The Divisional Commander issued the following special order:—
"15th Divisional Commander feels sure that this generous acknowledgment of the work of the Division will be highly valued by all. He wishes to add his own thanks. He is proud to have under his command a Division in which officers, N.C.O.'s and men are inspired with so fixed a determination to do their duty. The task given to the 15th Division in the Battle of Arras was a very heavy one, entailing hard work in preparation and great gallantry in attack. The difficulties of the operation only inspired all ranks to greater effort, and brilliant success has been achieved. The crushing defeat of the enemy on 9th April was due to the discipline, hard work, untiring energy, and magnificent gallantry of all ranks. Another page of honour has been added to the glorious record of the Division. The Divisional Commander wishes to thank every officer, N.C.O. and man, and he feels that it is indeed an honour to command the victorious 15th Division."
The signallers and runners during the battle of Arras had a severe time, owing to the heavy shell and machine gun fire. The system of deep buried cable had not yet been developed, all wires being laid over the open. They were therefore being constantly cut by shell fire, and the signallers had to be out continually, both night and day, repairing them. This also necessitated the use of runners to carry messages during the periods of the heavy bombardment. Signallers and runners were picked men, as the work was not only arduous and dangerous, but required both judgment and commonsense. We were lucky with the men chosen, as they on this and all other occasions did their work well, showing courage and devotion to duty.
At the close of this phase of the battle, Lieut.-Colonel Crichton went down the line sick, the command of the Battalion being taken over by Major MacLeod. The Battalion was billeted in Arras up till the 23rd April, re-organising and absorbing fresh drafts. They also practised the attack in open order, and did a certain amount of rifle practice in the "butte de tir." We left our billets in Grand Place on the night of the 22nd, relieving the 8/10th Gordons. We were to attack the enemy on the 23rd, the first objective being the "Blue" line. At 3.20 a.m. the Battalion was in position, "D" Company being on the left, "A" Company on the right, "B" and "C" Companies in support. On our right were the Seaforths, on the left the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (45th Brigade).
The zero hour was 4.45 a.m., when the Battalion commenced to attack under a heavy barrage. The enemy almost at once opened a barrage on our front line, and also an intense machine gun fire from an emplacement on our immediate front and from the high ground on the south side of Scarpe River. The machine gun emplacement on our front was to have been knocked out by our trench mortars, which were to open rapid fire on it half a minute before we attacked; but this scheme was not carried into effect, and we suffered very heavy casualties when the men got over the top and rushed the gun at the point of the bayonet. The fact that Lieut. Anderson, the trench mortar officer, was killed probably accounted for the failure of the trench mortar to knock out the machine gun. Lieut. Anderson was a most skilled and gallant officer, beloved by all, and his death must have had a disconcerting effect on his men. He was a cheery individual, and had often rendered very valuable service in the attack. We missed him both as a soldier and as a man. After rushing the gun at the point of the bayonet, our right was held up by machine gun fire. Our left, in the meantime, pushed on to Bullet Trench, seizing the south end of it, taking about 40 prisoners and capturing a machine gun. Here about 5.30 a.m., finding they were out of touch both on their left and right, they dug themselves in. The centre of the Battalion for a time had been held up by the machine gun fire, but succeeded finally in advancing and fortifying a post about the sunken road (5.45 a.m.) A small party on the right, with the assistance of Captain Morrison of the Black Watch, formed another post in the sunken road. By 10.30 a.m. those who were holding the post in Bullet Trench had managed, with the assistance of a few stokes and rifle grenades, to clear the trench up to the Cambrai Road, three posts being formed in the trenches.
For a time our right was insecure, as the Black Watch, who had attacked the village of Guemappe, had not succeeded in holding it, and had been driven out by the enemy. About 12 mid-day a new barrage was formed, under which we pushed forward the posts in the sunken road, advancing to a part of "Hammer Trench." These posts, being on high ground slightly in front of the village, spotted the enemy forming up for a counter attack against the Black Watch, and our Lewis Gunners were able to do considerable execution before the counter attack was broken up. The 46th Brigade advanced through the 44th, and again our Lewis gunners were able to do good work in firing on the enemy as he retired from the trenches on the right. After re-organising the Battalion moved back to behind the "Brown" line about 2 a.m. on the 24th.
Everyone believed we were now done with fighting for the time being, as our casualties had been heavy, and we were all congratulating each other on being the lucky ones who had got through it. Next day, however, the Commanding Officer received orders that we were to go back into the line in order to take Cavalry Farm on the 26th, as another Battalion had failed to do so. No doubt it was necessary, as there were no fresh troops available, but no one, unless he has done it, can realise the feelings of a Commanding Officer when he has to order the men to turn round and go back into the fight under such circumstances. But he was proud of his men who, tired as they were, once more turned back and faced the enemy without a grumble.
Lieut. Colonel Norman Macleod, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
commanded from 23rd April, 1917, to 10th June, 1918.