A British army, as it was,--is,--and ought to be

by James Campbell

But how did the Duke of Wellington act when nearly similarly situated to what Massena was before the lines of Torres Vedras?

His army was encamped in the month of November in the Pyrenees, exposed in crowded tents, to severe sufferings, from cold, rain, and snow, enough to make any men, and especially British soldiers, anxious to fight three times their numbers, or to storm all the redoubts or intrenched camps in the world in order to get out of such a situation, and some even fancied that his Lordship kept them there with that intention.

I partook along with the brigade to which I was attached, and with the rest of the 3rd division, of the comforts of that encampment in the Pyrenees. On the 9th of November I was sent for by Sir Thomas Brisbane, and I think he will remember the awful kind of cavern, with the torrent rushing through it at Zugarramurdi, in which he gave me directions for bringing down the division to where it was to remain, until the hour should arrive for its advance, under Sir Charles Colville, against the lines of the Nivelle. I scrambled back to the camp, leading my horse the greater part of the way, which was an excellent climber; but I had to look well about me, for by this very path, if it deserved the name, I was to bring down, as soon as it became dark, the fighting division; every individual of which then in camp being perfectly ignorant, that the moment was at hand, when they were to resign the comforts which they had there enjoyed. At the hour fixed upon, the bugle sounded for the troops to get under arms, and in twenty-five minutes more, the usual time allowed, the right brigade, followed by the other two, commenced the descent, the whole being cautioned to look carefully, if they could in the dark, to where they placed their feet. The baggage was to remain upon the ground, and to follow by another circuitous road, when ordered, in the morning, after some hours of pretty hard work, we at last found ourselves at Zugarramurdi, through which the division passed, and the brigades, in contiguous columns, were allowed to repose upon the ground for the remainder of the night, under the canopy of heaven, and until the hour for assaulting the redoubts and entrenchments arrived. Of course the same difficult operation had been performed unknown to the enemy, by the other divisions of the army, for the third had not advanced far when the cannon on our left belonging to Sir Lowry Cole's division, announced that others as well as ourselves were awake; and when day dawned, our army, to the right and left of us, was seen moving in most perfect order to make combined attacks upon the enemy's entrenchments.

I have been so far minute to show in how able a manner Lord Wellington's arrangements were invariably made for combined movements; but I have no intention of entering into a detail account of the action; and shall only say, that at night, the 3rd division, having carried the redoubts and entrenchments before them, and having accomplished, as usual, the work assigned them, found themselves beyond St. Pé; and we were able to congratulate ourselves that Lord Wellington had at last thought fit to allow us to find a way into a part of the country blessed with a more genial climate than the Pyrenees. Had Massena acted thus at Torres Vedras, there is no saying what might have been the result, for the Portuguese, as I before observed, were then young and inexperienced as soldiers, and but little to be depended upon, had the parts of the position occupied by them been assailed by the French.

It was an extraordinary occurrence in the action upon the Nivelle that a redoubt carried by our 88th regiment should have been defended by the greater part of the French 88th, the latter thus becoming prisoners to the former. And it was likewise the fate of the French 45th at Talavera to have been nearly destroyed by the fire of ours, as was ascertained by the numbers of killed and wounded left upon the ground, and also by the late Major-General Guard (who then commanded our 45th), who was left amongst the wounded at Talavera when our army retreated after the action.

I believe it is an axiom in war, at least it ought to be, that no extended position—fortify it as you please—can be held for any length of time against a properly combined movement of good troops. Had not we to fall back through the Pyrenees before Soult, and did we not find ourselves unable to make any effectual stand before him till we reached the ground in front of Pampeluna? Sir Thomas Picton certainly, the previous evening, checked the French for a short time; but after a night's march we found ourselves in the excellent position selected by him, and in which, when our army was more concentrated, we were able to frustrate all Soult's efforts, great as they were.

I must not here omit remarking, that it was insinuated, and even believed by many, that if Lord Wellington had not arrived in time, followed by a part of the army at this position, Sir Thomas Picton intended to have abandoned it, and to have retired behind Pampeluna, and thereby would have removed our blockading force, and thrown it open to Soult.

I can positively say that he had no such intention, and I feel I ought to make this assertion, if it were only in justice to Sir Thomas Picton's military reputation, and I know I can be borne out in it. I had been particularly employed with the 3rd division in originally forming the blockade of Pampeluna; that is to say, in taking up with the troops the positions to be occupied around it, and Sir Thomas Picton was aware that, in consequence, I was likely to be well acquainted with the various roads in the neighbourhood; he therefore sent for me on the night previous to the day upon which it was insinuated that he intended to have abandoned the position. He told me he expected to be attacked by Marshal Soult in the morning, that he was determined to stand his ground; but wished to know, if, before Lord Wellington could come to his assistance, and if such a misfortune should happen as that of his being obliged, by very superior numbers, and the unforeseen events of a battle, to fall back, if I was sufficiently acquainted with the roads around the city to enable me to undertake, under such circumstances, to conduct the troops, so as to keep them out of the range of the cannon upon the ramparts of the city. I replied, that I knew the roads sufficiently for the purpose, and was about to retire, when he repeated his determination to maintain his position, and even betrayed a kind of feeling of delight at the idea of giving Soult and his army battle, with only the few troops he could oppose to him, until the arrival of Lord Wellington.

Almost at this moment, as I learnt afterwards, an engineer officer (I don't remember his name) arrived to report himself, who had been looking for the 3rd division amongst the mountains; I think he said he had been sent to supply the place of Colonel Burgoyne, who had been taken ill, and was obliged to go to the rear. Sir Thomas, who at such a time, would have wished not to be plagued by a stranger, desired him, partly, it was fancied, with the intention of getting rid of him, to go and find out the different roads leading to the rear of Pampeluna; and I have often since wondered if in this could have originated the silly story of Sir Thomas Picton's intention of abandoning the position in which the battle was fought, and in which the 3rd division performed its usual brilliant part.

I think it but fair next to mention, that the dispositions made by the French at Orthes, were not only superior to what we usually met with, but they also fought that battle with seemingly more confidence in themselves, and in their chief, than they had latterly done. For some time after the action commenced, neither the 3rd nor 4th divisions, whose movements came more particularly under my observation, were able to gain any ground to their front, or to set properly to work; indeed, it was next to impossible for the former to advance, the position before them being judiciously and most formidably occupied by a considerable part of Soult's army; and we were aware that the moment we should attempt to go forward, we would have been taken in flank by a large body of troops, of whom part held very strong ground, and part possessed a wooded ravine, which separated the 3rd from the 4th divisions. We were thus most provokingly brought to a complete stand, exposed to a heavy cannonade, and also to the fire of the infantry in our front; and the French troops will fire away in that manner, and usually with considerable effect, as long as their opponents please.