The third objection was that "it undertook to re-establish the rebel State governments that had been overthrown." This was untrue in fact. It proposed that the executive should recognize actually existing governments de facto in the States, for the purpose of renouncing the Confederacy and acknowledging under oath their allegiance to the United States. For the purpose of such submission, it would seem clear that it would be an advantage to have it made by Vance, and Magrath, and Brown, and the rest who had been the real rebels, rather than by new men whose essential representative character might be denied. The subsequent history of reconstruction gives small support to the opinion that anything was gained which might not have been got more effectively by dictating the civil changes and terms of peace to these old State governments rather than to such provisional makeshifts as were afterward used. But the objection was, after all, not against Sherman, but against the dead Lincoln under whose oral authority Sherman was acting, and who had put the same in clearest written terms in his correspondence with General Weitzel and Judge Campbell after Richmond was in our possession. [Footnote: Dana to Stanton, April 5th: "Judge Campbell and Mr. Meyer had an interview with the President here this morning to consider how Virginia can be brought back to the Union. All they ask is an amnesty and a military convention to cover appearances. Slavery they admit to be defunct," etc. (Id., vol. xlvi. pt. iii. p. 575.) Lincoln to Grant, April 6th, says he had put into Judge Campbell's hands "an informal paper" repeating former propositions and adding "that confiscations shall be remitted to the people of any State which will now promptly and in good faith withdraw its troops and other support from resistance to the government. Judge Campbell thought it not impossible that the rebel legislature of Virginia would do the latter if permitted, and accordingly I addressed a private letter to General Weitzel with permission for Judge Campbell to see it, telling him that if they attempt this, to permit and protect them, unless they attempt something hostile to the United States," etc. (Id., p. 593.) Lincoln to Weitzel, April 6th. (Id., p. 612.) Dana to Stanton, April 7th. (Id., p. 619.) Dana to Stanton, April 8th, with enclosures of papers by Judge Campbell giving the contents of Mr. Lincoln's written memorandum to him. (Id., pp. 655-657.) When Mr. Lincoln got back to Washington, Lee having surrendered with the Virginia troops and the rebel legislature of Virginia not having assembled or acted, the President withdrew his permission for them to meet, saying he had dealt with them as men "having power de facto" to do what he wished but which was already done. Lincoln to Weitzel, April 12th. (Id., p. 725.)]
The fourth criticism was that by the terms proposed the State governments "would be enabled to re-establish slavery." Apart from the admissions of leading men of the South, and the facts already collated, [Footnote: Ante, pp. 481, 485.] Mr. Stanton, in saying this, ignored the Proclamation of Emancipation, on which, in his conversation with Judge Campbell, Mr. Lincoln had been entirely willing to rest. The Southern jurist had recognized the solidity of the legal ground "that if the proclamation of the President be valid as law, it has already operated and vested rights." This the judge had stated to his fellow-citizens as a fact in the situation not to be ignored, and had repeated it in his letter of April 7th to General Weitzel in a stronger form, if possible, saying, "The acceptance of the Union involves acceptance of his proclamation, if it be valid in law." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvi. pt. iii. pp. 656, 657.] The condition of its legal validity was not an insertion by Campbell--it was the expression of Mr. Lincoln himself, conceding the authority of the courts to pass upon the question as he had done in his amnesty proclamation. [Footnote: Gorham's Stanton, vol. ii. p. 235.] Mr. Stanton had these things before him, hardly a fortnight old, when he made his singular publication. They add no little to the difficulty of determining the true motives of his appeal to the public.
The fifth objection was the possibility of resulting liability for the rebel debts, which could hardly have been seriously meant.
The sixth was that it put in dispute the loyal State governments and the new State of West Virginia. As to the latter, the "Memorandum" was based on Mr. Lincoln's action in Virginia, and assumed that question to have been determined, so far as the executive was concerned. The criticism, like some of the rest, was aimed at what Mr. Lincoln had done, which was thus flogged over Sherman's shoulders; for the latter was, as we have to reiterate, ignorant that on Mr. Lincoln's return to Washington he had been induced to cancel what he had done. From any point of view but that of a momentary party advantage, it is hard to see the evil of submitting contesting State governments to the decision of the Supreme Court. Those of Louisiana and Arkansas were swept away very soon by Congressional action, and they were the only ones intended to be reached by the Sherman-Johnston "Memorandum."
The seventh declared that it "practically abolished the confiscation laws and relieved the rebels of every degree, who had slaughtered our people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes." Those who had "slaughtered" were primarily the officers and soldiers of the armies, and no fault was found with Grant's extension of amnesty to them by the Appomattox terms. It was true, besides, that the whole male population of the South, of military age, was part of the army, and that even State officers were "furloughed" to enable them to perform public duties of a civil nature. We have seen that Sherman carefully limited immunity to the action of the executive, that he meddled with no laws, and said that all the people were still liable to what the judicial department of the government might do. But he had also acknowledged, upon reflection, that clearer definition would be desirable in this respect, and had asked Johnston to be ready to act upon this. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 266.] It is our privilege, moreover, judging after the fact, to note how little Stanton's objection practically meant, and how much better Sherman represented the deeper purpose of the American people, since neither Mr. Davis nor any of his chief counsellors suffered "the pains and penalties for their crimes."
