General Grant's complete satisfaction with Sherman's personal attitude and readiness to accept the action of the President was shown in his wish to return at once to Washington. He prepared to start from Raleigh on the morning of the 26th, taking a steamer from New Berne on arriving there. [Footnote: Id., p. 309.] He expected, of course that the surrender would be completed and the result telegraphed him by the time his vessel was ready to start, but he was also moved by delicacy toward Sherman and the desire to relieve him from every appearance of supervision which his stay at Raleigh might give. Sherman, however, was also chivalrous, and requested Grant not to leave till he should see the capitulation finally signed. [Footnote: Id., p. 312.] All this, it must be remembered, was in entire ignorance of the follies perpetrated at the War Department during those days.
The hour fixed for the new conference at Durham was the same at which the armistice would expire; but Sherman, having the troops in readiness to start at a moment's notice, ordered that no movement should be made till his return. [Footnote:Id., p. 314.] An accident to his railroad delayed Johnston two or three hours, but on his arrival a brief conference satisfied him that the only course to pursue was to surrender on the terms given to Lee, and to trust to Sherman's assurance that such arrangements would be made in executing the capitulation as would guard against the evils of the dispersion of his army without means of subsistence, which both officers justly feared. As in Lee's case the language used avoided terms which implied being prisoners of war even momentarily, but provided that after delivering the arms to an ordnance officer at Greensborough (excepting side-arms of officers) and giving an "individual obligation not to take up arms against the Government of the United States, . . . all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their obligation and the laws in force where they may reside." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 313.]
At half-past seven in the evening Grant was able to write his dispatch to Stanton, Secretary of War, that the surrender was complete, and by using the telegraph to New Berne and Morehead City, and from Fort Monroe to Washington, the news reached Washington at ten in the morning of the 28th. [Footnote: Id., p. 311.] The same evening, and by same means of transmittal, he also informed Halleck at Richmond of the surrender, and recalled all his troops out of Sherman's theatre of operations. [Footnote: On April 16th Halleck had been assigned to command the Department of Virginia, thus relieving him of duty as chief of staff of the army in which General Rawlins succeeded him. On April 19th his command was made the Military Division of the James, including besides Virginia such parts of North Carolina as Sherman should not occupy. (Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt, iii. pp. 230, 250.) In reading the Official Records of this period, it must be borne constantly in mind that from two to four days was required to convey dispatches from Sherman to the War Department and vice versa,--the longer time in case they were sent by mail, and the shorter when use was made in part of the telegraph lines.] After hearing the details of Sherman's conversations with Johnston, and approving the suggestions of liberal arrangements looking to getting the Confederate troops quickly and quietly back to peaceful industry at their homes, Grant parted with us at Raleigh on the 27th, and returned as rapidly as possible to Washington, where the influence of his calm judgment and executive ability was sorely needed.
The orders for National forces in North Carolina except Schofield's troops to march homeward were issued on the 27th. Kilpatrick's division of cavalry was attached to Schofield's command, and the Army of the Ohio thus reinforced was left to garrison the Department of North Carolina. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 323.] To General Schofield was also intrusted the preparation of the printed paroles for all the troops included in the capitulation, so that there might be uniformity. To him also was committed the conclusion of the supplementary terms needed for the liberal execution of the convention, as had been discussed at the personal meeting of the commanders, at which he had been present. [Footnote: Id., pp. 320, 322.] Johnston sent in a draft of what he had understood to be thus informally arranged, the most important items of which were the "loan" to the Confederates of their army animals and wagons for farming purposes, the retention of a portion of their arms to enforce order and discipline till the separate organizations should reach their homes, and the extension of the privileges of the convention to naval officers of the Confederacy. [Footnote: Id., p. 321.] With slight modifications these were accepted by General Schofield and carried out. [Footnote:Id., pp. 350, 355, 482.] A large issue of rations to Johnston's troops had been voluntarily added without any request or stipulation. [Footnote: Schofield's Forty-six Years in the Army, p. 352, etc.; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 362, 363; Johnston's Narrative, pp. 412-420. General Schofield's recollection is that he wrote the convention