The Ministry are deserving of the greatest praise for the cool, resolute and statesmanlike manner in which they controlled the affairs of the Colony. They met the extraordinary difficulties that confronted them from time to time with courage and success. The stand made when the suspension of the Richmond executions was ordered is alone sufficient to cause their administration to be remembered and respected. A further measure of credit is due to Sir Thomas Watt, who, as Minister of Justice and Defence, was, of course, primarily responsible for the excellent state of military organization at the beginning of the campaign.
It is unnecessary to recapitulate what has already been said about Colonel Bru-de-Wold. The Militia was exceedingly fortunate in having so enthusiastic and experienced an officer as Commandant. The same applies to that distinguished soldier Major-General Sir John Dartnell who, for a time, relieved Colonel Bru-de-Wold.
That Colonel (now Brigadier-General Sir Duncan) McKenzie did more than come up to the high expectations formed of his capacities as a soldier was generally acknowledged. But few opportunities for distinguishing himself arose during the demonstrations in February and March. When he assumed command at Nkandhla, however, early in May, with Colonel Sir Aubrey Woolls-Sampson as Chief Staff Officer, they became numerous. It was due mainly to his generalship, ably supported by the column and other commanders, that the decisive results at Nkandhla and elsewhere were brought about. Every operation or action taken in hand by him during the campaign was planned with the greatest care and circumspection. He was fortunate in being provided with excellent intelligence. His policy was always to strike hard, and to afford no chance of escape. It was, in the main, owing to this method, and the vigour and resolution with which it was followed, that hostilities were brought to an end as soon as they were.
A fine horseman, with an unerring eye for country, his performances in the field were invariably marked by swiftness of action, and brilliancy and thoroughness of execution.
Colonel Leuchars commanded all troops in Natal proper and Nqutu district, though, after 30th May, he did so under McKenzie. Much useful and solid work was done by this popular officer, with Major (now Lieut.-Col.) S. Carter as Staff Officer. He proved himself to be a judicious, capable and reliable commander. The disturbed area over which he had control included no less than five magisterial districts. As these all abut on the Tugela, it can be seen that the command was one of exceptional difficulty, and this not only in a geographical, but a diplomatic, sense.
The first lesson of the Rebellion may, therefore, be said to have been (a) the happy conjunction of capable statesmen and soldiers, one and all ready to serve the Colony to the utmost in its time of need; and (b) the thoroughness of military organization.
Rebels' strategy, tactics, etc.—The primary object of the rebels was to score victories, however small, at the outset, it being felt that that was the most effective way of rousing the people from a condition of apathy or inertia brought on through chronic fear of Europeans. The masses considered it was useless fighting against a race far better armed than themselves, and one which, twenty-eight years before, had defeated the Zulu army when in its highest state of efficiency. If the Rebellion was not to fall flat, the most strenuous efforts had, therefore, to be made to secure adherents.
Having regard to their inferior weapons, the only chance of success lay in selecting a terrain suitable to their tactics. That, at any rate, would afford breathing-time, for if the theatre of war lay away from railways and in country difficult for horses, the longer would hostilities continue. Thus success was recognized as depending largely on protracting the campaign, by rendering it as difficult as possible for the troops.
To start hostilities, again, at the most favourable time, i.e. about May, when all the crops had been reaped, was regarded as essential. It is true that the Trewirgie affair occurred in February, but such must be regarded as an exception which proved the rule.
The feeling that they could, as it were, "float" a general rebellion was, no doubt, largely derived from the success achieved by a Zulu impi against Potgieter's commando at Holkrantz. The ambuscade at Mpanza, too, was a success, and afforded just the illustration required to support the cry that European bullets would not "enter." As Natives in general greatly dreaded rifle fire, it became necessary to counteract the fear by inventing the "non-entering-bullet" superstition. Had but one or two rebels been killed at Mpanza, not nearly so much would have been made of the superstition as was done.