greatest and wisest of those who
founded and have maintained our Government, that no man should
be eligible for a third term of the Presidential office.
"The absorption of wealth by the few, the consolidation of our
leading railroad systems, and formation of trusts and pools
require a stricter control by the Federal Government of those
arteries of commerce. ''We demand the enlargement of the
powers of the Inter-state Commerce Commission, and such
restrictions and guarantees in the control of railroads as
will protect the people from robbery and oppression.
"We favor the admission of the Territories of New Mexico and
Arizona into the Union as States, and we favor the early
admission of all the Territories giving the necessary
population and resources to entitle them to Statehood; and
while they remain Territories we hold that the officials
appointed to administer the government of any Territory,
together with the District of Columbia and Alaska, should be
bona fide residents of the Territory or District in which
their duties are to be performed. The Democratic party
believes in home rule, and that all public lands of the United
States should be appropriated to the establishment of free
homes for American citizens.
"We recommend that the Territory of Alaska be granted a
Delegate in Congress, and that the general land and timber
laws of the United States be extended to said Territory.
"The Federal Government should care for and improve the
Mississippi River and other great waterways of the Republic so
as to secure for the interior people easy and cheap
transportation to tidewater. When any waterway of the Republic
is of sufficient importance to demand aid of the Government,
such aid should be extended upon a definite plan of continuous
work until permanent improvement is secured.
{568}
"Confiding in the justice of our cause and the necessity of
its success at the polls, we submit the foregoing declaration
of principles and purposes to the considerate judgment of the
American people. We invite the support of all citizens who
approve them, and who desire to have them made effective
through legislation for the relief of the people and the
restoration of the country's prosperity."
In the course of the debate upon the silver question, a speech
of impassioned eloquence was made by William J. Bryan, of
Nebraska, who had represented his district in Congress for two
terms, 1891-1894, and who was rising to prominence among the
leaders of the free-silver Democracy of the west. The speech
excited an enthusiasm and an admiration which led to the
nomination of Mr. Bryan for the presidency. That unexpected
choice was reached after four ballots, in each of which the
votes for the Nebraska orator rose steadily in number. At the
fifth ballot they had passed the requisite two-thirds, and his
nomination was declared to be unanimous, though protests were
made. The entire delegation from New York and many delegates
from New England and New Jersey cast no votes, refusing to
take any part in the nomination of a candidate on the platform
laid down. The chosen candidate for Vice President was Arthur
Sewall, of Maine.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.
The National Silver Party.
The considerable body of Republicans who desired an unlimited
free coinage of silver, and were prepared to quit their party
on that issue, had made efforts to persuade the Democratic
convention at Chicago to accept their leader, Senator Teller,
of Colorado, for its presidential candidate. Failing in that,
they assembled a convention of delegates at St. Louis, July
22-24, and, under the name of the "National Silver Party,"
took the alternative method of uniting the free-silver
Republican vote with that of the free-silver Democracy, by
accepting the Democratic nominations as their own. William J.
Bryan and Arthur Sewall were duly nominated for President and
Vice President, and a "platform" set forth as follows:
"The National Silver Party in Convention assembled hereby
adopts the following declaration of principles:
"First. The paramount issue at this time in the United States
is indisputably the money question. It is between the gold
standard, gold bonds, and bank currency on the one side and
the bimetallic standard, no bonds, and Government currency on
the other.
"On this issue we declare ourselves to be in favor of a
distinctively American financial system. We are unalterably
opposed to the single gold standard, and demand the immediate
return to the constitutional standard of gold and silver, by
the restoration by this Government, independently of any
foreign power, of the unrestricted coinage of both gold and
silver into standard money at the ratio of sixteen to one, and
upon terms of exact equality, as they existed prior to 1873;
the silver coin to be a full legal tender equally with gold
for all debts and dues, private and public, and we favor such
legislation as will prevent for the future the demonetization
of any kind of legal-tender money by private contract.
"We hold that the power to control and regulate a paper
currency is inseparable from the power to coin money, and
hence that all currency intended to circulate as money should
be issued, and its volume controlled by the General Government
only, and should be legal tender.
"We are unalterably opposed to the issue by the United States
of interest-bearing bonds in time of peace, and we denounce as
a blunder worse than a crime the present Treasury policy,
concurred in by a Republican House, of plunging the country in
debt by hundreds of millions in the vain attempt to maintain
the gold standard by borrowing gold, and we demand the payment
of all coin obligations of the United States as provided by
existing laws, in either gold or silver coin, at the option of
the Government and not at the option of the creditor.
"The demonetization of silver in 1873 enormously increased the
demand for gold, enhancing its purchasing power and lowering
all prices measured by that standard; and since that unjust
and indefensible act the prices of American products have
fallen upon an average nearly fifty per cent., carrying down
with them proportionately the money value of all other forms
of property. Such fall of prices has destroyed the profits of
legitimate industry, injuring the producer for the benefit of
the non-producer, increasing the burden of the debtor,
swelling the gains of the creditor, paralyzing the productive
energies of the American people, relegating to idleness vast
numbers of willing workers, sending the shadows of despair
into the home of the honest toiler, filling the land with
tramps and paupers, and building up colossal fortunes at the
money centres.
"In the effort to maintain the gold standard the country has,
within the last two years, in a time of profound peace and
plenty, been loaded down with $262,000,000 of additional
interest-bearing debt, under such circumstances as to allow a
syndicate of native and foreign bankers to realize a net
profit of millions on a single deal.
"It stands confessed that the gold standard can only be upheld
by so depleting our paper currency as to force the prices of
our product below the European and even below the Asiatic
level to enable us to sell in foreign markets, thus
aggravating the very evils our people so bitterly complain of,
degrading American labor, and striking at the foundations of
our civilization itself.
"The advocates of the gold standard persistently claim that
the cause of our distress is over-production; that we have
produced so much that it has made us poor—which implies that
the true remedy is to close the factory, abandon the farm, and
throw a multitude of people out of employment, a doctrine that
leaves us unnerved and disheartened, and absolutely without
hope for the future.
"We affirm it to be unquestioned that there can be no such
economic paradox as over-production, and at the same time tens
of thousands of our fellow-citizens remaining half-clothed and
half-fed, and who are piteously clamoring for the common
necessities of life.
{569}
"Second. That over and above all other questions of policy we
are in favor of restoring to the people of the United States
the time-honored money of the Constitution—gold and silver,
not one, but both—the money of Washington and Hamilton and
Jefferson and Monroe and Jackson and Lincoln, to the end that
the American people may receive honest pay for an honest
product; that the American debtor may pay his just obligations
in an honest standard, and not in a standard that has depreciated
100 per cent. above all the great staples of our country, and
to the end further that the standard countries may be deprived
of the unjust advantage they now enjoy in the difference in
exchange between gold and silver—an advantage which tariff
legislation alone cannot overcome.
"We therefore confidently appeal to the people of the United
States to leave in abeyance for the moment all other
questions, however important and even momentous they may
appear, to sunder, if need be, all former party ties and
affiliations, and unite in one supreme effort to free
themselves and their children from the domination of the money
power—a power more destructive than any which has ever been
fastened upon the civilized men of any race or in any age, and
upon the consummation of our desires and efforts we invoke the
gracious favor of Divine Providence.
"Inasmuch as the patriotic majority of the Chicago convention
embodied in the financial plank of its platform the principles
enunciated in the platform of the American Bimetallic party,
promulgated at Washington, D. C., January 22, 1896, and herein
reiterated, which is not only the paramount but the only real
issue in the pending campaign, therefore, recognizing that
their nominees embody these patriotic principles, we recommend
that this convention nominate William J. Bryan, of Nebraska, for
President, and Arthur Sewall, of Maine, for Vice President."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.
People's or Populist Party Platform and Nominations.
The People's Party, more commonly called the Populist Party,
held its national convention at St. Louis on the 22d-25th of
July, simultaneously with that of the National Silver Party,
and with strong influences urging it to act on the same line.
One section of the party strove to bring about a complete
endorsement of the Democratic nominations made at Chicago.
Another section, styled the "Middle-of-the-Road" Populists,
opposed any coalition with other parties; while a third wished
to nominate Bryan, with a Populist candidate for Vice
President, looking to an arrangement with the Democratic
organization for a fusion of electoral tickets in various
States. The idea of the latter prevailed, and William J. Bryan
was nominated for President, with Thomas E. Watson, of
Georgia, for Vice President. The People's Party had little
disagreement with the Chicago declarations of the Democratic
Party, and none at all on financial questions, concerning
which its doctrines were set forth in the following platform:
"The People's Party, assembled in National Convention,
reaffirms its allegiance to the principles declared by the
founders of the Republic, and also to the fundamental
principles of just government as enunciated in the platform of
the party in 1892.
"We recognize that through the connivance of the present and
preceding administrations the country has reached a crisis in
its National life, as predicted in our declaration of four
years ago, and that prompt and patriotic action is the supreme
duty of the hour.
"We realize that while we have political independence, our
financial and industrial independence is yet to be attained by
restoring to our country the constitutional control and
exercise of the functions necessary to a people's government,
which functions have been basely surrendered by our public
servants to corporations and monopolies. The influence of
European money-changers has been more potent in shaping
legislation than the voice of the American people. Executive
power and patronage have been used to corrupt our legislatures
and defeat the will of the people, and plutocracy has been
enthroned upon the ruins of democracy. To restore the
government intended by the fathers, and for the welfare and
prosperity of this and future generations, we demand the
establishment of an economic and financial system which shall
make us masters of our own affairs and independent of European
control, by the adoption of the following declaration of
principles:
"We demand a National money, safe and sound, issued by the
general government only, without the intervention of banks of
issue, to be a full legal tender for an debts, public and
private, and a just, equitable, and efficient means of
distribution direct to the people and through the lawful
disbursements of the Government.
"We demand the free and unrestricted coinage of silver and
gold at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one, without
waiting for the consent of foreign nations.
"We demand that the volume of circulating medium be speedily
increased to an amount sufficient to meet the demands of the
business population of this country and to restore the just
level of prices of labor and production.
"We denounce the sale of bonds and the increase of the public
interest-bearing bond debt made by the present administration
as unnecessary and without authority of law, and we demand
that no more bonds be issued except by specific act of
Congress.
"We demand such legislation as will prevent the demonetization
of the lawful money of the United States by private contract.
"We demand that the Government, in payment of its obligations,
shall use its option as to the kind of lawful money in which
they are to be paid, and we denounce the present and preceding
administrations for surrendering this option to the holders of
government obligations.
"We demand a graduated income tax, to the end that aggregated
wealth shall bear its just proportion of taxation, and we
denounce the recent decision of the Supreme Court relative to
the income-tax law as a misinterpretation of the Constitution
and an invasion of the rightful powers of Congress over the
subject of taxation.
"We demand that postal savings banks be established by the
Government for the safe deposit of the savings of the people
and to facilitate exchange.
"Transportation being a means of exchange and a public
necessity, the Government should own and operate the railroads
in the interest of the people and on non-partisan basis, to
the end that all may be accorded the same treatment in
transportation, and that the tyranny and political power now
exercised by the great railroad corporations, which result in
the impairment if not the destruction of the political rights
and personal liberties of the citizens, may be destroyed. Such
ownership is to be accomplished gradually, in a manner
consistent with sound public policy.
{570}
"The interest of the United States in the public highways
built with public moneys and the proceeds of extensive grants
of land to the Pacific railroads should never be alienated,
mortgaged, or sold, but guarded and protected for the general
welfare as provided by the laws organizing such railroads. The
foreclosure of existing liens of the United States on these
roads should at once follow default in the payment of the debt
of the companies, and at the foreclosure sales of said roads
the Government should purchase the same if it becomes
necessary to protect its interests therein, or if they can be
purchased at a reasonable price; and the Government should
operate said railroads as public highways for the benefit of
the whole and not in the interest of the few, under suitable
provisions for protection of life and property, giving to all
transportation interests and privileges and equal rates for
fares and freight.
"We denounce the present infamous schemes for refunding those
debts and demand that the laws now applicable thereto be
executed and administered according to their true intent and
spirit.
"The telegraph, like the post-office system, being a necessity
for the transmission of news, should be owned and operated by
the Government in the interest of the people.
"The true policy demands that the National and State
legislation shall be such as will ultimately enable every
prudent and industrious citizen to secure a home, and
therefore the land should not be monopolized for speculative
purposes.
"All land now held by railroads and other corporations in
excess of their actual needs should by lawful means be
reclaimed by the Government and held for actual settlers only,
and private land monopoly, as well as alien ownership, should
be prohibited.
"We condemn the frauds by which the land grant to the Pacific
Railroad Companies have, through the connivance of the
Interior Department, robbed multitudes of bona fide settlers
of their homes and miners of their claims, and we demand
legislation by Congress which will enforce the exemption of
mineral land from such grants after as well as before patent.
"We demand that bona fide settlers on all public lands be
granted free homes, as provided in the National homestead law,
and that no exception be made in the case of Indian
reservations when opened for settlement, and that all lands
not now patented come under this demand.
"We favor a system of direct legislation through the
initiative and referendum under proper constitutional
safeguards.
"We demand the election of President, Vice-President, and
United States Senators by a direct vote of the people.
"We tender to the patriotic people of Cuba our deepest
sympathy in their heroic struggle for political freedom and
independence, and we believe the time has come when the United
States, the great Republic of the world, should recognize that
Cuba is and of right ought to be a free and independent State.
"We favor home rule in the Territories and the District of
Columbia and the early admission of the Territories as States.
"All public salaries should be made to correspond to the price
of labor and its products.
"In times of great industrial depression idle labor should be
employed on public works as far as practicable.
"The arbitrary course of the courts in assuming to imprison
citizens for indirect contempt and ruling by injunction should
be prevented by proper legislation.
"We favor just pensions for our disabled Union soldiers.
"Believing that the elective franchise and untrammelled ballot
are essential to a government of, for, and by the people, the
People's Party condemn the wholesale system of
disfranchisement adopted in some States as unrepublican and
undemocratic, and we declare it to be the duty of the several
State legislatures to take such action as will secure a full,
free, and fair ballot and an honest count.
"While the foregoing propositions constitute the platform upon
which our party stands, and for the vindication of which its
organization will be maintained, we recognize that the great
and pressing issue of the pending campaign, upon which the
present Presidential election will turn, is the financial
question, and upon this great and specific issue between the
parties we cordially invite the aid and co-operation of all
organizations and citizens agreeing with us upon this vital
question."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.
National Democratic Platform and Nominations.
An extensive revolt in the Democratic Party against the
declarations and the action of the party convention at Chicago
had been quickly made manifest, and steps were soon taken
towards giving it an organized form. These led to the
assembling of a convention of delegates at Indianapolis, on
the 2d and 3d of September, which, in the name of the
"National Democratic Party," repudiated the platform and the
candidates put forward at Chicago, and branded them as false
to the historic party name which they assumed. General John M.
Palmer, of Illinois, was put in nomination for President, and
General Simon Bolivar Buckner, of Kentucky, for Vice
President, of the United States, and a declaration of
Democratic principles adopted, the fundamental passages of
which are quoted in the following:
"This convention has assembled to uphold the principles upon
which depend the honor and welfare of the American people, in
order that democrats throughout the Union may unite their
patriotic efforts to avert disaster from their country and
ruin from their party.
"The democratic party is pledged to equal and exact justice to
all men of every creed and condition; to the largest freedom
of the individual consistent with good government; to the
preservation of the federal government in its constitutional
vigor, and to the support of the states in all their just
rights; to economy in the public expenditures; to the
maintenance of the public faith and sound money; and it is
opposed to paternalism and all class legislation. The
declarations of the Chicago convention attack individual
freedom, the right of private contract, the independence of
the judiciary, and the authority of the president to enforce
federal laws. They advocate a reckless attempt to increase the
price of silver by legislation, to the debasement of our
monetary standard; and threaten unlimited issues of paper
money by the government.
{571}
They abandon for republican allies the democratic cause of
tariff reform, to court favor of protectionists to their
fiscal heresy. In view of these and other grave departures
from democratic principles, we cannot support the candidates
of that convention, nor be bound by its acts. The democratic
party has survived defeats, but could not survive a victory
won in behalf of the doctrine and policy proclaimed in its
name at Chicago.
"The conditions, however, which made possible such utterances
from a national convention, are the direct result of class
legislation by the republican party. It still proclaims, as it
has for years, the power and duty of government to raise and
maintain prices by law, and it proposes no remedy for existing
evils except oppressive and unjust taxation. … The demand of
the republican party for an increase in tariff taxation has
its pretext in the deficiency of the revenue, which has its
causes in the stagnation of trade and reduced consumption, due
entirely to the loss of confidence that has followed the
populist threat of free coinage and depreciation of our money,
and the republican practice of extravagant appropriations beyond
the needs of good government. We arraign and condemn the
populistic conventions of Chicago and St. Louis for their
cooperation with the republican party in creating these
conditions, which are pleaded in justification of a heavy
increase of the burdens of the people by a further resort to
protection. We therefore denounce protection and its ally,
free coinage of silver, as schemes for the personal profit of
a few at the expense of the masses; and oppose the two parties
which stand for these schemes as hostile to the people of the
republic, whose food and shelter, comfort and prosperity are
attacked by higher taxes and depreciated money. In fine, we
reaffirm the historic democratic doctrine of tariff for
revenue only. …
"The experience of mankind has shown that, by reason of their
natural qualities, gold is the necessary money of the large
affairs of commerce and business, while silver is conveniently
adapted to minor transactions, and the most beneficial use of
both together can be insured only by the adoption of the
former as a standard of monetary measure, and the maintenance
of silver at a parity with gold by its limited coinage under
suitable safeguards of law. Thus the largest possible
employment of both metals is gained with a value universally
accepted throughout the world, which constitutes the only
practical bimetallic currency, assuring the most stable
standard, and especially the best and safest money for all who
earn their livelihood by labor or the produce of husbandry. They
cannot suffer when paid in the best money known to man, but
are the peculiar and most defenceless victims of a debased and
fluctuating currency, which offers continual profits to the
money changer at their cost.
"Realizing these truths demonstrated by long and public
inconvenience and loss, the democratic party, in the interests
of the masses and of equal justice to all, practically
established by the legislation of 1834 and 1853 the gold
standard of monetary measurement, and likewise entirely
divorced the government from banking and currency issues. To
this long-established democratic policy we adhere, and insist
upon the maintenance of the gold standard, and of the parity
therewith of every dollar issued by the government, and are
firmly opposed to the free and unlimited coinage of silver and
to the compulsory purchase of silver bullion. But we denounce
also the further maintenance of the present costly patchwork
system of national paper currency as a constant source of
injury and peril. We assert the necessity of such intelligent
currency reform as will confine the government to its
legitimate functions, completely separated from the banking
business, and afford to all sections of our country uniform,
safe, and elastic bank currency under governmental
supervision, measured in volume by the needs of business.
"The fidelity, patriotism, and courage with which President
Cleveland has fulfilled his great public trust, the high
character of his administration, its wisdom and energy in the
maintenance of civil order and the enforcement of the laws,
its equal regard for the rights of every class and every
section, its firm and dignified conduct of foreign affairs,
and its sturdy persistence in upholding the credit and honor
of the nation are fully recognized by the democratic party,
and will secure to him a place in history beside the fathers
of the republic. We also commend the administration for the
great progress made in the reform of the public service, and
we indorse its effort to extend the merit system still
further. We demand that no backward step be taken, but that
the reform be supported and advanced until the un-democratic
spoils system of appointments be eradicated."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.
Prohibition Platform and Nominations.
The Prohibition Party had been the first to open the
presidential campaign with candidates placed in the field. Its
national convention was held at Pittsburg, on the 27th and
28th of May, and its nominees for President and Vice President
were Joshua Levering, of Maryland, and Hale Johnson, of
Illinois. But a split in the convention occurred on attempts
made to graft free-silver and kindred doctrines on the
one-issue platform which the majority of the party desired.
Except in a single particular, the latter prevailed. The
platform adopted was as follows:
"The Prohibition Party, in national convention assembled,
declares its firm conviction that the manufacture,
exportation, importation, and sale of alcoholic beverages has
produced such social, commercial, industrial, and political
wrongs, and is now so threatening the perpetuity of all our
social and political institutions, that the suppression of the
same by a national party organized therefor is the greatest
object to be accomplished by the voters of our country, and is
of such importance that it, of right, ought to control the
political actions of all our patriotic citizens until such
suppression is accomplished. The urgency of this course
demands the union without further delay of all citizens who
desire the prohibition of the liquor traffic. Therefore be it
"Resolved, That we favor the legal prohibition by state and
national legislation of the manufacture, importation, and sale
of alcoholic beverages. That we declare our purpose to
organize and unite all the friends of prohibition into one
party; and in order to accomplish this end we deem it of right
to leave every prohibitionist the freedom of his own
convictions upon all other political questions, and trust our
representatives to take such action upon other political
questions as the changes occasioned by prohibition and the
welfare of the whole people shall demand."
{572}
Resolved, "The right of suffrage ought not to be abridged on
account of sex."
Those delegates who were dissatisfied with this platform
withdrew from the convention, assembled in another hall,
assumed the name of "The National Party," adopted the
following declarations, and nominated Charles E. Bentley, of
Nebraska, and J. II. Southgate, of North Carolina, for the two
highest offices in the national government:
"The National Party, recognizing God as the author of all just
power in government, presents the following declaration of
principles, which it pledges itself to enact into effective
legislation when given the power to do so:
"The suppression of the manufacture and sale, importation,
exportation, and transportation of intoxicating liquors for
beverage purposes. We utterly reject all plans for regulating
or compromising with this traffic, whether such plans be
called local option, taxation, license, or public control. The
sale of liquors for medicinal and other legitimate uses should
be conducted by the State, without profit, and with such
regulations as will prevent fraud or evasion.
"No citizen should be denied the right to vote on account of
sex.
"All money should be issued by the General Government only,
and without the intervention of any private citizen,
corporation, or banking institution. It should be based upon
the wealth, stability, and integrity of the nation. It should
be a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and
should be of sufficient volume to meet the demands of the
legitimate business interests of the country. For the purpose
of honestly liquidating our outstanding coin obligations, we
favor the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold,
at the ratio of sixteen to one, without consulting any other
nation.
"Land is the common heritage of the people and should be
preserved from monopoly and speculation. All unearned grants
of land, subject to forfeiture, should be reclaimed by the
Government and no portion of the public domain should
hereafter be granted except to actual settlers, continuous use
being essential to tenure.
"Railroads, telegraphs, and other natural monopolies should be
owned and operated by the Government, giving to the people the
benefit of service at actual cost.
"The National Constitution should be so amended as to allow
the national revenues to be raised by equitable adjustment of
taxation on the properties and incomes of the people, and
import duties should be levied as a means of securing
equitable commercial relations with other nations.
"The contract convict-labor system, through which speculators
are enriched at the expense of the State, should be abolished.
"All citizens should be protected by law in their right to one
day of rest in seven, without oppressing any who
conscientiously observe any other than the first day of the
week.
"American public schools, taught in the English language,
should be maintained, and no public funds should be
appropriated for sectarian institutions.
"The President, Vice-President, and United States Senators
should be elected by direct vote of the people.
"Ex-soldiers and sailors of the United States army and navy,
their widows, and minor children, should receive liberal
pensions, graded on disability and term of service, not merely
as a debt of gratitude, but for service rendered in the
preservation of the Union.
"Our immigration laws should be so revised as to exclude
paupers and criminals. None but citizens of the United States
should be allowed to vote in any State, and naturalized
citizens should not vote until one year after naturalization
papers have been issued.
"The initiative and referendum and proportional representation
should be adopted.
"Having herein presented our principles and purposes, we
invite the co-operation and support of all citizens who are
with us substantially agreed."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.
Socialist-Labor Party Nominations.
Still another party which placed candidates for the presidency
and vice-presidency in nomination was the Socialist-Labor
organization, which held a convention in New York, July 4-10,
and named for the two high offices, Charles H. Matchett, of
New York, and Mathew Maguire, of New Jersey. Its platform
embodied the essential doctrines of socialism, as commonly
understood, and was as follows:
"The Socialist Labor Party of the United States, in convention
assembled, reasserts the inalienable rights of all men to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
"With the founders of the American Republic we hold that the
purpose of government is to secure every citizen in the
enjoyment of this right; but in the right of our conditions we
hold, furthermore, that no such right can be exercised under a
system of economic inequality, essentially destructive of
life, of liberty, and of happiness.
"With the founders of this Republic we hold that the true
theory of politics is that the machinery of government must be
owned and controlled by the whole people; but in the light of
our industrial development we hold, furthermore, that the true
theory of economics is that the machinery of production must
likewise belong to the people in common.
"To the obvious fact that our despotic system of economics is
the direct opposite of our democratic system of politics, can
plainly be traced the existence of a privileged class, the
corruption of Government by that class, the alienation of
public property, public franchises, and public functions to
that class, and the abject dependence of the mightiest of
nations upon that class.
"Again, through the perversion of democracy to the ends of
plutocracy, labor is robbed of its wealth which it alone
produces, is denied the means of self-employment, and by
compulsory idleness in wage slavery, is even deprived of the
necessaries of life.
"Human power and natural forces are thus wasted, that the
plutocracy may rule. Ignorance and misery, with all their
concomitant evils, are perpetuated, that the people may be
kept in bondage. Science and invention are diverted from their
humane purpose to the enslavement of women and children.
"Against such a system the Socialist Labor party once more
enters its protest. Once more it reiterates its fundamental
declaration that private property in the natural sources of
production and in the instruments of labor is the obvious
cause of all economic servitude and political dependence.
{573}
"The time is fast coming when, in the natural course of social
evolution, this system, through the destructive action of its
failures and crises on one hand, and the constructive
tendencies of its trusts and other capitalistic combinations
on the other hand, shall have worked out its own downfall.
"We therefore call upon the wage-workers of the United States,
and upon all honest citizens, to organize under the banner of
the Socialist Labor party into a class-conscious body, aware
of its rights and determined to conquer them by taking
possession of the public powers, so that, held together by an
indomitable spirit of solidarity under the most trying
conditions of the present class struggle, we may put a summary
end to that barbarous struggle by the abolition of classes,
the restoration of the land and of all the means of
production, transportation, and distribution to the people as
a collective body, and the substitution of the co-operative
commonwealth for the present state of planless production,
industrial war, and social disorder, a commonwealth in which
every worker shall have the free exercise and full benefit of
his faculties, multiplied by all modern factors of
civilization.
"With a view to immediate improvement in the condition of
labor we present the following demands:
"1. Reduction of the hours of labor in proportion to the
progress of production.
"2. The United States shall obtain possession of the
railroads, canals, telegraphs, telephones, and all other means
of public transportation and communication; the employés to
operate the same co-operatively under control of the Federal
Government and to elect their own superior officers, but no
employé shall be discharged for political reasons.
"3. The municipalities shall obtain possession of the local
railroads, ferries, waterworks, gas-works, electric plants,
and all industries requiring municipal franchises; the
employés to operate the same co-operatively under control of
the municipal administration and to elect their own superior
officers, but no employé shall be discharged for political
reasons.
"4. The public lands declared inalienable. Revocation of all
land grants to corporations or individuals the conditions of
which have not been complied with.
"5. The United States to have the exclusive right to issue
money.
"6. Congressional legislation providing for the scientific

management of forests and waterways, and prohibiting the waste
of the natural resources of the country.
"7. Inventions to be free to all: the inventors to be
remunerated by the nation.
"8. Progressive income tax and tax on inheritances; the
smaller incomes to be exempt.
"9. School education of all children under fourteen years of
age to be compulsory, gratuitous, and accessible to all by
public assistance in meals, clothing, books, etc., where
necessary.
"10. Repeal of all pauper, tramp, conspiracy, and sumptuary
laws. Unabridged right of combination.
"11. Prohibition of the employment of children of school age
and of female labor in occupations detrimental to health or
morality. Abolition of the convict-labor contract system.
"12. Employment of the unemployed by the public authorities
(county, State, or nation).
"13. All wages to be paid in lawful money of the United
States. Equalization of women's wages to those of men where
equal service is performed.
"14. Laws for the protection of life and limb in all
occupations, and an efficient employers' liability law.
"15. The people to have the right to propose laws and to vote
upon all measures of importance according to the referendum
principle.
"16. Abolition of the veto power of the Executive (National,
State, or municipal), wherever it exists.
"17. Abolition of the United States Senate and all upper
legislative chambers.
"18. Municipal self-government.
"19. Direct vote and secret ballots in all elections.
Universal and equal right of suffrage without regard to color,
creed, or sex. Election days to be legal holidays. The
principle of proportional representation to be introduced.
"20. All public officers to be subject to recall by their
respective constituencies.
"21. Uniform civil and criminal law throughout the United
States. Administration of justice free of charge. Abolition of
capital punishment."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1896.
The Canvass and Election.
The canvass which occupied the months between party
nominations and the election was the most remarkable, in many
respects, that the country had ever gone through. On both
sides of the silver question intense convictions were burning
and intense anxieties being felt. To the defenders of the gold
standard of value—the monetary standard of the world at
large—an unlimited free coinage of silver legal tender money,
at the ratio of 16 to 1, meant both dishonor and ruin—national
bankruptcy, the wreck of industry, and chaos in the commercial
world. To many of those who strove with desperate eagerness to
bring it about it meant, on the contrary, a millennial social
state, in which abundance would prevail, the goods of the
world be divided more fairly, and labor have a juster reward.
So the issue fronted each as one personal, vital, almost as of
life and death. Their conflict bore no likeness to those
commonly in politics, where consequences seem remote, vague,
general to the body politic,—not, instantly overhanging the
head of the individual citizen, as in this case they did. Not
even the patriotic and moral excitements of the canvass of
1860 produced so intense a feeling of personal interest in the
election—so painful an anxiety in waiting for its result. And
never in any former political contest had the questions
involved been debated so earnestly, studied so widely and
intently, set forth by every artifice of exposition and
illustration with so much ingenious pains. The "campaign
literature" distributed by each party was beyond computation
in quantity and beyond classification in its kinds. The
speeches of the canvass were innumerable. Mr. Bryan
contributed some hundreds, in tours which he made through the
country, and Mr. McKinley, at his home, in Canton, Ohio,
received visiting delegations from all parts of the country
and addressed them at more or less length.
