China under the Empress Dowager

by J. O. P. Bland; Sir E. Backhouse

For the moment he continued to issue new Edicts, one ordering the making of macadamised roads in Peking, another the enrolment of militia for purposes of national defence, while a third authorised Manchus to leave Peking, should they so wish, to earn their living in the provinces. On the 27th of the 7th Moon, appeared the last of his important Reform Decrees—a document pathetic in the light of subsequent events.

“In promoting reforms, we have adopted certain European methods, because, while China and Europe are both alike in holding that the first object of good government should be the welfare of the people, Europe has travelled further on this road than we have, so that, by the introduction of European methods, we simply make good China’s deficiencies. But our Statesmen and scholars are so ignorant of what lies beyond our borders that they look upon Europe as possessing no civilisation. They are all unaware of those numerous branches of western knowledge whose object it is to enlighten the minds and increase the material prosperity of the people. Physical well-being and increased longevity of the race are thereby secured for the masses.

“Is it possible that I, the Emperor, am to be regarded as a mere follower after new and strange ideas because of my thirst for reform? My love for the people, my children, springs from the feeling that God has confided them to me and that to my care they have been given in trust by my illustrious Ancestors. I shall never feel that my duty as Sovereign is fulfilled until I have raised them all to a condition of peaceful prosperity. Moreover, do not the foreign Powers surround our Empire, committing frequent acts of aggression? Unless we learn and adopt the sources of their strength, our plight cannot be remedied. The cause of my anxiety is not fully appreciated by my people, because the reactionary element deliberately misrepresents my objects, spreading the while baseless rumours so as to disturb the minds of men. When I reflect how deep is the ignorance of the masses of the dwellers in the innermost parts of the Empire on the subject of my proposed reforms, my heart is filled with care and grief. Therefore do I hereby now proclaim my intentions, so that the whole Empire may know and believe that their Sovereign is to be trusted and that the people may co-operate with me in working for reform and the strengthening of our country. This is my earnest hope. I command that the whole of my Reform Decrees be printed on Yellow paper and distributed for the information of all men. The District Magistrates are henceforward privileged to submit Memorials to me through the Provincial Viceroys, so that I may learn the real needs of the people. Let this Decree be exhibited in the front hall of every public office in the Empire so that all men may see it.”

But the sands had run out. Tzŭ Hsi now emerged from “the profound seclusion of her Palace” and Kuang-Hsü’s little hour was over.

XIV
THE COUP D’ÉTAT OF 1898

In August 1898—at the end of the 7th Moon—the position of affairs in the Palace (known only to a few) was that the Empress Dowager had been won over to the reactionary party; she was postponing a decisive step, however, until she and the Emperor made their proposed visit to Tientsin in the 9th Moon. It was her intention there to confer with Jung Lu before resuming the Regency, because of the unmistakable hostility towards her then prevailing in the southern provinces, which she wished to allay, as far as possible, by avoiding any overt measures of usurpation until her preparations were made. On the 1st of the 8th Moon, the Emperor, who was then in residence at the Summer Palace, received in audience Yüan Shih-k’ai, the Judicial Commissioner of Chihli, and discussed with him at great length the political needs of the Empire. Yüan (then in his fortieth year) had owed his rapid advancement to the protection of the great Viceroy Li Hung-chang; nevertheless, among his rivals and enemies there were many who attributed the disastrous war with Japan in 1894 to his arbitrary conduct of affairs as Imperial Resident in Corea. There is no doubt that his reports and advice on the situation at Seoul precipitated, if they did not cause, the crisis, leading the Chinese Government to despatch troops into the country in the face of Japan’s desire and readiness for war, and thus to the extinction of China’s sovereignty in the Hermit Kingdom; but the fact had not impaired Yüan’s personal prestige or his influence at Court. As a result of this audience the Emperor was completely won over by Yüan’s professed interest in the cause of reform, and was convinced that in him he had secured a powerful supporter. His Majesty had already realised that he must now reckon with the Old Buddha’s uncompromising opposition; quite recently she had severely rebuked him for even noticing K’ang Yu-wei’s suggestion that he should act more on his own authority. Jung Lu, he knew, would always loyally support his Imperial mistress; and there was not one prominent Manchu in the Empire, and, as far as Peking was concerned, hardly a Chinese, who would dare to oppose the Old Buddha, if once she declared herself actively on the side of reaction. The only two high officials in Peking on whom he could confidently reckon for sympathy and support were the Cantonese Chang Yin-huan, and Li Tuan-fen, a native of Kueichou. But if he could obtain control of the Northern foreign-drilled army, the reactionary party might yet be overthrown. To secure this end it was essential that Jung Lu, the Governor-General of Chihli and Commander-in-Chief of the foreign-drilled forces, should be put out of the way, and this before the Empress could be warned of the plot. The Emperor therefore proposed to have Jung Lu put to death in his Yamên at Tientsin, and then swiftly to bring a force of 10,000 of his disciplined troops to the capital, who would confine the Empress Dowager to the Summer Palace. At the same time the most prominent reactionaries in Peking, i.e., Kang Yi, Yü Lu, Huai T’a Pu and Hsü Ying-ku’ei were to be seized at their residences and hurried off to the prison of the Board of Punishments. This was the scheme suggested by K’ang Yu-wei, the Censor Yang Shen-hsiu, and the secretaries of the Grand Council, T’an Ssu-t’ung, Lin-Hsü, Yang Jui, and Liu Kuang-ti. At this first audience Yüan Shih-k’ai was informed of the Emperor’s determination to maintain and enforce his reform policy, and was asked whether he would be loyal to his sovereign if placed in command of a large force of troops. “Your servant will endeavour to recompense the Imperial favour,” he replied, “even though his merit be only as a drop of water in the ocean or a grain of sand in the desert; he will faithfully perform the service of a dog or a horse while there remains breath in his body.”

Completely reassured by Yüan’s words and earnest manner and his apparently genuine zeal for reform, the Emperor straightway issued the following Decree:—

“At the present time army reform is of all things most essential, and the judicial commissioner of Chihli, Yüan Shih-k’ai, is an energetic administrator and thoroughly earnest in the matter of training our forces. We therefore accord him the rank of Expectant Vice-President of a Board and place him in special charge of the business of army reform. He is to memorialise from time to time regarding any measures which he may desire to introduce. Under the present conditions of our Empire it is of the first importance that our defences be strengthened, and it behoves Yüan Shih-k’ai therefore to display all possible energy and zeal in the training of our troops, so that an efficient army may be organised, and the Throne’s determination to secure homogeneous forces be loyally supported.”