Early on the 1st, the columns under Huger, Jackson, and Magruder met at the Charles City cross-roads, but the enemy had given up that position and marched away, leaving to them the abandoned forest land. The disappointment of the Confederate commander in the failure of combination ordered for the 30th was noted by those who were near him, while the composure with which it was borne indicated the grander elements of his character, and drew those who knew his plans and purposes closer to him.

Jackson was ordered to follow on the direct line of the enemy’s retreat; Huger and Magruder marched to co-operate on his right; Longstreet’s and A. P. Hill’s divisions were held in reserve. General Lee rode near Jackson’s column to view the army on that front. Feeling unwell and much fatigued, he called me to temporary service near him. As he rode to the left, he ordered me, with the columns of Huger and Magruder, to make reconnoissance of the enemy’s new position in that quarter, and to report of the feasibility of aggressive battle.

I found some difference between General Lee’s maps and General Magruder’s guides, but my authority was only for a reconnoissance, and posting the divisions. An elevated point was found off the enemy’s left front, as high as the plateau upon which his army stood, from which a fair view was had of his position and down along his front and the open as far as Jackson’s field, the latter just filing in by his batteries on much lower but open ground.

Profound silence rested upon the field. Jackson’s batteries, yet a little beyond the point of range, marched to their places as quietly as if taking positions for review. Porter’s field seemed as little concerned at the developments along his flank and front, indicating that there was to be no waste of ammunition on that July day. His guns could not be counted, but blocking them off by batteries there seemed to be eighty on his front, besides the siege battery in rear. His guns were all trailed to Jackson’s front, thus presenting a flank towards the high point upon which I stood. From the crest at this little ridge the ground dropped off sharply some eighteen inches or two feet to a lower terrace, forming a natural parapet and terre-plein for forty or sixty guns, massed. The spacious open along Jackson’s front appeared to offer a field for play of a hundred or more guns, and although his lower ground was not inviting of combat even by a hundred guns, it was yet judged that advancing combat by eighty or a hundred guns, in combination with the forty-gun battery of position, might justify assault, and the tremendous game at issue called for adventure.

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I thought it probable that Porter’s batteries, under the cross-fire of the Confederates thus posted on his left and front, could be thrown into disorder, and thus make way for combined assaults of the infantry. I so reported, and General Lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending the pioneer corps out to cut a road for the right batteries of position.

I suggested position to Magruder for his division, but he insisted that the Quaker road was not correctly located on General Lee’s maps, so I left that part of the order to be looked after by General Lee’s recognized staff. General Chilton, chief of staff, was then sent by General Lee to assist General Magruder in posting the troops, and I was ordered back to locate the batteries.

But eight guns came in proper time and were posted. These General Magruder proposed to supplement by thirty of his own under Colonel S. D. Lee, to be reinforced by the others as they came up. With this understanding I returned to head-quarters, made my report, and was permitted to go back to my command proper.

The most convenient point for observing the effect of the artillery fire was occupied by General Armistead’s brigade. That officer was designated by General Lee to give notice, if the combat was successful, by advancing his brigade, under the shouts of infantry charge, as the signal for general assault.