{574}
With all the excitement of anxiety and the heated conflict of
beliefs there was little violence of any kind, from first to
last. The critical election day (November 3) passed with no
serious incidents of disorder. The verdict of the people,
pronounced for the preservation of the monetary standard which
the world at large has established in general use, was
accepted with the equanimity to which self-governing citizens
are trained. Nearly fourteen millions of votes were cast, of
which the Republican presidential electors received 7,104,244;
electors representing the various parties which had nominated
Mr. Bryan received, in all, 6,506,835; those on the National
Democratic ticket received 134,652; those on the Prohibition
tickets, 144,606; those on the Socialist-Labor ticket, 36,416.
In the Electoral College, there were 271 votes for McKinley,
and 176 for Bryan. The States giving their electoral votes for
McKinley were California (excepting 1 vote, cast for Bryan),
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky
(except 1), Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin. The States which chose electors for Bryan
were Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, besides
the single votes won in California and Kentucky. For Vice
President, Hobart received 271 electoral votes—the same as
McKinley; but Sewall received 27 less than Bryan, that number
being cast for the Populist candidate, Watson. This was
consequent on fusion arrangements between Democrats and
Populists in 28 States.
In some States, the majority given against silver free coinage
was overwhelming, as for example, in New York, 268,000
plurality for McKinley, besides 19,000 votes cast for the
"Gold Democratic" candidate; New Jersey, 87,000 Republican
plurality and 6,000 votes for General Palmer; Pennsylvania,
295,000 and 11,000; Massachusetts, 173,000 and 11,000. On the
other hand, Texas gave Bryan a plurality of 202,000, and
Colorado 135,000.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (November).
Agreement with Great Britain for the settlement of the
Venezuela dispute.
See (in this volume)
VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896 (December).
President Cleveland on affairs in Cuba.
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896-1897.
Immigration Bill vetoed by President Cleveland.
On the 17th of December, 1896, a bill to amend the immigration
laws, which had passed the House of Representatives during the
previous session of Congress, passed the Senate, with
amendments which the House refused to accept. By conferences
between the two branches of Congress an agreement was finally
reached, in which the House concurred on the 9th of February
and the Senate on the 17th. But the President disapproved the
measure, and returned it to Congress on the 2d of March, with
his objections set forth in the following Message:
"I herewith return without approval House bill No. 7864,
entitled 'An act to amend the immigration laws of the United
States.'
"By the first section of this bill it is proposed to amend
section 1 of the act of March 3, 1891, relating to immigration
by adding to the classes of aliens thereby excluded from
admission to the United States the following: 'All persons
physically capable and over 16 years of age who can not read
and write the English language or some other language; but a
person not so able to read and write who is over 50 years of
age and is the parent or grandparent of a qualified immigrant
over 21 years of age and capable of supporting such parent or
grandparent may accompany such immigrant, or such a parent or
grandparent may be sent for and come to join the family of a
child or grandchild over 21 years of age similarly qualified
and capable, and a wife or minor child not so able to read and
write may accompany or be sent for and come and join the
husband or parent similarly qualified and capable.'
"A radical departure from our national policy relating to
immigration is here presented. Heretofore we have welcomed all
who came to us from other lands except those whose moral or
physical condition or history threatened danger to our
national welfare and safety. Relying upon the zealous
watchfulness of our people to prevent injury to our political
and social fabric, we have encouraged those coming from
foreign countries to cast their lot with us and join in the
development of our vast domain, securing in return a share in
the blessings of American citizenship. A century's stupendous
growth, largely due to the assimilation and thrift of millions
of sturdy and patriotic adopted citizens, attests the success
of this generous and free-handed policy which, while guarding
the people's interests, exacts from our immigrants only
physical and moral soundness and a willingness and ability to
work. A contemplation of the grand results of this policy can
not fail to arouse a sentiment in its defense, for however it
might have been regarded as an original proposition and viewed
as an experiment its accomplishments are such that if it is to be
uprooted at this late day its disadvantages should be plainly
apparent and the substitute adopted should be just and
adequate, free from uncertainties, and guarded against
difficult or oppressive administration.
"It is not claimed, I believe, that the time has come for the
further restriction of immigration on the ground that an
excess of population overcrowds our land. It is said, however,
that the quality of recent immigration is undesirable. The
time is quite within recent memory when the same thing was
said of immigrants who, with their descendants, are now
numbered among our best citizens. It is said that too many
immigrants settle in our cities, thus dangerously increasing
their idle and vicious population. This is certainly a
disadvantage. It can not be shown, however, that it affects
all our cities, nor that it is permanent; nor does it appear
that this condition where it exists demands as its remedy the
reversal of our present immigration policy. The claim is also
made that the influx of foreign laborers deprives of the
opportunity to work those who are better entitled than they to
the privilege of earning their livelihood by daily toil. An
unfortunate condition is certainly presented when any who are
willing to labor are unemployed, but so far as this condition
now exists among our people it must be conceded to be a result
of phenomenal business depression and the stagnation of all
enterprises in which labor is a factor.
{575}
With the advent of settled and wholesome financial and
economic governmental policies and consequent encouragement to
the activity of capital the misfortunes of unemployed labor
should, to a great extent at least, be remedied. If it
continues, its natural consequences must be to check the
further immigration to our cities of foreign laborers and to
deplete the ranks of those already there. In the meantime
those most willing and best entitled ought to be able to
secure the advantages of such work as there is to do.
"It is proposed by the bill under consideration to meet the
alleged difficulties of the situation by establishing an
educational test by which the right of a foreigner to make his
home with us shall be determined. Its general scheme is to
prohibit from admission to our country all immigrants
'physically capable and over 16 years of age who can not read
and write the English language or some other language,' and it
is provided that this test shall be applied by requiring
immigrants seeking admission to read and afterwards to write
not less than twenty nor more than twenty-five words of the
Constitution of the United States in some language, and that
any immigrant failing in this shall not be admitted, but shall
be returned to the country from whence he came at the expense
of the steamship or railroad company which brought him.
"The best reason that could be given for this radical
restriction of immigration is the necessity of protecting our
population against degeneration and saving our national peace
and quiet from imported turbulence and disorder. I can not
believe that we would be protected against these evils by
limiting immigration to those who can read and write in any
language twenty-five words of our Constitution. In my opinion,
it is infinitely more safe to admit a hundred thousand
immigrants who, though unable to read and write, seek among us
only a home and opportunity to work than to admit one of those
unruly agitators and enemies of governmental control who can
not only read and write, but delights in arousing by
inflammatory speech the illiterate and peacefully inclined to
discontent and tumult. Violence and disorder do not originate
with illiterate laborers. They are, rather, the victims of the
educated agitator. The ability to read and write, as required
in this bill, in and of itself affords, in my opinion, a
misleading test of contented industry and supplies
unsatisfactory evidence of desirable citizenship or a proper
apprehension of the benefits of our institutions. If any
particular element of our illiterate immigration is to be
feared for other causes than illiteracy, these causes should
be dealt with directly, instead of making illiteracy the
pretext for exclusion, to the detriment of other illiterate
immigrants against whom the real cause of complaint cannot be
alleged.
"The provisions intended to rid that part of the proposed
legislation already referred to from obvious hardship appear
to me to be indefinite and inadequate. A parent, grandparent,
wife, or minor child of a qualified immigrant, though unable
to read and write, may accompany the immigrant or be sent for
to join his family, provided the immigrant is capable of
supporting such relative. These exceptions to the general rule
of exclusion contained in the bill were made to prevent the
separation of families, and yet neither brothers nor sisters
are provided for. In order that relatives who are provided for
may be reunited, those still in foreign lands must be sent for
to join the immigrant here. What formality is necessary to
constitute this prerequisite, and how are the facts of
relationship and that the relative is sent for to be
established? Are the illiterate relatives of immigrants who
have come here under prior laws entitled to the advantage of
these exceptions? A husband who can read and write and who
determines to abandon his illiterate wife abroad will find
here under this law an absolutely safe retreat. The illiterate
relatives mentioned must not only be sent for, but such immigrant
must be capable of supporting them when they arrive. This
requirement proceeds upon the assumption that the foreign
relatives coming here are in every case, by reason of poverty,
liable to become a public charge unless the immigrant is
capable of their support. The contrary is very often true. And
yet if unable to read and write, though quite able and willing
to support themselves and their relatives here besides, they
could not be admitted under the provisions of this bill if the
immigrant was impoverished, though the aid of his fortunate
but illiterate relative might be the means of saving him from
pauperism.
"The fourth section of this bill provides—'That it shall be
unlawful for any male alien who has not in good faith made his
declaration before the proper court of his intention to become
a citizen of the United States to be employed on any public works
of the United States or to come regularly or habitually into
the United States by land or water for the purpose of engaging
in any mechanical trade or manual labor for wages or salary,
returning from time to time to a foreign country.' The fifth
section provides—'That it shall be unlawful for any person,
partnership, company, or corporation knowingly to employ any
alien coming into the United States in violation of the next
preceding section of this act.'
"The prohibition against the employment of aliens upon any
public works of the United States is in line with other
legislation of a like character. It is quite a different
thing, however, to declare it a crime for an alien to come
regularly and habitually into the United States for the
purpose of obtaining work from private parties, if such alien
returns from time to time to a foreign country, and to
constitute any employment of such alien a criminal offense.
When we consider these provisions of the bill in connection
with our long northern frontier and the boundaries of our
States and Territories, often but an imaginary line separating
them from the British dominions, and recall the friendly
intercourse between the people who are neighbors on either
side, the provisions of this bill affecting them must be
regarded as illiberal, narrow, and un-American. The residents
of these States and Territories have separate and especial
interests which in many cases make an interchange of labor
between their people and their alien neighbors most important,
frequently with the advantage largely in favor of our
citizens. This suggests the inexpediency of Federal
interference with these conditions when not necessary to the
correction of a substantial evil, affecting the general
welfare. Such unfriendly legislation as is proposed could
hardly fail to provoke retaliatory measures, to the injury of
many of our citizens who now find employment on adjoining
foreign soil.
{576}
The uncertainty of construction to which the language of these
provisions is subject is a serious objection to a statute
which describes a crime. An important element in the offense
sought to be created by these sections is the coming
'regularly or habitually into the United States.' These words
are impossible of definite and certain construction. The same
may be said of the equally important words 'returning from
time to time to a foreign country.'
"A careful examination of this bill has convinced me that for
the reasons given and others not specifically stated its
provisions are unnecessarily harsh and oppressive, and its
defects in construction would cause vexation and its operation
would result in harm to our citizens.
GROVER CLEVELAND."
In the House of Representatives, the Bill was passed again,
over the veto, by the requisite vote of two-thirds; in the
Senate it was referred to the Committee on Immigration, and no
further action was taken upon it. Therefore, it did not become
a law.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1896-1898.
Agitation for monetary reforms.
The Indianapolis Commission.
Secretary Gage's plan.
The Senatorial block in the way.
On November 18, 1896, the Governors of the Indianapolis Board
of Trade invited the Boards of Trade of Chicago, St. Louis,
Cincinnati, Louisville, Cleveland. Columbus, Toledo, Kansas
City, Detroit, Milwaukee, St. Paul, Des Moines, Minneapolis,
Grand Rapids, Peoria, and Omaha to a conference on the first
of December following, to consider the advisability of calling
a larger convention from commercial organizations throughout
the country for the purpose of discussing the wisdom of
selecting a non-partisan commission to formulate a sound
currency system. This preliminary conference issued a call for
a non-partisan monetary convention of business men, chosen
from boards of trade, chambers of commerce, and commercial
clubs, to meet in Indianapolis, on January 12, 1897. At the
convention there were assembled, with credentials, 299
delegates, representing business organizations and cities in
nearly every State in the Union. The result of its
deliberations was expressed in resolutions which opened as
follows:
"This convention declares that it has become absolutely
necessary that a consistent, straightforward, and deliberately
planned monetary system shall be inaugurated, the fundamental
basis of which should be: First, that the present gold
standard should be maintained. Second, that steps should be
taken to insure the ultimate retirement of all classes of
United States notes by a gradual and steady process, and so as
to avoid the injurious contraction of the currency, or
disturbance of the business interests of the country, and that
until such retirements provision should be made for a
separation of the revenue and note-issue departments of the
Treasury. Third, that a banking system be provided, which
should furnish credit facilities to every portion of the
country and a safe and elastic circulation, and especially
with a view of securing such a distribution of the loanable
capital of the country as will tend to equalize the rates of
interest in all parts thereof."
Recognizing the necessity of committing the formulation of
such a plan to a body of men trained and experienced in these
matters, a commission was proposed. In case no commission
should be authorized by Congress in the spring of 1897, the
Executive Committee of the Convention was authorized to select
a commission of eleven members, "to make thorough
investigation of the monetary affairs and needs of this
country, in all relations and aspects, and to make appropriate
suggestions as to any evils found to exist, and the remedies
therefor."
Congress did not authorize the appointment of a monetary
commission; and the Executive Committee of the Convention
selected a commission of eleven members, which began its
sittings in Washington, September 22, 1897. … The Commission
was composed as follows: George F. Edmunds, Vermont, chairman;
George E. Leighton, Missouri, vice-chairman; T. G. Bush,
Alabama; W. B. Dean, Minnesota; Charles S. Fairchild, New
York; Stuyvesant Fish, New York; J. W. Fries, North Carolina;
Louis A. Garnett, California; J. Laurence Laughlin, Illinois;
C. Stuart Patterson, Pennsylvania; Robert S. Taylor, Indiana;
and L. Carron Root and H. Parker Willis, secretaries. Early in
January, 1898, the report of the Monetary Commission was
made public, and a second convention of delegates from the
boards of trade and other commercial organizations of leading
cities in the country was called together at Indianapolis,
January 20-26, to consider its recommendations. The measures
proposed by the Commission were approved by the convention,
and were submitted to Congress by a committee appointed to
urge their enactment in law. The Secretary of the Treasury,
Mr. Gage, had already, in his first annual report and in the
draft of a bill which he laid before the House committee on
banking and currency, made recommendations which accorded in
principle with those of the Commission, differing somewhat in
details. Both plans, with some proposals from other sources,
were now taken in hand by the House committee on banking and
currency, and a bill was prepared, which the committee
reported to the House on the 15th of June. But the other
branch of Congress, the Senate, had already declared itself in
a way which forbade any hope of success. By a vote of 47 to
32, that body had resolved, on the 28th of January, that "all
the bonds of the United States issued, or authorized to be
issued, under the said acts of Congress herein before recited,
are payable, principal and interest, at the option of the
government of the United States, in silver dollars, of the
coinage of the United States, containing 412½ grains each of
standard silver: and that to restore to its coinage such
silver coins as a legal tender in payment of said bonds,
principal and interest, is not in violation of the public
faith, nor in derogation of the rights of the public
creditor." The House, by 182 to 132, had rejected this
resolution; but the Senate action had demonstrated the evident
uselessness of attempting legislation in the interest of a
monetary reform. Accordingly the House bill, after being
reported and made public, for discussion outside, was
withdrawn by the committee, and the subject rested in
Congress, while agitation in the country went on.
{577}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897.
The Industrial Revolution.
"In 1865 the problem presented was this: The United States
could certainly excel any European nation in economic
competition, and possibly the whole Continent combined, if it
could utilize its resources. So much was admitted; the doubt
touched the capacity of the people to organize a system of
transportation and industry adequate to attain that end.
Failure meant certain bankruptcy. Unappalled by the magnitude
of the speculation, the American people took the risk. What
that risk was may be imagined when the fact is grasped that in
1865, with 35,000 miles of road already built, this people
entered on the construction of 160,000 miles more, at an
outlay, probably, in excess of $10,000,000,000. Such figures
convey no impression to the mind, any more than a statement of
the distance of a star. It may aid the imagination, perhaps,
to say that Mr. Giffen estimated the cost to France of the war
of 1870, including the indemnity and Alsace and Lorraine, at
less than $3,500,000,000, or about one-third of this
portentous mortgage on the future.
"As late as 1870 America remained relatively poor, for
America, so far as her export trade went, relied on
agriculture alone. To build her roads she had to borrow, and
she expected to pay dear; but she did not calculate on having
to pay twice the capital she borrowed, estimating that capital
in the only merchandise she had to sell. Yet this is very nearly
what occurred. Agricultural prices fell so rapidly that
between 1890 and 1897, when the sharpest pressure prevailed,
it took something like twice the weight of wheat or cotton to
repay a dollar borrowed in 1873, that would have sufficed to
satisfy the creditor when the debt was contracted. Merchandise
enough could not be shipped to meet the emergency, and
balances had to be paid in coin. The agony this people endured
may be measured by the sacrifice they made. At the moment of
severest contraction, in the single year 1893. the United
States parted with upwards of $87,000,000 of gold, when to
lose gold was like draining a living body of its blood. …
"What America owed abroad can never be computed; it is enough
that it reached an enormous sum, to refund which, even under
favorable circumstances, would have taken years of effort;
actually forced payment brought the nation to the brink of a
convulsion. Perhaps no people ever faced such an emergency and
paid, without recourse to war. America triumphed through her
inventive and administrative genius. Brought to a white heat
under compression, the industrial system of the Union suddenly
fused into a homogeneous mass. One day, without warning, the
gigantic mechanism operated, and two hemispheres vibrated with
the shock. In March, 1897, the vast consolidation of mines,
foundries, railroads, and steamship companies, centralized at
Pittsburg, began producing steel rails at $18 the ton, and at
a bound America bestrode the world. She had won her great
wager with fate. … The end seems only a question of time.
Europe is doomed not only to buy her raw material abroad, but
to pay the cost of transport. And Europe knew this
instinctively in March, 1897, and nerved herself for
resistance. Her best hope, next to a victorious war, lay in
imitating America, and in organizing a system of
transportation which would open up the East.
"Carnegie achieved the new industrial revolution in March,
1897. Within a twelvemonth the rival nations had emptied
themselves upon the shore of the Yellow Sea. In November
Germany seized Kiao-chau, a month later the Russians occupied
Port Arthur, and the following April the English appropriated
Wei-hai-wei; but the fact to remember is that just 400 miles
inland, due west of Kiao-chau, lies Tszechau, the centre,
according to Richthofen, of the richest coal and iron deposits
in existence. There with the rude methods used by the Chinese,
coal actually sells at 13 cents the ton. Thus it has come to
pass that the problem now being attacked by all the statesmen,
soldiers, scientific men, and engineers of the two eastern
continents is whether Russia, Germany, France, England, and
Japan, combined or separately, can ever bring these resources
on the market in competition with the United States."
B. Adams,
The New Industrial Revolution
(Atlantic Monthly, February, 1901).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (January-May).
Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain rejected by the Senate.
See, (in this volume),
VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.
The correspondence which took place between the governments of
the United States and Great Britain, on the subject of an
arbitration of the Venezuela Boundary dispute, having led to
the revival of a project for the negotiation of a general
treaty of arbitration, which the late American Secretary of
State, Mr. Gresham, had broached to the British government in
the spring of 1895, the terms of such an arrangement were
carefully and fully discussed between Secretary Olney and Lord
Salisbury, during the year 1896, and an agreement was reached
which took form in a solemn compact for the settlement by
arbitration of all matters in difference between the two
countries, signed at Washington on the 11th of January, 1897.
The treaty thus framed was as follows:
"ARTICLE I.
The High Contracting Parties agree to submit to Arbitration in
accordance with the provisions and subject to the limitations
of this Treaty all questions in difference between them which
they may fail to adjust by diplomatic negotiation.
"ARTICLE II.
All pecuniary claims or groups of pecuniary claims which do
not in the aggregate exceed £100,000 in amount, and which do
not involve the determination of territorial claims, shall be
dealt with and decided by an Arbitral Tribunal constituted as
provided in the next following Article. In this Article and in
Article IV the words 'groups of pecuniary claims' mean
pecuniary claims by one or more persons arising out of the
same transactions or involving the same issues of law and
fact.'
"ARTICLE III.
Each of the High Contracting Parties shall nominate one
arbitrator who shall be a jurist of repute and the two
arbitrators so nominated shall within two months of the date
of their nomination select an umpire. In case they shall fail
to do so within the limit of time above mentioned, the umpire
shall be appointed by agreement between the Members for the
time being of the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Members for the time being of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in Great Britain, each nominating body acting by
a majority. In case they shall fail to agree upon an umpire
within three months of the date of an application made to them
in that behalf by the High Contracting Parties or either of
them, the umpire shall be selected in the manner provided for
in Article X. The person so selected shall be the President of
the Tribunal and the award of the majority of the Members
thereof shall be final.
{578}
"ARTICLE IV.
All pecuniary claims or groups of pecuniary claims which shall
exceed £100,000 in amount and all other matters in difference,
in respect of which either of the High Contracting Parties
shall have rights against the other under Treaty or otherwise,
provided that such matters in difference do not involve the
determination of territorial claims, shall be dealt with and
decided by an Arbitral Tribunal, constituted as provided in
the next following Article.
"ARTICLE V.
Any subject of Arbitration described in Article IV shall be
submitted to the Tribunal provided for by Article III, the
award of which Tribunal, if unanimous, shall be final. If not
unanimous either of the High Contracting Parties may within
six months from the date of the award demand a review thereof.
In such case the matter in controversy shall be submitted to
an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of five jurists of repute, no
one of whom shall have been a member of the Tribunal whose
award is to be reviewed and who shall be selected as follows,
viz:—two by each of the High Contracting Parties, and one, to
act as umpire, by the four thus nominated and to be chosen
within three months after the date of their nomination. In
case they shall fail to choose an umpire within the limit of
time above-mentioned, the umpire shall be appointed by
agreement between the Nominating Bodies designated in Article
III acting in the manner therein provided. In case they shall
fail to agree upon an umpire within three months of the date
of an application made to them in that behalf by the High
Contracting Parties or either of them, the umpire shall be
selected in the manner provided for in Article X. The person
so selected shall be the President of the Tribunal and the
award of the majority of the Members thereof shall be final.
"ARTICLE VI.
Any controversy which shall involve the determination of
territorial claims shall be submitted to a Tribunal composed
of six members, three of whom (subject to the provisions of
Article VIII) shall be Judges of the Supreme Court of the
United States or Justices of the Circuit Courts to be
nominated by the President of the United States, and the other
three of whom (subject to the provisions of Article VIII)
shall be Judges of the British Supreme Court of Judicature or
Members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be
nominated by Her Britannic Majesty, whose award by a majority
of not less than five to one shall be final. In case of an
award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award
shall also be final unless either Power shall, within three
months after the award has been reported, protest that the
same is erroneous, in which case the award shall be of no
validity. In the event of an award made by less than the
prescribed majority and protested as above provided, or if the
members of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be equally divided,
there shall be no recourse to hostile measures of any
description until the mediation of one or more friendly Powers
has been invited by one or both of the High Contracting
Parties.
"ARTICLE VII.
Objections to the jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal
constituted under this Treaty shall not be taken except as
provided in this Article. If before the close of the hearing
upon a claim submitted to an Arbitral Tribunal constituted
under Article III or Article V either of the High Contracting
Parties shall move such Tribunal to decide, and thereupon it
shall decide that the determination of such claim necessarily
involves the decision of a disputed question of principle of
grave general importance affecting the national rights of such
party as distinguished from the private rights whereof it is
merely the international representative, the jurisdiction of
such Arbitral Tribunal over such claim shall cease and the
same shall be dealt with by arbitration under Article VI.
"ARTICLE VIII.
In cases where the question involved is one which concerns a
particular State or Territory of the United States, it shall
be open to the President of the United States to appoint a
judicial officer of such State or Territory to be one of the
Arbitrators under Article III or Article V or Article VI. In
like manner in cases where the question involved is one which
concerns a British Colony or possession, it shall be open to
Her Britannic Majesty to appoint a judicial officer of such
Colony or possession to be one of the Arbitrators under
Article III or Article V or Article VI.
"ARTICLE IX.
Territorial claims in this Treaty shall include all claims to
territory and all claims involving questions of servitudes,
rights of navigation and of access, fisheries and all rights
and interests necessary to the control and enjoyment of the
territory claimed by either of the High Contracting Parties.
"ARTICLE X.
If in any case the nominating bodies designated in Articles
III and V shall fail to agree upon an Umpire in accordance
with the provisions of the said Articles, the Umpire shall be
appointed by His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway. Either
of the High Contracting Parties, however, may at any time give
notice to the other that, by reason of material changes in
conditions as existing at the date of this Treaty, it is of
opinion that a substitute for His Majesty should be chosen
either for all cases to arise under the Treaty or for a
particular specified case already arisen, and thereupon the
High Contracting Parties shall at once proceed to agree upon
such substitute to act either in all cases to arise under the
Treaty or in the particular case specified as may be indicated
by said notice; provided, however, that such notice shall have
no effect upon an Arbitration already begun by the constitution
of an Arbitral Tribunal under Article III. The High
Contracting Parties shall also at once proceed to nominate a
substitute for His Majesty in the event that His Majesty shall
at any time notify them of his desire to be relieved from the
functions graciously accepted by him under this Treaty either
for all cases to arise thereunder or for any particular
specified case already arisen.
"ARTICLE XI.
In case of the death, absence or incapacity to serve of any
Arbitrator or Umpire, or in the event of any Arbitrator or
Umpire omitting or declining or ceasing to act as such,
another Arbitrator or Umpire shall be forthwith appointed in
his place and stead in the manner provided for with regard to
the original appointment.
{579}
"ARTICLE XII.
Each Government shall pay its own agent and provide for the
proper remuneration of the counsel employed by it and of the
Arbitrators appointed by it and for the expense of preparing
and submitting its case to the Arbitral Tribunal. All other
expenses connected with any Arbitration shall be defrayed by
the two Governments in equal moieties. Provided, however,
that, if in any case the essential matter of difference
submitted to arbitration is the right of one of the High
Contracting Parties to receive disavowals of or apologies for
acts or defaults of the other not resulting in substantial
pecuniary injury, the Arbitral Tribunal finally disposing of
the said matter shall direct whether any of the expenses of
the successful party shall be borne by the unsuccessful party,
and if so to what extent.
"ARTICLE XIII.
The time and place of meeting of an Arbitral Tribunal and all
arrangements for the hearing and all questions of procedure
shall be decided by the Tribunal itself. Each Arbitral
Tribunal shall keep a correct record of its proceedings and
may appoint and employ all necessary officers and agents. The
decision of the Tribunal shall, if possible, be made within
three months from the close of the arguments on both sides. It
shall be made in writing and dated and shall be signed by the
Arbitrators who may assent to it. The decision shall be in
duplicate, one copy whereof shall be delivered to each of the
High Contracting Parties through their respective agents.
"ARTICLE XIV.
This Treaty shall remain in force for five years from the date
at which it shall come into operation, and further until the
expiration of twelve months after either of the High
Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other of
its wish to terminate the same.
"ARTICLE XV.
The present Treaty shall be duly ratified by the President of
the United States of America, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Britannic Majesty;
and the mutual exchange of ratifications shall take place in
Washington or in London within six months of the date hereof
or earlier if possible."
United States, 54th Congress, 2d Session,
Senate Document Number 63.
Public feeling in both countries gave joyful welcome to this
nobly conceived treaty when it was announced. All that was
best in English sentiment and American sentiment had been
shuddering at the thought of possible war between the kindred
peoples, and thanked God for what promised some certitude that
no dispute would be pushed to that barbarous appeal. Only the
mean thought and temper of either country was provoked to
opposition; but, unhappily, the meaner temper and the narrower
and more ignorant opinion on one side of the sea had been
getting so strong a representation in the United States Senate
as to prove capable of much mischief there, on this and other
matters of most serious public concern. When the great
covenant of peace went to that body for approval, there were
senators who found it offensive to them because it came from
the hands of President Cleveland and Secretary Olney; and
there were other senators whose dignity was hurt by the eager
impatience with which the public voice cried out for their
ratifying vote; and still others there were who looked with
official jealousy at the project of an arbitral tribunal which
might sometimes take something from senatorial functions in
foreign affairs. And the combination of pitiful motives had
strength enough to baffle the high hopes and defeat the will
of the American people.
Of the public feeling thus outraged, the following is one
expression of the time, among many which it would be possible
to quote:
Many people "are represented by influential papers like the
St. Paul 'Pioneer Press' and the Minneapolis 'Journal,' the
latter declaring that it is humiliating to think that, widely
as the treaty is favored throughout the country, a few
ill-natured men in the Senate have the power to delay
ratification. In the Central West the feeling is generally
strong for arbitration, if we may judge from the Chicago
'Times-Herald,' the St. Louis 'Republic,' the Indianapolis
'Journal,' and the Cleveland 'Leader.' In the South there are
such cheering reports as this from the Memphis 'Scimetar'; 'If
the treaty now under consideration in the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations should fail of ratification, public opinion
in this country would demand that the incoming Administration
provide another embodying the same vital principle.' In the
East the sentiment in favor of immediate ratification of the
original draft has been almost universal, the only two
journals of note differing from this being the New York 'Sun'
and the Washington 'Post.' The trend of opinion is shown in
the adoption by the Massachusetts House of Representatives of
an endorsement by a vote of 141 to 11. An important meeting
took place last week in Washington in favor of ratification.
The speakers were ex-Secretary of State Foster, Mr. G. G.
Hubbard, Professor B. L. Whitman, ex-Senator J. B. Henderson,
ex-Governor Stanard, and Justice Brewer, of the Supreme Court.
The last named said; 'I do not believe in saying to the
gentlemen charged with the duty of considering carefully that
treaty, that "you must vote for it." There is something in my
own nature which, when anybody says to me "you must," causes
something to run up my spinal column which says "I won't." It
is the Senate's duty to consider that treaty carefully, and
when I say that, I say it is no trespass upon their rights for
American citizens to express their views of that treaty. What are
the errors and losses incidental to arbitration compared to
the horrors of war? What are a few million dollars of wrongful
damages in comparison to the sacrifice of thousands of human
lives?'"
The Outlook, February 6, 1897.
"This treaty was greeted with widespread favor in the press,
but was antagonized at once in the Senate by the jingo element
and by the personal adversaries of the administration. The
committee on foreign relations reported the draft favorably,
but with certain amendments, on February 1. The ensuing debate
soon revealed that a vote on ratification could not be
obtained before March 4, and the whole matter was dropped. At
the opening of the new Congress the Senate Committee again
considered the treaty and reported it, with amendments, on
March 18. During two weeks' discussion the Senate adopted the
committee's amendments and also others, with the result that
the draft was radically transformed.