of the 26th, Johnston and Sherman being unable to agree: but as it was in substance a transcript of the Grant-Lee terms of April 9th, according to Sherman's note to Johnston of the 24th demanding their acceptance "purely and simply" (Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 294), the account I have given seems to me best supported by all the evidence.] Both parties understood that Johnston's command included all Confederate troops east of the Chattahoochee, though this is not stated in the terms. [Footnote: Grant to Halleck, Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 312; Johnston to York, Id., p. 854; Do. to Governor Brown, Id., p. 855. Sherman's Field Order No. 65, Id., p. 322.] At the earnest request of the Confederate general, none of our troops were sent up to Greensborough, where his headquarters and principal camp were, until the printing of the paroles was completed and staff officers sent to issue them on April 30th. [Footnote: Id., pp. 349, 350, 35l. 483.] Sherman wrote a farewell letter to Johnston on the 27th, telling of his instructions to General Schofield to give him ten days' rations for 25,000 men, "to facilitate what you and I and all good men desire, the return to their homes of the officers and men composing your army." [Footnote: Id., p. 320.] He spoke also of his directions to "loan" to them enough animals fit for farming purposes to insure a crop. Concluding, he said: "Now that war is over, I am as willing to risk my person and reputation as heretofore, to heal the wounds made by the past war, and I think my feeling is shared by the whole army. I also think a similar feeling actuates the mass of your army, but there are some unthinking young men who have no sense or experience, that unless controlled may embroil their neighbors. If we are forced to deal with them, it must be with severity, but I hope they will be managed by the people of the South." [Footnote: Ibid.] His Field Order No. 65, announcing the end of war east of the Chattahoochee, referred to the same purpose "to relieve present wants and to encourage the inhabitants to renew their peaceful pursuits and to restore the relations of friendship among our fellow-citizens and countrymen." He directed that "great care must be taken that all the terms and stipulations on our part be fulfilled with the most scrupulous fidelity, whilst those imposed on our hitherto enemies be received in a spirit becoming a brave and generous army." [Footnote: Id., p. 322]
A copy of this order was enclosed in Sherman's letter to Johnston, and the latter replied in a similar noble tone. "The enlarged patriotism manifested in these papers," he said, "reconciles me to what I had previously regarded as the misfortune of my life--that of having had you to encounter in the field. The enlightened and humane policy you have adopted will certainly be successful. It is fortunate for the people of North Carolina that your views are to be carried out by one so capable of appreciating them. I hope you are as well represented in the other departments of your command; if so, an early and complete pacification in it may be expected.... The disposition you express to heal the wounds made by the past war has been evident to me in all our interviews. You are right in supposing that similar feelings are entertained by the mass of this army. I am sure that all the leading men in it will exert their influence for that object." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 336.]
Down to this moment the progress of events had been full of satisfaction to Sherman, and of gratification to his noble ambition. If the implication contained in the order sending Grant in person to his headquarters had pained him, Grant's perfect handling of the situation had prevented the wound being deep, and Sherman was pleased, on the whole, to be relieved of negotiations on all civil questions. But the day after Grant had left him,--when he had issued his admirable Order No. 65, and exchanged chivalrous sentiments with Johnston,--when he had completed his work in his great campaign and, leaving to Schofield the finishing of the administrative task in North Carolina, was turning his face homeward full of anticipation of rejoining family and friends, with his great career in a retrospect which was altogether gratifying--at this culmination of his glory as a soldier and his pride as a patriot, he received the sorest blow and the deepest wound he ever knew.
The mail, on the 28th, brought a copy of the "New York Times," containing Mr. Stanton's now famous dispatch to General Dix dated the 22d, sent for the purpose of general publication, in which he made known the fact that Sherman had entered into a convention with Johnston, that it was disapproved by the President, and that Sherman was ordered to resume hostilities. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 285.] Had the newspaper publication stopped here, it would still have been a grave indiscretion, for the news of what was done in Washington usually reached the enemy more promptly than it came to our officers at the front, and the enterprising spies at the capital would have thought their fortunes made by getting on the 22d orders which did not reach Sherman, in fact, till the 24th, with official comments of which the general was ignorant till the 28th.
