(8) The perusal of Schelling's work on Ideal Transcendentalism leaves no doubt as to his view of this identity, which at bottom neither is nor can be any thing else than pantheism; yet, for the sake of truth, we will allow that Schelling seems to have modified his doctrine, or to have feared its consequences, if we are to consider the indications found in his discourse at the opening of his course of philosophy, at Berlin, the 13th of November, 1841. We there find the following passage, worthy of the attention of all thinking men: "The difficulties and obstacles of all kinds, against which philosophy contends are visible, and in vain would we attempt to dissemble them. Never was there a more powerful reaction against philosophy on the part of real and active life than at this present epoch; and this proves philosophy to have penetrated even to the vital questions of society, those concerning which no one can rest indifferent. So long as a philosophy is only in the first stages of formation, taking the first steps in its march, no one cares for it, except philosophers themselves; other men await the last word of philosophy, since it is important to the general public only in its results.

"We confess that we ought not to take as the practical result of a solid and profoundly meditated philosophy whatever it may please any body to designate as such: were it so, the world would be subjected to doctrines the most repugnant to sound morality, even such as sap its foundation. No! No one judges of philosophy by the practical conclusions drawn by ignorance or presumption. Moreover, lest deception on this point be possible, the public should reject a philosophy which has such results, without examining or even judging it in its principles; it should say that it cannot understand the depth of these questions, or the artificial and intricate march of the arguments; but without pausing here it should promptly decide that a philosophy leading to such conclusions cannot be true in its principles. What the Roman moralist said of the useful: nihil utile nisi quod honestum, is equally applicable to the investigation of truth: no philosophy that respects itself will allow that it leads to irreligion. Yet actual philosophy is in such a state, that, however much it promises a religious result, no one admits it; for deductions drawn from it convert the dogmas of the Christian religion into a vain phantasmagory.

"As to this, some of its most faithful disciples are openly agreed; be the suspicion well founded or not, its existence suffices, and this opinion is established.

"But active life in the last result is always right; and so philosophy is exposed to great risks. They who war on one philosophy are not far from condemning all philosophy; they say in their heart, there is no longer philosophy in the world. I myself am not exempt from these condemnations, since it is pretended that it is I, who first gave impulse to this philosophy which is at present so badly judged of, because of its religious results.

"How shall I defend myself? Certainly I would never attack a philosophy for its last results; but I would judge it in its first principles, as every philosophical mind should. It is moreover well enough known that I have shown myself little satisfied with the philosophy of which I speak.


"The moral and spiritual worlds are so divided that any point of union for an instant should be a motive of satisfaction. Besides to destroy, is a very sad thing when there is nothing wherewith to replace the thing destroyed. 'Do it better yourself,' we say to one who can do nothing but criticize.


"I therefore consecrate myself entirely to the mission with which I am charged; for you I will live; for you I will labor without ceasing while there remains in me the breath of life, and while He permits me, without whose permission not a hair can fall from our head, and yet less a deeply felt word proceed from our mouth. He, without whose inspiration not one lucid idea can shine on our mind, nor one thought of truth and liberty illumine our soul."