Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation: A Book for the Times

by James B. Walker

The etymology of the Hebrew language, as written by Moses, and spoken by the Israelites, furnishes an interesting illustration of the origin of the few abstract terms with which their minds were familiar. The abstract ideas of the Hebrew tongue may even now, in most instances, be traced to the object or circumstance whence they originated. Thus the idea of power, among the Hebrews, was derived from the horn of an animal; and the same word, in Hebrew, which signifies horn, likewise signifies power, and may be translated in either way to suit the sense. The idea was originally conveyed through the eye, by noticing that the strength of the animal was exerted through its horn. The force thus exerted, especially when the animal was enraged, was the greatest which fell under their observation; and sometimes, in its effects, it was disastrous and overwhelming. Hence, the horn soon became a figure to denote power, and when the idea was once originated and defined in their minds, they could apply it to any object which produced a strong effect either upon the bodies or the minds of men. An idea of power likewise originated from the human hand, because through it man exerted his strength. The same word in Hebrew still expresses both the object and the idea derived from it—‘Life and death are in the power of the tongue,’ reads literally—‘Life and death are in the hand of the tongue.’ Sunshine, in Hebrew, is synonymous with happiness, the idea being originated by experiencing the pleasant feelings produced by the effects of a sunny day; and when thus originated, it was applied to the same and similar feelings produced by other causes. The abstract idea of judgment or justice is derived from a word which signifies to cut or divide; it being originated by the circumstance that when the primitive hunters had killed a stag, or other prey, one divided the flesh with a knife, among those who assisted in the pursuit, distributing a just portion to each. Thus, the act of cutting and dividing their prey, which was the first circumstance that called into exercise and placed before their senses the principle of justice, was the circumstance from which they derived this most important abstract idea.

Other instances might be mentioned. These are sufficient to show the manner in which the abstract ideas of the Hebrews were originated. And so, every new idea which found a place in their understanding had to be originated, primarily, by an impression made by external objects upon the senses.

Further, all ideas which admit of the signification of more or most perfect, can be originated only by a comparison of one object with another. More lovely, or more pure, can only be predicated of one thing by comparison with another which it excels in one of these respects. By a series of comparisons, each one exceeding the last in beauty or purity, an idea of the highest degree of perfection may be produced. Thus one flower may be called lovely, another more lovely, and the rose the most lovely; and the idea of the superior beauty of the rose would be originated by the comparison or contrast between it and other flowers of less beauty. It is not said that the rose would not appear lovely without comparison, but the idea of its superior loveliness is originated by comparison, and it could be derived in no other way.

With these principles in mind, we return to the inquiry, How could the idea of God’s holiness, or moral purity, be conveyed to the minds of the Jews?

First, mark the principles—(1.) There was not an object in the material world which would convey to the mind the idea of God’s holiness.—(2). The idea, therefore, would have to be originated, and thrown into their mind, through the senses, by a process instituted for that express purpose.—(3.) The plan to originate the idea, in order to meet the constitution of the mind, must consist of a series of comparisons.

Now mark the correspondency between these principles, founded upon the laws of the mind, and that system devised to instruct the Israelites in the knowledge of God.

In the outset, the animals common to Palestine were divided, by command of Jehovah, into clean and unclean; in this way a distinction was made, and the one class in comparison with the other was deemed to be of a purer and better kind. From the class thus distinguished, as more pure than the other, one was selected to offer as a sacrifice. It was not only to be chosen from the clean beasts, but, as an individual, it was to be without spot or blemish. Thus it was, in their eyes, purer than the other class, and purer than other individuals of its own class. This sacrifice the people were not deemed worthy, in their own persons, to offer unto Jehovah; but it was to be offered by a class of men who were distinguished from their brethren, purified, and set apart for the service of the priest’s office. Thus the idea of purity originated from two sources; the purified priest and the pure animal purified, were united in the offering of the sacrifice. But before the sacrifice could be offered it was washed with clean water—and the priest had, in some cases, to wash himself, and officiate without his sandals. Thus, when one process of comparison after another had attached the idea of superlative purity to the sacrifice—in offering it to Jehovah in order that the contrast between the purity of God and the highest degrees of earthly purity might be seen, neither priest, people, nor sacrifice was deemed sufficiently pure to come into his presence; but the offering was made in the court without the holy of holies. In this manner, by a process of comparison, the character of God, in point of purity, was placed indefinitely above themselves and their sacrifices.[14]

[14] It is not argued that no other end was designed and accomplished by the arbitrary separation of animals into classes of clean and unclean. By this means the Jews were undoubtedly excluded from partaking in the feasts of the heathen around, who ate those animals which were forbidden to them. An excellent writer observes that it is characteristic of the wisdom of God to accomplish many ends by a single act of providence. [Back]

And not only in the sacrifices, but throughout the whole Levitical economy, the idea of purity pervaded all its ceremonies and observances. The camp was purified—the people were purified—everything was purified and re-purified; and each process of the ordinances was designed to reflect purity upon the others; until finally that idea of purity formed in the mind and rendered intense by the convergence of so many rays, was, by comparison, referred to the idea of God; and the idea of God in their minds being that of an infinitely powerful and good Spirit, hence purity, as a characteristic or attribute of such a nature, would necessarily assume a moral aspect, because it appertained to a moral being—it would become moral purity, or holiness. Thus they learned, in the sentiment of Scripture, that God was of too pure eyes to look upon iniquity.

That the idea of moral purity in the minds of the Israelites was thus originated by the machinery of the Levitical dispensation, is supported, not only by the philosophy of the thing, but by many allusions in the Scriptures. Such allusions are frequent, both in the writers of the old and of the new dispensations; evidencing that, in their minds, the idea of moral purity was still symbolized by physical purity. The rite of baptism is founded upon this symbolical analogy: the external washing with water being significant of the purifying influence of the Holy Spirit. St. John saw in vision the undefiled in heart clothed with linen pure and white; evincing that, to the mind of the Jew, such vestments as the high priest wore when he entered the holy of holies, were still emblematical of moral purity. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is an apostolic exposition of the spiritual import of the Levitical institution, so far as that institution particularly concerns believers under the New Testament dispensation, we have the foregoing view of the design of ceremonial purification expressly confirmed. ‘It was, therefore, necessary,’ says Paul to the Hebrews, ‘that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these (that is, with these purifying processes addressed to the senses), but the heavenly things themselves with better sacrifices than these.’ The plain instruction of which is, that the parts and processes of the Levitical economy were patterns addressed to the senses of unseen things in heaven, and that the purifying of those patterns indicated the spiritual purity of the spiritual things which they represented.