A history of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, and of Dinuzulu's arrest, trial, and expatriation

by James Stuart

The fact that, at the beginning of June, the position was extremely serious, only shows that the enemy's tactics had been effective, differing widely from the free, open methods practised during the Zulu War. But for the remarkable coup at Mome, the Rebellion might easily have developed to far greater proportions. As it was, many Chiefs on both sides of the Tugela had begun to assist directly or indirectly. And it is clear that the more protracted the fighting, the more Natives at large would have inferred that the Government had got to the end of its resources, and was, therefore, unable to cope with the situation. Once such a notion had been created and been widely believed, anything up to 100,000 might have risen, and so called for an army corps to deal with the outbreak at a cost of £10,000,000 or so. That is the prospect the Ministry had before them at the latter end of May and beginning of June.

That principles such as the foregoing would be followed in any future Native war appears axiomatic, particularly as Natives know quite well that their tactics in 1906 were, on the whole, successful; Mome, though a catastrophe, was due to accident or carelessness that could easily have been avoided by a competent commander.

That an outbreak should have occurred at Mapumulo subsequent to the débâcle in Zululand, is remarkable chiefly as showing lack of territorial organization. Although a certain amount had been introduced at Nkandhla, between the arrival of Bambata and the action at Mome, the army daily becoming more crafty and efficient, it had reference only to such rebels as had actually massed at that place. A supreme organizer was wanting, one who, whilst directing at Nkandhla, could have so far enforced obedience as to control situations such as those at Umsinga, and especially in Mapumulo and Ndwedwe divisions. That there was this want was undoubtedly felt by every insurgent. They knew too much of Tshaka's successes to do otherwise than realize that they were weak, and see what such weakness was due to. That is why Dinuzulu's personality and presence was so much in demand. That is why, for instance, one heard of such talk as that they would seize and carry him off to lead them whether he willed it or not. To have a visible leader and to submit to his direction, that was the height of their ambition. Only then did they feel themselves to be a people, possessed to some extent of their former solidarity. To sacrifice their lives for someone is everything, to have to do so for an absent reality, nothing.

Another lesson is the necessity of pursuing the enemy the moment he starts hostilities. Quick pursuit is what every Zulu holds as a primary maxim of warfare. Such action inspires loyalists with confidence, because affording them protection at the time they most require it.

The policy of the rebels having been to avoid conflict whenever the conditions were unfavourable, meant that the campaign resolved itself into one where the troops had always to assume the offensive.[305] The enemy deliberately invited being hunted in the forests in which he took refuge. There was no other alternative but to 'hunt' him. His perpetual and masterly evasiveness was resorted to just because felt to be the most telling and safest tactics to adopt. He knew that, man for man, he was infinitely better acquainted with forests, streams, dongas, caves, hills and valleys than the Europeans, most of whom had spent the greater part of their lives in towns at a distance and in sedentary occupations. But, whilst practising these methods, the motive was invariably to draw the troops on after him in the hope of small parties becoming detached when the opportunity was smartly seized, and the severest blow possible struck. This being the game, can it be wondered at that the rebels were severely punished whenever they were come upon? For it must be remembered that, up to the moment of Mome, nothing had been further from their minds than to surrender. Ample opportunities for so doing, notably when the troops first went to Cetshwayo's grave, were afforded, but the negotiations fell through because they felt, and even publicly stated that they had not had enough fighting. From their point of view, it was in their interest to continue.

This watchful evasiveness, then, was the essence of the situation at Nkandhla. Hence it sometimes happened that the troops drove one or other of the bushes in the belief the enemy was there, whereas, as a matter of fact, he was not there at all, but at Macala ten miles off or elsewhere, having slipped away during the night.

In these circumstances, it was soon realized that, not 2,500, but 10,000 men were required to deal with Nkandhla alone, although the rebels themselves did not exceed 2,000 in number. In no other way was it possible to put a cordon round the forests, and, by confining the enemy, speedily starve him into submission.

Connected with the same tactics was the waylaying of a force when on the march. This generally took place at a carefully-selected position, from which there was an immediate and safe line of retreat. Instances of this occurred at Mpanza, Bobe, Macrae's store, Peyana, Insuze and Ponjwana. At all, except Mpanza and others not here named, the method was to divide the impi into two bodies, one to attack the front, and the other the rear, of the advancing column. And the principle was observed, although the ground rendered the application thereof extremely difficult. On no occasion did attack take place in the open, as often happened during the Zulu War.

The only standing camp attacked was that of Leuchars at Mpukunyoni. This took place at dawn, there being no shelter for the troops except their saddles.

At Macrae's store, the attack came just after sunset and later—the only instance of night attack. When the offensive is assumed by Zulus, the proper time to do so is just before dawn, unless the force be a strong one, when battle would be given in broad daylight.