The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912

by James H. Blount

Again, he says:

We cannot leave the insurgents either to form a government [he of course did not know what a complete government they had already formed] or to battle against a foe which * * * might readily overcome them.

He also was of course unaware how thoroughly anxious the Spaniards then in the Philippines were to get away, and how completely they were at the mercy of the new Philippine Republic and its forces. “On all hands” says Judge Day, “it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government.” Of course we knew absolutely nothing worth mentioning about the Filipinos at that time. Judge Day then proposes, for the reasons indicated, to accept Luzon and some adjacent islands, as being of “strategic advantage,” and to leave Spain the rest, with a “treaty stipulation for non-alienation without the consent of the United States.” It seems to me that Judge Day’s scheme was the least desirable of all.

Senator Gray’s memorandum of the same date is a red-hot argument against taking over any part of the archipelago. He begins thus:

The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take Philippine Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon through our history. * * * It will make necessary * * * immense sums for fortifications and harbors * * * Climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth * * *. On whole, instead of indemnity, injury * * *. Cannot agree that any obligation incurred to insurgents * * *. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not be our duty to stay by them at the conclusion of war * * *. No place for * * * government of subject people in American system * * *. Even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon * * * the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world * * * for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. * * * Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word * * *. Above all let us not make a mockery of the [President’s] instructions, where, after stating that we took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity * * * and that we had no designs of aggrandizement and no ambition for conquest, the President * * * eloquently says: “It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war.”

The next day, October 26th, came this laconic answer:

The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must be required.

Probably the one thing about the Paris Peace negotiations that is sure to interest the average American most at this late date is the matter of how we came to pay that twenty millions. It was this way. On October 27th, the Commission wired Washington:

Last night Spanish ambassador called upon Mr. Reid.

It seems they talked long and earnestly far into the night, trying to find a way which would prevent the conference from resulting in sudden disruption, and consequent resumption of the war. Mr. Reid made plain the inflexible determination of the American people not to assume the Cuban debt. The Ambassador said: “Montero Rios[6] could not return to Madrid now if known to have accepted entire Cuban indebtedness,” and asked delay to see “if some concessions elsewhere might not be found which would save Spanish Commissioners from utter repudiation at home.” There is no doubt that the talk we are now considering was a “heart-to-heart” affair, probably quite informal. Yet it is one of the most important talks that have occurred between any two men in this world in the last fifty years. Mr. Reid finally threw out a hint to the effect that as the preponderance of American public sentiment seemed rather inclined to retain the Philippines, “It was possible,” he said, “but not probable that out of these conditions the Spanish Commissioners might find something either in territory or debt[7] which might seem to their people at least like a concession.!”[8]