{580}
Instead of the general reference of all disputes to the
tribunals, it was provided that any difference 'which, in the
judgment of either power, materially affects its honor or its
domestic or foreign policy,' should be submitted to
arbitration only by special agreement; that no question should
be submitted save with the consent of the Senate in its
treaty-making capacity; and that no claim of a British subject
against a state or territory of the United States should be
submitted under any circumstances. The first of these changes
was due mainly to the objection that without it the Monroe
Doctrine might be subjected to arbitration; the second to the
sensitiveness of senators as to their constitutional functions
in foreign relations; and the third to a desire to protect
states against claims on their defaulted bonds. Other changes
modified materially the method of appointing the arbitrators
for the United States, and struck out entirely the designation
of the King of Sweden as umpire. Even with these amendments,
the opposition to the treaty was not overcome; and the final
vote on ratification, taken May 5, resulted in its rejection,
the vote standing 43 to 26, less than two-thirds in the
affirmative. Thirty Republicans and 13 Democrats voted for the
treaty; 8 Republicans, 12 Democrats and 6 Populists against
it."
Political Science Quarterly,
June, 1897.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (March).
Inauguration of President McKinley.
Leading topics of the inaugural address.
The President's Cabinet.
The inauguration of President McKinley was performed with the
customary ceremonies on the 4th of March. In his inaugural
address, the new President laid somewhat less emphasis than
might have been expected on the need of measures for reforming
the monetary system of the country, but strongly urged that
instant steps be taken to increase the revenues of the
government by a return to higher tariff charges. "With
adequate revenue secured," he argued, "but not until then, we
can enter upon such changes in our fiscal laws as will, while
insuring safety and volume to our money, no longer impose upon
the government the necessity of maintaining so large a gold
reserve, with its attendant and inevitable temptations to
speculation. Most of our financial laws are the outgrowth of
experience and trial, and should not be amended without
investigation and demonstration of the wisdom of the proposed
changes. We must be both 'sure we are right' and 'make haste
slowly.' …
"The question of international bimetallism will have early and
earnest attention. It will be my constant endeavor to secure
it by cooperation with the other great commercial powers of
the world. Until that condition is realized, when the parity
between our gold and silver money springs from and is
supported by the relative value of the two metals, the value
of the silver already coined, and of that which may hereafter
be coined, must be kept constantly at par with gold by every
resource at our command. The credit of the government, the
integrity of its currency, and the inviolability of its
obligations must be preserved. This was the commanding verdict
of the people, and it will not be unheeded.
"Economy is demanded in every branch of the government at all
times, but especially in periods like the present of
depression in business and distress among the people. The
severest economy must be observed in all public expenditures,
and extravagance stopped wherever it is found, and prevented
wherever in the future it may be developed. If the revenues
are to remain as now, the only relief that can come must be
from decreased expenditures. But the present must not become
the permanent condition of the government. It has been our
uniform practice to retire, not increase, our outstanding
obligations; and this policy must again be resumed and
vigorously enforced. Our revenues should always be large
enough to meet with ease and promptness not only our current
needs and the principal and interest of the public debt, but
to make proper and liberal provision for that most deserving
body of public creditors, the soldiers and sailors and the
widows and orphans who are the pensioners of the United
States. …
"A deficiency is inevitable so long as the expenditures of the
government exceed its receipts. It can only be met by loans or
an increased revenue. While a large annual surplus of revenue
may invite waste and extravagance, inadequate revenue creates
distrust and undermines public and private credit. Neither
should be encouraged. Between more loans and more revenue
there ought to be but one opinion. We should have more
revenue, and that without delay, hindrance, or postponement. A
surplus in the treasury created by loans is not a permanent or
safe reliance. It will suffice while it lasts, but it cannot
last long while the outlays of the government are greater than
its receipts, as has been the case during the last two years.
… The best way for the government to maintain its credit is to
pay as it goes—not by resorting to loans, but by keeping out
of debt—through an adequate income secured by a system of
taxation, external, or internal, or both. It is the settled
policy of the government, pursued from the beginning and
practiced by all parties and administrations, to raise the
bulk of our revenue from taxes upon foreign productions
entering the United States for sale and consumption, and
avoiding, for the most part, every form of direct taxation
except in time of war.
"The country is clearly opposed to any needless additions to
the subjects of internal taxation, and is committed by its
latest popular utterance to the system of tariff taxation.
There can be no misunderstanding either about the principle
upon which this tariff taxation shall be levied. Nothing has
ever been made plainer at a general election than that the
controlling principle in the raising of revenue from duties on
imports is zealous care for American interests and American
labor. The people have declared that such legislation should
be had as will give ample protection and encouragement to the
industries and the development of our country. … The paramount
duty of congress is to stop deficiencies by the restoration of
that protective legislation which has always been the firmest
prop of the treasury. The passage of such a law or laws would
strengthen the credit of the government both at home and
abroad, and go far toward stopping the drain upon the gold
reserve held for the redemption of our currency, which has
been heavy and well-nigh constant for several years. In the
revision of the tariff, especial attention should be given to
the re-enactment and extension of the reciprocity principle of
the law of 1890, under which so great a stimulus was given to
our foreign trade in new and advantageous markets for our
surplus agricultural and manufactured products."
{581}
Without effect, the incoming President urged the ratification
of the treaty of arbitration with Great Britain, negotiated by
his predecessor and still pending in the Senate. In concluding
his address he announced his intention to convene Congress in
extra session, saying: "The condition of the public treasury
demands the immediate consideration of congress. It alone has
the power to provide revenue for the government. Not to
convene it under such circumstances, I can view in no other
sense than the neglect of a plain duty."
On the day following his inauguration, the President sent to
the Senate the following nominations for his Cabinet, which
were confirmed:
Secretary of State, John Sherman of Ohio;
Secretary of the Treasury, Lyman J. Gage of Illinois;
Secretary of War, Russel A. Alger of Michigan;
Attorney-General, Joseph McKenna of California;
Postmaster-General, James A. Gary of Maryland;
Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long of Massachusetts;
Secretary of the Interior, Cornelius N. Bliss of New York;
Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson of Iowa.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (March-July).
Passage of the Dingley Tariff Act.
Carrying out an intention announced in his Inaugural Address,
President McKinley called Congress together in extra session
on the 15th of March, asking for immediate action to increase
the revenue of the government by increased duties, "so levied
upon foreign products as to preserve the home market, so far
as possible, to our own producers." In his Inaugural Address
the President had expressed the understanding of his party as
to the chief meaning of the late election, by saying that "the
country is … committed by its latest popular utterance to the
system of tariff taxation. … The people have declared that
such legislation should be had as will give ample protection
and encouragement to the industries and development of our
country. … The paramount duty of Congress is to stop
deficiencies by the restoration of that protective legislation
which has always been the firmest prop of the treasury." To
the majority in both Houses of Congress these views were
entirely acceptable, and they were acted upon at once. The
Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives in
the previous Congress had already prepared a comprehensive new
tariff bill, which it passed on to its successor. This
ready-made bill was reported to the House on the first day of
the session, by Mr. Dingley, chairman of the newly appointed
committee, as he had been of the one before it. Debate on the
measure began a week later, and was controlled by a fixed
programme, which required it to be ended on the 31st of March.

The bill was then passed, by a vote of 205 against 121. Of the
action of the Senate upon it, and of the main features of the
bill as it was finally shaped and became law, the following is
a succinct account:
"The bill, referred at once to the Senate Committee on
Finance, was reported after a month, on May 8, with important
amendments. There was an attempt to impose some purely revenue
duties, and, as to the protective duties, the tendency was
towards lower rates than in the House bill, though on certain
articles, such as wools of low grade, hides, and others (of
which more will be said presently), the drift was the other
way. The Senate, however, paid much less respect than the
House to the recommendations of the committee in charge. In
the course of two months, from May 4 to July 7, it went over
the tariff bill item by item, amending without restraint,
often in a perfunctory manner, and not infrequently with the
outcome settled by the accident of attendance on the
particular day; on the whole, with a tendency to retain the
higher rates of the House bill. As passed finally by the
Senate on July 7, the bill, though it contained some 872
amendments, followed the plan of the House Committee rather
than that of the Senate Committee. As usual, it went to a
Conference Committee. In the various compromises and
adjustments in the Senate and in the Conference Committee
there was little sign of the deliberate plan and method which
the House had shown, and the details of the act were settled
in no less haphazard fashion than has been the case with other
tariff measures. As patched up by the Conference Committee,
the bill was promptly passed by both branches of Congress, and
became law on July 24. In what manner these political
conditions affected the character of the act will appear from
a consideration of the more important specific changes.
"First and foremost was the reimposition of the duties on
wool. As the repeal of these duties had been the one important
change made by the act of 1894, so their restoration was the
salient feature in the act of 1897. … Clothing wool was
subjected once more to a duty of 11 cents a pound, combing
wool to one of 12 cents. On carpet wool there were new graded
duties, heavier than any ever before levied. If its value was
12 cents a pound or less the duty was 4 cents; if over 12
cents, the duty was 7 cents. … The duties on carpet wool, as
has already been noted, were made higher than ever before. In
the House the rates of the act of 1890 had been retained; but
in the Senate new and higher rates were inserted. … They were
demanded by the Senators from some States in the Far West,
especially from Idaho and Montana. … They [the Senators in
question] needed to be placated and they succeeded in getting
higher duties on the cheap carpet wools, on the plea of
encouragement for the comparatively coarse clothing wool of
their ranches. … The same complications that led to the high
duty on carpet wool brought about a duty on hides. This rawest
of raw materials had been on the free list for just a quarter
of a century, since 1872, when the duty of the war days had
been repealed. … But here, again, the Senators from the
ranching States were able to dictate terms. … In the Senate a
duty of 20 per cent. was tacked on. The rate was reduced to 15
per cent. in the Conference Committee, and so remains in the
act. The restored duties on wool necessarily brought in their
train the old system of high compensating duties on woollens.
… In the main, the result was a restoration of the rates of
the act of 1890. There was some upward movement almost all
along the line; and the ad valorem duty alone, on the classes
of fabrics which are most largely imported, crept up to 55 per
cent. …
{582}
"On cotton goods the general tendency was to impose duties
lower than those of 1890. This was indicated by the drag-net
rate, on manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for,
which had been 50 per cent. in 1890, and was 45 per cent. in
1897. On two large classes of textile goods new and distinctly
higher duties were imposed,—on silks and linens. … The mode of
gradation was to levy the duties according to the amount of
pure silk contained in the goods. The duties were fixed by the
pound, being lowest all goods containing a small proportion of
pure silk, and rising as that proportion became larger; with
the proviso that in no case should the duty be less than 50
per cent. … Thus, the duty on certain kinds of silks was $1.30
cents per pound, if they contained 45 per cent in weight of
silk; but advanced suddenly to $2.25, if they contained more
than 45 per cent. … On linens another step of the same kind
was taken, specific duties being substituted here also for
ad-valorem. … Linens were graded somewhat as cottons had been
graded since 1861, according to the fineness of the goods as
indicated by the number of threads to the square inch. If the
number of threads was 60 or less per square inch, the duty was
1¾ cents a square yard; if the threads were between 60 and
120, the duty was 2¾ cents; and so on,—plus 30 per cent.
ad-valorem duty in all cases. But finer linen goods, unless
otherwise specially provided for, were treated leniently. If
the weight was small (less than 4½ ounces per yard), the duty
was but 35 per cent. On the other hand, linen laces, or
articles trimmed with lace or embroidery, were dutiable at 60
percent.,—an advance at 10 per cent. over the rate of 1890. …
It was inevitable, under the political conditions of the
session, that in this schedule something should again be
attempted for the farmer; and, accordingly, we find a
substantial duty on flax. The rate of the act of 1890 was
restored,—3 cents a pound on prepared flax, in place of the
rate of 1½ cents imposed by the act of 1894. …
"On chinaware the rates of 1890 were restored. The duty on the
finer qualities which are chiefly imported had been lowered to
35 per cent. in 1894, and was now once more put at 60 per
cent. On glassware, also, the general ad-valorem rate, which
had been reduced to 35 per cent. in 1894, was again fixed at
45 per cent., as in 1890. Similarly the specific duties on the
cheaper grades of window-glass and plate-glass, which had been
lowered in 1894, were raised to the figures of 1890. … The metal
schedules in the act of 1897 showed in the main a striking
contrast with the textile schedules. Important advances of
duty were made on many textiles, and in some cases rates went
considerably higher even than those of 1890. But on most
metals, and especially on iron and steel, duties were left
very much as they had been in 1894. … On steel rails there was
even a slight reduction from the rate of 1894—$6.72 per ton
instead of $7.84. On coal there was a compromise rate. The
duty had been 75 cents a ton in 1890, and 40 cents in 1894; it
was now fixed at 67 cents. On the other hand, as to certain
manufactures of iron and steel farther advanced beyond the
crude stage, there was a return to rates very similar to those
of 1890. Thus, on pocket cutlery, razors, guns, we find once
more the system of combined ad-valorem and specific duties,
graded according to the value of the article. … Copper
remained on the free list, where it had been put in 1894. …
For good or ill the copper duty had worked out all its effects
years before. On the other hand, the duties on lead and on
lead ore went up to the point at which they stood in 1890.
Here we have once more the signs of concession to the silver
Republicans of the far West. … The duty on tin plate, a bone
of contention under the act of 1890, was disposed of, with
little debate, by the imposition of a comparatively moderate
duty. …
"A part of the act which aroused much public attention and
which had an important bearing on its financial yield was the
sugar schedule—the duties on sugar, raw and refined. … The act
of 1890 had admitted raw sugar free, while that of 1894 had
imposed a duty of 40 per cent. ad valorem. … The price of raw
sugar had maintained its downward tendency; and the duty of 40
per cent. had been equivalent in 1896 to less than one cent a
pound. In the act of 1897 the duty was made specific, and was
practically doubled. Beginning with a rate of one cent a pound
on sugar tested to contain 75 per cent., it advanced by stages
until on sugar testing 95 per cent. (the usual content of
commercial raw sugar) it reached 1.65 cents per pound. The
higher rate thus imposed was certain to yield a considerable
increase of revenue. Much was said also of the protection now
afforded to the beet sugar industry of the West. That
industry, however, was still of small dimensions and uncertain
future. … On refined sugar, the duty was made 1.95 cents per
pound, which, as compared with raw sugar testing 100 per
cent., left a protection for the domestic refiner,—i. e., for
the Sugar 'Trust,'—of 1/8 of one cent a pound. Some intricate
calculation would be necessary to make out whether this
'differential' for the refining interest was more or less than
in the act of 1894; but, having regard to the effect of the
substitution of specific for ad-valorem duties, the Trust was
no more favored by the act of 1897 than by its predecessor,
and even somewhat less favored. The changes which this part of
the tariff act underwent in the two Houses are not without
significance." In the bill passed by the House. "the so-called
differential, or protection to the refiners, was one-eighth of
a cent per pound. In the Senate there was an attempt at
serious amendment. The influence of the Sugar Trust in the
Senate had long been great. How secured, whether through party
contributions, entangling alliances, or coarse bribery, the
public could not know; but certainly great, as the course of
legislation in that body demonstrated." The Senate attempted
to make an entire change in the scheme of sugar duties, which
would give the Trust a fifth of a cent per pound of protective
differential, instead of an eighth; but the House resisted,
with more success than in 1894, and the senatorial friends of
the Sugar Trust had to give way.
See, also (in this volume),
TRUSTS: UNITED STATES;
and SUGAR BOUNTIES.
"The tariff act of 1894 had repealed the provisions as to
reciprocity in the act of 1890, and had rendered nugatory such
parts of the treaties made under the earlier act as were
inconsistent with the provisions of its successor. The act of
1897 now revived the policy of reciprocity, and in some ways
even endeavored to enlarge the scope of the reciprocity
provisions"
See below: A. D. 1899-1901.
F. W. Taussig,
Tariff History of the United States,
4th edition, chapter 7 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (April-October).
Negotiations for an international bi-metallic agreement.
See (in this volume)
MONETARY QUESTIONS: A. D 1897 (APRIL-OCTOBER).
{583}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (June).
Appointment of the Nicaragua Canal Commission.
See (in this volume)
CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1889-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (November).
Refusal to negotiate with the insurgent republic of the
Philippine Islands.
On the 3d of November, 1897, Mr. Rounseville Wildman, the U.
S. Consul at Hongkong, addressed the following to the State
Department: "Since my arrival in Hongkong I have been called
upon several times by Mr. F. Agoncilla, foreign agent and high
commissioner, etc., of the new republic of the Philippines.
Mr. Agoncilla holds a commission, signed by the president,
members of cabinet, and general in chief of the republic of
Philippines, empowering him absolutely with power to conclude
treaties with foreign governments. Mr. Agoncilla offers on
behalf of his government alliance offensive and defensive with
the United States when the United States declares war on
Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's judgment, will be very soon.
In the meantime he wishes the United States to send to some
port in the Philippines 20,000 stand of arms and 200,000
rounds of ammunition for the use of his government, to be paid
for on the recognition of his government by the United States.
He pledges as security two provinces and the custom-house at
Manila. He is not particular about the price—is willing the
United States should make 25 per cent or 30 per cent profit.
He is a very earnest and attentive diplomat and a great
admirer of the United States. On his last visit he surprised
me with the information that he had written his government
that he had hopes of inducing the United States to supply the
much-needed guns, etc. In case Señor Agoncilla's dispatch
should fall into the hands of an unfriendly power and find its
way into the newspapers, I have thought it wise to apprise the
State Department of the nature of the high commissioner's
proposals. Señor Agoncilla informs me by late mail that he
will proceed at once to Washington to conclude the proposed
treaty, if I advise. I shall not advise said step until so
instructed by the State Department."
To this communication, the Third Assistant Secretary of State,
Mr. Cridler, returned the following reply, December 15, 1897:
"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch Number 19
of November 3, 1897, in which you announce the arrival at your
post of Mr. F. Agoncilla, whom you describe as foreign agent
and high commissioner of the new republic of the Philippines,
and who holds full power to negotiate and conclude treaties
with foreign powers. Mr. Agoncilla offers an alliance
'offensive and defensive with the United States when the
United States declares war on Spain, which, in Mr. Agoncilla's
judgment, will be very soon,' and suggests that 20,000 stand
of arms and 200,000 rounds of ammunition be supplied to his
government by that of the United States. You may briefly
advise Mr. Agoncilla, in case he should call upon you, that
the Government of the United States does not negotiate such
treaties and that it is not possible to forward the desired
arms and ammunition. You should not encourage any advances on
the part of Mr. Agoncilla, and should courteously decline to
communicate with the Department further regarding his alleged
mission."
Treaty of Peace and Accompanying Papers
(55th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document
Number 62, part 1, pages 333,334).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (November).
Treaty with Russia and Japan to suspend pelagic sealing.
See (in this volume)
BERING SEA QUESTIONS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (December).
President McKinley on Cuban affairs.
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897 (December).
Stringent measures against pelagic sealing.
See (in this volume)
BERING SEA QUESTIONS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897-1898 (December-March).
Reports from Cuba of the suffering condition of
the "reconcentrados."
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1897-1898 (DECEMBER-MARCH).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897-1899.
Agreements with the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee,
and Seminole tribes of Indians.
Work of the Dawes Commission.
See (in this volume)
INDIANS, AMERICAN: A. D. 1893-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1897-1900.
Treaty for the annexation of Hawaii.
Its failure of ratification.
Passage of joint resolution to annex, and of an Act
for the government of the islands.
See (in this volume)
HAWAII.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (February-March).
American sympathy with the Cubans and indignation
against Spain.
Destruction of the United States battle-ship "Maine"
in Havana harbor.
Investigation and findings of the American and
Spanish courts of inquiry.
Public feeling in the United States, excited by a terrible
state of suffering in Cuba, resulting from Spanish methods of
dealing with insurrection in that island, had been gathering
intensity for months past, and threatening a rupture of
peaceful relations between the United States and Spain.
See (in this volume),
CUBA: A. D. 1896-1897 and 1897-1898)
A sudden crisis in the situation was produced, on the morning
of the 15th of February, 1898, by news that the United States
battle-ship "Maine," while paying a visit of courtesy to the
harbor of Havana, had been totally destroyed, on the previous
evening, by an explosion which killed most of her crew. In a
subsequent message on the subject to Congress, President
McKinley recited the circumstances of the catastrophe, and the
proceedings adopted to ascertain its cause, with the
conclusions reached, in the following words: "For some time
prior to the visit of the 'Maine' to Havana Harbor our
consular representatives pointed out the advantages to flow
from the visit of national ships to the Cuban waters, in
accustoming the people to the presence of our flag as the
symbol of good will and of our ships in the fulfillment of the
mission of protection to American interests, even though no
immediate need therefor might exist. Accordingly on the 24th
of January last, after conference with the Spanish minister;
in which the renewal of visits of our war vessels to Spanish
waters was discussed and accepted, the peninsular authorities
at Madrid and Havana were advised of the purpose of this
Government to resume friendly naval visits at Cuban ports, and
that in that view the 'Maine' would forthwith call at the port
of Havana. This announcement was received by the Spanish
Government with appreciation of the friendly character of the
visit of the 'Maine,' and with notification of intention to
return the courtesy by sending Spanish ships to the principal
ports of the United States. Meanwhile the 'Maine' entered the
port of Havana on the 25th of January, her arrival being
marked with no special incident besides the exchange of
customary salutes and ceremonial visits.
{584}
"The 'Maine' continued in the harbor of Havana during the
three weeks following her arrival. No appreciable excitement
attended her stay; on the contrary, a feeling of relief and
confidence followed the resumption of the long-interrupted
friendly intercourse. So noticeable was this immediate effect
of her visit that the consul-general strongly urged that the
presence of our ships in Cuban waters should be kept up by
retaining the 'Maine' at Havana, or, in the event of her
recall, by sending another vessel there to take her place. At
forty minutes past 9 in the evening of the 15th of February
the 'Maine' was destroyed by an explosion, by which the entire
forward part of the ship was utterly wrecked. In this
catastrophe 2 officers and 264 of her crew perished, those who
were not killed outright by her explosion being penned between
decks by the tangle of wreckage and drowned by the immediate
sinking of the hull. Prompt assistance was rendered by the
neighboring vessels anchored in the harbor, aid being
especially given by the boats of the Spanish cruiser 'Alfonso
XII' and the Ward Line steamer 'City of Washington,' which lay
not far distant. The wounded were generously cared for by the
authorities of Havana, the hospitals being freely opened to
them, while the earliest recovered bodies of the dead were
interred by the municipality in a public cemetery in the city.
Tributes of grief and sympathy were offered from all official
quarters of the island.
"The appalling calamity fell upon the people of our country
with crushing force, and for a brief time an intense
excitement prevailed, which in a community less just and
self-controlled than ours might have led to hasty acts of
blind resentment. This spirit, however, soon gave way to the
calmer processes of reason and to the resolve to investigate
the facts and await material proof before forming a judgment
as to the cause, the responsibility, and, if the facts
warranted, the remedy due. This course necessarily recommended
itself from the outset to the Executive, for only in the light
of a dispassionately ascertained certainty could it determine
the nature and measure of its full duty in the matter. The
usual procedure was followed, as in all cases of casualty or
disaster to national vessels of any maritime State. A naval
court of inquiry was at once organized, composed of officers
well qualified by rank and practical experience to discharge
the onerous duty imposed upon them. Aided by a strong force of
wreckers and divers, the court proceeded to make a thorough
investigation on the spot, employing every available means for
the impartial and exact determination of the causes of the
explosion. Its operations have been conducted with the utmost
deliberation and judgment, and while independently pursued no
attainable source of information was neglected, and the
fullest opportunity was allowed for a simultaneous
investigation by the Spanish authorities. The finding of the
court of inquiry was reached, after twenty-three days of
continuous labor, on the 21st of March, instant, and, having
been approved on the 22d by the commander in chief of the
United States naval force on the North Atlantic Station, was
transmitted to the Executive. It is herewith laid before the
Congress, together with the voluminous testimony taken before
the court. Its purport is, in brief, as follows:
"When the 'Maine' arrived at Havana she was conducted by the
regular Government pilot to buoy Number 4, to which she was
moored in from 5½ to 6 fathoms of water. The state of
discipline on board and the condition of her magazines,
boilers, coal bunkers, and storage compartments are passed in
review, with the conclusion that excellent order prevailed and
that no indication of any cause for an internal explosion
existed in any quarter. At 8 o'clock in the evening of
February 15 everything had been reported secure, and all was
quiet. At forty minutes past 9 o'clock the vessel was suddenly
destroyed. There were two distinct explosions, with a brief
interval between them. The first lifted the forward part of
the ship very perceptibly. The second, which was more open,
prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the court
to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward
magazines. The evidence of the divers establishes that the
after part of the ship was practically intact and sank in that
condition a very few moments after the explosion. The forward
part was completely demolished. Upon the evidence of a
concurrent external cause the finding of the court is as
follows:
"'At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point of 11½
feet from the middle line of the ship and 6 feet above the
keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to
be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore
about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk
uninjured. The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed
V shape (˄), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and
32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back
upon itself against the continuation of the same plating,
extending forward. At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken
in two and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the
angle formed by the outside bottom plates. This break is now
about 6 feet below the surface of the water and about 30 feet
above its normal position. In the opinion of the court this
effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a
mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18
and somewhat on the port side of the ship.'
"The conclusions of the court are: That the loss of the
'Maine' was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on
the part of any of the officers or members of her crew; That
the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine,
which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her
forward magazines; and That no evidence has been obtainable
fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the 'Maine'
upon any person or persons.
"I have directed that the finding of the court of inquiry and
the views of this Government thereon be communicated to the
Government of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, and I do not
permit myself to doubt that the sense of justice of the
Spanish nation will dictate a course of action suggested by
honor and the friendly relations of the two Governments. It
will be the duty of the Executive to advise the Congress of
the result, and in the meantime deliberate consideration is
invoked."
Congressional Record, March 28, 1898.
{585}
A Spanish naval board of inquiry, convened by the maritime
authority at Havana, and investigating the matter with haste,
arrived at a conclusion quite opposite to that stated above,
reporting on the 22d of March that "an explosion of the first
order, in the forward magazine of the American ironclad
'Maine,' caused the destruction of that part of the ship and
its total submersion in the same place in this bay at which it
was anchored. … That the important facts connected with the
explosion in its external appearances at every moment of its
duration having been described by witnesses, and the absence
of all circumstances which necessarily accompany the explosion
of a torpedo having been proved by these witnesses and
experts, it can only be honestly asserted that the catastrophe
was due to internal causes. … That the character of the
proceedings undertaken and respect for the law which
establishes the absolute extra-territoriality of a foreign war
vessel have prevented the determination, even by conjecture,
of the said internal origin of the disaster, to which also the
impossibility of establishing the necessary communication
either with the crew of the wrecked vessel or the officials of
their Government commissioned to investigate the causes of the
said event, or with those subsequently intrusted with the
issue, has contributed. … That the interior and exterior
examination of the bottom of the 'Maine,' whenever it is
possible, unless the bottom of the ship and that of the place
in the bay where it is sunk are altered by the work which is
being carried on for the total or partial recovery of the
vessel, will prove the correctness of all that is said in this
report; but this must not be understood to mean that the
accuracy of these present conclusions requires such proof."
U. S. Senate Report Number 885,
55th Congress, 2d Session, page 635.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (February-December).
In the Chinese "battle of concessions."
See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1898 (FEBRUARY-DECEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (March).
Account by Senator Proctor of the condition of
the "reconcentrados" in Cuba.
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1897-1898 (DECEMBER-MARCH).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (March-April).
Continued discussion of Cuban affairs with Spain.
Unsatisfactory results.
Message of the President asking Congress for authority
to terminate hostilities in Cuba.
On the 11th of April, President McKinley addressed another
special message to Congress, setting forth the unsatisfactory
results with which Cuban affairs had been further discussed
with the government of Spain, and formally asking to be
authorized and empowered to take measures for securing a "full
and final termination of hostilities" in the oppressed island.
He said:
"Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands
the President to give from time to time to the Congress
information of the state of the Union and to recommend to
their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body
with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the
relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the
warfare that for more than three years has raged in the
neighboring island of Cuba. I do so because of the intimate
connection of the Cuban question with the state of our own
Union, and the grave relation the course which it is now
incumbent upon the nation to adopt must needs bear to the
traditional policy of our Government, if it is to accord with
the precepts laid down by the founders of the Republic and
religiously observed by succeeding Administrations to the
present day.
"The present revolution is but the successor of other similar
insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion
of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century,
each of which, during its progress, has subjected the United
States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality
laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce,
caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our
citizens, and, by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and
uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities
and offended the humane sympathies of our people. Since the
present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has
seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and
sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history of
the island and rarely paralleled as to the numbers of the
combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution
of modern times where a dependent people striving to be free
have been opposed by the power of the sovereign state. Our
people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to
comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed,
its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid
waste, its mills in ruins, and its people perishing by tens of
thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves
constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which
our laws enjoin and which the law of nations commands, to
police our own waters and to watch our own seaports in
prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans. Our trade
has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has
been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our
people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest
among our own citizens which has inevitably found its
expression from time to time in the National Legislature, so
that issues wholly external to our own body politic engross
attention and stand in the way of that close devotion to
domestic advancement that becomes a self-contained
commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all
foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has,
indeed, aroused the utmost concern on the part of this
Government, as well during my predecessor's term as in my own.
"In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered
through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor
made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of
this Government in any way that might tend to an honorable
adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted
colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of
self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of
Spain. It failed through the refusal of the Spanish Government
then in power to consider any form of mediation or, indeed, any
plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual
submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then
only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant.
The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents
was in no wise diminished. The efforts of Spain were
increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by
the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman
phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized
Christian peoples.
{586}
The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by
the captain-general's bando of October 21, 1896, in the
province of Pinar del Rio, was thence extended to embrace all
of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able
to reach by occupation or by military operations. The
peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural
interior, were driven into the garrison towns or isolated
places held by the troops. The raising and movement of
provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid
waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in
short, everything that could desolate the land and render it
unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or
the other of the contending parties and executed by all the
powers at their disposal.
