It is possible to breed from stock a very great number of animals, all of which are connected by a tie of blood-relationship, that is, all have descended from the same ancestor or ancestors. Such an assemblage of animals would resemble those assemblages living in the wild which we call species, in that a certain morphological similarity would be exhibited by all the individuals. If the breeding were conducted so as to avoid selection, the range of variability would be very much the same as that observed in the wild race. The two groups of animals—that bred artificially, and that observed in natural conditions—would be very much alike, and it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the natural race, like the artificial one, is a family in the human sense, that is, all the individuals composing it are connected together by a tie of common descent.

Let us extend this reasoning to categories of organisms of higher orders than species. We can associate together groups of species in the same way that we associate together the individuals of the same species. There are certain morphological characters which are common to all the species in the category, but there are also differences between specific group and specific group, and these differences may be regarded as variations from the generic morphological type. All the Cats, for instance, have certain characters in common: fully retractile claws, a certain kind of dentition, certain cranial characters, and so on. We postulate a feline type of structure, and we then regard the characters displayed by the cat, lion, tiger, leopard, etc., as deviations from this feline morphological type. Thus we establish the Family Felidæ. But again we find that the Felidæ together with the Canidæ, and many other species of animals, also display common characters, dental and osteological chiefly, and we express this resemblance by assembling all these families in one Order, the Carnivora. The Carnivores, however, are only one large group of Quadrupeds: there are many others, such as the Rodents, Ungulates, Cetacea, etc., and all of these possess common characters. In all of them the integument is provided with hairs, or other similarly developed structures; all breathe by means of a diaphragm; in all, the young are nourished by suckling the mammæ of the mother; and all develop on a placenta. We therefore group them all in the Class Mammalia. Now the Mammals possess an internal skeleton of which the most fundamental part is an axial rod—the notochord—developing to form a vertebral column; and this notochordal skeleton is also possessed by the Birds, Reptiles, Amphibia, and Fishes. There are also some smaller groups in which the notochord is present but does not develop to form segmented vertebræ. Including these, we are able to form a large category of animals—the Chordata—and this phylum is sharply distinguished from all other cognate groups.

All animals and plants may be classified in a similar way. Insects, Spiders, and Crustacea, for instance, are all animals in which the body is jointed, each joint or segment being typically provided with a pair of jointed appendages or limbs. Because of this similarity of fundamental structure we include all these animals, with some others, in one phylum, the Arthropoda. So also with the rest of the animal kingdom, and similar methods may be extended to the classification of the plants. A few small groups in each of the kingdoms are difficult to classify, but it has been possible to arrange most living organisms in a small number of sub-kingdoms or phyla, and even to attempt to trace relationships between these various categories.

The mere systematic description of the organic world would have resulted in such a reasoned classification apart altogether from any notions of an evolutionary process. But the classification, originally a conventional way of making a list of organisms, would at once suggest morphological similarities. It would suggest that all the Cats were Carnivores, that all the Carnivores were Mammals, and that all the Mammals were Chordates. It would suggest that all Wasps were Hymenoptera, that all Hymenoptera were Insects, and that all Insects were Arthropods. It would establish a host of logical relations between animals of all kinds.

It would show us a number of groups of animals separated from each other by morphological dissimilarities. But let us also consider all those animals which lived in the past of the earth, and the remains of which are found in the rocks as fossils. Including all the forms of life known to Palæontology, we should find that the dissimilarities between the various groups would tend to disappear. The gaps between existing Birds and Reptiles, for instance, would become partially bridged. Palæontology would also supplement morphology in another way. The study of the structure of animals leads us to describe them as “higher” and “lower”—higher in the sense of a greater complexity of structure. Thus the body of a Carnivore is more complex than that of a Fish, inasmuch as it possesses the homologues of the truly piscine gills, but it also possesses a four-chambered heart instead of a two-chambered one; and it possesses the mammalian lungs, diaphragm, and placenta, structures which are not present in the Fish. Now, so far as its imperfect materials go, palæontology shows us that the higher forms of life appeared on the earth at a later date than did the lower forms. The remains of Mammals, for instance, are first found in rocks which are younger than (that is, they are superposed upon) those rocks in which Reptiles first appear; and so also Reptiles appear later in the rock series than do Fishes. Palæontology thus adds to the logical order suggested by morphology a chronological order of this nature: higher, or more complex forms of life appeared at a later date in the history of the earth than did lower or less complex ones.

