[*7] They were of many nationalities—Germans, Spaniards, Italians—"a horde of 40,000 ruffians free from all restraint." They gratified their elemental passions and lusts at the expense of the most cultivated population in the world. The Germans were the worst: "the Lutherans amongst them setting an example which was quickly followed of disregard of holy places." The Spaniards, however, excelled them in deliberate cruelty. For three days this barbarism went on unchecked. On the fourth the barbarians began to quarrel amongst themselves over the division of the booty. "The Germans ... turned to drunkenness and buffoonery. Clad in magnificent vestments and decked with jewels, accompanied by concubines who were bedizened with like ornaments, they rode on mules through the streets and imitated with drunken gravity the processions of the Papal Court." Cf. Creighton, op. cit., vol. VI., pp. 342-3.
[8] Vat. Urb. MSS. No. 1677, f. 19.
[*9] The Duke was very slow as usual. There was plenty of time for him to receive imploring letters. A career, which was a failure brought about by dilatoriness and treason, here seems to have reached its lowest point. As always, Dennistoun is too favourable in his judgment of anyone belonging to the Rovere house.
[*10] Where indeed! The Duke of Urbino had left Florence on May 3rd, but it was the 22nd of that month before he reached Isola. Strangely enough, he marched much slower than the barbarians.
[*11] This amazing route is inexplicable. The way by the Val di Chiana was, of course, a highway to Rome. The way by Perugia, "with a rendezvous at Orvieto," is inexplicable. No more fatuous proceeding can be imagined. From Florence he would keep the Via Aretina so far as Arezzo, following it indeed thence to Rigutino to Camuscia to the Case del Piano in the Perugino close to Trasimeno. If he went thence to Perugia he was merely trying to delay his march. It was off the main route, and would lead him into the valley of Spoleto. From Perugia to Orvieto there was no good road. If he wished for a road to Rome via Perugia he should have joined the Via Flaminia at Foligno and followed it directly to the Eternal City.
[*12] It is impossible to represent the Duke in a worse light than he appears. He behaved throughout the campaign like a selfish fool; he seems never to have understood the gravity of the situation or the enormity of his crime. His biographer does not seem to understand it either.
[*13] As we know, he did not reach Isola till the 22nd. Rome was then sacked. If Guicciardini delayed, as Baldi says, we know that it was for some good reason, for his integrity and his patriotism cannot be questioned. We may well doubt Baldi's tittle-tattle.
[14] Vat. Urb. MSS. No. 818, f. 5. Sanuto has preserved a letter which he says gave the first authentic information of the sack to the combined leaders, and which urges them to exertion in most pressing terms. It will be found in [II. of the Appendix], with two other letters detailing the principal incidents of that direful event in terms which, though in a great measure anticipated by our narrative, show the impression made by them at the time, and probably conveyed the fullest information of the catastrophe to the Duchess of Urbino and to the Emperor. See the Pontiff's brieves illustrating his feeble policy, No. I.
[15] Memoirs of Antenore Leonardi, dictated by him in 1581, Vat. Urb. MSS. No. 1023, f. 85. Among the works dedicated to Francesco Maria II. is a Treatise on Tides by Annibale Raimondo of Verona [1589], who had served under his grandfather in Lombardy, and at this time. In the preface, a somewhat inflated testimony is borne to that Duke's military talents, arguing that his tactics were ever aggressive when unimpeded by other leaders, who in the present instance prevented him from marching upon Rome. But the author was eighty-four when he wrote a statement palpably intended for an adulatory purpose, and his feeble or partial reminiscences cannot be considered of material weight. We have thought it right, in a passage so nearly touching the Duke of Urbino's fair fame, to embrace the conflicting views of our best authorities: the narratives of Paruta and Morosini, Venetians, who had no interest in his reputation, go far to reconcile these and justify him. They tell us that the Signory, profoundly moved by the Pontiff's danger, sent pressing orders for their army to support him; and that, in compliance therewith, Francesco Maria and the Proveditore Pisani resolved to advance upon Rome and rescue Clement, even at the hazard of a general engagement, but that the other Proveditore, Vetturi, formally protested against exposing the army to so great a risk: that disgusted by the failures brought on by these misunderstandings, the Signory superseded Vetturi, and grumbled against their general: that the latter, annoyed by unmerited reflections, wished to throw up his command, and that it was only after cool consideration, and flattering advances from the senate, that he consented to remain in its service. See his formal defence, [App. III.] *Nothing can justify him, and it is impossible to defend him with honour. After all the only excuse for a soldier is his success, and Francesco Maria knew not what success meant. The testimony of courtiers should go for nothing. History has tried him, and the ruin of Rome bears witness to the treason of this ineffectual Signorotto. The Pope surrendered Castel S. Angelo on June 7th.
[16] Vat. Urb. MSS. No. 1677, f. 38.