"By the time the present Administration took office, a year
ago, reconcentration—so called—had been made effective over
the better part of the four central and western
provinces—Santa Clara, Matanzas, Habana, and Pinar del Rio.
The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000
or more was herded within the towns and their immediate
vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute
of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the most
unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with
the devastation of the depopulated areas of production,
destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by
month the death rate increased in an alarming ratio. By March,
1897, according to conservative estimates from official
Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from
starvation and the diseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per
centum of their total number. No practical relief was accorded
to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering
from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called 'zones
of cultivation' established within the immediate areas of
effective military control about the cities and fortified
camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The
unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, with
aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could
not have tilled the soil without tools, seed, or shelter for
their own support or for the supply of the cities.
Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to
cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its
predestined result. As I said in my message of last December,
it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only
peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave.
"Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone
a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that
characterized the second year of the war, when the insurgents
invaded even the thitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio
and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city
of Habana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the
central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a
measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Habana, but,
under the existing conditions of the rural country, without
immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus
partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and
their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the
essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at
the outset. In this state of affairs my Administration found
itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My
message of last December reviewed the situation, and narrated
the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and
opening the way to some form of honorable settlement. The
assassination of the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change
of government in Spain. The former administration, pledged to
subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more
liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform
involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Porto
Rico.
"The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy,
General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective
amelioration of the condition of the island, although not
accepted to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape,
were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase,
would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the
war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth
prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Coincidentally with
these declarations, the new Government of Spain continued and
completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of
testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing
American citizens held under one charge or another connected
with the insurrection, so that by the end of November not a
single person entitled in any way to our national protection
remained in a Spanish prison.
"While these negotiations were in progress the increasing
destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming
mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success
which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to
the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious
expenditure through the consular agencies of the money
appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint
resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane
extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of
sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the
Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last I caused to
be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting
contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the
starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of
January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a
central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York
City, composed of three members, representing the American
National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of
the community. The efforts of that committee have been
untiring and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free
transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work.
The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of
other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba
and cooperated with the consul-general and the local
authorities to make effective distribution of the relief
collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly
$200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the
sufferers, and more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted
duty free, and transportation to the interior has been
arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to
Habana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if
not all, of the towns where suffering exists.
{587}
Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for
a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized
by the Spanish Government. Within a few days past the orders
of General Weyler have been revoked; the reconcentrados, it is
said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and aided
to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works
have been ordered to give them employment, and a sum of
$600,000 has been appropriated for their relief.
"The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation
or extermination a final military victory for either side
seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical
exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a
condition which in effect ended the ten years' war by the truce
of Zanjon. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion
of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be
contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least
of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are,
deeply and intimately, by its very existence. Realizing this,
it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness,
no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose
by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an
immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted on
the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation and
correspondence, through the United States minister at Madrid,
propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice
until October 1 for the negotiation of peace with the good
offices of the President. In addition, I asked the immediate
revocation of the order of reconcentration, so as to permit
the people to return to their farms and the needy to be
relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States,
cooperating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full
relief.
"The reply of the Spanish cabinet was received on the night of
the 31st ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace
in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the insular
parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be
necessary to reach a final result, it being, however,
understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the
Central Government are not lessened or diminished. As the
Cuban parliament does not meet until the 4th of May next, the
Spanish Government would not object, for its part, to accept
at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the
insurgents from the general in chief, to whom it would
pertain, in such case, to determine the duration and
conditions of the armistice. The propositions submitted by
General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish Government were
both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are
before me, and are substantially in the language above given.
The function of the Cuban parliament in the matter of
'preparing' peace and the manner of its doing so are not
expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from General
Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions
preceding the final conference it is understood that the
Spanish Government stands ready to give the insular congress
full powers to settle the terms of peace with the
insurgents—whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by
means of legislation does not appear.
"With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace,
and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is
brought to the end of his effort. In my annual message of
December last I said: 'Of the untried measures there remain
only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents;
recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the
contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other
party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be
thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal
aggression.' Thereupon I review these alternatives, in the
light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875,
when after seven years of sanguinary, destructive, and cruel
hostilities in Cuba he reached the conclusion that the
recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and
indefensible; and that the recognition of belligerence was not
warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I
commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question,
pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a
recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already
onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction,
could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices
in the territory of hostilities. Nothing has since occurred to
change my view in this regard; and I recognize as fully now as
then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which
process the so-called recognition of belligerents is
published, could, of itself and unattended by other action,
accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor—the
instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery
that afflicts the island.
"Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the
independence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we
find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They
are well summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress,
December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the
independence of Texas. He said: 'In all the contests that have
arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes
relating to the Crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the
separation of the American possessions of both from the
European Governments, and out of the numerous and constantly
occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America, so wisely
consistent with our just principles has been the action of our
Government that we have, under the most critical
circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other
evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good
will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence
compelled to decide. It has thus made known to the world that
the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to
avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the
internal government of other nations, and eventually to
recognize the authority of the prevailing party without
reference to our particular interests and views or to the
merits of the original controversy. … But on this, as on every
other trying occasion, safety is to be found in a rigid
adherence to principle. In the contest between Spain and the
revolted colonies we stood aloof, and waited not only until
the ability of the new States to protect themselves was fully
established, but until the danger of their being again
subjugated had entirely passed away.
{588}
Then, and not until then, were they recognized. Such was our
course in regard to Mexico herself. … It is true that with
regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been
expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the
Republic himself captured, and all present power to control
the newly-organized government of Texas annihilated within its
confines; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at
least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of
Texas. The Mexican Republic, under another Executive, is
rallying its forces under a new leader and menacing a fresh
invasion to recover its lost dominion. Upon the issue of this
threatened invasion the independence of Texas may be
considered as suspended; and were there nothing peculiar in
the relative situation of the United States and Texas, our
acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could
scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve
with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all
similar questions.'
"Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that
there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish
interest in view of the former claim on our part to the
territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in
seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the
incorporation of Texas in the Union, concluding thus:
'Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still
stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until
Mexico itself or one of the great foreign powers shall
recognize the independence of the new government, at least
until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have
proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of
that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to
uphold the government constituted by them. Neither of the
contending parties can justly complain of this course. By
pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established
policy of our Government, a policy which has secured to us
respect and influence abroad and inspired confidence at home.'
"These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson.
They are evidence that the United States, in addition to the
test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition
of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted
state shall 'constitute in fact a body politic, having a
government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the
elements of stability,' and forming de facto, 'if left to
itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of
discharging the duties of a state'), has imposed for its own
governance in dealing with cases like these the further
condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due
to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again
subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away. This
extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The
Congress, to whom President Jackson referred the question as
one 'probably leading to war,' and therefore a proper subject
for 'a previous understanding with that body, by whom war can
alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for
sustaining its perils must be furnished,' left the matter of
the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the Executive,
providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when
the President should be satisfied that the Republic of Texas
had become 'an independent State.' It was so recognized by
President Van Buren, who commissioned a chargé d'affaires
March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to
reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at the time
no bona fide contest going on between the insurgent province
and its former sovereign.
"I said in my message of December last, 'It is to be seriously
considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its favor.' The same
requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered
when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in
question, for no less positive test can be applied to the
greater act than to the lesser, while, on the other hand, the
influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal
policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors
when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are
secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real
question is whether the community claiming recognition is or
is not independent beyond peradventure.
"Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be
wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the
present time the independence of the so-called Cuban republic.
Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United
States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this
country now to the recognition of any particular government in
Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of
international obligation toward the organization so
recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be
subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We
would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to
it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When it shall appear
hereafter that there is within the island a government capable
of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a
separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper
forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be
promptly and readily recognized and the relations and
interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.
"There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the
war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational
compromise between the contestants or as the active ally of
the one party or the other. As to the first, it is not to be
forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the
United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention
in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending
to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate
pacific result just and honorable to all interests concerned.
The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba untarnished
by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood
of American citizens. The forcible intervention of the United
States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large
dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents
where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their
borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves,
however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the
contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.
{589}
"The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized
as follows:
First.
In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities,
bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there,
and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or
unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is
all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is
therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for
it is right at our door.
Second.
We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that
protection and indemnity for life and property which no
government there can or will afford, and to that end to
terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal
protection.
Third.
The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious
injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people and
by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the
island.
Fourth,
and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition
of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and
entails upon this Government an enormous expense.
With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us
and with which our people have such trade and business
relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in
constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves
ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and
are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation,
the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to
prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and
entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need
not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a
constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a
semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.
"These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out
have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has
deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already
transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of
inquiry on the destruction of the battleship 'Maine' in the
harbor of Habana during the night of the 15th of February. The
destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart

with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave
sailors and marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in
the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to
death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the
nation. The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to
say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government,
was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the
'Maine' was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a
submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility:
that remains to be fixed. In any event the destruction of them
'Maine' by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and
impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is
intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the
Spanish Government cannot assure safety and security to a
vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Habana on a
mission of peace, and rightfully there.
"Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic
correspondence, a dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the
26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister
for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do
all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter
of the 'Maine.' The reply above referred to of the 31st
ultimo, also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain
to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can
arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the
note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th
instant, as follows: 'As to the question of fact which springs
from the diversity of views between the reports of the
American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be
ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose
decision Spain accepts in advance.' To this I have made no
reply.
"President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the
contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent
indefinite prolongation, said: 'In such an event, I am of
opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the
responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously
consider the only remaining measures possible—mediation and
intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water
separating the island from the peninsula, … the contending
parties appear to have within themselves no depository of
common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and
excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of
peacemaker. In this view in the earlier days of the contest
the good offices of the United States as a mediator were
tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the
interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both
parties, but were at the time declined by Spain, with the
declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be
indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the
opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the
strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its
injuries to the interests of the United States and of other
nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great
injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the
relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in
the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any
adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any
success whereby one party shall possess and control the island
to the exclusion of the other. Under these circumstances, the
agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention,
seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be
invoked for the termination of the strife.'
"In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during
the pending struggle, it was said: 'When the inability of
Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become
manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is
extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence,
and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has
degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the
useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of
the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be
presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain
will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge.'
{590}
"In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to
this question, I said: 'The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just
alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all
our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba,
is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and
other action by the United States will remain to be taken.
When that time comes that action will be determined in the
line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without
misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this
Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to
it the protection of their interests and honor, and to
humanity. Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense
ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic
considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the
Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and
property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts
to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be
honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a
duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization,
and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault
on our part, and only because the necessity for such action
will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the
civilized world.'
"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has
waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may
flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not
been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present
methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition
which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of
Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in
behalf of endangered American interests which give us the
right and the duty to speak and act, the War in Cuba must
stop.
"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the
Congress to authorize and empower the President to take
measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities
between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to
secure in the island the establishment of a stable government,
capable of maintaining order and observing its international
obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security
of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military
and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for
these purposes. And in the interest of humanity and to aid in
preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I
recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be
continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public
Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.
"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn
responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the
intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors.
Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the
Constitution and the law, I await your action.
"Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing
message, official information was received by me that the
latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General
Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim
a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which
have not yet been communicated to me. This fact with every
other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have your just
and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which
you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful
result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving
people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another
justification for our contemplated action."
Congressional Record,
April 11, 1898.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).
Action of Congress empowering the President to expel
Spanish authority from the island of Cuba, and its result
in a state of war with Spain.
On the 13th of April, two days after receiving the President's
Message, as above, the House of Representatives adopted the
following resolution, by a vote of 324 against 19: "Resolved,
That the President is hereby authorized and directed to
intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with
the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there and
establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable
and independent government of their own in the island of Cuba;
and the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use
the land and naval forces of the United States to execute the
purpose of this resolution."
Congressional Record,
April 13, 1898, pages 4192-4196.
Three days later the Senate adopted the following, by 27 votes
against 21: "Resolved by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
First.
That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent, and that the Government of the
United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the
true and lawful Government of that island.
"Second.
That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the
Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
"Third.
That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into
effect.
"Fourth.
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said island except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."
Congressional Record,
April 16, 1898, page 4386-4387.
The two Houses were in conflict, it will be seen, on the
question of the recognition of what claimed to be the
government of the Republic of Cuba, organized by the
insurgents. A majority of the House shared the doubts
expressed by the President in his message, as to the existence
of such a government in Cuba as could be recognized without
embarrassment; a majority of the Senate shut its eyes to that
doubt. After two days of heated controversy, the Senate gave
way, and the following resolution, recommended by conference
committees, was adopted in both Houses,—in the Senate by 42
yeas to 35 nays (12 not voting); in the House by 311 to 6 (39
not voting):
{591}
"Resolved, etc.
"First.
That the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right ought
to be free and independent.
"Second.
That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the
Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and
government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and
naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
"Third.
That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces
of the United States, and to call into the actual service of
the United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into
effect.
"Fourth.
That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."
Congressional Record,
April 18, 1898, pages 4421-4422, and 4461-4462.
One week later, on the 25th of April, the President
communicated to Congress an account of his action in
accordance with this joint resolution, and its result in a
state of war between the United States and Spain as follows:
"Upon communicating to the Spanish minister in Washington the
demand which it became the duty of the Executive to address to
the Government of Spain in obedience to said resolution, the
minister asked for his passports and withdrew. The United
States minister at Madrid was in turn notified by the Spanish
minister for foreign affairs that the withdrawal of the
Spanish representative from the United States had terminated
diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that all
official communications between their respective
representatives ceased therewith.
"I commend to your special attention the note addressed to the
United States minister at Madrid by the Spanish minister for
foreign affairs on the 21st instant, whereby the foregoing
notification was conveyed. It will be perceived therefrom that
the Government of Spain, having cognizance of the joint
resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the
things which the President is thereby required and authorized
to do, responds by treating the reasonable demands of this
Government as measures of hostility, following with that
instant and complete severance of relations by its action
which, by the usage of nations, accompanies an existent state
of war between sovereign powers.
"The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands
of the United States being denied with a complete rupture of
intercourse by the act of Spain, I have been constrained, in
exercise of the power and authority conferred upon me by the
joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April
22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of
Cuba, lying between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and of the port
of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in
exercise of my constitutional powers and using the authority
conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April 22,
1898, to issue my proclamation dated April 23, 1898, calling
forth volunteers in order to carry into effect the said
resolution of April 20, 1898. …
"In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the
adoption of such other measures as may be necessary to enable
me to carry out the expressed will of the Congress of the
United States in the premises, I now recommend to your
honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declaring
that a state of war exists between the United States of
America and the Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action
thereon, to the end that the definition of the international
status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made
known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance
of all its duties in the conduct of a public war may be
assured."
Congressional Record,
April 25, 1898, page 4671.
The recommendation of the President was carried out, on the
same day, by the passage in both Houses, unanimously, of an
enactment, "First. That war be, and the same is hereby,
declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day
of April, A. D. 1898, including said day, between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. Second. That the
President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed
and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States, and to call into the actual service of the
United States the militia of the several States, to such
extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect."
Congressional Record,
April 25, pages 4674 and 4693.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).
Cabinet changes.
Two resignations from the President's cabinet occurred in
April, both occasioned by failing health. Honorable James A.
Gary was succeeded as Postmaster-General by Honorable Charles
Emory Smith, and Honorable John Sherman was followed in the
Secretaryship of State by his First Assistant in that office,
Judge William R. Day.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May).
War with Spain.
Military preparations.
Regular and Volunteer armies.
"The Rough Riders."
At the outbreak of the war, the Regular Army of the United
States numbered but 28,000 officers and men. Under authority
given by acts of Congress it was rapidly increased, and
returns for May, 1898, show 2,191 officers and nearly 42,000
men in the ranks. At the same time, a Volunteer Army was being
speedily raised and equipped. By proclamation of April 2-3d,
the President called for 125,000 volunteers, to be
apportioned, as far as practicable, among the states and
territories, according to population. On the 25th of May he
called for 75,000 more. Before the end of May, 118,580
enlisted volunteers, with 6,224 officers, were reported to
have been mustered in. These were assembled in various camps
and prepared for service in a more or less hurried way. At the
beginning, six army corps were constituted, embracing both the
Regular and Volunteer branches of the army. The First Corps,
under Major General John R. Brooke, and the Third under Major
General James F. Wade, were organized at Camp Thomas, Georgia.
The Second was organized under Major General William M.
Graham, at Camp Alger, near Falls Church, Virginia. The
organization of the Fourth Corps, Major General John J.
Coppinger, commanding, was begun at Mobile, Alabama. The Fifth
Corps was organized at Tampa, Florid., under Major General
William R. Shafter.
{592}
A Sixth Corps, which had been provided for, was never
organized; but the Seventh was formed, at Tampa, Florida,
under Major General Fitzhugh Lee. Subsequently an Eighth Corps
was concentrated at San Francisco, and transported to the
Philippine Islands. Tampa, Florida, was the port chosen for
the shipment of troops to Cuba, and extensive preparations
were made for the transport service from that point. The
movement waited, first, for the preparation of newly levied
troops, and, secondly, for naval operations to make the voyage
of transports to Cuba safe from attack.
Annual Report of the Adjutant-General to the
Major-General Commanding the Army, 1898.
Among the Volunteer regiments organized, one known as that of
"the Rough Riders" excited public interest in the greatest
degree. "The moment that the newspapers sent broadcast the
tale that such a regiment was contemplated, excitement began
in nearly every State in the Union, and did not end until the
announcement was made that the regiment was complete. As it
stood, finished, the troops which made it up, theoretically
came from the following sections, although men from the East
and from other States and Territories were scattered through
each troop. Troops A, B, and C, from Arizona. Troop D, from
Oklahoma. Troops E, F, G, H, and I, from New Mexico. Troop K,
from Eastern colleges and cities. Troops L and M, from Indian
Territory.
"Senator Warren, of Iowa, is responsible for the idea of the
Rough Riders. He introduced and carried through Congress,
aided by Senators Kyle, Carter, and others, a bill authorizing
the enrollment of three regiments, to be made up of expert
hunters, riflemen, cow-men, frontiersmen, and such other hardy
characters as might care to enlist from the Territories.
Captain Leonard Wood, of the Medical Corps, was the
President's chief medical adviser, and had had much experience
in Indian fighting in the West. Theodore Roosevelt was
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and had had some knowledge of
men and things on the frontier, through his life on his Own
and other ranches. It was the President's intention to offer
to Wood the colonelcy of one regiment, to Roosevelt the
colonelcy of a second, and to Griggsby, of Montana, the
colonelcy of a third. Wood and Roosevelt received their offers
at about the same moment. Roosevelt promptly declined his, on
the theory that he had not had sufficient military experience
to warrant him in taking command of a regiment. He asked that
he might be given the second place in the regiment commanded
by Wood, which was done. Thus the Rough Riders began.
"Alexander Brodie, who afterwards became major of the
regiment, was probably the first man to systematically start
towards the organization of this particular regiment. … It was
on the 3d of May that the Arizona men started for San Antonio.
It was on the 8th of May that the very last men of all—those
of K Troop—left Washington for San Antonio. These were the
'dude warriors,' the 'dandy troopers,' the 'gilded gang.' When
their train pulled into San Antonio, and they started
stragglingly to march into camp, they encountered a contingent
of 340 cowboys from New Mexico. Oil and water are not farther
removed than were the everyday natures of these two groups of
men. Yet, instantly they fraternized, and from that
moment—through the hardships of it all—these men were
brothers. … Probably no military organization has ever been
made up of men selected from so large a number of applicants,
or of men so carefully selected. … A large delegation of men
from Harvard College called upon Roosevelt one day in
Washington and offered their services in a body. Indeed,
delegations of that kind from most of the Eastern Colleges
went to him, but went to him in vain. His secretary answered
more than five thousand individual applications for places in
the regiment, and answered ninety-nine per cent. of them with
declinations."
E. Marshall,
The Story of the Rough Riders,
chapter 1
(Copyright, G. W. Dillingham & Co., New York).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Cuba)
War with Spain.
Blockade of Cuban ports.
On the 21st of April, the following instructions were
despatched by the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral
Sampson, appointed that day to the command of the naval force
on the Atlantic Station: "You will immediately institute a
blockade of the north coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas
on the east to Bahia Honda on the west; also, if in your
opinion your force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the
south side of the island. It is considered doubtful if the
present force at your command would warrant a more extensive
blockade. It should be borne in mind that whenever the Army is
ready to embark for Cuba the Navy will be required to furnish
the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it
does not seem desirable that you should undertake at present
to blockade any more of the island than has been indicated. It
is believed that this blockade will cut off Havana almost
entirely from receiving supplies from the outside. The Navy
Department is considering the question of occupying the port
of Matanzas by a military force large enough to hold it and to
open communications with the insurgents, and this may be done
at an early date, even before the main party of the Army is
ready to embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are
directed to co-operate with the Army and assist with such
vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a
movement."
Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,
volume 2, page 175.
In previous confidential orders to the commander of the North
Atlantic squadron, issued April 6, in anticipation of
hostilities, the Department had directed as follows: "In the
event of hostilities with Spain, the Department wishes you to
do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war
vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats
which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.
"2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron
to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago
de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the
more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within
those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest
that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats
might accomplish the desired object, viz, the destruction of
the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own
men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two
reasons for this: First. There may be no United States troops
to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and
arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of
October. Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it
particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled
before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable
vessels.
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"3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you
will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the
ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de
Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause
the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over."
Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,
volume 2, page 171.
The prudent policy here set forth restricted the action of the
fleet to blockading duty so closely, during the early weeks of
the war, that no serious demonstrations against the Spanish
land batteries were made. Admiral Sampson had been urgent for
permission to force the entrance to Havana harbor, before its
defenses were strengthened, expressing perfect confidence that
he could silence the western batteries, and reach a position
from which the city would be at the mercy of his guns; but he
was not allowed to make the attempt. The projected occupation
of Matanzas was not undertaken.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Philippines).
Statements of the circumstances in which Aguinaldo, the
head of the insurrectionary movement in the Philippines,
went to Manila, to co-operate with the American forces.
On the 4th of May, 1898, the following was published in the
"Singapore Free Press": "General Emilio Aguinaldo, accompanied
by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Marcelo H. del Pilar, and his
private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in
Singapore from Saigon on April 21, 1898. In Saigon, where
Aguinaldo had remained for one week, he had interviews with
one or two old Philippino friends now resident there. The
special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to
consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray,
an old and intimate English friend, for fifteen years resident
in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands
generally—particularly as to the possibility of war between
the United States and Spain, and whether, in such an event,
the United States would eventually recognize the independence
of the Philippines, provided he lent his co-operation to the
Americans in the conquest of the country. The situation of the
moment was this, that the conditions of the honorable peace
concluded on December 14, 1897, between President Aguinaldo,
on behalf of the Philippine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General
Primo di Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out,
although their immediate execution had been vouched for in
that agreement. These reforms would have provided protection
to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of
the religious fraternities, would have secured improved civil
and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed, in many
ways, improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the
people. The repudiation by the Spanish Government of these
conditions, made by General Primo di Rivera, now left the
rebel leaders, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong,
free to act. And it was in pursuance of that freedom of action
that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his friends in Saigon
and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of
operations in the Philippines.
"Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on
matters connected with the Philippines has been very
considerable, as our readers will have seen, was introduced by
the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt,
consul-general of the United States, who was anxious, in view
of contingencies, to learn as much as possible about the real
condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after this
that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once
met his friends, including Mr. Bray. Affairs now becoming more
warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. Spencer Pratt,
eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and
General Aguinaldo, which took place late on the evening of
Sunday, the 24th April, at 'The Mansion,' River Valley road.
There were present on that occasion General Emilio Aguinaldo y
Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of
America; Mr. Howard W. Bray; Aguinaldo's private secretary,
Mr. J. Leyba; Colonel M. H. del Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino
Santos.
"During this conference, at which Mr. Bray acted as
interpreter, General Aguinaldo explained to the American
consul-general, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of the
late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of
the country. General Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the
nature of the co-operation he could give, in which he, in the
event of the American forces from the squadron landing and
taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order
and discipline amongst the native troops and inhabitants in
the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the
war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenceless
Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare.
He further declared his ability to establish a proper and
responsible government on liberal principles, and would be
willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United
States intend giving to Cuba.
"The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the
general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself
at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at
Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent interchange of
telegrams consequently took place. As a result another private
interview was arranged at the American consular residence at
the Raffles Hotel between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer
Pratt, Mr. Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to
General Aguinaldo. As a sequel to this interview, and in
response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, General
Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available
steamer, the Peninsular and Oriental 'Malacca,' on Tuesday,
the 26th April, at noon, accompanied by his aide-de-camp,
Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private secretary. …
"Throughout the whole stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore
the editor was kept fully informed daily of the progress of
affairs. Naturally, however, all statement of what occurred
has been withheld by us until what has been deemed the fitting
moment has arrived. The substance of the whole incident in its
relations to the recent course of affairs in the Philippines
has been very fully telegraphed by the editor both to New York
and London."
{594}
Mr. Pratt, the U. S. Consul-General at Singapore, had already,
under date of April 28, given his own official report of the
interview with General Aguinaldo, to the Department at
Washington, as follows:
"I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th
instant, and confirmed in my dispatch Number 211 of that date,
a telegram which deciphered read as follows. … 'General
Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey
co-operation insurgents Manila.
PRATT.'
"The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday the 23d
instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here,
incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents,
General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. H. W. Bray, an English gentleman
of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a
merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by
the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish
misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom
I had previously obtained much valuable information for
Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc.,
at different points in the islands. Being aware of the great
prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no
one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same
influence and control that he could, I determined at once to
see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was
accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the
24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present
the General's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as
interpreter.
"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the
state of and object sought to be obtained by the present
insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the
Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself,
whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the
Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent
action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the
expediency of co-operating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,
and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed
thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should
the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day
as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:
'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange
with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if
desired. Telegraph.
PRATT.'
"The Commodore's reply reading thus:
'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.
DEWEY.'
"I received it late that night, and at once communicated to
General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private
secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off
by the British steamer 'Malacca,' which left here on Tuesday,
the 26th. Just previous to his departure, I had a second and
last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of
which I shall give you by next mail. The general impressed me
as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the
confidence that had been placed in him.
"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with
the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible
conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and
administering the Philippines. If this course of mine meets
with the Government's approval, as I trust it may, I shall be
fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due
some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.
How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to
decide."
Two days later (April 30), Mr. Pratt reported further, as
follows: "Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th
instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and
last interview I had with General Emilio Aguinaldo, on the eve
of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the
necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting
absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no
excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American
Government, the President having declared that the present
hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord
with modern principles of civilized warfare. To this General
Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was
perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the
insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should
direct. The general further stated that he hoped the United
States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least
long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government
of their own, in the organization of which he would desire
American advise and assistance. These questions I told him I
had no authority to discuss."
Of the arrival of Aguinaldo at Hongkong and his conveyance
thence to Manila, the following account was given by Mr.
Wildman, the U. S. Consul at Hongkong, in a communication to
the State Department at Washington, which bears date July 18:
"On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately called
on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from
Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States
ship 'McCulloch,' and I put him aboard in the night so as to
save any complications with the local Government. Immediately
on the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavite he issued a
proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left,
forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offense to
maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of
which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he
hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date
until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful
in the field and dignified and just as the head of his
government. According to his own statements to me by letter,
he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the Germans,
and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic Church.
He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Consul
Williams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of
moment has occurred which would lead anyone to believe that he
was not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in
this consulate. The insurgents are fighting for freedom from
the Spanish rule, and rely upon the well-known sense of
justice that controls all the actions of our Government as to
their future."
{595}
In reply to Consul Pratt's report of his interviews with
General Aguinaldo, and of his proceedings in connection with
the departure of that personage from Singapore to Hongkong,
the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Day, wrote, June 16,
as follows: "The Department observes that you informed General
Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United
States; and, in the absence of the fuller report which you
promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this
Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To
obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General
Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so
doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be
practicable to gratify. This Government has known the
Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious
subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes.
While their contest with that power has been a matter of
public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from
this Government any recognition. The United States, in
entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of
its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the
exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and
will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their
former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience
which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of
your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the
assumption that this government would cooperate with him for
the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting
his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize
any political claims which he may put forward, your action was
unauthorized and cannot be approved."
Treaty of Peace, and Accompanying Papers
(55th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document Number 62,
part 2, pages 337-354).
See, also (in this volume),
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1806-1808.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-June).
The War with Spain.
Movements or the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera,
and the blockading of it in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.
Lieutenant Hobson's exploit.
The sinking of the collier "Merrimac" in the channel.
The opening of hostilities found a Spanish squadron of four
armored cruisers (the "Cristobal Colon," the "Almirante
Oquendo," the "Vizcaya," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa,") with
three torpedo-boat destroyers (the "Pluton," "Furor" and
"Terror") and some lighter craft, assembled at the Cape Verde
islands, under Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera. They were in
Portuguese waters, and Portugal, though friendly to Spain, was
forced to issue a proclamation of neutrality, on the 20th of
April, which required the Spanish fleet to depart. Some of the
vessels then returned to Spain; but the seven named above
sailed westward, and their destination became a mystery, very
exciting for some time to the American mind. They might
attempt to surprise some American coast city; they might
intercept the battle-ship "Oregon," then making her way from
the Pacific coast, by the long circuit around Cape Horn; they
might have some plan for breaking the Cuban blockade. Acting
on the latter conjecture, and surmising that Porto Rico would
be chosen for the Spanish naval base, Admiral Sampson moved in
that direction to seek them. He attacked the forts at San Juan
(May 12), and satisfied himself that no fleet was in the bay.
The truth was that Cervera was then just entering the
Caribbean Sea, considerably to the south of Sampson's search.