The eighth criticism was that the "Memorandum" offered terms "that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition." Mr. Stanton could hardly have forgotten, when writing this, that they were in fact not only based on what Sherman had learned of his policy from Mr. Lincoln himself, as we have seen, but they were what President Lincoln had repeatedly offered and the Confederates had repeatedly rejected, the last rejection being after the Hampton Roads conference in the first days of February. [Footnote: Nicolay and Hay's "Lincoln," vol. x. pp. 122, 123, 128]
Exactly what was meant by the ninth criticism it is hard to say. It is said that the "Memorandum," if adopted, would "relieve the rebels from the pressure of our victories" and leave them "in condition to renew their efforts to overthrow the United States government and subdue the loyal States whenever their strength was recruited and any opportunity was offered." As it provided for the disarming and disbanding of every Confederate company, left our victorious troops free to garrison every State, and gave protection to individuals only so long as they were obedient to the National government, we must regard the apprehension of new efforts to subdue the loyal States as fantastic and not serious.
It was inevitable that such a manifesto to the public should be greatly exasperating to Sherman. Seeing also the manner in which it was interpreted by the newspapers, he believed that it was purposely so worded as to imply what it did not explicitly assert, and to hold him up to the nation as one little better than a traitor. He was very emphatic in saying that being overruled did not trouble him; it was the public perversion of what he had done, attributing to his "Memorandum" what the publication of its text would have contradicted, which outraged his feelings. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. pp. 335, 345.] Grant frankly adhered to his opinion that in the actual condition of affairs he could not himself advise the ratification of the terms proposed; yet he saw the injustice done Sherman, and condemned it. [Footnote: Id., pp. 410, 531.] Their relations continued as cordial as ever, and his influence was potent in preventing further ill results from following the quarrel.
The publication was followed by other acts of Mr. Stanton which increased the irritation. On the 27th of April he informed Halleck, Canby, and Thomas that "Sherman's proceedings" were disapproved, and ordered them to direct their subordinates "to pay no attention to any orders but your own or from General Grant." [Footnote: Id., vol. xlix. pt. ii. p. 484; vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 321.] This was a day after Johnston had made his final surrender under the second convention, and when Grant had been two days with Sherman. It led to Halleck's ordering Meade to pay no attention to the truce, even after the surrender of Johnston was signed, and might have caused serious results if Grant had not been very prompt in giving counter-orders to Halleck. [Footnote: Id., p. 312.] All the department commanders naturally understood Stanton's language in sending Grant to North Carolina, as superseding Sherman in command, though in fact this was not done. They concluded that if any new terms were made with Johnston the action would be in Grant's name, and his signature would verify the truce. But as Grant did not do this, and everything remained in Sherman's hands as before, the actual surrender was ignored and credit refused, by order of the Secretary of War, to the armistice declared while the paroles were being issued. Stanton took no steps to correct this, and for two weeks the strange muddle continued in the Southwest. This came to such a pass that on May 8th Sherman inquired of Grant whether "the Secretary of War's newspaper order" had taken Georgia out of his command. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 434.] Grant replied, "I know of no order which changes your command in any particular," and, in his patient rôle of peacemaker, suggested that the necessity of prompt communication when Sherman was not in telegraphic communication with Washington had caused some irregularities. [Footnote:Id., p. 445.]
One of the minor incidents in Stanton's course of action throws so strong light on his methods and was so irritating an example of the suppressio veri that it must be mentioned. Immediately after his interview with Sherman in the early morning of the 24th, Grant had sent a dispatch to Stanton, which the latter sent to General Dix for publication in the following form: "A dispatch has just been received by this department from General Grant, dated Raleigh, 9 A. M., April 24th. He says: 'I reached here this morning, and delivered to General Sherman the reply to his negotiations with Johnston. Word was immediately sent to Johnston, terminating the truce, and information that civil matters could not be entertained in any convention between army commanders.'" [Footnote: Id., p. 311.] Taken in connection with the previous publication, this was naturally interpreted to mean that Grant had sent the "word" to Johnston, and it strengthened the current against Sherman. The dispatch as sent by Grant was this: "I reached here this morning and delivered to General Sherman the reply to his negotiations with Johnston. He was not surprised, but rather expected their rejection. Word was immediately sent to Johnston terminating the truce, and information that civil matters could not be entertained in any convention between army commanders. General Sherman has been guided in his negotiations with Johnston entirely by what he thought was precedent authorized by the President. He had before him the terms given by me to Lee's army and the call of the rebel legislature of Virginia authorized by General Weitzel, as he supposed with the sanction of the President and myself. At the time of the agreement General Sherman did not know of the withdrawal of authority for the meeting of that legislature. The moment he learned through the papers that authority for the meeting had been withdrawn, he communicated the fact to Johnston as having bearing on the negotiations had." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. iii. p. 293.] I have italicized the omitted parts to show how absolutely essential they were to a true statement of Sherman's attitude, and how grave was the offence against fair dealing to suppress them after the appeal to the public had been made by the first publication. The dispatch is also historically important as proof of the ideal character of Grant's disinterestedness and frank friendship for Sherman in this juncture.