About the dawn of day on the 21st of June, 1813, the 3rd division moved off under its chief, Sir Thomas Picton, to perform perhaps more than the part assigned it in the splendid scenes with which we were about to treat our spectacle-loving foes. I went on with the advance, consisting of our Light Infantry companies, and the 5th battalion 60th German riflemen, all experienced troops, and well acquainted with and accustomed to their work. To my surprise, and I believe that of Sir Thomas Brisbane, and many others, we met with no opposition in passing the Zadorra, on the banks of which, as is well known, the Black Prince, in olden times, astonished his foes, not only by his own valour and knightly bearing, but also by the deeds of such soldiers as I wish to bring into the ranks of our regiments, and of whom there are still abundance in Great Britain and Ireland. I must however here take the liberty to remark, that I have often since wondered, why Lord Wellington did not allude, just before the troops went into battle, to what history tells us was by that gallant prince achieved on the ground which then lay before us. Napoleon, and I think Nelson also, would have done so; but Lord Wellington, perhaps less enthusiastic, very likely considered that his army required no such incitement to perform what he looked upon as merely their duty. I believe I am not wrong, but I have always fancied this seeming want of enthusiasm, to be a kind of defect in the Duke of Wellington, for it certainly has had at all times, and in all situations, when judiciously worked upon, a most surprising influence upon the minds and hearts of mankind in general.
Whilst the troops were passing this, in a military point of view, formidable object, over some very narrow bridges, I again went on some distance, and even in front of our light troops, to ascertain, if possible, what might be before us, for by this time Lord Hill was sharply engaged considerably to our right, and we began strongly to suspect, that the French still intended to be for once patient, and to deceive us; so much so, that I every instant expected to see their masses and cannon crown the rising ground just before us, prepared to attack us, whilst still embarrassed in the passage of the deep, high banked, but narrow river.
I very soon observed on the more distant heights a few videttes, whose attention seemed entirely attracted to their left, in which direction the firing had greatly increased.
Sir Thomas Picton and his generals were also soon aware of the mistake the French had evidently committed in neglecting or overlooking this essential position; Sir Thomas therefore (for I know not what had become of Lord Dalhousie and the 7th division) with his usual impetuosity, pushed his light troops, cannon and columns, rapidly for the unoccupied heights, of which he got possession without firing a shot, and before the enemy seemed to be aware of their importance; or else they had erroneously calculated, that the natural difficulties we should encounter at the Zadorra would either greatly delay, or perhaps deter us altogether from advancing in the direction we had taken. As soon, however, as they saw what we had achieved, and which threatened them with such ruinous consequences, they quickly brought forward a large body of troops of all arms, to recover what they ought never to have lost. A desperate struggle ensued, especially in a village just behind the heights, and which ought to have been guarded with the utmost care by the French, being an important point in their position; but Sir Thomas Brisbane, with his brigade, after a severe contest, and by turning their left with his right regiment, had got full possession of it, and the fate of the battle was thus, I may say, in a moment decided, for their centre being forced, the wings, especially the left, had also to give way, and to my delight, I beheld at this critical moment, our old and often tried friends, the light division, coming on in our own style, upon our right, carrying all before them.
When we had repulsed the enemy, who had fought very gallantly, from the village, and were again advancing upon them in the usual manner of the 3rd division, Lord Wellington rode up to us, followed by his staff; and he knew well how to profit from what had been, at least to us, so unexpectedly accomplished.
There was much hard fighting after this, and many brilliant feats were performed by the three brigades, in following up the French, who were so hard pressed, that even before they reached Vittoria, they were unable to offer any effectual resistance to our continued and impetuous attacks.
I apprehend, as will appear by referring to the instructions from Sir George Murray, that this was not the manner in which it had been intended that the action was to have been fought; and I even fear that I am not borne out in my statements by the Gazette account of it; but I feel convinced they can be corroborated by many, and I think I owe this detail of the part it performed to the 3rd division and its chiefs. I have, however, no intention of farther detailing what occurred between us and the French during the remainder of that eventful day; yet I must observe, that the loss of the 3rd division, in consequence of Sir Thomas Picton's perhaps too rapid advance, was great in officers and men; for undoubtedly he had thus drawn upon it the brunt of the battle; but my chief object, in at all alluding to it, was to shew that the French Marshal, who commanded under Joseph, and his état-major, committed great errors, especially in neglecting, or not understanding their position, and which in the end became irretrievable and ruinous to their brave army.
Towards the close of this battle, and when I thought the 3rd division had got well through its day's work, in the usual manner, and when the part of the French infantry before us were going off in hopeless and irretrievable confusion, intermixed with their baggage, their cavalry suddenly appeared before us, presenting a firm and most imposing front. Our cavalry—I think they were all light—had now got in front of us, in considerable force; it was therefore evident, that an important moment in the battle approached; and as Sir Thomas Brisbane was anxious to see how our cavalry would accomplish a charge, which we concluded must be made, I most willingly went on with him some distance before his brigade, still advancing in column. Our cavalry went on bravely to the attack, but the French did not wait to receive it: on the contrary, they advanced boldly, rapidly, and in fine order, to meet our people. The shock was severe. But I soon saw, and I believe so did my general, that it was high time for us to be off to the infantry, for I must confess that the battle of Marengo flashed across my mind at the instant. We soon rejoined the brigade, when commanding officers of corps were requested to keep them well in hand, and ready, if necessary, to form squares. But the French seemed to have accomplished what they had in view; that is to say, to cover the retreat of their discomfitted infantry.
Having, in the course of this work, occasionally touched upon military tactics and arrangements, I must, in corroboration of what I ventured to say with regard to the Duke of Wellington and Massena at the lines of Torres Vedras, and in farther proof that the French were not superior to us as tacticians, here allude briefly to what occurred upon the Nivelle. Let the reader cast his eyes over a good map of the country, or rather a plan of the action, which bears that name, and which may be seen in Colonel Jones's account of the Peninsular war; and let him consider and calculate upon the apparent consequences of an attack upon a position of such strength, taken up after due examination by Soult, and covered by his directions, with strong and well planned redoubts, mutually supporting each other; and I think he will admit that the French lines upon the Nivelle, and those held by our army at Torres Vedras were not very dissimilar. It could not also have been unknown to Massena, that a very great part of the troops under Lord Wellington were untried Portuguese, destitute of military reputation; and which had only been recently placed under British officers.
It is not to be supposed, that the commander of a French army was without information, or that he was not allowed to incur the expense of employing spies, or otherwise obtaining intelligence; I cannot, therefore, imagine he was entirely ignorant of the preparations making by his adversary for his reception at Torres Vedras; and he might also have learnt that the redoubts and lines of connection in that position could not be finished by the time he might arrive before it. If, therefore, he were to advance at all into Portugal, he undoubtedly should have made his arrangements for attacking the lines of Torres Vedras the moment he could reach them; but whether what I have stated was known or not to Massena, he had probably been spoiled by too much good fortune, until it was his fate to meet Lord Wellington in the field.