He touched at the French island of Martinique, and at the
Dutch island of Curaçoa, and then slipped across to Santiago
de Cuba, where he was to be overtaken by his fate. In the long
hill-sheltered bay, with a narrow entrance, which forms this
excellent Cuban harbor, the Spanish fleet was so hidden that
nearly a fortnight passed before its whereabouts could be
fully ascertained. It was not until May 20 that a blockade of
Santiago was established by a flying squadron of the American
fleet, under Commodore Schley, with certainty that the
squadron of Cervera was harbored there. On the 1st of June,
Admiral Sampson arrived on the scene, with a stronger naval
force, and took command. To attempt to force the narrow
entrance of the harbor, strongly fortified and thickly mined
as it was, and attack the Spanish fleet in the bay, was not
deemed practicable. The course resolved upon was to hold the
enemy fast in the shelter he had sought, until Santiago could
be taken, by a land attack. In pursuance of this plan, an
exploit of splendid daring was performed, in the early morning
of June 3, by a young officer, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson
Hobson, with a crew of seven volunteers, who placed and sank a
huge coaling ship, the "Merrimac," in the channel that leads
into Santiago Bay. The following is Admiral Sampson's report
of the undertaking and its achievement:
"Before coming here, I decided to make the harbor entrance
secure against the possibility of egress of the Spanish ships
by obstructing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a
collier at that point. Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his
professional opinion as to a sure method of sinking the ship,
he manifested a most lively interest in the problem. After
several days' consideration he presented a solution which he
considered would insure the immediate sinking of the ship when
she had reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we
prepared for before we reached Santiago. This plan included
ten electric torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each of 78
pounds of gunpowder, sinking the ship partially before going
in, cutting the sea valves, and opening the cargo ports. The
plan contemplated a crew of only seven men and Mr. Hobson, who
begged that it might be intrusted to him. The anchor chains
were ranged upon deck for both the anchors, forward and aft,
the plan including the anchoring of the ship almost
automatically. As soon as I reached Santiago and had the
collier to work upon the details were commenced and diligently
prosecuted, hoping to complete them in one day, as the moon
and tide served best the first night after our arrival.
Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of 4 o'clock in the
morning arrived and the preparations were scarcely completed.
After a careful inspection of the final preparations I was
forced to relinquish the plan for that morning, as dawn was
breaking. Mr. Hobson begged to try it at all hazards.
"This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could
be made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. We
waited impatiently after the firing by the Spaniards had
ceased. When they did not reappear from the harbor at 6
o'clock I feared they had all perished. A steam launch, which
had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet Powell to rescue the
men, appeared at this time, coming out under a persistent fire
from the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A careful
inspection of the harbor from this ship showed that the
'Merrimac' had been sunk in the channel somewhat farther in
than had been intended.
{596}
This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cervera came out
under a flag of truce with a letter from the Admiral extolling
the bravery of the crew in an unusual manner. I can not myself
too earnestly express my appreciation of the conduct of Mr.
Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more
brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing blew up
the 'Albemarle.'" The sunken ship did not actually block the
channel; but that fact takes nothing from the gallantry of the
exploit. Why the intended spot in the channel was missed was
explained by Lieutenant Hobson in a statement which he
afterwards made: "When the 'Merrimac' poked her nose into the
channel," says the Lieutenant, "our troubles commenced. The
deadly silence was broken by the swash of a small boat
approaching us from the shore. I made her out to be a picket
boat. She ran close up under the stern of the 'Merrimac' and
fired several shots from what seemed to be 3 pounder guns. The
'Merrimac's' rudder was carried away by this fire. That is why
the collier was not sunk across the channel. We did not discover
the loss of the rudder until Murphy [the volunteer assigned to
that duty] had cast anchor. We then found that the 'Merrimac'
would not answer to the helm and were compelled to make the
best of the situation. … Submarine mines and torpedoes were
exploded all around us, adding to the excitement. The mines
did no damage, although we could hear the rumbling and feel
the ship tremble. We were running without lights, and only the
darkness saved us from utter destruction. When the ship was in
the desired position and we found that the rudder was gone, I
called the men on deck. While they were launching the
catamaran I touched off the explosives. At the same time two
torpedoes, fired by the 'Reina Mercedes,' struck the
'Merrimac' amidships. I can not say whether our own explosives
or the Spanish torpedoes did the work, but the 'Merrimac' was
lifted out of the water, and almost rent asunder."
What followed, in the experience of the crew, when their
vessel went down, is described as follows by Lieutenant
Hobson, in a narrative of "The Sinking of the Merrimac," which
he published at a later day: "The stricken vessel now reeled
to port. Some one said: 'She is going to turn over on us,
sir,' to which I replied: 'No; she will right herself in
sinking, and we shall be the last spot to go under.' The
firing suddenly ceased. The vessel lowered her head like a
faithful animal, proudly aware of its sacrifice, bowed below
the surface, and plunged forward. The stern rose and heeled
heavily; it stood for a moment, shuddering, then started
downward, righting as it went. A great rush of water came up
the gangway, seething and gurgling out of the deck. The mass
was whirling from right to left 'against the sun'; it seized
us and threw us against the bulwarks, then over the rail. Two
were swept forward as if by a momentary recession, and one was
carried down into a coal-bunker—luckless Kelly. In a moment,
however, with increased force, the water shot him up out of
the same hole and swept him among us. The bulwarks
disappeared. A sweeping vortex whirled above. We charged about
with casks, cans, and spars, the incomplete stripping having
left quantities on the deck. The life-preservers stood us in
good stead, preventing chests from being crushed, as well as
buoying us on the surface; for spars came end on like
battering-rams, and the sharp corners of tin cans struck us
heavily. … When we looked for the life-boat we found that it
had been carried away. The catamaran was the largest piece of
floating debris; we assembled about it. The line suspending it
from the cargo-boom held and anchored us to the ship, though
barely long enough to reach the surface, causing the raft to
turn over and set us scrambling as the line came taut.
"The firing had ceased. It was evident the enemy had not seen
us in the general mass of moving objects; but soon the tide
began to drift these away, and we were being left alone with
the catamaran. The men were directed to cling close in, bodies
below and only heads out, close under the edges, and were
directed not to speak above a whisper, for the destroyer was
near at hand, and boats were passing near. We mustered; all
were present, and direction was given to remain as we were
till further orders, for I was sure that in due time after
daylight a responsible officer would come out to reconnoiter.
It was evident that we could not swim against the tide to
reach the entrance. Moreover, the shores were lined with
troops, and the small boats were looking for victims that
might escape from the vessel. The only chance lay in remaining
undiscovered until the coming of the reconnoitering boat, to
which, perhaps, we might surrender without being fired on. …
The air was chilly and the water positively cold. In less than
five minutes our teeth were chattering; so loud, indeed, did
they chatter that it seemed the destroyer or the boats would
hear. … We remained there probably an hour."
At daylight a steam launch approached, and was hailed by
Lieutenant Hobson, who judged that there must be officers on
board to whom it would be safe to surrender. He was more than
right. The commander of the launch was Admiral Cervera, in
person, who took the nearly exhausted men from the water and
treated them with great kindness, admiring the bravery of
their exploit, and sending a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson
to announce their safety. They were taken aboard the 'Reina
Mercedes,' and, as prisoners of war, were confined at first in
Morro Castle, and afterwards in the city. It so happened that
they were locked in the Morro during a bombardment of the
Spanish coast defences and fleet by ten of our vessels on June
6th, when about 1,500 projectiles were fired; and much anxiety
and indignation were expressed in this country in view of that
circumstance; but Mr. Ramsden, British consul at Santiago,
explained in a despatch that they were removed as soon as
lodgings could be prepared in the barracks—actually on June
7th. They were released on July 6th in exchange for prisoners
captured by our forces.
{597}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-July).
War with Spain,
Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.
Despatches of Admiral Dewey.
His relations with Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief.
Arrival of American troops for the occupation of the city.
Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic Squadron, then
awaiting orders at Hongkong, received on the 25th of April the
following despatch by cable from the Secretary of the Navy: "War
has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at
once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once,
particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture
vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." On the sixth day
after receiving these orders (namely on May 1st), he was able
to report from Manila, by a telegram sent from Hongkong on the
7th: "The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning.
Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish
vessels: 'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de
Biloa,' 'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de
Cuba,' 'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Curreo,'
'Velasco,' one transport, 'Isla de Mandano,' water battery at
Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The
squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I
request the Department will send immediately from San
Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of
telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong."
In due time the post brought particulars of the action, in the
following report from Commodore Dewey, dated May 4: "The
squadron left Mirs Bay, [China] on April 27, immediately on
the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at
Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies
the squadron. Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30
and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and
arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon.
The 'Boston' and 'Concord' were sent to reconnoiter Port
Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take
position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the
'Boston' and 'Concord,' but the Spanish fleet was not found,
although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal (
inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their
intention to go there. Entered the Boca Grande, or south
channel, at 11.30 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8
knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the
south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots
taking effect. The 'Boston' and 'McCulloch' returned the fire.
The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and
arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 a.
m. by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the
Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line
across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water
in Canacao Bay. The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the
flagship 'Olympia,' under my personal direction, leading,
followed at distance by the 'Baltimore,' 'Raleigh,' 'Petrel,'
'Concord,' and 'Boston,' in the order named, which formation

was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire
at 5.41 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were
exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective. The
squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges
varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, countermarching in a line
approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The
enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective.
"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the
'Olympia' with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One
was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before
an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish
flagship 'Reina Christina' made a desperate attempt to leave
the line and come out to engage at short range, but was
received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the
'Olympia' being concentrated upon her, that she was barely
able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started
in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until
she sank. At 7.35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported
to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch
rapid-fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron
for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if
necessary. The three batteries at Manila had kept up a
continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which
fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these
batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance
to the Pasig River, the second on the south bastion of the
walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-ha]f
mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the
Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not
cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of
silencing them.
"At 11.16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of
ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the
attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire
Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 p. m. the squadron
ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships
sunk, burnt, and deserted. At 12.40 p. m. the squadron
returned and anchored off Manila, the 'Petrel' being left
behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats,
which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed
by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete
manner possible. The Spanish lost the following vessels:
Sunk—'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de Ulloa.'
Burnt—'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de Cuba,'
'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Correo,' 'Velasco,'
and 'Isla Mindanao,' (transport). Captured—'Rapido,' and
'Hercules' (tugs), and several small launches. I am unable to
obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded,
but believe their loss to be very heavy. The 'Reina Christina'
alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.
"I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron
under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed,
and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will
be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are
herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even
penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the
squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle. I
beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander
in chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more
loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the
squadron now under my command. … On May 2, the day following
the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it
remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and
magazines of the batteries there. … On the 3d the military
forces evacuated the Cavite Arsenal, which was taken
possession of by a landing party."
{598}
Promptly in response to this report of his victory, a joint
resolution of thanks to Commodore Dewey and his officers and
men, by the two Houses of Congress, was despatched to them,
with announcement to the former of his promotion to the rank
of rear-admiral. The admiral replied, on the 13th, from
Cavite, making due acknowledgments, and adding: "I am
maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe
rebels are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and
making no demonstrations. Great scarcity of provisions in the
city. I believe the Spanish Governor-General will be obliged
to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain
possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require,
in my best judgment, a well equipped force of 5,000 men."
On the 20th he reported, further: "Aguinaldo, the rebel
commander in chief, was brought down by the 'McCulloch' [from
Hongkong]. Organizing forces near Cavite and may render
assistance that will be valuable." On the 27th of June, in
reply to inquiries from the Navy Department, he explained his
relations with Aguinaldo, as follows: "Aguinaldo, insurgent
leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by
permission, on 'Nanshan.' Established self Cavite, outside
arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his
army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a
personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting
him in any way with the force under my command, and on several
occasions I have declined requests that I should do so,
telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of
the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to
understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being
opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of
insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil
government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron,
but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been
wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and
ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from
the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct
the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations
with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The
United States has not been bound in any way to assist
insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my
knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to
capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they
not yet having many guns. In my opinion these people are far
superior in their intelligence and more capable of
self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar
with both races."
Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, pages 67-72 and 103.
On the 30th of June, troops sent from San Francisco, to the
number of 2,500 officers and men, commanded by General T. M.
Anderson, arrived in Manila Bay, to co-operate with the navy
in taking Manila and occupying the city, when taken. They were
followed by a second expeditionary force, under General F. V.
Greene, which arrived July 17, and by a third, July 25 and 31,
with which came General Merritt, commanding the corps and the
Department of the Pacific. General Merritt's army then
numbered nearly 11,000 men, and it was increased during the
next few weeks to more than 15,000.
Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 499.
An English officer, Major Younghusband, who visited Manila at
this time, remarked: "It may, perhaps, with some confidence be
prophesied that when the cold fit, which will in due course
follow the warmth of the present enthusiasm, falls on the
nation, America will discover that the true parting of the
ways was … in having allowed Admiral Dewey to do more than
defeat the Spanish fleet and exact a heavy indemnity from the
city of Manila before sailing away." It would seem to be more
true, however, to say that the parting of the ways was when a
military expedition was sent from San Francisco to Manila, to
be landed, for the capture of the city and for the occupation
of the islands. It is claimed with reason that Admiral Dewey
could not "sail away," after the destruction of the Spanish
ships, because he needed the harbor he had seized, his fleet
having lost most of the privileges it had formerly been using
in neutral ports, when it became the fleet of a belligerent
power. To retain possession of Manila Bay while it was needed
by the American fleet was clearly a measure connected
legitimately with the general conduct of the war against
Spain. But it is difficult to see that the landing of soldiers
on the island of Luzon and the capture of the city of Manila
added anything to the security with which the Bay was held for
the purposes of Admiral Dewey's fleet, or that it contributed
at all to the weakening of Spain in the war, and to the rescue
of Cuba from Spanish misrule. For two months, from the first
day of May until the last day of June, before a soldier
arrived, and for six weeks longer, before Manila surrendered,
Admiral Dewey appears to have been as fully and as
conveniently in possession of all the advantages that
harborage there could give him, as he was after the Spanish
flag had been lowered in the city and on the island.
Therefore, the American conquest of the Philippines does not
readily connect itself with the war for the liberation of
Cuba, as a necessary part of it, but presents itself to the
mind as a somewhat supplementary enterprise, undertaken with
objects of its own.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (May-August).
Conduct of English and German naval officers at Manila.
While Admiral Dewey was holding Manila Bay, before the taking
of the city, there were many rumors and exciting stories
afloat, of offensive behavior towards the American fleet by
commanders of German war ships that were sent to the scene. As
far as possible, the facts were officially suppressed, in
order to avoid a quarrel between the two countries, and no
authoritative account of what occurred can be found. But some
incidents obtained publicity which are probably true in the
main. The first unpleasant happening appears to have been the
arrival in Manila Bay of a German naval vessel, which steamed
in with entire disregard of the blockading fleet, as though
the port was its own. Thereupon Admiral Dewey sent a forcible
reminder to the captain that he was intruding upon a blockade,
by firing a shot across his bow, and ordering him to heave to.
The German captain, in a rage, is said to have called on the
commanding officer of a British squadron that was in the Bay,
for advice as to what he should do, and was told that he owed
the American Admiral an apology for his violation of naval
etiquette, well settled for such circumstances as those
existing in Manila Bay. According to the story, the British
commander, Captain Sir Edward Chichester, himself on the best
of terms with Admiral Dewey, visited the latter, on behalf of
the German officer, and made the matter smooth.
{599}
But, either through indiscretion of his own, or because he had
instructions to interfere as much as possible with the
proceedings of the Americans, the German commander continued
to pursue an offensive course. According to report, be went so
far as to stop a movement which Aguinaldo (then a recognized
ally of the United States) was making, to take possession of a
certain island, and to capture some Spaniards who were on it.
This provoked Admiral Dewey to a demonstration against him so
threatening that he drew back in haste, and the island was
occupied.
According to all accounts, Admiral Dewey showed unsurpassed
wisdom and dignity in meeting and checking these offensive
proceedings without allowing them to become a cause of
international quarrel; and he was happily aided in doing so by
the hearty support of the British naval commander. According
to still another report of the time, a German admiral, who had
come upon the scene, meditated an interference to forbid the
bombarding of Manila, when the city was about to be attacked,
and, calling upon Sir Edward Chichester to ascertain what
action the latter would take, was significantly told, "That is
only known to Admiral Dewey and myself,"—which convinced him
that his project was not wise. An English writer has related,
with much satisfaction, that when Sir Edward's ship, the
"Immortalité," finally steamed out of Manila Bay, returning to
Hong Kong, "every ship in the American fleet manned her yards
and gave the British man-of-war three cheers as she passed
along; and she with the answering signal, 'thank you,' flying
at her mast-head, went on her way."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).
Act creating the United States Industrial Commission.
An Act "authorizing the appointment of a non-partisan
Commission to collate information and to consider and
recommend legislation to meet the problems presented by labor,
agriculture, and capital," was passed by Congress and approved
by the President June 18, 1898. It provided:
"That a commission is hereby created, to be called the
'Industrial Commission,' to be composed as follows. Five
members of the Senate, to be appointed by the presiding
officer thereof; five members of the House of Representatives,
to be appointed by the Speaker, and nine other persons, who shall
fairly represent the different industries and employments, to
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. … That it shall be the duty of this
commission to investigate questions pertaining to immigration,
to labor, to agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,
and to report to Congress and to suggest such legislation as
it may deem best upon these subjects. … That it shall furnish
such information and suggest such laws as may be made a basis
for uniform legislation by the various States of the Union, in
order to harmonize conflicting interests and to be equitable
to the laborer, the employer, the producer, and the consumer.
… That the commission shall give reasonable time for hearings,
if deemed necessary, and if necessary it may appoint a
subcommission or subcommissions of its own members to make
investigation in any part of the United States, and it shall
be allowed actual necessary expenses for the same. It shall
have the authority to send for persons and papers and to
administer oaths and affirmations. … That it may report from
time to time to the Congress of the United States, and shall
at the conclusion of its labors submit a final report."
The Commission thus contemplated was duly appointed by the
President, and organized by the election of Senator Kyle for
its chairman. For the scope and plan of its investigations a
committee on procedure made the following recommendations,
which were adopted by the Commission and which have been
followed in what it has done:
"The main work of the Commission may … be said to be to study
and compare existing laws bearing upon industrial conditions,
here and elsewhere, to ascertain by competent testimony
wherein they are deficient, defective, inoperative, or
oppressive, and to recommend such remedial statutes as will
tend not only to make the conditions of industry more uniform
as between the several States, but to remove such existing
sources or causes of discontent, inequality, and injustice as
can be reached and regulated through legislation. … In order
to secure satisfactory results, it appears to your committee
imperatively necessary that the work shall be confined
strictly to the main purpose, viz, of ascertaining the nature
and effects of existing legislation, and the nature of
remedial legislation which may be necessary or desirable to
equalize conditions in industry and to remove any just grounds
of complaint on the part of either labor or capital or of the
people at large.
"To facilitate the progress of the work we recommend the
division of the Commission into four subcommissions of five
members each, to be severally charged with the investigation
of present conditions and the formulation of remedial
suggestions in the following branches of industry:
1. On agriculture and agricultural labor.
2. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in
manufacturing and general business.
3. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in mining.
4. On transportation.
In addition, we recommend a fifth subcommission, to be known
as the subcommission on statistics, in the membership of which
there shall be one representative of each of the above
subcommissions. …
"The committee also suggests that there are certain subjects
of inquiry which appertain equally to all the groups into
which it has recommended that the Commission be segregated.
The subjects of immigration, of education, of combinations and
trusts, and of taxation at once suggest themselves as
belonging in this category. It is therefore recommended that
these subjects, one or more of them, be examined into by the
full Commission pending the organization of the several
subcommissions."
The subject to which the Commission gave earliest attention
was that of "Trusts and Industrial Combinations," on which it
submitted a preliminary report on the 1st of March, 1900.
See (in this volume)
TRUSTS.
{600}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).
Act providing for the arbitration of disputes between
employers and employees in inter-state commerce.
The following are the main sections of a very important Act of
Congress, approved June 1, 1898, which provides for the
arbitration of disputes between railway and other employees
engaged in interstate commerce and the companies or
individuals employing them:
"That the provisions of this Act shall apply to any common
carrier or carriers and their officers, agents, and employees,
except masters of vessels and seamen, … engaged in the
transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad,
or partly by railroad and partly by water, for a continuous
carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the
United States or the District of Columbia, to any other State
or Territory of the United States, or the District of
Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an
adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United
States through a foreign country to any other place in the
United States. …
"Section 2. That whenever a controversy concerning wages,
hours of labor, or conditions of employment shall arise
between a carrier subject to this Act and the employees of
such carrier, seriously interrupting or threatening to
interrupt the business of said carrier, the chairman of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor
shall, upon the request of either party to the controversy,
with all practicable expedition, put themselves in
communication with the parties to such controversy, and shall
use their best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to
amicably settle the same; and if such efforts shall be
unsuccessful, shall at once endeavor to bring about an
arbitration of said controversy in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
"Section 3. That whenever a controversy shall arise between a
carrier subject to this Act and the employees of such carrier
which can not be settled by mediation and conciliation in the
manner provided in the preceding section, said controversy may
be submitted to the arbitration of a board of three persons,
who shall be chosen in the manner following: One shall be
named by the carrier or employer directly interested; the
other shall be named by the labor organization to which the
employees directly interested belong, or, if they belong to
more than one, by that one of them which specially represents
employees of the same grade and class and engaged in services
of the same nature as said employees so directly interested:
Provided, however, That when a controversy involves and
affects the interests of two or more classes and grades of
employees belonging to different labor organizations, such
arbitrator shall be agreed upon and designated by the
concurrent action of all such labor organizations; and in
cases where the majority of such employees are not members of
any labor organization, said employees may by a majority vote
select a committee of their own number, which committee shall
have the right to select the arbitrator on behalf of said
employees. The two thus chosen shall select the third
commissioner of arbitration; but, in the event of their
failure to name such arbitrator within five days after their
first meeting, the third arbitrator shall be named by the
commissioners named in the preceding section. A majority of
said arbitrators shall be competent to make a valid and
binding award under the provisions hereof. The submission
shall be in writing, shall be signed by the employer and by
the labor organization representing the employees, shall
specify the time and place of meeting of said board of
arbitration, shall state the questions to be decided, and
shall contain appropriate provisions by which the respective
parties shall stipulate, as follows:
"First. That the board of arbitration shall commence their
hearings within ten days from the date of the appointment of
the third arbitrator, and shall find and file their award, as
provided in this section, within thirty days from the date of
the appointment of the third arbitrator; and that pending the
arbitration the status existing immediately prior to the
dispute shall not be changed: Provided, That no employee shall
be compelled to render personal service without his consent.
"Second. That the award and the papers and proceedings,
including the testimony relating thereto certified under the
hands of the arbitrators and which shall have the force and
effect of a bill of exceptions, shall be filed in the clerk's
office of the circuit court of the United States for the
district wherein the controversy arises or the arbitration is
entered into, and shall be final and conclusive upon both
parties, unless set aside for error of law apparent on the
record.
"Third. That the respective parties to the award will each
faithfully execute the same, and that the same may be
specifically enforced in equity so far as the powers of a
court of equity permit: Provided, That no injunction or other
legal process shall be issued which shall compel the
performance by any laborer against his will of a contract for
personal labor or service.
"Fourth. That employees dissatisfied with the award shall not
by reason of such dissatisfaction quit the service of the
employer before the expiration of three months from and after
the making of such award without giving thirty days' notice in
writing of their intention so to quit. Nor shall the employer
dissatisfied with such award dismiss any employee or employees
on account of such dissatisfaction before the expiration of three
months from and after the making of such award without giving
thirty days' notice in writing of his intention so to
discharge.
"Fifth. That said award shall continue in force as between the
parties thereto for the period of one year after the same
shall go into practical operation, and no new arbitration upon
the same subject between the same employer and the same class
of employees shall be had until the expiration of said one
year if the award is not set aside as provided in section
four. That as to individual employees not belonging to the
labor organization or organizations which shall enter into the
arbitration, the said arbitration and the award made therein
shall not be binding, unless the said individual employees
shall give assent in writing to become parties to said
arbitration. …
"Section 7. That during the pendency of arbitration under this
Act it shall not be lawful for the employer, party to such
arbitration, to discharge the employees, parties thereto,
except for inefficiency, violation of law, or neglect of duty;
nor for the organization representing such employees to order,
nor for the employees to unite in, aid, or abet, strikes
against said employer; nor, during a period of three months
after an award under such an arbitration, for such an employer
to discharge any such employees, except for the causes
aforesaid, without giving thirty days' written notice of an
intent so to discharge; nor for any of such employees, during
a like period, to quit the service of said employer without
just cause, without giving to said employer thirty days'
written notice of an intent so to do; nor for such
organization representing such employees to order, counsel, or
advise otherwise.
{601}
Any violation of this section shall subject the offending
party to liability for damages; Provided, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent any employer, party to
such arbitration, from reducing the number of its or his
employees whenever in its or his judgment business necessities
require such reduction. …
"Section 10. That any employer subject to the provisions of
this Act and any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer
who shall require any employee, or any person seeking
employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into
an agreement, either written or verbal, not to become or
remain a member of any labor corporation, association, or
organization; or shall threaten any employee with loss of
employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any
employee because of his membership in such a labor
corporation, association, or organization; or who shall
require any employee or any person seeking employment, as a
condition of such employment, to enter into a contract whereby
such employee or applicant for employment shall agree to
contribute to any fund for charitable, social or beneficial
purposes; to release such employer from legal liability for
any personal injury by reason of any benefit received from
such fund beyond the proportion of the benefit arising from
the employer's contribution to such fund; or who shall, after
having discharged an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent
such employee from obtaining employment, or who shall, after
the quitting of an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent
such employee from obtaining employment, is hereby declared to
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof in
any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in
the district in which such offense was committed, shall be
punished for each offense by a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars."
United States Statutes at Large,
volume 30, page 424.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).
The War with Spain.
Seizure of the island of Guam.
The following order, dated May 10, 1898, was addressed by the
Secretary of the Navy to the Commander of the U. S. S.
'Charleston':
"Upon the receipt of this order, which is forwarded by the
steamship 'City of Pekin' to you at Honolulu, you will proceed
with the 'Charleston' and 'City of Pekin' in company, to
Manila, Philippine Islands. On your way, you are hereby
directed to stop at the Spanish Island of Guam. You will use
such force as may be necessary to capture the port of Guam,
making prisoners of the governor and other officials and any
armed force that may be there. You will also destroy any
fortifications on said island and any Spanish naval vessels
that may be there, or in the immediate vicinity. These
operations at the Island of Guam should be very brief, and
should not occupy more than one or two days. Should you find
any coal at the Island of Guam, you will make such use of it
as you consider desirable. It is left to your discretion
whether or not you destroy it. From the Island of Guam,
proceed to Manila and report to Rear-Admiral George Dewey, U.
S. N., for duty in the squadron under his command."
In a despatch dated June 24, Captain Glass, of the
"Charleston," reported the execution of these orders as
follows: "I have the honor to report that in obedience to the
Department's telegraphic order of May 24, 1898, this ship
sailed from Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, on the 4th instant for
Manila with the transports 'City of Pekin,' 'Australia,' and
'City of Sydney' under convoy. When clear of land, I opened
the confidential order of May 10, 1898, and changed course for
the Island of Guam, next day informing Commander Gibson, in
charge of transports, and Brigadier-General Anderson,
commanding expeditionary force, of the change in my orders and
that the transports would accompany the 'Charleston.' Arriving
off the north end of the island at daylight, June 20, I first
visited the port of Agana, the capital of Guam, and of the
Mariana group, and finding no vessels there of any kind,
proceeded to San Luis D'Apra, where it was expected that a
Spanish gunboat and a military force would be found, a rumor
to that effect having reached me while at Honolulu. Arriving
off the port at 8.30 a. m., it was found that Fort Santiago,
on Oroté Point, was abandoned and in ruins, and I steamed
directly into the harbor, having ordered the transports to
take a safe position outside and await instructions. A few
shots were fired from the secondary battery at Fort Santa Cruz
to get the range and ascertain if it was occupied. Getting no
response, ceased firing and came to anchor in a position to
control the harbor, and it was then found that this fort also
was abandoned. The only vessel in port was a small Japanese
trading vessel from Yokohama. An officer had just shoved off
from the ship to board the Japanese vessel, and obtain
information as to the condition of affairs on shore, when a
boat was seen approaching the ship, through the reefs at the
head of the harbor, flying the Spanish flag and bringing two
officers, the captain of the port, a lieutenant-commander in
the Spanish navy, and the health officer, a surgeon of the
Spanish army. These officers came on board, and, in answer to
my questions, told me they did not know that war had been
declared between the United States and Spain, their last news
having been from Manila, under date of April 14. I informed
them that war existed and that they must consider themselves
as prisoners. As they stated that no resistance could be made
by the force on the island, I released them on parole for the
day, to proceed to Agana and inform the governor that I
desired him to come on board ship at once, they assuring me
that he would do so as soon as he could reach the port. While
awaiting the return of these officers, an examination was made
of the harbor, the only dangers to navigation were buoyed, and
the transports came in during the afternoon.
"At 5 p. m. the governor's secretary, a captain in the Spanish
army, came on board, bringing me a letter from the governor,
in which he stated that he was not allowed by law to go on
board a foreign vessel and requested me to meet him on shore
for a conference. This letter is appended, marked A. As it was
then too late to land a party, from the state of the tide on
the reef between the ship and the landing place, I directed
the secretary to return and say to the governor that I would
send an officer ashore with a communication for him early next
day.
{602}
… At 8.30 a. m. on June 21 Lieutenant William Braunersreuther
was sent ashore, under flag of truce, with a written demand
for the immediate surrender of the defenses of the Island of
Guam and all officials and persons in the military service of
Spain. Mr. Braunersreuther was directed to wait half an hour
only for a reply, to bring the governor and other officials on
board as prisoners of war in case of surrender, or in case of
refusal or delay beyond the time given, to return and take
command of the landing force, which he would find in
readiness, and proceed to Agaña. At 12.15 p. m. Mr.
Braunersreuther returned to the ship, bringing off the
governor and three other officers, his staff, and handed me a
letter from the governor acceding fully to my demand. Having
received the surrender of the Island of Guam, I took formal
possession at 2.45 p. m., hoisting the American flag on Fort
Santa Cruz and saluting it with 21 guns from the 'Charleston.'