A parallel chronological sequence would also be suggested by the results of embryology. This branch of biology shows us that all animals pass through a series of stages in their individual development, or ontogeny. The earlier stages represent a simple type of structure, usually a hollow ball of cells, but as development proceeds, the structure of the embryo becomes more and more complex. The process of development is continuous in many animals, but in others (perhaps in most) larval stages appear, that is, development is interrupted, and the animal may lead for a time an independent existence similar to that of the fully developed form. Often these larval stages suggest types of structure lower than that of the fully developed animal into which they transform. Even if larval stages may not appear in the ontogeny, it is very often the case that the developing embryo exhibits traces, or at least reminiscences, of the types of morphology characteristic of the animals which are lower or less complex than itself; thus the piscine gills appear during the development of the tailed Amphibian, and even in that of the Mammal, and then vanish, or are converted into organs of another kind. The individual thus passes through a series of developmental stages of increasing complexity: it repeats, in its ontogeny, the palæontological sequence in a distorted and abbreviated form.

It is true that the evidence afforded by palæontology is very meagre. The preservation of the remains of organisms in the stratified rocks is a very haphazard process, and it depends for its success on a series of conditions that are not always present. As the surface of the earth becomes better known, our knowledge of the life of the past will become fuller, but there can be little doubt that whole series of organisms must have existed in the past, and that no recognisable traces of these are known to us. There is also no doubt that the sequences indicated by palæontology are very incomplete: they are obscured and shortened by many conditions. The earlier embryologists entertained hopes that the study of embryology would reveal the direction of the evolutionary process in many groups of animals: if the organism repeats in its ontogeny the series of stages through which it passed in its phylogenetic development, then a close study of the embryological process ought to disclose these stages. Although these hopes have not been realised, there is yet sufficient truth in the doctrine of recapitulation to enable us to state that there is a rough parallelism between the palæontological and embryological sequences.

We therefore state a plausible hypothesis when we assert that different species may be related to each other in the same way that the individuals of the same species are related, that is, by a tie of blood-relationship; and that different genera, families, orders, and so on are also so related. Morphological studies enable us to arrange numbers of species in such a way that series, in each of which there is an increasing specialisation of structure, are formed. Both palæontology and embryology show, to some extent at least, that these stages of ever-increasing specialisation of structure occurred one after the other. Now, stated briefly and baldly as we have put it, this argument may not appear to the general reader to possess much force, but it is almost impossible to over-state the strength of the appeal which it makes to the student of biology. To such a one a belief in a process of transformism will appear to be inseparable from a reasoned description of the facts of the science.

But it would be no more than a belief, not even a hypothesis, if we did not attempt to verify it experimentally. It is merely logical relationships that we establish, and the chronological succession of forms of life, higher forms succeeding lower ones, does not itself do more than suggest an evolutionary process. All that we have said is compatible with a belief in a process of special creation. But if we cling to such a belief, if we suppose that the organisms inhabiting the earth, now and in the past, are the manifestations of a Creative Thought, we must still accept the notion of logical and chronological relationships between all these forms of life. If we permit ourselves to speculate on the working of the Creative Thought, we seem to recognise that the ideas of the different species must have generated each other, and that the genesis of living things must have occurred in some such order as is indicated by a scientific hypothesis of transformism. An evolutionary process must have occurred somewhere, but the kinships so established between organisms would be logical and not material ones.

Science must not, of course, describe the mode of origin of species in this way. So long as it investigates living things by the same methods which it uses in the investigation of inorganic things, it must hold that the concepts of physical science are also adequate for the description of organic nature. It must assume that matter and energy and natural law are given; and that, even in the conditions of our world, life must have originated from lifeless matter; must have shaped itself, and undergone the transformations that are suggested by the results of biology. It must assume, in spite of the formidable difficulties that the assumption encounters, that cosmic physical processes are reversible and cyclical; and that worlds and solar systems are born, evolve, and decay again. Every stage in such a cosmic process, as well as every stage in the evolution of living things, must have been inevitably determined by the stages preceding it. Such a mechanistic explanation must assume that a superhuman intellect, but still a finite intellect like our own, such a calculator as that imagined by Laplace or Du Bois-Reymond, would be able to deduce any state of the world, or universal system, from any other state, by means of an immense system of differential equations. It would be able, as Huxley says, to calculate the fauna of Great Britain from a knowledge of the properties of the primitive nebulosity with as much certainty as we can say what will be the fate of a man’s breath on a frosty day. Such a fine notion as that of an universal mathematics must ever remain as the ideal towards which science strives to approximate.