But this was the least of the faults of this curious document. It said that Sherman had entered into "what is called a basis of peace." No such name was given the paper, and the manner of attributing it misled the public as to its character. It suppressed the fact that the "Memorandum" was by its terms wholly without binding effect if not approved by the President. Without saying so, it persuasively led the reader to believe that Sherman had violated instructions issued by Mr. Lincoln on March 3d, which in fact were never published till it was done in this dispatch, and were wholly unknown to the general, who believed he was acting in accordance with President Lincoln's wishes given him orally at the end of March. It spoke of orders sent by Sherman to Stoneman "to withdraw from Salisbury and join him" as opening "the way for Davis to escape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported to be very large." Only complete ignorance of the actual military situation could account for so erroneous a statement. Davis was in the midst of Johnston's whole army, most of which was halted by the truce at Greensborough. Stoneman, on a brilliant cavalry raid, passed rapidly from the North near Greensborough a week before, had struck Salisbury on the 13th, and immediately marched northwest, on his return to East Tennessee, whence he had started. He was at Statesville, forty miles on his way, when Sherman and Johnston made the armistice on the 18th, of which he did not hear a word till he was over the mountains on the 23d. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. pp. 334, 335.] Sherman first heard of Davis's "plunder" from Grant on the 24th, and immediately asked the navy to frustrate any efforts to take it out of the country. [Footnote: Ante, p. 494.] Davis did not leave the protection of Johnston's army till he knew that Stoneman was far away and his road was clear. In fact, it was only when, after the rejection of the first convention, Johnston had begun negotiations for the separate surrender of his own forces, and further delay would have made him a prisoner. As to the "plunder of the banks" thus published by the Secretary, it turned out that officers of Carolina banks who had taken their assets to Richmond for protection against the perils of war, had taken advantage of the protection of Mr. Davis's escort to carry them home when Richmond fell. As to the specie treasure, rumored to be many millions, about forty thousand dollars was at Greensborough paid to Johnston's soldiers at the rate of $1.17 to each, and the remainder, except a small sum, seems to have been distributed to the cavalry escort, about 3000 strong, which protected Mr. Davis to the Savannah River and then dispersed; the sum was thirty-five dollars per man, given as part of their arrears of pay. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. pp. 801, 803, 820, 850; Id., vol. xlix. pt. i. pp. 548, 551, 552, 555; Davis's Rise and Fall, vol. ii. pp. 691, 695; Johnston's Narrative, p. 408; Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 373.] The statement in Mr. Stanton's dispatch regarding this "plunder," copied from one received from Halleck, which in turn was based on anonymous rumor, was so couched as to give credit to the imputation that Sherman was to be duped or bribed to allow Davis with his effects, "including this gold plunder," to escape. Not only did the form of the publication give this impression, but that it was in fact so understood and treated is simple matter of history.
Even this was not all. There were appended to this nine enumerated criticisms, most of which were baseless. The first declared that both Sherman and Johnston knew the former had no power to do what was done in the Memorandum. What was done in fact was to transmit to the government, for its acceptance or rejection, Johnston's offer to disband all the remaining armies of the Confederacy, wherever situated, on the terms which were stated. The "Memorandum" itself said that the generals lacked power "to fulfil these terms;" but that they had power to make a truce till the government of the United States considered the proposal, is too plain for serious dispute. Yet Mr. Stanton's criticism implied that the arrangement had not been merely proposed, but had been actually concluded, for the strictures otherwise had no meaning.
The second said that "it was a practical acknowledgment of the rebel government." On the other hand, Sherman had utterly refused to deal with or acknowledge that government in any way. The effect of ratification of the terms would have been its silent disappearance without being named. If the argument were worth anything, it would have been much more potent against the exchanges of prisoners which had been carried on through commissioners of both governments. But the next clause had the added bugbear that the arms when deposited at the State capitals might be "used to conquer and subdue the loyal States." This suppressed the fact that by the "Memorandum" the arms were "to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington City subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States." The allowance of arms to local authorities to preserve order was a necessity so self-evident that, in the face of this objection by Mr. Stanton, General Schofield, in supplementary terms of the final surrender, allowed Johnston's troops to retain part of the arms in this way, and no whisper of further objection was made. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 482.]