In years gone by I had known him in pleasant army service, part of the time as a brevet lieutenant of his company. When the name was announced, and as he dismounted, I approached to offer my hand and such amenities as were admissible under the circumstances, but he drew up with haughty mien, which forbade nearer approach, so that the courtesies were concluded by the offer of staff-officers to escort him to the city of Richmond.
It was during this affair that General Holmes’s division advanced against the Federals at Turkey Bridge with a six-gun field battery and engaged, and was met by the fire of thirty field guns and the gunboat batteries, which drove him to confusion, abandoning two guns. Earlier in the day, Magruder’s column had been ordered by a long détour to support the fight at Frayser’s Farm, but the trouble encountered by Holmes’s division seemed serious, and caused the Confederate commander to divert Magruder’s march to support that point, through which a resolute advance might endanger our rear at Frayser’s Farm. After night Magruder was called to relieve the troops on the front of my line. His march during the day was delayed by his mistaken guide.
The Confederates claimed as trophies of the battle ten pieces of artillery, some prisoners, and most of the field from which McCall’s division had been dislodged. Holmes’s division lost two guns in the affair at Turkey Bridge, but other Confederates secured and afterwards made better use of them.
During this eventful day the Federals were anxiously pushing their trains to cover on the river, and before noon of July 1 all, except those of ammunition necessary for immediate use, had safely passed the field selected for their Malvern Hill battle.
CHAPTER XI.
BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.
Last Stand in the Great Retreat—Strength of McClellan’s Position—The Confederates make Poor Use of their Artillery—A Mistake and Defeat for Lee’s Army—The Campaign as a Whole a Great Success, but it should have been far greater—McClellan’s Retreat showed him well equipped in the Science of War—Review of the Campaign—Jackson’s and Magruder’s Misunderstanding—Moral Effect of the Gunboats on the James River—“There should be a Gunboat in Every Family.”
At Malvern Hill, hardly a league away from Frayser’s, now left to silence save for the moans of the unfortunate fallen, and standing south of the line to Turkey Bridge, was Fitz-John Porter with the reserve artillery massed, supported by the divisions of Sykes and Morell on the left and Couch’s on the right, from the Crew House to J. W. Binford’s. The field had been carefully selected and as judiciously guarded by well-posted commands, holding the only way left which gave hope of successful passage to cover under the gunboats. During the night of the 30th of June and early morn of the 1st of July this position was reinforced by the retreating Federals,—first by the Second and Third Corps, McCall’s division of the Fifth, and W. F. Smith’s of the Sixth, and later by other troops. Among the trains moving for the river was one of ten siege guns under Colonel Tyler. These were dropped in Porter’s rear and put in battery, giving them a sweep of the avenues of approach and extensive rake of the woodlands, and a great number of lighter batteries bristled upon the brow and down the slopes of the hill. On either flank the plateau was somewhat guarded by ravines and tangled marsh lands, while the front approach was over ascending slopes, so broken as to make advancing artillery combat slow and hazardous.