From a personal examination of Fort Santa Cruz, I decided that
it was entirely useless as a defensive work, with no guns and
in a partly ruinous condition, and that it was not necessary
to expend any mines in blowing it up. The forts at Agaña, San
Luis D'Apra, and Umata are of no value and no guns remain in
the island except four small cast-iron guns of obsolete
pattern at Agaña, formerly used for saluting, but now
condemned as unsafe even for that purpose. No Spanish vessel
of war has visited Guam during the last eighteen months. No
coal was found on the island."
Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1898,
volume 2, pages 151-3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June-July).
War with Spain.
Expedition of the army under General Shafter
against Santiago de Cuba.
Battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill.
To co-operate with the navy in operations for the capture of
Santiago de Cuba, and of the Spanish fleet blockaded in the
harbor of that town, orders were issued from Washington on the
31st of May, by Major-General Miles, Commanding the Army,
"with the approval of the Secretary of War," which directed
General Shafter, commanding the forces assembled at Tampa,
Florida, to place them on transports and proceed with them,
under convoy of the navy, to Santiago. Owing to an extreme
lack of both railway and harbor facilities at Tampa, an entire
week was consumed in the embarkation of the troops and
supplies. When on shipboard, the expedition was delayed
another week by false reports of the appearance of Spanish
cruisers on the Cuban coast, which seemed to the Washington
authorities to call for a stronger naval convoy to guard the
transport fleet. It was not until the 14th of June that the
fleet was permitted to sail, with 16,000 men. It arrived off
Guantanamo, near Santiago, on the morning of the 20th.
Meantime, the blockading fleet had bombarded the forts at
Santiago twice, on the 6th and on the 16th, and had silenced
them, for the time being, on both occasions, but apparently
with no permanent effect. With more success, two vessels from
the fleet had entered the harbor of Guantanamo on the 7th and
taken possession of the lower bay, where a marine battalion
was landed on the 10th and established in camp, to hold ground
until the army arrived. Meantime, also, communication with
General Garcia, commanding Cuban forces, had been opened, and
arrangements made, the results of which were subsequently
acknowledged by General Miles, in his annual report, as
follows:
"General Garcia regarded my requests as his orders, and
promptly took steps to execute the plan of operations. He sent
3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 Spaniards
stationed at Holguín. A portion of this latter force started
to the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was
successfully checked and turned back by the Cuban forces under
General Feria. General Garcia also sent 2,000 men, under
Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guantánamo, and they
were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, under
General Ríos, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this
garrison, 3,500 started to reenforce the garrison at Santiago,
and were engaged in no less than thirty combats with the
Cubans on their way before reaching Santiago. … With an
additional force of 5,000 men General Garcia besieged the
garrison of Santiago, taking up a strong position on the west
side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards
received General Shafter and Admiral Sampson at his camp near
that place. He had troops in the rear, as well as on both
sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our
troops."
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 16.
The troops from Tampa, under General Shafter, arriving on the
20th, were disembarked on the 22d, 23d and 24th, at Daiquiri,
and advanced to Siboney. The first resistance encountered was
at La Guasima, three miles from Siboney, on the Santiago road,
where the Spaniards were driven from strong entrenchments by a
part of Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division
(dismounted). The brigade thus first in the fighting was
composed of the 1st and 10th regiments of regular cavalry and
the 1st United States Volunteer cavalry, commonly called the
"Rough Riders." After the engagement at La Guasima, six days
were occupied in concentrating the army (including the Cuban
auxiliaries of General Garcia), mostly at Sevilla, a short
distance beyond La Guasima, on the same road, and in
overcoming great difficulties of transportation for supplies.
On June 30, General Shafter reconnoitered the country around
Santiago and made his plan of attack. "From a high hill," says
his subsequent report, "from which the city was in plain view,
I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The
roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than
bridlepaths, until the San Juan River and El Caney were
reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of
Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the
Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong
outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear
of any force operating against San Juan Hill. In view of this
I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one
division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to
Santiago, passing by El Poso House, and, as a diversion, to
direct a small force against Aguadores from Siboney along the
railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention
of the Spaniards in the latter direction and of preventing
them from attacking our left flank.
"During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and
explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton's division
[composed of Chaffee's, Miles' and Ludlow's brigades],
assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out
during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack
there early the next morning.
{603}

Map Illustrating the Santiago Campaign…
{604}
After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney road
toward Santiago and take position on the right of the line.
Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry [embracing Sumner's
brigade—3d, 6th and 9th regular cavalry, and Young's brigade
mentioned above] and Kent's division of infantry [Wikoft's,
Hawkins's and Pearson's brigades] were directed on the
Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Poso,
toward which heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon
of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the
next morning and at the proper time prepare the way for the
advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at
this point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard
at El Caney and his infantry fire showed he had become well
engaged.
"The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to
cutting out and repairing the roads and to other necessary
preparations for battle. These preparations were far from what
I desired them to be; but we were in a sickly climate; our
supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road,
which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was
entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing
our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of
supplies; and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with
8,000 reenforcements for the enemy, was en route from
Manzanillo and might be expected in a few days. Under those
conditions I determined to give battle without delay.
"Early on the morning of July 1, Lawton was in position around
El Caney, Chaffee's brigade [7th, 12th, and 13th U. S.
Infantry] on the right, across the Guantanamo road; Miles's
brigade [1st, 4th, and 25th U. S. Infantry] in the center, and
Ludlow's [8th and 22d U. S. Infantry and 2d Microcassettes
Volunteers] on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's
retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to the latter
brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6.15 A. M. The
battle here soon became general and was hotly contested. The
enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more so
by blockhouses, a stone fort, and entrenchments cut in solid
rock, and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The
opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been
anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right of
the main line during the day, as had been intended.
"After the battle had continued for some time Bates's brigade
of two regiments (3d and 20th United States Infantry] reached
my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El
Caney, to give assistance, if necessary. He did so and was put
in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued
with varying intensity during most of the day and until the
place was carried by assault, about 4.30 p. m. As the
Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road,
Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective work and to
practically cut off all retreat in that direction.
"After the battle at El Caney was well opened and the sound of
the small-arms fire caused us to believe that Lawton was
driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery to
open fire from the heights of El Poso on the San Juan'
blockhouse, which could be seen situated in the enemy's
entrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This
fire was effective and the enemy could be seen running away
from the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from
El Poso was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They
evidently had the range of this hill, and their first shells
killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used
smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions
of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our
black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.
"At this time the cavalry division [of General Wheeler] under
General Sumner (commanding temporarily in consequence of the
illness of General Wheeler, who returned to duty that day],
which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El
Poso House, was ordered forward, with directions to cross the
San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago side,
while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear and
deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance
with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it
impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all
points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as
to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It
naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the
long range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a
number of our men while marching along this road and before
there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time
Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all
possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the
enemy. General Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of
his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the
narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the
San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred
yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that
was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of my staff, who
had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This
information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner
moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to
utilize the road to the left. … After crossing the stream, the
cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with
Lawton's left when he should come up, and with their left
resting near the Santiago road. In the meanwhile Kent's
division, with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins's
brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from
the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both
trails, but more especially the one to the left, and crossing
the creek formed for attack in the front of San Juan Hill."
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 147.
"The particulars of this gallant attack, which won the hill
and decided the fate of Santiago, are given with more
clearness in the report of General Kent, who commanded the
division which had most of the fighting to do, than in that of
General Shafter. Wikoff's 'heroic brigade,' writes General
Kent, 'consisting of the 13th, 9th, and 24th United States
Infantry, speedily crossed the stream and were quickly
deployed to the left of the lower ford.
{605}
While personally superintending this movement Colonel Wikoff
was killed, the command of the brigade then devolving upon
Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, who immediately fell
severely wounded, and then upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum,
24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the
withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then
devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, 9th Infantry.
Meanwhile I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward
the second brigade [Pearson's] which was bringing up the rear.
The 10th and 2d Infantry, soon arriving at the forks, were
deflected to the left to follow the Third Brigade [Wikoff's],
while the 21st was directed along the main road to support
Hawkins [whose brigade was composed of the 6th and 16th U. S.
Infantry and the 71st New York Volunteers].
"Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the 10th and 2d
moved forward in column in good order toward the green knoll …
on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deployed,
passed over the knoll, and ascended the high ridge beyond,
driving back the enemy in the direction of his trenches. I
observed this movement from the Fort San Juan Hill. … Prior to
this advance of the second brigade, the third, connecting with
Hawkins's gallant troops on the right, had moved toward Fort
San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire,
scaling a steep and difficult hill, and assisting in capturing
the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1.30 p. m. This
crest was about 125 feet above the general level and was
defended by deep trenches and a loopholed brick fort
surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. General Hawkins, some
time after I reached the crest, reported that the 6th and 16th
Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider
incorrect. Credit is almost equally due the 6th, 9th, 13th,
16th, and 24th regiments of infantry. … The Thirteenth
Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but
unfortunately destroyed them. …
"The greatest credit is due to the officers of my command,
whether company, battalion, regimental, or brigade commanders,
who so admirably directed the formation of their troops,
unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the
desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest, I
have already mentioned the circumstances of my third brigade's
advance across the ford, where, in the brief space of ten
minutes, it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two
ranking officers by disabling wounds; yet in spite of these
confusing conditions the formations were effected without
hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting
singly in some instances and by battalions and regiments in
others, rushing through the jungle, across the stream, waist
deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed-wire
entanglements. …
"The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle pits, I
directed my line to hold their positions and intrench. At ten
minutes past 3 p. m. I received almost simultaneously two
requests—one from Colonel Wood, commanding a cavalry brigade,
and one from General Sumner—asking for assistance for the
cavalry on my right, 'as they were hard pressed.' I
immediately sent to their aid the 13th Infantry, who promptly
went on this further mission, despite the heavy losses they
had already sustained. Great credit is due to the gallant
officer and gentleman, Brigadier General H. S. Hawkins, who,
placing himself between the two regiments, leading his
brigade, the 6th and 16th Infantry, urged and led them by
voice and bugle calls to the attack so successfully
accomplished."
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 164.
The part borne by the dismounted cavalry division in the
capture of the Spanish intrenchments on San Juan Hill is
described as follows in the report of General Sumner,
temporarily in command:
"After crossing the creek with sufficient strength to hold it
and protect the crossing, I received verbal orders to move by
the right flank to connect with Lawton's left. During the
execution of this movement a balloon, under command of Colonel
Derby, came up the road, forcing open Wood's Brigade and
cutting it in two, thereby delaying the movement. The
artillery fire of the enemy opened upon the balloon and
continued for more than an hour, thereby subjecting part of my
command massed and the rest moving by the flank to long
shrapnel fire. Many officers and men were wounded here by
exploding shells and small arms' firing of the enemy. After
completing the deployment the command was so much committed to
battle that it became necessary either to advance or else
retreat under fire.
"Lieutenant Miley, representing General Shafter, authorized an
advance, which was ordered, Carroll's brigade taking the
advance, reinforced on the right by Roosevelt's regiment and
supported by the 1st and 10th Cavalry of Wood's Brigade. The
advance was made under heavy infantry fire through open flat
ground, cut up by wire fences, to the creek, dIstant about 600
yards. The advance was made in good order, the enemy's fire
being returned only under favorable opportunities. In crossing
the flat one officer (Captain O'Neil) and several men were
killed and several officers and men wounded. Both sides of the
creek are heavily wooded for about 200 yards. The creek was
swollen, and the crossing through this space and the creek was
made with great difficulty. After passing through the thick
woods the ground was entirely open and fenced by wire. From
this line it was necessary to storm the hill, upon the top of
which is a house loopholed, etc., for defense. The slope of
the hill is very difficult, but the assault was made with
great gallantry and with much loss to the enemy. In this
assault Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenants Smith and Shipp were
killed; Colonel Carroll, Lieutenants Thayer and Myer were
wounded. A number of casualties occurred among the enlisted
men. After taking this hill the front line advanced to take
the Fort San Juan Hill under fire from strong force of the
enemy in trenches and house known as 'Blockhouse.' … The
assault was successful, the line storming the trenches and
blockhouse with conspicuous gallantry and coolness, capturing
three prisoners, wounding and killing many of the enemy. …
Connected with my left, Hawkins's brigade of Kent's division
carried everything in front of it and captured the house and
hill known as 'Fort San Juan' proper."
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2. page 370.
{606}
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt, who commanded the Rough Riders
regiment that day, while Colonel Wood commanded the brigade,
tells the story of the fight, and what followed, very tersely,
in his report: "After crossing the river at the ford," says
the Lieutenant-Colonel, "we were moved along and up its light
bank under fire, and were held in reserve at a sunken road.
Here we lost a good many men, including Captain O'Neil,
killed, and Lieutenant Haskell, wounded. We then received your
order to advance and support the regular cavalry in the attack
on the intrenchments and blockhouses on the hills to the left.
The regiment was deployed on both sides of the road, and moved
forward until we came to the rearmost lines of the regulars.
We continued to move forward until I ordered a charge, and the
men rushed the blockhouse and rifle pits on the hill to the
right of our advance. They did the work in fine shape, though
suffering severely. The guidons of Troops E and G were first
planted on the summit, though the first men up were some A and
B troopers who were with me.
"We then opened fire on the intrenchments on a hill to our
left which some of the other regiments were assailing and
which they carried a few minutes later. Meanwhile we were
under a heavy rifle fire from the intrenchments along the
hills to our front, from whence they also shelled us with a
piece of field artillery until some of our marksmen silenced
it. When the men got their wind we charged again and carried
the second line of intrenchments with a rush. Swinging to the
left, we then drove the Spaniards over the brow of the chain
of hills fronting Santiago. By this time the regiments were
much mixed, and we were under a very heavy fire, both of
shrapnel and from rifles from the batteries, intrenchments,
and forts immediately in front of the city. On the extreme
front I now found myself in command with fragments of the six
cavalry regiments of the two brigades under me. The Spaniards
made one or two efforts to retake the line, but were promptly
driven back.
"Both General Sumner and you sent me word to hold the line at
all hazards, and that night we dug a line of intrenchments
across our front, using the captured Spaniards' intrenching
tools. We had nothing to eat except what we captured from the
Spaniards; but their dinners had fortunately been cooked, and
we ate them with relish, having been fighting all day. We had
no blankets and coats, and lay by the trenches all night. The
Spaniards attacked us once in the night, and at dawn they
opened a heavy artillery and rifle fire. Very great assistance
was rendered us by Lieutenant Parker's Gatling battery at
critical moments; he fought his guns at the extreme front of
the firing line in a way that repeatedly called forth the
cheers of my men. One of the Spanish batteries which was used
against us was directly in front of the hospital so that the
red cross flag flew over the battery, saving it from our fire
for a considerable period. The Spanish Mauser bullets made
clean wounds; but they also used a copper-jacketed or
brass-jacketed bullet which exploded, making very bad wounds
indeed.
"Since then we have continued to hold the ground; the food has
been short; and until today [July 4] we could not get our
blankets, coats, or shelter tents, while the men lay all day
under the fire from the Spanish batteries, intrenchments, and
guerrillas in trees, and worked all night in the trenches,
never even taking off their shoes. But they are in excellent
spirits, and ready and anxious to carry out any orders they
receive. At the end of the first day the eight troops were
commanded, two by captains, three by first lieutenants, two by
second lieutenants, and one by the sergeant whom you made
acting lieutenant. We went into the fight about 490 strong; 86
were killed or wounded, and there are about half a dozen
missing. The great heat prostrated nearly 40 men, some of them
among the best in the regiment."
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 684.
There have been much contradiction and controversy concerning
some of the orders by which the battle of San Juan was
directed. The following are the conclusions on that subject of
a civilian observer who seems to have seen and investigated
with impartiality:
"The orders under which the battle of San Juan was fought were
given by Adjutant-General McClernand to General Kent, commanding
the Infantry Division—consisting, in addition to the
organizations already mentioned (Wikoff's and Pearson's
brigades), of the First Brigade, including the Sixth and
Sixteenth United States Infantry and the Seventy-first New
York, under General Hawkins—at about nine o'clock in the
morning. There is no question fortunately as to the exact
wording of the orders. A little green knoll to the left of the
Santiago road and half a mile short of the San Juan Heights was
pointed out as the point which was to be the extreme limit of
the forward movement of the Infantry Division. Once there,
further orders would be given. The orders under which General
Sumner advanced from El Pozo would appear to have been more
specific, and certainly more clear than the orders which
General Kent received for the Infantry Division a few minutes
later. At the same time, it is true that these orders were
also based upon a complete misconception of the situation and
a total ignorance of the Spanish position and the lay of the
country beyond El Pozo. General Sumner's orders were to
advance along that branch of the Aguadores Creek which runs
parallel with the Santiago road from El Pozo, until it joins
the main stream of the Aguadores at the angle subsequently
known as the 'bloody angle,' where the creek makes a sharp
turn to the left, and then runs a general southerly course
toward the town of Aguadores and the sea. This creek General
Sumner was instructed to hold until the result of Lawton's
attack upon Caney became known, and he received further
orders. Once the creek was reached, Sumner, under the most
unfavorable circumstances of a heavy fire, and the thick and
pathless jungles which his men had to penetrate, deployed his
whole division, and then sent back word to McClernand, the
adjutant-general of the corps, acquainting him with the actual
conditions by which he was confronted, and asking whether his
orders contemplated an attack upon the enemy's intrenched
position, setting forth at the same time the utter
impossibility of keeping his men inactive for a long time
under such a heavy fire as was being poured in upon them.
{607}
"Had it been proposed to carry out the plan, as discussed and
agreed upon at General Shafter's headquarters the night
before, to advance along the right flank of the Spanish
position, keeping in touch with Lawton, obviously these two
divisions, or a large part of them, should have been directed
to take the direct road which ran north from El Pozo to
Marianaje and thence to El Caney, leaving in front of San Juan
only force sufficient to retain the Spaniards in their
position. But the divisions were ordered to proceed along the
Santiago road, and in a very few minutes came under fire. The
original plan may have been changed at the last moment, of
course; but as every movement that was subsequently made was
in the line of carrying this plan out, until finally, on the
12th, General Lawton succeeded in completely investing the
town on the north and west, this does not seem likely. The
more probable explanation of the movement and of what
followed, and the one accepted by general officers, is as
follows: That it was still intended to follow Lawton's advance
on the right, but that owing to our failure to develop the
Spanish position in our front, and our complete ignorance of
the lay of the land, the flank movement was not begun until
too late—not until the troops had been led into a position
from which they could be extricated only by wresting from the
Spaniards the block-houses and the trenches from which,
unexposed and unseen, they were delivering such a galling fire
upon our men, engaged in wandering aimlessly about in an
almost trackless tropical jungle. At this moment of great
confusion and uncertainty, when the road was choked with the
regiments of both the cavalry and infantry divisions, mutually
hindering one another in their struggles to advance, and
having to sustain a heavy and destructive fire which could not
be answered, an ordeal even for the veteran soldier; at this
moment, when something might still have been done to mislead
the enemy and cover our advance, the war balloon was sent up
directly behind our columns. This mistake betrayed the exact
location of our advance, and the Spanish fire became heavier
and better directed, and our losses more severe."
S. Bonsal,
The Fight for Santiago,
chapter 6 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company).
The same writer gives a sickening account of the sufferings of
the wounded after the battle and the miserable failure of
provision for any kind of succor or care of them. "Of course:"
he says, "in view of the perilous situation which the two
divisions now occupied upon the crest of the hill, and the
great anxiety which was felt at headquarters for the safety of
the whole army, and the preparations which had to be made
against the expected night attack of the Spaniards to drive
our men back and retake their lost position, the search for
the dead and wounded this evening had to be confined to a very
limited area, and was only as thorough as the shortness of the
time for which men could be spared from the colors permitted.
The jungle and the great fields of long grass were not
searched, and thus many of the wounded were not discovered
until the following day; and quite a number, indeed, not until
the armistice was declared, on the third day after the battle,
when the men had time to ransack the hill-side and the valley
for the missing. And there were some—those who had the
strength when they fell to crawl through the cactus, the
Spanish bayonet, and all manner of prickly and trailing plants
into the deeper and more protected recesses of the jungle—who
were never discovered at all until days, many days, had
passed; and the gathering of the vultures told where some poor
fellow had died without care and without food, of his wounds
or from starvation. Of such an one, when his place of hiding
was discovered, there was, as a rule, only left a whitened
skeleton and pieces of the uniform he had worn. The last
resting place of not a few was never discovered at all.
"I believe I am giving a moderate estimate when I say that at
least one-third of the men wounded on July 1st received no
attention, and were not brought back to the division hospital
until the afternoon of Ju]y 3d. This night we knew nothing,
and had not even the slightest suspicion, of how numerous the
undiscovered wounded were. … Only about half of the wounded
men who were discovered this evening and been brought back to
the dressing station when the moon rose above the dark forest
line, and lit up the battlefield and the heights of San Juan
as clearly, and, indeed, more clearly than day, for there was
now not the dazzling force and the confusing mirage of the
pitiless sunlight to blind the sight. The majority of these
men had had their wounds dressed where they fell, or soon
after falling, with the first-aid bandages. There were very
few indeed to whom it had been possible to give any further
attention than this, as the regimental surgeons, for want of
transportation, had been unable to bring their medical chests,
and those who were best provided carried with them only small
pocket cases. …
"When the first-aid bandages were applied, the wounded man and
those who helped him were, as a rule, under fire, which made
any but the most summary methods of wound-dressing quite
impossible. Fortunately these bandages, so simple and
practical, lent themselves excellently well to this procedure.
The first thing the soldiers or the hospital attendants would
do when they came upon a wounded man was, in the case of a
wound in the body, to tear off his shirt, or in the case of a
wound in the leg, tear off his trousers, and then wrap around
the wound the first-aid bandage. The wound-dressers were
generally in such haste, and the wounded men usually so
helpless to assist in any way, and their shirts and trousers
so rotten from the drenching rains in which they had been worn
without change day or night, that the taking off of the clothing
was literally what I call it—tearing, and the garment came off
so rent as to be quite useless for further wear. Consequently
the soldiers were carried half-naked, or, if they had been
wounded in both the body and the lower limbs, as was so
frequently the case, entirely naked, to the army wagons and so
down to the hospital, where there was not a scrap of clothing
or bedding forthcoming to cover them with. These who were
stripped in this way during the daytime were baked and
blistered by the fierce sunlight, only to shiver with the
penetrating cold and dampness after the rain had ceased to
fall and when the chill night came on.
"Knowing that he was totally unprepared to clothe or cover the
wounded that would probably be brought in, the chief surgeon
of the corps issued an order, the evening before the battle,
that all wounded men should be brought in with their blankets,
halves of shelter-tents, and ponchos when possible. This was
certainly a step in the right direction, even if it was but a
frank confession by the authorities that no preparation had
been made by them for the emergency which it cannot be said
was suddenly thrust upon them, but which they might have
foreseen and should have been preparing against for many weeks
previous.
{608}
While the attending soldiers, realizing how serious for their
wounded comrades it would be to have to lie in the hospitals
uncovered to wind and weather, made great efforts to find
their packs, these efforts were not often successful, and a
great majority of the wounded reached the hospital half
naked, and had thereafter only the covering and the bedding
which their comrades and the hospital attendants were able to
'rustle' for them, and this was little enough and not seldom
nothing at all.
"Had this expedition been provided with a greater number of
surgeons and hospital attendants, had the ambulances been at
hand which we left in Tampa or upon the transports, ambulances
without which it is reasonable to suppose—at least we had
supposed—no civilized power would enter upon an aggressive
war, much less upon a campaign in which we had the advantage
of choosing both our own time and the field of operations, the
outrageous treatment which our wounded suffered, and the
barbarous scenes which we were called upon to witness upon
this and the following days would never have occurred."
S. Bonsai,
The Fight for Santiago,
chapter 8 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company).
The troops which had carried San Juan Hill were intrenched,
that night, in the positions they had gained, and those which
had taken El Caney were brought into connection with them,
Lawton's division on their right and Bates's brigade on the
left. The battle was renewed by the Spaniards soon after
daylight on the morning of the 2d, and raged with more or less
fury throughout the day. That evening, about 10 o'clock, a
fierce attempt was made to break through the American lines,
but without success. Again, on the morning of the third, the
Spaniards reopened battle, but with less vigor than before.
General Shafter then sent the following letter to General
Toral, the Spanish commander: "I shall be obliged, unless you
surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the
citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children,
that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow
morning." In reply, General Toral wrote; "It is my duty to say
to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will
inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of
your message." Several of the foreign consuls at Santiago then
came into the American lines and persuaded General Shafter to
delay the shelling of the town until noon of the 5th, provided
that the Spanish forces made no demonstration meantime against
his own. This established a truce which was renewed, in a
series of negotiations until the 10th. "I was of the opinion,"
reported General Shafter, "that the Spaniards would surrender
if given a little time, and I thought this result would be
hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand
they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon
this presumption I determined to offer to return all the
wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear
transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not
to serve against the forces of the United States until
regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These
officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates,
27 in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some
of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors,
and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish
prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades. The
cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically
terminated the battle of Santiago." General Shafter goes on to
say that when the battle was fiercest, on July 1st, he probably
had no more than 12,000 men on the firing line, not counting a
few Cubans who assisted in the attack on El Caney, and who
fought with valor. They were confronted by about equal numbers
of the enemy, in strong and intrenched positions. "Our losses
in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81
officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing 79. The missing, with
few exceptions, reported later." Up to this time, General
Shafter had been unable to complete the investment of the town
with his own men, and had depended upon General Garcia with
his Cubans, placed on the extreme right of the American lines,
to watch for and intercept reinforcements. They failed to do
so, and 2,800 Spaniards, under General Escario, entered the
city on the night of the 2d. The American commander now
extended his own lines as rapidly as possible and completed
the investment of the town.
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, pages 155-157.
As stated above, permission was given on the 3d for
non-combatants to leave the city. "They did leave in the
following days to the number of perhaps 20,000, filling the
neighboring villages and roads with destitute people, mostly
women and children. It then seemed to fall to our lot to see
that these people did not starve in a desolate country, and to
be as much our duty to take care of these people, whom our
policy had driven from their homes, as it was for Spain to
feed the reconcentrados, whom they drove from their homes
under their war policy. The task was not insignificant."
Report of Inspector-General
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 596).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July).
Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.
See (in this volume)
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: A. D. 1898.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 1).
National Bankrupt Law.
After years of effort on the part of its advocates, a national
bankrupt law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and
received the President's signature on the 1st of July, 1898.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 3).
Destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago.
On the morning of July 3, Admiral Cervera, convinced that
Santiago would be taken by the American forces, and acting
under orders from the Captain-General at Havana, made a
desperate attempt to save his squadron by escaping to sea. The
result was a total destruction of the Spanish ships, in an
engagement with the blockading fleet, of which Admiral Sampson
gave the following account in his official report:
"The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9.35 and
10 a. m., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at
9.31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.
The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at
that moment were as follows: The flagship 'New York' was 4
miles east of her blockading station and about 7 miles from
the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I
intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go
to the front to consult with General Shafter.
{609}
A discussion of the situation and a more definite
understanding between us of the operations proposed had been
rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of
the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff
on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General
Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made
arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in
the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron
appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near
their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle
about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the
westward, in the following order: The 'Indiana' about a mile
and a half from shore, the 'Oregon'—the 'New York's' place
being between these two—the 'Iowa,' 'Texas,' and 'Brooklyn,'
the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The
distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from 2½
to 4 miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading
distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about
8 miles. The 'Massachusetts' had left at 4 a. m., for
Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the 'Iowa' and
'Texas.' The auxiliaries 'Gloucester' and 'Vixen' lay close to
the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large
vessels, the 'Gloucester' to the eastward and the 'Vixen' to
the westward. The torpedo boat 'Ericsson' was in company with
the flagship and remained with her during the chase until
ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient
service in rescuing prisoners from the burning' Vizcaya.' …
"The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a
speed estimated at from 8 to 10 knots, and in the following
order: 'Infanta Maria Teresa' (flagship), 'Vizcaya,'
'Cristobal Colon,' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' The distance
between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from
the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of
the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an
interval of only about 12 minutes elapsed. Following the
'Oquendo,' at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the
torpedo-boat destroyer 'Pluton,' and after her the 'Furor.'
The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their
guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading
vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke
from their guns. The men of our ships in front of the port
were at Sunday 'quarters for inspection.' The signal was made
simultaneously from several vessels, 'Enemy ships escaping,'
and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they
sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within 8
minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The
'New York' turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet,
flying the signal, 'Close in towards harbor entrance and
attack vessels,' and gradually increasing speed, until toward
the end of the chase she was making 16½ knots, and was rapidly
closing on the 'Cristobal Colon.' She was not, at any time,
within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part
in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts
in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one
of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to
escape from the 'Gloucester.'
"The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the
westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power
of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had
closed in towards the Morro at the instant of the enemy's
appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire,
well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and
silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards
carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the
battle developed into a chase in which the 'Brooklyn' and
'Texas' had, at the start, the advantage of position. The
'Brooklyn' maintained this lead. The 'Oregon,' steaming with
amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first
place. The 'Iowa' and the 'Indiana' having done good work, and
not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me,
in succession, at about the time the 'Vizcaya' was beached, to
drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These
vessels rescued many prisoners. The 'Vixen,' finding that the
rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran
outside of our own column and remained there during the battle
and chase.
"The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the
'Gloucester' excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed
it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is
a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht
'Corsair'—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She
was lying about 2 miles from the harbor entrance, to the
southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening
fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the
'Pluton' and 'Furor,' the 'Gloucester' was slowed, thereby
gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the
destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and
was able to close to short range, while her fire was accurate,
deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the
'Gloucester' was under the fire of the Socapa Battery. Within
twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor
the careers of the 'Furor' and the 'Pluton' were ended, and
two-thirds of their people killed. The 'Furor' was beached and
sunk in the surf; the 'Pluton' sank in deep water a few
minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury
from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships
'Iowa,' 'Indiana,' and the 'Texas,' yet I think a very
considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire,
at close range, of the 'Gloucester's' battery. After rescuing
the survivors of the destroyers, the 'Gloucester' did
excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the
'Infanta Maria Teresa.'
