On the following day Baron von Schoen made two visits at the French Foreign Office and assured the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that
Germany was on the side of France in the ardent desire for the maintenance of peace, and she earnestly hoped that France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St. Petersburg.
I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, where the efficacy of her action was sure, with a view to avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of Servia.
The Ambassador having pointed out to me that that was irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, “that the question only concerned Austria and Servia,” I said to him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in the matter.
Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of instructions on this point, and I told him that in these circumstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg alone.
Our conversation concluded with the renewed assurance by the Ambassador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he declared, was with France on this point.[55]
The incident now followed, which suggested to the French Foreign office a subtle attempt of Germany to compromise the relations of France with Russia by imputing disloyalty to the former. On his second visit a few hours later, Baron von Schoen desired the French Foreign Office to give to the public a statement with reference to the preceding interview, and suggested the following, which he dictated to the French official:
“The German Ambassador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had a further interview in the course of the afternoon, during which they examined, in the most friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means which might be employed for the maintenance of general peace.”
The Acting Political Director at once replied: “Then, in your mind, everything is settled, and you give us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note, or will be willing to converse with the Powers with regard to it?”
The Ambassador appeared to be taken aback, and made a vigorous denial. It was therefore pointed out to him that if nothing had changed in the negative attitude of Germany, the terms of the suggested “note to the Press” were excessive, and likely to give French opinion a false feeling of security by creating illusions as to the actual situation, the dangers of which were but too evident.[56]