If any additional testimony is needed as to the masterful part played by Smith at Chattanooga, it is found in the fact that Grant made haste to attach him to his own staff and to recommend him for promotion to the grade of major-general to take rank from the date of his original appointment, declaring in support of his recommendation that he felt "under more than ordinary obligations for the masterly manner in which he discharged the duties of his position." Later he recommended that Smith be put first of all the army on the list for promotion, adding: "He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the army, is very practical and industrious," and emphasized it all with the highly eulogistic declaration that "no man in the army is better qualified than he for the largest military commands."
It is noteworthy that about the same time General Butler with whom he had served for a short season, made an application to have General Smith re-assigned to his command, but the Secretary of War, having evidently forgotten his order for Smith's arrest at the close of the Gettysburg campaign, wrote: "The services of William F. Smith, now Chief Engineer in the Army of the Cumberland, are indispensable in that command, and it will be impossible to assign him to your Department." But this was not all. General George H. Thomas, the soul of honor and fair dealing on the 20th of November, 1863, although General Smith had already been transferred from his own to the staff of General Grant, formally recommended him for promotion in the following striking and comprehensive words:
"For industry and energy displayed by him from the time of his reporting for duty at these headquarters, in organizing the Engineer Department, and for his skillful execution of the movements at Brown's Ferry, Tennessee, on the night of October 26th, 1863, in surprising the enemy and throwing a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River at that point, a vitally important service necessary to the opening of communications between Bridgeport and Chattanooga."
Certainly no language could be more clear and unequivocal than this, and yet, as though General Thomas wished to remove all chance of doubt as to whom the highest credit was due, he declared in a later and more formal official report:
"To Brigadier General William F. Smith, Chief Engineer, should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which conceived and the ability which executed the movements at Brown's Ferry."
While even the best memory so long after the event is but little to be depended upon for details, it may serve especially when supplementing the records, to strengthen the conclusions therefrom. In this instance it should be stated that it was perfectly well known to the late Charles A. Dana, then present at Chattanooga as Assistant Secretary of War, and also to myself, who was serving at the time on General Grant's staff as Inspector General, and was in daily contact with all the leading officers, that it was General Smith, and General Smith alone, who conceived and carried out the plan actually used for the capture of Brown's Ferry and the re-establishment of the direct line of communication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. Indeed, there was no question in that army, or at that time, in regard to the matter. Rosecrans was never mentioned in connection with it, while Smith's praise was in everybody's mouth till the close of the campaign, not only for the Brown's Ferry movement, but, what was still more important, for the plan of operations against Bragg's position on Missionary Ridge. He it was who personally familiarized himself with the terrain in the entire field of operations, which, with the mountains, valleys, rivers and creeks, that gave it its unique character, was the most complicated and difficult one of the entire war, if not the most complicated and difficult one upon which a great battle was ever fought. It was he alone who worked out every detail of the combinations and movements by which the great victory of Missionary Ridge was won. I state this upon my own knowledge and not upon hearsay.
Moreover, it was conceded by all in high command that Smith was easily the leading strategist in that entire host. He knew all the details of the ground and all the difficulties to be overcome, better than any other man. He studied them more closely, and with more intelligence than any other man, not only because it was his duty to do so, but because he was conscious of the portentous fact now so commonly lost sight of that the safety and success of the army depended upon the discovery and adoption of a feasible plan of action. Grant, the generalissimo, had neither the time nor opportunity to gather the facts. He was neither an engineer nor strange as it may seem, a close calculator of the chances.
He necessarily depended upon the Chief Engineer, and the criticism which was sure to come from others, to gather and sift the data upon which final action must be based. Thomas was there from the first, able, methodical and invincible, a great field tactician, but not specially distinguished for his knowledge of engineering, grand tactics or strategy. Sherman came afterwards. He was bold, active and energetic, and had a fine eye for topography. He knew as well as anyone what could be done and what could not be done by an army, but he came too late to take part in the original investigations, or to do anything more than to accept the part assigned to him, and from an examination of the ground say whether or not he could carry it out. The important fact is that Smith was, beyond any question, the first mind among them all for working out just such problems as confronted the leaders of the Union army at Chattanooga, and that task was by common consent assigned to him. The responsibility was Grant's. His judgment and resolution must necessarily decide and execute, but it was Smith's place to gather the facts and work out the details of one of the most complicated military problems that was ever presented for solution, and it can hardly be too much to say that he discharged his task with such patience, skill and success as to justly entitle himself to be known in history as the Strategist of Chattanooga. Were his distinguished associates living, it cannot be doubted they would willingly concede that honor to him. In their official reports and correspondence at the time they went far beyond the usual limit to give him praise, and although Grant finally withdrew his friendship from him, for reasons which will be given hereafter, he never in the slightest degree withdrew or modified the praise he had awarded him for his services in the Chattanooga campaign.
But to return to the details of the plan of operations. It was Smith who discovered the possibility of turning Bragg's position on Missionary Ridge, by the Army of the Tennessee. After personal examination of the lay of the ground he suggested that Sherman's army coming up from Bridgeport through Lookout Valley should cross to the north side of the Tennessee by the bridge at Brown's Ferry, and after passing to the east side of Moccasin Point, under cover of the woods, to a position opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, should re-cross the Tennessee River, by a bridge to be thrown under cover of darkness, and land on the end of Missionary Ridge with the obvious purpose of marching along the Ridge and rolling up and destroying Bragg's army, or taking it in reverse and driving it from its line of supply and retreat. As early as the 8th of November, Mr. Dana, writing to the Secretary of War, speaks of a reconnaissance made by Thomas, Smith and Brannan on the north side of the river to a point opposite the mouth of Citico Creek, near the head of Missionary Ridge, which he thought at that time "proved Smith's plan of attack impractical." But further investigation proved that a passage could he made higher up the river, and when Sherman was taken to the place that had been selected, examining both the place for the bridge and its approaches, on both sides of the river, with his usual care, he closed his field glasses with a snap and turning to Smith said with emphasis: "Baldy, it can be done!"
And so much of it as referred to the passage of the river was done without halt or fault, just as it had been planned. Sherman's entire army, except his rear division that had been cut off by a break in the Brown's Ferry floating bridge, was brought upon the field just in the way suggested and by the means which had been provided by General Smith. I assisted in transferring the troops to the South bank of the river at the point of crossing, by the use of the river steamer "Dunbar," which had been put under my command so as to make certain that a sufficient force should be on the ground in time to cover the construction of the bridge. The bridge was laid successfully and the army was transferred without delay. Every stage of the movement pointed to an onward and victorious march against Bragg's commanding position, and a complete victory was finally achieved, but much to the surprise and disappointment of all, it was not attained at the time nor in the way that had been expected. The prearranged plan, so far as it concerns Sherman's army, had no other legitimate purpose than to land it on Bragg's exposed right flank and double him up or drive him from his regular line of supply and retreat. And there is nothing more certain than that there was no man in authority on either side who intended the battle to be fought as it was actually fought, nor who seriously expected the victory to be won in the way it finally was won by Thomas's army, and not by Sherman's.