"The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering
in the same direction, and in formation, removed all tactical
doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every
United States vessel to close in, immediately engage, and
pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already
stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past
a number of the blockading ships which could not immediately
work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in
passing, and the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' and the 'Oquendo' were
probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen
minutes of the engagement. It was afterwards learned that the
'Infanta Maria Teresa's' fire main had been cut by one of our
first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With
large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft,
these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the
beach—the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' at about 10.15 a. m. at Nima
Nima, 6½ miles from Santiago Harbor entrance, and the
'Almirante Oquendo' at about 10.30 a. m. at Juan Gonzales, 7
miles from the port.
{610}
"The 'Vizcaya' was still under the fire of the leading
vessels; the 'Cristobal Colon' had drawn ahead, leading the
chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the
leading American ships. The 'Vizcaya' was soon set on fire,
and, at 11.15, she turned inshore, and was beached at
Aserraderos, 15 miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and
with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to
explode. When about 10 miles west of Santiago the 'Indiana'
had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at
Aserraderos the 'Iowa' was signaled to 'Resume blockading
station.' The 'Iowa' assisted by the 'Ericsson' and the
'Hist,' took off the crew of the 'Vizcaya,' while the
'Harvard' and the 'Gloucester' rescued those of the 'Infanta
Maria Teresa' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' This rescue of
prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish
vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and
gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and
aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it
was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main
magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just
inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers
and men until their work of humanity was complete.
"There remained now of the Spanish ships only the 'Cristobal
Colon'—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by
the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of
escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the 'Vizcaya'
went ashore, the 'Colon' was about 6 miles ahead of the
'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon'; but her spurt was finished, and
the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the
'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' came the 'Texas,' 'Vixen,' and
'New York.' It was evident from the bridge of the 'New York'
that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the
chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12.50 the
'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' opened fire and got her range—the
'Oregon's' heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1.20 she
gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors,
and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, 48 miles from Santiago.
Captain Cook, of the 'Brooklyn,' went on board to receive the
surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the 'New
York,' received his report, and placed the 'Oregon' in charge
of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the
prisoners to be transferred to the 'Resolute,' which had
followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had
gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all
their personal effects should be retained by the officers.
This order I did not modify. The 'Cristobal Colon' was not
injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by
beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was
so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her
sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure,
after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it
became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was
pushed by the 'New York' bodily up on the beach, the 'New
York's' stem being placed against her for this purpose—the
ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable
judgment—and sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this
not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would
have been, to a certainty, a total loss.
"I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish
forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous
and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the
night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to
escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt
in daylight. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron
was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part
in it—the commodore in command on the second division, the
captains of ships, their officers, and men. The fire of the
battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance
of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost
before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. …
Several of the [American] ships were struck—the 'Brooklyn'
more often than the others—but very slight material injury was
done, the greatest being aboard the 'Iowa.' Our loss was 1 man
killed and 1 wounded, both on the 'Brooklyn.' It is difficult to
explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in
a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish
gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and
accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns
and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements
of prisoners and by observation."
Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, pages 506-511.
Some particulars of the destruction of the "Furor," the
"Pluton," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa," and of the rescue of
surviving Spaniards, including Admiral Cervera, are given in a
report by Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of the "Gloucester,"
as follows: "The 'Pluton' was run on the rocks about 4 miles
west of Morro and blew up. Our crew cheered at the sight of
the explosion. The 'Furor' soon commenced to describe circles
with a starboard helm, her fire ceased, and it became apparent
that she was disabled. A white rag was waved from forward and
we stopped firing. Lieutenants Wood and Norman and Assistant
Engineer Proctor were sent to rescue the crews and to see if
the prizes could be saved. These found a horrible state of
affairs on the 'Furor.' The vessel was a perfect shambles. As
she was on fire and burning rapidly, they took off the living
and then rescued all they could find in the water and on the
beach. The 'Pluton' was among the rocks in the surf and could
not be boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were
adrift on life buoys and wreckage. These were all taken on board.
I have since learned that the 'New York' passed a number of
men in the water who had doubtless jumped overboard from the
destroyers to escape our fire. All these were probably
drowned. While this work was going on several explosions took
place on the 'Furor,' and presently—at about 11.30—she threw
her bows in the air, and turning to port slowly sank in deep
water. …
{611}
"While one of our boats was still ashore, seeing heavy clouds
of smoke behind the next point the ship was moved in that
direction, the men being at quarters and everything in
readiness for further action. On rounding the point two
men-of-war were found on the beach burning fiercely aft, the
majority of the crew being crowded on the forecastle and
unable apparently to reach land, only 200 yards away. Our
boats, under Lieutenant Norman and Ensign Edson, put off to
the nearer vessel, which proved to be the flagship 'Infanta
Maria Teresa,' and rescued all on board by landing them on the
beach through the surf. Lieutenant Norman formally received
the surrender of the commander in chief and all his officers
and men present, and as soon as all hands had been transferred
ashore, brought on board this ship all the higher officers,
including the admiral. Lieutenant Wood meanwhile rescued the
remaining survivors on board the 'Oquendo,' the second of the
burning vessels. The Spanish officers not feeling that the
prisoners on shore were secure from attack by Cuban partisans,
by your orders I directed Lieutenant Norman to land with a
small force, establish a camp on shore, and hoist the United
States flag over it. He took with him all the rations that
could be spared from the stores aboard."
Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, page 542.
The following is a translation, from Admiral Cervera's report,
as partly published in newspapers at Madrid, giving his
description of the destruction of his flagship and his own
rescue from death: "The enemy's fire produced terrible damages
on board the 'Infanta Maria Teresa,' destroying the elements
of defence—among others, the net for protection against fire.
In this critical moment the captain of the ship, Señor Concas,
fell wounded, and it was necessary to withdraw him, I taking
command of the vessel, because it was impossible to find the
second commandant of the 'Maria Teresa.' Immediately
afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning in
consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very great
and ignited other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid
to flood the after magazines, but it was impossible. Dense
clouds of smoke impeded walking in the passages and practicing
any kind of operations. In this situation I could only think
of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta
Cabrera. The contest was impossible on our side, and there was
nothing more to be done but to save as much as possible. I
thought to lower the flag, but that was not possible on
account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In these
anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the 'Maria
Teresa,' into which a number of us jumped. Those that were not
dying were saved with nothing. The 'Teresa' lowered a small boat,
which sank before it could be of any service. Subsequently
they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this also sank
after making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving
myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres
Sequeros and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving
on board the American ship 'Gloucester' naked. At this time we
were all naked."
Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, pages 558-559.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 July (4-17).
The surrender of Santiago and of all the Spanish forces
in eastern Cuba.
The following is a continuation of the report made by General
Shafter of his operations at Santiago de Cuba, resulting in
the surrender of the entire forces of Spain in eastern Cuba:
"The information of our naval victory was transmitted under
flag of truce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4,
and the suggestion again made that he surrender to save
needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed
Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor
the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of
life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was
temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the
navy should not enter the harbor. In the meanwhile letters
passing between General Toral and myself caused the cessation
of hostilities to continue; each army, however, continued to
strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the
Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on
July 6 called General Toral's attention to the changed
conditions and at his request gave him time to consult his
home Government. This he did, asking that the British consul,
with the employees of the cable company, be permitted to
return from El Caney to the city. This I granted. The strength
of the enemy's position was such I did not wish to assault if
it could be avoided. An examination of the enemy's works, made
after the surrender, fully justified the wisdom of the course
adopted. The intrenchments could only have been carried with
very great loss of life, probably with not less than 3,000
killed and wounded.
"On July 8 General Toral offered to march out of the city with
arms and baggage, provided he would not be molested before
reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the American forces the
territory then occupied by him. I replied that while I would
submit his proposition to my home Government, I did not think
it would be accepted. In the meanwhile arrangements were made
with Admiral Sampson that when the army again engaged the
enemy the navy would assist by shelling the city from ships
stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes.
On July 10 the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia
arrived, and were placed on the line to the right of the
cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton further to
the right and to practically command the Cobra road. On the
afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off
at 4 p. m., and I determined to open with four batteries of
artillery, and went forward in person to the trenches to give
the necessary orders; but the enemy anticipated us by opening
fire with his artillery a few minutes after the hour stated.
His batteries were apparently silenced before night, while
ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. During
this firing the navy fired from Aguadores, most of the shells
falling in the city. There was also some small-arms firing. On
this afternoon and the next morning we lost Captain Charles W.
Rowell, 2d Infantry, and 1 man killed, and Lieutenant Lutz, 2d
Infantry, and 10 men wounded. On the morning of July 11 the
bombardment by the Navy and my field guns was renewed and
continued until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to
the Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's
brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our hold
upon the enemy was complete.
{612}
"At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city
was again demanded. The firing ceased and was not again
renewed. By this date the sickness in the army was increasing
very rapidly as a result of exposure in the trenches to the
intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the
dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the
troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the
siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of
the army I did not think an assault would be justifiable,
especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in
their preliminary propositions to surrender. On July 11 I
wrote General Toral as follows: 'With the largely increased
forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your
line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting
that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of
Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to
state that should your excellency so desire the Government of
the United States will transport the entire command of your
excellency to Spain.' General Toral replied that he had
communicated my proposition to his general-in-chief, General

Blanco.
"July 12 I informed the Spanish commander that Major-General
Miles, commander-in-chief of the American Army, had just
arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal
interview on the following day. He replied he would be pleased
to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th, and I
informed him his surrender only could be considered, and that
as he was without hope of escape he had no right to continue
the fight. On the 14th another interview took place, during
which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis of his
army, the Fourth Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the
capitulation embracing all of eastern Cuba east of a line
passing from Acerraderos on the south to Sagua de Tanamo on
the north, via Palma Soriano. It was agreed commissioners
should meet during the afternoon to definitely arrange the
terms. … The terms of surrender finally agreed upon included
about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in
the surrendered district. It was arranged the formal surrender
should take place between the lines on the morning of July 17,
each army being represented by 100 armed men. At the time
appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon with my general
officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the Second Cavalry under
Captain Brett. General Toral also arrived with a number of his
officers and 100 infantry. We met midway between the
representatives of our two armies, and the Spanish commander
formally consummated the surrender of the city and the 24,000
troops in Santiago and the surrendered district. After this
ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at
12 o'clock noon the American flag was raised over the
governor's palace with appropriate ceremonies."
Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 2, pages 157-159.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898
(July-August: Army administration).
Red-tape and politics.
Their working in the campaign.
"The Cuban campaign had been foreseen by intelligent officers
for more than a year, but the department which clothes the
army had taken no steps toward providing a suitable uniform
for campaigning in the tropics until war was declared. The
Fifth Army Corps, a comparatively small body of 17,000 men,
was concentrated at Tampa on the railroad within reach of all
the appliances for expediting business. Between April 26, when
war was declared, and, June 6, when the corps embarked for
Cuba, sufficient time elapsed to have clothed 1,000,000 men if
the matter had been handled in the same manner a wholesale
clothing firm would handle similar business. Yet the corps
went to Cuba wearing the winter clothing it had brought on its
backs from Montana, Wyoming, and Michigan. It endured the heat
of the tropics clad in this, and was furnished with light
summer clothing by the department to wear for its return to
Montauk, where the breezes were so bracing that the teeth
chattered even when the men were clad in winter clothing. The
only reason for this absolute failure to properly clothe the
army was that the methods of the department are too slow and
antiquated for the proper performance of business. There was
no lack of money. It was a simple case of red-tape delays.
There can be no doubt that the intention was that the summer
clothing should be worn in Cuba and that there should be warm
clothing issued at Montauk. It was issued after the troops had
shivered for days in their light clothes. The delays
unavoidably connected with an obsolete method caused great
suffering that should not have been inflicted upon men
expected to do arduous duty. A sensible man would not put a
heavy blanket on a horse to do draught work on a hot day; but
the red tape of an antiquated way of doing business caused our
soldiers to wear heavy woolen clothes in torrid heat, when every
nerve was to be strained to the breaking point in athletic
exertion. This is not pointed out in a fault-finding spirit.
The men are proud to have been in the Fifth Corps and to have
endured these things for the country and the flag; but these
unnecessary sufferings impaired the fighting strength of the
army, caused much of the sickness that visited the Fifth
Corps, and might have caused the failure of the whole
expedition. …
"The difficulty here depicted was one which beset the
department at every turn in the whole campaign. It is a
typical case. Transports, tentage, transportation—it was the
same in everything. With the most heroic exertions the
department was able to meet emergencies only after they had
passed. This was caused partly by lack of ready material, but
mainly by an inelastic system of doing business which broke
down in emergencies. This, in turn, was caused mainly by the
illiberal treatment accorded to this, as well as to every
other department of the army by Congress. It uniformly cuts
mercilessly all estimates of this, as of every other
department, and leaves no margin of expenditure or chance of
improvement. It dabbles in matters which are purely technical
and require the handling of expert executive talent. …
"Plans for war should be prepared in advance. This was
especially true of the last war, which had been foreseen for
years and considered a probability for several months. All
details should have been previously worked out, all
contingencies foreseen before hostilities began. Such plans
would require some modifications, of course, but would form a
working basis.
{613}
Neither Santiago nor Manila Bay would have been foreseen; but
any plans for war would have involved the consideration and
solution of the following problems: How to raise, arm, equip,
organize, mobilize, clothe, feed, shelter, and transport large
bodies of soldiers. The point where the battle might occur
would be a mere tactical detail to be worked out at the proper
time. The above problems could all be solved in time of peace and
should have been solved. The general staff performs this
function in foreign armies, but we had no such body in our
service and nothing to imperfectly take its place. …
"The most urgently needed reform is the absolute divorcement
of the army in all of its departments from politics. … No
department of the army should be more exempt from political
influence than the staff. This points at once to the most
urgent reform, viz., make the commanding general the real
working head of the army, instead of the Secretary of War. No
good results have come to the service by the extension of the
Secretary's powers in Grant's first administration. Most of
the evils of the service can be traced to the fact that the
general commanding has since that time been practically
deprived of his proper functions, and the real head of the
army has been a politician."
Lieutenant J. H. Parker,
Our Army Supply Department and the need of a General Staff
(Review of Reviews, December, 1898).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Cuba).
The War with Spain.
Sickness in the American army at Santiago.
Its alarming state.
Hurried removal of troops to Montauk Point, Long Island.
"After the surrender of General Toral's army General Shafter
urged the War Department from time to time to hasten the
shipment of the Spanish prisoners to their homes, in order
that the American Army, whose condition was now deplorable,
might be transported to the United States. At this time about
half the command had been attacked by malarial fever, with a
few cases of yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid fever. The
yellow-fever cases were mainly confined to the troops at
Siboney, and the few cases found among the troops at the front
were at once transferred to that place. … There was great
fear, and excellent grounds for it, that the yellow fever, now
sporadic throughout the command, would become epidemic. With
the command weakened by malarial fevers, and its general tone
and vitality much reduced by all the circumstances incident to
the campaign, the effects of such an epidemic would
practically mean its annihilation. The first step taken to
check the spread of disease was the removal of all the troops
to new camping grounds. … It was directed that the command be
moved in this way every few days, isolating the cases of
yellow fever as they arose, and it was expected that in a
short time the yellow fever would be stamped out. … But the
effect produced on the command by the work necessary to set up
the tents and in the removal of the camps increased the number
on the sick report to an alarming degree. Convalescents from
malarial fever were taken again with the fever, and yellow
fever, dysentery, and typhoid increased. It was useless now to
attempt to confine the yellow-fever cases to Siboney, and
isolation hospitals were established around Santiago. It was
apparent that to keep moving the command every few days simply
weakened the troops and increased the fever cases. Any exertion
in this heat caused a return of the fever, and it must be
remembered that the convalescents now included about 75 per
cent. of the command. The Commanding General was now directed
to move the entire command into the mountains to the end of
the San Luis railroad, where the troops would be above the
yellow fever limit; but this was a physical impossibility. …
"The situation was desperate; the yellow-fever cases were
increasing in number, and the month of August, the period in
which it is epidemic, was at hand. It was with these
conditions staring them in the face, that the officers
commanding divisions and brigades and the Chief Surgeon were
invited by General Shafter to discuss the situation. As a
result of this conference the General sent the following
telegram giving his views [and those of the General Officers
and Medical Officers]. … 'In reply to telegram of this date
[August 3], stating that it is deemed best that my command be
moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I
have to say that under the circumstances this move is
practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired,
although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to
exceed 1,000 men a day, at the best, and it will take until
the end of August to make this move, even if the sick-list
should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley,
who has looked over the ground, says it is not a good camping
ground. … In my opinion there is but one course to take, and
that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the
detached regiments that came with it, and were sent
immediately after it, with the least delay possible, to the
United States. If this is not done I believe the death-rate
will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every
medical officer present. I called together to-day the General
Officers and the senior Medical Officers and telegraph you
their views.' …
"On August 4th instructions were received from the War
Department to begin the removal of the command to Montauk
Point, Long Island. Some of the immune regiments were on the
way to Santiago, and other regiments were at once ordered
there to garrison the district as General Shafter's command
was withdrawn. The first of the fleet of vessels to return the
Spanish troops arrived in time to be loaded and leave August
9th, and by the end of the month nearly all were transported.
"After the surrender the relations between the American and
Spanish troops were very cordial. There could be little or no
conversation between individuals, but in many ways the respect
each had for the other was shown, and there seemed to be no
hatred on either side. Most of the Spanish officers remained
in their quarters in town, and they shared in the feeling
displayed by their men. Salutations were generally exchanged
between the officers, and American ways and manners became
very popular among the Spaniards. …
{614}
"By the 25th of the month General Shafter's entire command,
with the exception of a few organizations just ready to
embark, had departed, and, turning over the command to General
Lawton, he sailed that day with his staff on the 'Mexico,' one
of the captured transports, and at noon September 1st went
ashore at Montauk Point, Long Island."
J. D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter,
chapter 12 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Philippines).
Correspondence between the General commanding
United States forces at Cavite and Manila,
and Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader.
On the 4th of July, General Thomas M. Anderson, then
commanding the "United States Expeditionary Forces" at Cavite
Arsenal, addressed the following communication to "Señor Don
Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding Philippine Forces":
"General: I have the honor to inform you that the United
States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to
command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of
Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for
the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons
I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to
have you and your people co-operate with us in military
operations against the Spanish forces. In our operations it
has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a
base of operations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere
with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and
other native citizens of all functions and privileges not
inconsistent with military rule. I would be pleased to be
informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my
command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain
order and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and
kindness. I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to
instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in
the performance of their duties and not to assume that they
can not visit Cavite without permission."
On the following day Aguinaldo replied:
"General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine
people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most
profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments
with which the natives of these islands inspire the great North
American nation and your excellency. I also thank most
profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us,
and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which
is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special
satisfaction whenever occasion represents. I have already
ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your
officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent
their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me of
whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command,
so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes." …
To this communication General Anderson returned the following
on the 6th: "General: I am encouraged by the friendly
sentiment expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter
received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite
understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very
soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be
apparent to you as a military officer that we will require
much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for
our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's
advice and co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the
resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we
do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly
against our common enemy. But for a short time we must
organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for
storing them near our fleet and transports. I am solicitous to
avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having
two sets of military officers exercising command in the same
place. I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary
precaution. Your own medical officers have been making
voluntary inspections with mine, and fear epidemic diseases if
the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have
prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?"
…
On the 9th of July General Anderson reported to the War
Department at Washington: "General Aguinaldo tells me he has
about 15,000 fighting men, but only 11,000 armed with guns,
which mostly were taken from the Spaniards. He claims to have
in all 4,000 prisoners. When we first landed he seemed very
suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a
better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and
seems willing to co-operate. But he has declared himself
dictator and president, and is trying to take Manila without
our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his
purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our
part to establish a provisional government."
On the 17th the American commander caused another
communication to be addressed to "General Emilio Aguinaldo" as
follows: "Sir: General Anderson wishes me to say that, the
second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the
vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this,
supply this army and shelter, will require certain assistance
from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses,
buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for
shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing
to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the
native population are not willing to give us this assistance
as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it
becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to
seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this,
as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent
millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards
and to give good government to the whole people, and the
return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson
wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their
good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at
the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase 500
horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for
horses with each individual owner. I regret very much that I
am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost
importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as
possible."
To this communication there seems to have been no written
reply until the 24th; and, on the 20th, the Chief
Quartermaster reported to General Anderson "that it is
impossible to procure transportation except upon Señor
Aguinaldo's order, in this section, who has an inventory of
everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid
them." On the 23d General Anderson repeated his request, as
follows:
{615}
"General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your
excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means
of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight
the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.
As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. If
you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make
requisition directly on the people. I beg leave to request an
answer at your earliest convenience."
The next day Aguinaldo replied: "I have the honor to manifest
to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that
which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any
response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked
of me in the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I
replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was
disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of
the number of these with due anticipation (notice). I have
circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in
the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I
cannot assure your excellency that we have the number of 500
that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these
vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in
January and March last. Whenever we have them united (or
collected), I shall have the pleasure to advise your
excellency. I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50
carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever
necessary, always (premising) that you afford me a previous
advice of four days in anticipation."
Meantime, General Anderson had written to the War Department,
on the 18th: "Since reading the President's instructions to
General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the
establishment of a provisional government on our part will
probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active
hostility to Spain. The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has
declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has
declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and
administration under it. We have observed all official
military courtesies, and he and his followers express great
admiration and gratitude to the great American Republic of the
north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are
using every effort to take Manila without us. I suspect also
that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish
authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila. The city is
strongly fortified and hard to approach in the rainy season.
If a bombardment fails we should have the best engineering
ability here." And, again on the 21st, he had written: "Since
I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate
system of military government, under his assumed authority as
dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us,
except by his order. As to this last I have written to him
that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts,
fuel and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and
that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of
civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that
I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not
recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I
have made no formal protest against his proclamation as
dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and
execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a
protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request,
and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of
Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every
other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship. These
people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all
deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives.
They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization
of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are
fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are
industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a
given time than a regiment of volunteers."
On the 24th General Anderson received from the Philippine
leader a very clear and definite statement of his attitude
towards the "Expeditionary Forces of the United States," and
the intentions with which he and the people whom he
represented were acting. "I came," he wrote, "from Hongkong to
prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the
Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word
to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal
discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had the
strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects,
establishing a government according to their desires. Thus it
is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and
afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated
themselves from Spanish domination, I established a
revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a
democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal
circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the
provinces] might be justly represented, and administered to
their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been
acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected
that the great North American nation, which struggled first
for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of
slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence
of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any
other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the
right of preference to our gratitude.
"Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the
favors we have received through Admiral Dewey, and [being]
more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict
which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be
extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that
of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the
undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the
places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without
previous notice to this government, because as no formal
agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine
people might consider the occupation of its territories by
North American troops as a violation of its rights.
"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish
squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so
rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to
your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you
should communicate in writing to this government the places
that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation,
that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent
the commission of any transgression against friendship.
{616}
I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident
proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I
can not answer for that which another nation whose friendship
is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people]; and
it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further
proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always
professed for the North American people, in the complete
security that it will find itself completely identified with
our cause of liberty."
In the same strain, on the 1st of August, Aguinaldo wrote to
United States Consul Williams, as to a "distinguished friend:"
"I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the
right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not
forget for a moment the favors which we have received and are
now receiving; but however great those favors may be, it is
not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots.
These say that if the object of the United States is to annex
these islands, why not recognize the government established in
them, in order in that manner to join with it the same as by
annexation? Why do not the American generals operate in
conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting the
forces, render the end more decisive? Is it intended, indeed,
to carry out annexation against the wish of these people,
distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolutionary
government is the genuine representative by right and deed of
the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is
it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and
friendship?
"It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the
favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up
to the present the American forces have shown not an active,
only a passive, co-operation, from which they suppose that the
intentions of these forces are not for the best. They assert,
besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was brought
from Hongkong to assure those forces by my presence that the
Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and
that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned
by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save
themselves much labor, fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war
with Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy
suspicions. I have full confidence in the generosity and
philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history
of the privileged people of the United States, and for that
reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and
the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly,
as also the distinguished generals who represent your country
in these islands, that you entreat the Government at
Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the
Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power
with my people that the United States shall not repent their
sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed
people.
"Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people
abominate savagery; that in the midst of their past
misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice,
and civil life, and that they are not able to lay aside their
own wishes when their future lot and history are under
discussion. Say also that I and my leaders know what we owe to
our unfortunate country; that we know how to admire and are
ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and
the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands
pre-eminent the immortal General Washington."
United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
Senate Document Number 208.
In an article published in the "North American Review,"
February, 1900, General Anderson discussed his relations with
Aguinaldo very frankly, in part as follows: "On the 1st of
July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked
me at once whether 'the United States of the North' either had
recognized or would recognize his government—I am not quite
sure as to the form of his question, whether it was 'had' or
'would.' In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were,
in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go
beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral
Dewey and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his
government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey
had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the
situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams
states in one of his letters to the State Department that
several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our
declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number,
yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether
Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or
did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government
would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so,
probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their
statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress,
what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and
thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval
vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and
ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were
permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had
thrown into the bay; and, with the four thousand rifles taken
from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hong
Kong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to
arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell
Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of
the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were
captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the
first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the
Admiral had had no reason to surmise.
"But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo. I told him I
was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no
authority to recognize his government; that we had come to
whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the
indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I
added that, as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we
would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased
with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take
Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly
disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. … A few days
thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and
staff and a band of music. On that occasion he handed me an
elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had
received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that
they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a
form of government.
{617}
With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people
from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust
in Spain rather than America. The day before, two German
officers had called on Aguinaldo and I believed they had
brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was
agreeable to him. He did not answer, but asked if we, the
North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the
Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that,
but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no
colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: 'I have studied
attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find
in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear.' It may
seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the
time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts,
fuel and forage. …
"The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the
Filipinos can … be traced back to our refusal to recognize the
political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with
them arose from our refusal to let them co-operate with us.
About nine o'clock on the evening of August 12, I received
from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid
the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering
Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty
minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every
preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front.
Certainly, they would not have given up part of their line to
us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They,
therefore, received General Merritt's interdict with anger and
indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila
as their capital, and Luzon as their country. … At seven
o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the
Filipinos from the city. … I therefore took the responsibility
of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoor, ten miles below,
requesting him to withdraw his troops and intimating that
serious consequences would follow if he did not do so. I
received his answer at eleven, saying that a Commission would
come to me the next morning with full powers. Accordingly the
next day Señors Buencomeno, Lagarde, Araneto and Sandeco came
to Division Headquarters in Manila and stated that they were
authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops, if we
would promise to reinstate them in their present positions on
our making peace with Spain. Thereupon I took them over to
General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told
them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely
on the honor of the American people. The General then read to
them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino
people. …
"There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a
conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a
more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with
them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we
refused their request to leave their military force in a good
strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with
Spain without a guarantee of their independence."
T. M. Anderson,
Our Rule in the Philippines
(North American Review, volume 170, page 275).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Porto Rico).
Occupation of Porto Rico.
"With the fall of Santiago the occupation of Porto Rico became
the next strategic necessity. General Miles had previously been
assigned to organize an expedition for that purpose.
Fortunately, he was already at Santiago, where he had arrived
on the 11th of July with reinforcements for General Shafter's
army. With these troops, consisting of 3,415 infantry and
artillery, 2 companies of engineers and 1 company of the
signal corps, General Miles left Guantanamo on July 21st,
having 9 transports, convoyed by the fleet, under Captain
Higginson, with the 'Massachusetts' (flagship), 'Dixie,',
Gloucester,' 'Columbia' and 'Yale,' the two latter carrying
troops. The expedition landed at on July 25th, which port
was entered with little opposition. Here the fleet was joined
by the 'Annapolis' and the 'Wasp,' while the 'Puritan' and
'Amphitrite' went to San Juan and joined the 'New Orleans,'
which was engaged in blockading that port. The major general
commanding was subsequently reinforced by General Schwan's
brigade of the Third Army Corps, by General Wilson with a part
of his division and also by General Brooke with a part of his
corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men. On July 27th
he entered Ponce, one of the most important ports in the
island, from which he thereafter directed operations for the
capture of the island. With the exception of encounters with
the enemy at Guayama, Hormigueros [the Rio Prieto], Coamo, and
Yauco and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there
was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with
great vigor and by the 12th of August much of the island was
in our possession and the acquisition of the remainder was
only a matter of a short time. At most of the points in the
island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed.
Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for
delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage."
Message of the President of the United States
to Congress, December 5, 1898.
"During the nineteen days of active campaign on the island of
Puerto Rico a large portion of the island was captured by the
United States forces and brought under our control. Our forces
were in such a position as to make the positions of the
Spanish forces, outside of the garrison at San Juan, utterly
untenable. The Spaniards had been defeated or captured in the
six different engagements which took place, and in every
position they had occupied up to that time. The volunteers had
deserted their colors, and many of them had surrendered to our
forces and taken the oath of allegiance. This had a
demoralizing effect upon the regular Spanish troops. … The
loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and captured was nearly
ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded."
General Miles,
Report
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 36).
{618}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-September).
The War with Spain.
Capture of Manila.
Relations with the Filipino insurgents.
General Merritt's report.
Aguinaldo declared President of the Philippine Republic.
"Immediately after my arrival [July 25] I visited General
Greene's camp and made a reconnaissance of the position held
by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent
forces, hereafter to be described. I found General Greene's
command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to
the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but
owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies, the
greater portion of the force had shelter tents only, and were
suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low,
flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun
or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain
so frequent at this season. I was at once struck by the
exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by
the officers and men under such circumstances, and this
feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American
soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary
hardships of the work they have undertaken to do, has grown
and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying
campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have
brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion.
"I discovered during my visit to General Greene that the left
or north flank of his brigade camp extended to a point on the
'Calle Real' about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish
defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the
powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred
yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of
Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less
detached works, eastward, through swamps and rice fields,
covering all the avenues of approach to the town and
encircling the city completely. The Filipinos, or insurgent
forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the
American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the
Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my
arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never
accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men.
These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of
ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of
investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works
throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road
called the 'Calle Real,' passing along the front of General
Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila,
the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within
800 yards of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as
well the road to the right, leading from the village of Pasay,
and the approach by the beach was also in their possession.
This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of
quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish
position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was
difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our
relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated as
follows:
"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the principal
leader of the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to
Cavite from Hongkong, and, with the consent of our naval
authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing
the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having
met with some success, and the natives flocking to his
assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of
republican form, with himself as president, and at the time of
my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and
legislative departments and subdivision of territory for
administrative purposes had been accomplished, at least on
paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many
points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of
Manila. As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival
nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and
as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the
occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and
stated that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute
and supreme and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to
hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until
I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as
I would not until then be in a position to issue a
proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his
pretensions should clash with my designs.
"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city
were pressed and military operations conducted without
reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom
of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact
that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish
intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the
extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by
pre-arranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and
clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were
able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.
"To return to the situation of General Greene's brigade as I
found it on my arrival, it will be seen that the difficulty in
gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the
fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw
from the beach and the 'Calle Real,' so that Greene could move
forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene
to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander
in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the
American forces unobstructed control of the roads in their
immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly
General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on
the 'Calle Real' and the beach and constructed a trench, in
which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.
The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very
sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July
31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was
all that could be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the
War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those who
deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. Our
position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted
successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering,
however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the
losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be
ascertained.
"The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for
outpost duty made it imperative to re-enforce General Greene's
troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in
transports on the 31st of July. The difficulties of this
operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were at
anchor off Cavite, 5 miles from a point on the beach where it
was desired to disembark the men.
{619}
Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day
after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies
ashore was to load them from the ship's side into native
lighters (called 'cascos') or small steamboats, move them to a
point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the
surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head on to the
beach. The landing was finally accomplished, after days of
hard work and hardship; and I desire here to express again my
admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the
men of all commands engaged in this operation. Upon the
assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had
about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time
had come for final action. During the time of the night
attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he
would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish
line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop
the night firing and loss of life, but the admiral had
declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our
position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that,
in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for
which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General
MacArthur was in position and the 'Monterey' had arrived, and
under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion
that we should send a joint letter to the captain-general
notifying him that he should remove from the city all
non-combatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations
against the defenses of Manila might begin at any time after
the expiration of that period.
"This letter was sent August 7, and a reply was received the
same date, to the effect that the Spanish were without places
of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick women,
and children now lodged within the walls. On the 9th a formal
joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. This
demand was based upon the hopelessness of the struggle on the
part of the Spaniards, and that every consideration of
humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to
bombardment under such circumstances. The captain-general's
reply, of same date, stated that the council of defense had
declared that the demand could not be granted; but the
captain-general offered to consult his Government if we would
allow him the time strictly necessary for the communications
by way of Hongkong. This was declined on our part for the
reason that it could, in the opinion of the admiral and
myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no
immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was
apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken
at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to
relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great
exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a
bivouac during the rainy season.
"The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated
that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing
into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with
women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large
amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last
resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an
attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the
Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at
that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the
seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy. It was
not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case
the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy
had made practicable breaches in the works and shaken the troops
holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing
to the absence of siege guns. … It was believed, however, as
most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of
civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive
the enemy out of his intrenchments before resorting to the
bombardment of the city. …
"All the troops were in position on the 13th at an early hour
in the morning. About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed
forward from Cavite and before 10 a. m. opened a hot and
accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire projectiles on
the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder
magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in
position in our trenches near the 'Calle Real,' began firing
with great accuracy. At 10.25, on a prearranged signal from
our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance,
the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of
skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade
passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another
line from the same regiment from the left flank of our
earthworks advancing swifty up the beach in open order. Both
these lines found the powder-magazine fort and the trenches
flanking it deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish
works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line
situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men
were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled
down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised
our own.
"The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined
advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his
brigade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy
Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions.
In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing
simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp
fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his
front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing
to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the
roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With
much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the
brigade commander and the troops engaged these difficulties
were overcome with a minimum loss, and MacArthur advanced and
held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated
in his instructions.
"The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the
walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into
Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon
Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers,
of my staff, and Lieutenant Brumby, United States Navy,
representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate
with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these
officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the
Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the
Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of
capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself.
This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal
terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers
representing the two forces, a copy of which is hereto
appended and marked.
{620}
Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea
front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and
saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment,
which had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and
entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the colonel
was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in
places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the
enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and
standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming
proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.
"In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I
desire here to record my appreciation of the admirable manner
in which the orders for attack and the plan for occupation of
the city were carried out by the troops exactly as
contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a
town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all
principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the
insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an
army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American
troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all
rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete
possession of a city of 300,000 people, filled with natives
hostile to the European interests, and stirred up by the
knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside
trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate,
resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his
regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish. …
"The amount of public funds and the numbers of the prisoners
of war and small arms taken have been reported in detail by
cable. It will be observed that the trophies of Manila were
nearly $900,000, 13,000 prisoners, and 22,000 arms.
Immediately after the surrender my headquarters were
established in the ayuntamiento, or city office of the
Governor-General, where steps were at once inaugurated to set
up the government of military occupancy. … On the 16th a
cablegram containing the text of the President's proclamation
directing a cessation of hostilities was received by me, and
at the same time an order to make the fact known to the
Spanish authorities, which was done at once. This resulted in
a formal protest from the Governor-General in regard to the

transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that
the proclamation was dated prior to the surrender. To this I
replied that the status quo in which we were left with the
cessation of hostilities was that existing at the time of the
receipt by me of the official notice, and that I must insist
upon the delivery of the funds. The delivery was made under
protest.
"After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of
my office as military governor, I had direct written
communication with General Aguinaldo on several occasions. He
recognized my authority as military governor of the town of
Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to
withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at
the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters
in this connection had not been settled at the date of my
departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank
and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted
to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for
trouble with them owing to that fact, but, notwithstanding
many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the
leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they
are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to
antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only
chance of future political improvement.
"On the 28th instant I received a cablegram directing me to
transfer my command to Major-General Otis, United States
Volunteers, and to proceed to Paris, France, for conference
with the peace commissioners. I embarked on the steamer
'China' on the 30th in obedience to these instructions."
Report of General Wesley Merritt
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, pages 39-45).
"Aguinaldo … retired to Malalos, about 25 miles to the
northward, leaving his troops entrenched round Manila, and
there with considerable pomp and ceremony on September 29th,
1898, he was declared First President of the Philippine
Republic, and the National Congress was opened with Pedro
Paterno as President of that assembly."
G. J. Younghusband,
The Philippines and Round About,
page 27.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-December).
War with Spain.
Suspension of hostilities.
Negotiation of Treaty of Peace.
Instructions to American Commissioners.
Relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and cession
of Porto Rico, the island of Guam and the Philippine Islands
to the United States.
In his message to Congress, December 5, 1898, President
McKinley gave the following account of his reception of
overtures from Spain, for the termination of the war, and of
the negotiations which resulted in a treaty of peace:
"The annihilation of Admiral Cervera's fleet, followed by the
capitulation of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish
Government a realizing sense of the hopelessness of continuing
a struggle now become wholly unequal, it made overtures of
peace through the French Ambassador, who, with the assent of
his Government, had acted as the friendly representative of
Spanish interests during the war. On the 26th of July M.
Cambon presented a communication signed by the Duke of
Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of State, inviting the United
States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to
make peace. On the 30th of July, by a communication addressed
to the Duke of Almodovar and handed to M. Cambon, the terms of
this Government were announced, substantially as in the
protocol afterwards signed. On the 10th of August the Spanish
reply, dated August 7th, was handed by M. Cambon to the
Secretary of State. It accepted unconditionally the terms
imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of the Ladrone
group, but appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible
reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippine
Islands. Conceiving that discussion on this point could
neither be practical nor profitable, I directed that, in order
to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith
closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the
terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be
undertaken.
{621}
The vague and inexplicit suggestion of the Spanish note could
not be accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual
ultimatum a draft of protocol embodying the precise terms
tendered to Spain in our note of July 30th, with added
stipulations of detail as to the appointment of commissioners
to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles. On
August 12th M. Cambon announced his receipt of full powers to
sign the protocol submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of
August 12th M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and
the Secretary of State, as the plenipotentiary of the United
States, signed a protocol providing:
Article I—
Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title
to Cuba.
Article II-
Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by
the United States.
Article III-
The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and
harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace,
which shall determine the control, disposition and government
of the Philippines.
The fourth article provided for the appointment of joint
commissions on the part of the United States and Spain, to
meet in Havana and San Juan, respectively, for the purpose of
arranging and carrying out the details of the stipulated
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in
the West Indies.
The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more
than five commissioners on each side, to meet at Paris not
later than October 1st, and proceed to the negotiation and
conclusion of a treaty of peace, subject to ratification
according to the respective constitutional forms of the two
countries.
The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of
the protocol hostilities between the two countries should be
suspended and that notice to that effect should be given as
soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its
military and naval forces. Immediately upon the conclusion of
the protocol I issued a proclamation of August 12th,
suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The
necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph.
The blockade of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Porto Rico
was in like manner raised. On the 18th of August the
muster-out of 100,000 Volunteers, or as near that number as
was found to be practicable, was ordered. On the 1st of
December 101,165 officers and men had been mustered out and
discharged from the service and 9,002 more will be mustered
out by the 10th of this month. Also a corresponding number of
general staff officers have been honorably discharged from the
service. The military commissions to superintend the
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were
forthwith appointed: For Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade,
Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C.
Butler. For Porto Rico, Major-General John R. Brooke,
Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley and Brigadier-General William
W. Gordon, who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners
at Havana and San Juan respectively. … Pursuant to the fifth
article of the protocol, I appointed William H. Day, late
Secretary of State; Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye and
George Gray, Senators of the United States, and Whitelaw Reid,
to be the peace commissioners on the part of the United
States. Proceeding in due season to Paris they there met on
the first of October five commissioners, similarly appointed
on the part of Spain."
Message of the President to Congress,
December 5, 1898.
The instructions given (September 16) by President McKinley to
the commissioners appointed to treat for peace with Spain, and
the correspondence between the commissioners at Paris and the
President and the Secretary of State at Washington during the
progress of the negotiations, were communicated confidentially
to the United States Senate on the 30th of January, 1899, but
not published until February, 1901, when the injunction of
secrecy was removed and the printing of the papers ordered by
vote of the Senate. The chief interest of these papers lies in
their disclosure of what passed between the American executive
and the peace commissioners on the subject of the Philippine
Islands which led to the demand for their entire surrender by
Spain.
In his instructions of September 16th to the commissioners, on
their departure for the meeting with Spanish commissioners at
Paris, the President wrote on this subject: "By article 6 of
the protocol it was agreed that hostilities between the two
countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect
should be given as soon as possible by each Government to the
Commanders of its military and naval forces. Such notice was
given by the Government of the United States immediately after
the signature of the protocol, the forms of the necessary
orders having previously been prepared. But before notice
could reach the commanders of the military and naval forces of
the United States in the Philippines they captured and took
possession by conquest of the city of Manila and its suburbs,
which are therefore held by the United States by conquest as
well as by virtue of the protocol. In view of what has taken
place it is necessary now to determine what shall be our
future relations to the Philippines. …
"Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to
lasting results and to the achievement of the common good
under the demands of civilization rather than to ambitious
designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this
consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by
Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that
requirement we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged.
It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but
simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say
that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent
peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag
should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events
and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and
the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere. The
Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less
true, however, that, without any original thought of complete
or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our
arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not
disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human
action. A vowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated
all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can
not be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part
the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which
we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose
growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has
plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.
{622}
"Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial
opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be
indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the
enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in
the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open
door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to
others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and
inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on
large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial
basis and upon broad and equal privileges. It is believed that
in the practical application of these guiding principles the
present interests of our country and the proper measure of its
duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its
exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord
with the just, moral, and humane purpose which was invoked as
our justification in accepting the war.
"In view of what has been stated, the United States can not
accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of
the island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United
States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and
merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into
such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United
States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and
merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and
rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of
protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country
within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed
to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain
shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in
the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the
United States."
On the 7th of October, Mr. Day, on behalf of the American
commissioners, cabled a long communication from Paris to Mr.
Hay, his successor in the United States Department of State,
summarizing testimony given before the Commission by General
Merritt, lately commanding in the Philippines, and statements
brought by General Merritt from Admiral Dewey, General Greene,
and others. In part, the telegram was as follows:
"General Anderson, in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June
and July, seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and
native authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. General
Merritt reports that Admiral Dewey did not approve this
correspondence and advised against it. Merritt and Dewey both
kept clear of any compromising communications. Merritt
expresses opinion we are in no way committed to any insurgent
programme. Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt
said insurrection practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and
religious differences between the inhabitants of various
islands. United States has helped rather than injured
insurrection. Under no obligation other than moral to help
natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish rule, even
with amnesty. Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards
did better in future than in past. Insurgents would fight
among themselves if they had no common enemy. Think it
feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some
adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies.
Natives could not resist 5,000 troops. … General Merritt
thinks that if United States attempted to take possession of
Luzon, or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his
immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are
divided and his opposition would not amount to anything. If
the islands were divided, filibustering expeditions might go
from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant
danger of conflict with Spain. In answer to questions of
Senator Frye, Merritt said insurgents would murder Spaniards
and priests in Luzon and destroy their property if the United
States withdrew. United States under moral obligation to stay
there. He did not know whether the effect of setting up a
government by the United States in Luzon would be to produce
revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their
government. … Answering questions of Mr. Gray, Merritt said
consequences in case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph
made it doubtful whether United States would be morally
justified in withdrawing. Our acts were ordinary acts of war,
as if we had attacked Barcelona, but present conditions in
Philippine Islands were partly brought about by us. Insurgents
not in worse condition by our coming. Spaniards hardly able to
defend themselves. If we restored them to their position and
trenches, they might maintain themselves with the help of a
navy when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a
responsibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be
sentimental. He thought it would be an advantage if the United
States would change its policy and keep the islands. (He)
thought our interests in the East would be helped by the cheap
labor in the Philippines, costing only from 20 to 80 cents a
day, according to skill. … Answering questions of Mr. Reid,
Merritt said he considered capture of Manila practically
capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was
not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity
bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey's victory we armed
insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was
over-estimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants
with Dewey's cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing
this to continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his
principal followers, if allowed to do so."
October 25, Judge Day cabled a message to Washington, saying:
"Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning
Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted
herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit
instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question
in joint commission almost immediately." The differing
statements then transmitted were three in number, the first of
them signed by Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, who said:
"Information gained by commission in Paris leads to conviction
that it would be naval, political, and commercial mistake to
divide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken
tends to this effect. As instructions provide for retention at
least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in
Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We
therefore ask for extension of instructions. Spain governed
and defended these islands from Manila, and with destruction
of her fleet and the surrender of her army we became as
complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with
nothing needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with
the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession.
{623}
The Ladrones and Carolines were also governed from the same
capital by the same governor-general. National boundaries
ought to follow natural divisions, but there is no natural
place for dividing Philippine Islands. … If we do not want the
islands ourselves, better to control their disposition; that
is, to hold the option on them rather than to abandon it.
Could then at least try to protect ourselves by ample treaty
stipulations with the acquiring powers. Commercially, division
of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous
rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept."
Disagreeing with this view, Judge Day said:
"I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the
entire Philippine island group. In the spirit of our
instructions, and bearing in mind the often declared
disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of
conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be
consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory
permanently held must be taken as war indemnity and with due
regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our
military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents.
Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We
cannot leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to
their unaided resources, either to form a government or to
battle against a foe which (although) unequal to us, might
readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the
inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This
is particularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group. Only
experience can determine the success of colonial expansion
upon which the United States is entering. It may prove
expensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is tried
with ignorant and semibarbarous people at the other side of
the world. It should therefore be kept within bounds." Judge
Day, accordingly, suggested a division of the archipelago that
would give to the United States Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan,
and control the entrance to the China Sea. Senator Gray, in a
third statement, dissented from both these views, saying: "The
undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take Philippine
Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse
accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted
upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs the case of
Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into
European politics and the entangling alliances against which
Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will
make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers; a greatly
increased military establishment; immense sums for
fortifications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous
complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of
taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American
labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap; no area
for homes for American citizens; climate and social conditions
demoralizing to character of American youth; new and disturbing
questions introduced into our politics; church question
menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity—injury. The
undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to
insurgents is paramount to our own manifest interests. … No
place for colonial administration or government of subject
people in American system. So much from standpoint of
interest; but even conceding all benefits claimed for
annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit
to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and
Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength
to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and
by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in the hour of
victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for
doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from
high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example
in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgar greed
for territory which Europe has inherited from medieval times.
Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn
and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have
achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our
word. … At the very least let us adhere to the President's
instructions and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon
forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other
islands. Above all let us not make a mockery of the injunction
contained in those instructions, where, after stating that we
took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and
in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations, and
that we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of
conquest, the President among other things eloquently says:
'It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace
should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in
facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the
concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its
original action.' This and more, of which I earnestly ask a
re-perusal, binds my conscience and governs my actions."
But the President had now arrived at a different state of
mind, and directed Secretary Hay to make the following reply,
on the 26th: "The information which has come to the President
since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the
cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands
subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future
contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, or
humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole
archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the
former must therefore be required. The President reaches this
conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole
subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities
it will impose, believing that this course will entail less
trouble than any other and besides will best subserve the
interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can not
escape responsibility."
Two days later, the moral and political reflections of the
President on the subject were expressed still further to the
commissioners by Secretary Hay, in the following telegram:
"While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest,
which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition,
control, and government the President prefers should be the
subject of negotiation as provided in the protocol. It is
imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only
by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion
should be our least concern; that we shall not shirk the moral
obligations of our victory is of the greatest.
{624}
It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently
destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part
in her feeble control now would increase our difficulties and
be opposed to the interests of humanity. The sentiment in the
United States is almost universal that the people of the
Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from
Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully
concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the
islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or
powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We
must either hold them or turn them back to Spain.
Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen
as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can
see but one plain path of duty—the acceptance of the archipelago.
Greater difficulties and more serious
complications—administrative and international—would follow
any other course. The President has given to the views of the
commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the
conclusion above announced in the light of information
communicated to the commission and to the President since your
departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration
of duty and humanity. The President is not unmindful of the
distressed financial condition of Spain, and whatever
consideration the United States may show must come from its
sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real
or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full cession
of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the
commission."
On the 3d of November, Judge Day cabled: "After a careful
examination of the authorities, the majority of the commission
are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippine
Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was
signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and
capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures
made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and
status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require
cession of Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and
expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of islands,
the broken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would
leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors."
On the 4th, Senator Davis added a personal telegram as
follows: "I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago
on other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial
conquest of the Philippine Islands, such as indemnity or as
conditions of peace imposed by our general military success
and in view of our future security and general welfare,
commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol admits all
these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected
territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow
and untenable under protocol."
Secretary Hay replied, for the President, on the 5th: "The
President has no purpose to question the commission's judgment
as to the grounds upon which the cession of the archipelago is
to be claimed. His only wish in that respect is to hold all
the ground upon which we can fairly and justly make the claim.
He recognizes fully the soundness of putting forward indemnity
as the chief ground, but conquest is a consideration which
ought not to be ignored. How our demand shall be presented,
and the grounds upon which you will rest it, he confidently
leaves with the commissioners. His great concern is that a
treaty shall be effected in terms which will not only satisfy
the present generation but, what is more important, be
justified in the judgment of posterity."
Discussion followed, in which Judge Day and Senator Gray
repeated the views they had formerly expressed, in dissent
from the policy determined upon by the President and his
cabinet, the latter saying: "Believing that the result of a
failure to obtain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of
the whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be
deprecated as inconsistent with the traditions and
civilization of the United States, I would be willing to take
the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, and I would,
to that end, make such reasonable concessions as would comport
with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and
prostrate foe. I mean that I would prefer the latter
alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind as
to the policy of taking the Philippine Islands at all."
So far as concerned the demands of the United States (which
Spain was powerless to resist), the question was settled, on
the 13th of November, by a telegram from Secretary Hay to Mr.
Day, in which he said: "We are clearly entitled to indemnity
for the cost of the war. We can not hope to be fully
indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be
difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the
archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely
can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost
of the war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life
and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Porto Rico,
which we have and which is wholly inadequate. … You are
therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole
of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain ten to
twenty millions of dollars, and if you can get cession of a
naval and telegraph station in the Carolines, and the several
concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as
applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and
Reid, you can offer more."
United States, 56th Congress, 2d Session,
Senate Document Number 148
(Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain).
Discussion between the Spanish and American commissioners at
Paris was prolonged until the 10th of December, when the
former yielded to what they protested against as hard terms,
and the following Treaty of Peace was signed:
Treaty of Peace.
ARTICLE I.
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to
be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so
long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the
obligations that may under international law result from the
fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and
property.
ARTICLE II.
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.
{625}
ARTICLE III.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the
Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within
the following line: A line running from west to east along or
near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the
middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred
and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh
(127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence
along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of
four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude,
thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five
minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the
meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and
thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along
the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and
thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the
parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40')
north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees
and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the
one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude
east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection
of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the
one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of
longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred
and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of
Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will
pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000)
within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of
the present treaty.
ARTICLE IV.
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the
date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present
treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of
the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and
merchandise of the United States.
ARTICLE V.
The United States will, upon the signature of the present
treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish
soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by
the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question
shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of
the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate
the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms
similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to
arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in
the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which
is to continue in force till its provisions are completely
executed. The time within which the evacuation of the
Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed
by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war
vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their
carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and
materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and
naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the
property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of
field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences,
shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months,
to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the
treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase
such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between
the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.
ARTICLE VI.
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release
all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned
for political offences, in connection with the insurrections
in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United
States. Reciprocally the United States will release all
persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will
undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in
the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. The
Government of the United States will at its own cost return to
Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return
to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines,
according to the situation of their respective homes,
prisoners released or caused to be released by them,
respectively, under this article.
ARTICLE VII.
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for
indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either
Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other
Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the
late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of
ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for
indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will
adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain
relinquished in this article.
ARTICLE VIII.
In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III
of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto
Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of
Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings,
wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and
other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong
to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of
Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or
cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph
refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights
which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of
all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other
associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess
property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or
of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such
individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession,
as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively
referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may
exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in
such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy
of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested.
Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in
respect of documents in the archives of the islands above
referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as
the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of
Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official
archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the
islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the
rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and
records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons
shall without distinction have the right to require, in
accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts,
wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols
or files, or which may be contained in the executive or
judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands
aforesaid.
{626}
ARTICLE IX.
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights
of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the
right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions,
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.
ARTICLE X.
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the
free exercise of their religion.
ARTICLE XI.
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by
this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be
subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside,
pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they
shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to
pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the
courts belong.
ARTICLE XII.
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which
Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be
determined according to the following rules:
1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private
individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date
mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or
right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be
final, and shall be executed in due form by competent
authority in the territory within which such judgments should
be carried out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the
date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment
before the court in which they may then be pending or in the
court that may be substituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the
Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which
by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its
jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having
been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the
competent authority of the place in which the case arose.
ARTICLE XIII.
The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents
acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico,
the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of
the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall
continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and
artistic works, not subversive of public order in the
territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of
duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be
reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of
this treaty.
ARTICLE XIV.
Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in
the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over
which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present
treaty.
ARTICLE XV.
The Government of each country will, for the term of ten
years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the
same treatment in respect of all port charges, including
entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties,
as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the
coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on
six months notice given by either Government to the other.
ARTICLE XVI.
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty
by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the
time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the
termination of such occupancy, advise any Government
established in the island to assume the same obligations.
ARTICLE XVII.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain;
and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within
six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In
faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have
signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done
in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year
of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.
[Signed]
William R. Day,
Cushman K. Davis,
William P. Frye,
Geo. Gray,
Whitelaw Reid,
Eugenio Montero Ríos,
B. de Abarzuza,
J. de Garnica,
W. R. de Villa Urrutia,
Rafael Cerero.
That the treaty would be ratified by the Senate of the United
States was by no means certain when it was signed, and
remained questionable for two months.
See below:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).
Some time after the conclusion of the treaty, it was
discovered that the boundaries defined in it for the cession
of the Philippine Islands failed to include the islands of
Cagayan, or Kagayan, and Sibutu, in the southern part of the
archipelago. Still later, it was found that several small
islands (the Bachi or Bashee group, and others) belonging to
the Spanish possessions in the East were left lying outside of
the northern Philippine boundary, as laid down in the treaty
of cession. It is said that the Japanese government called
attention to this latter error, desiring to have the islands
in question, which are near to Formosa, controlled by the
United States, rather than by Spain. By a new treaty with
Spain, negotiated in 1900, all these outlying islands were
acquired by the United States, for the sum of $100,000.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August).
Losses of the armies at Santiago and in the Philippines.
See below:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE).
{627}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August 21).
The War with Spain.
Letter from departing Spanish soldiers to the soldiers
of the American army.
The following letter, addressed, on the eve of their departure
for Spain, by the Spanish soldiers at Santiago, to the
soldiers of the American army, "is surely," says
Lieutenant-Colonel Miley, who quotes it in his book entitled
"In Cuba with Shafter"—"is surely the most remarkable letter
ever addressed by vanquished soldiers to their conquerors:
'Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our
duty as well-born men in whose breasts there lives gratitude
and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without
sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and
farewell. We fought you with ardor and with all our strength,
endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest
rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been
vanquished by you, so our generals and chiefs judged in
signing the capitulation, but our surrender and the
blood-battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for
resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly.
You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty
as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective
States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great
courage, as before stated—a quality we had not met with during
the three years we have carried on this war against a people
without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of
doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot
their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled.
This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this
unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws
and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most
civilized nations of the world; have given honorable burial to
the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with
great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners
and their comfort; and lastly, to us, whose condition was
terrible, you have given freely of food and of your stock of
medicines, and have honored us with distinction and courtesy,
for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost
harmony. With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all,
there remains but to express our farewell, and with the
greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in
this land, which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but
will be yours. You have conquered it by force and watered it
with your blood, as your conscience called for under the
demands of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of
the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous
Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers—these people are
not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will
find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern
civilized humanity. From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers.
(Signed) Pedro Lopez De Castillo, Soldier of Infantry.
Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.'"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August-December).
Situation in the Philippines following the occupation
of Manila by American forces.
Growing distrust and unfriendliness of the Tagalos.
Report of General Otis.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (December).
Organization of military government in Cuba.
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-OCTOBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
Statistics of the Spanish-American War.
The following military and naval statistics of the war with
Spain, compiled from official sources, were submitted to the
House of Representatives, during its debate on the Army Bill,
in December, 1900, as part of an appendix to a speech made in
support of the Bill by Honorable Charles Dick, of Ohio:
ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF THE ARMY
DURING AND AFTER THE WAR.
By an Act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, providing for
the temporary increase of the military establishment of the
United States, "the organized and active land forces were
declared to consist of the Regular Army and of the militia of
the several States when called into service, constituting two
branches, designated, respectively, as be Regular Army and the
Volunteer Army of the United States. And the President was
authorized to organize the regular and volunteer troops into
divisions of three brigades, each brigade to be composed of
three or more regiments, and when three or more divisions are
present in the same army, to organize them into army corps,
each corps to consist of not more than three divisions. Under
the authority conferred upon him by the joint resolution of
April 20 and the act of April 22, 1898, the President issued a
proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling for volunteers to the
number of 125,000 men, to be apportioned as far as practicable
among the several States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia, according to population, to serve for two years
unless sooner discharged. Among the several arms of the
service the troops were apportioned as follows: Five regiments
and 17 troops of cavalry, 16 batteries of light artillery, 1
regiment and 7 batteries of heavy artillery, 119 regiments and
10 battalions of infantry. May 25, 1898, the President issued
a proclamation calling for an additional force of 75,000 men.
For controlling military reasons, it was determined to utilize
so much of this additional force as was necessary to bring up
the several State organizations in service to the full legal
strength, the remainder to be apportioned among the several
States and Territories according to their respective quotas as
nearly as possible. The apportionment to the several arms of
service under this second call was for 16 batteries of light
artillery, 3 battalions of heavy artillery, and 22 regiments,
ten battalions, and 46 companies of infantry."
The strength of the Regular Army on the 1st of April, 1898,
just before the breaking out of the war, was as follows:
Officers. Enlisted Men.
General officers and staff corps. 532 2,026
Cavalry. 437 6,047
Artillery. 288 4,486
Infantry. 886 12,828
Miscellaneous. 653
Total. 2,143 26,040
The Regular Army was authorized to be increased to 65,000 men
as a war footing. The total strength of the armies, Regular
and Volunteer, at several later dates, was as follows:
{628}
DATE. Regulars. Volunteers. Total.
April 15, 1898 28,183 28,183
May 31, 1898 38,816 124,776 162,592
August 31, 1898 56,362 216,256 272,618
January 31, 1899 65,531 90,241 155,772
June 30, 1899 63,535 16,550 80,085

Maximum force at any one time during Spanish-American war,
274,717 officers and men. On the 29th of November, 1898, the
Army of the United States consisted of 2,324 officers and
61,444 enlisted men of the regular force, and of 5,216
officers and 110,202 enlisted men of the volunteer force,
making an aggregate of 7,540 officers and 171,646 enlisted
men.
PAY OF ARMY.
Payments made to Regular and Volunteer armies engaged during
Spanish-American war, from April 21, 1898, to April 11, 1899,
$67,065,629.56.
CASUALTIES IN ACTION.
In Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines between May 1, 1898,
and June 30, 1899.
Killed Cuba Porto Rico Philippines
Officers 21 16
Enlisted men 223 4 219
Wounded:
Officers 101 92
Enlisted men 1,344 36 1,349
Died of Wounds:
Officers 10 10
Enlisted men 64 8 82
Died of Disease:
Officers 34 4 11
Enlisted men. 888 251 369
Grand total, 5,136.
Casualties in Fifth Army Corps in campaign against Santiago,
June 22, 1898, to July 17, 1898.