Owing to casualties in the previous fighting, we had now only three Company Officers left, besides the Commanding Officer and Lieut. Legate, who was acting as Adjutant. A request was made to be allowed to bring up fresh officers from the transport lines, but this was refused. Unfortunately, just as the Battalion was moving off, one of the three officers became a casualty, leaving only two, neither of whom had been in action before the previous day's fighting. When we reached the lines and found that the Battalion was to carry out the attack on Cavalry Farm, the Commanding Officer suggested to Brigade that he would go forward to Company Headquarters, as the Battalion had been practically reduced to the strength of a Company, especially in officers. However, the Brigade would not agree to this.
The intention was that the Battalion was to take Cavalry Farm and the trenches to the east of it. The 45th Brigade were to attack to the north of Cambrai Road, and take a German strong point so as to protect our left, while the Black Watch were to advance on our right and form a line of posts. As soon as the Battalion had captured the farm, the 9th Pioneer Gordons were to make a communication trench up to it. The attack commenced at 11 p.m. We managed to capture the farm, but on getting past it we found the trench to the east strongly held by the enemy. These we attacked, but almost immediately found ourselves between two fires, coming from the trenches in front and from machine guns close on our left rear, situated in the strong point which the 45th Brigade had failed to capture. The result was that we had to fall back on the farm. In the meantime the Gordons, having heard that we had taken the farm, came up to commence their trench. They also came under the same heavy cross fire as was holding up our advance, and had to withdraw. The Major in Command and many others become casualties.
This information being received at the Battalion Headquarters, the Commanding Officer decided to go forward and try to re-organise the attack. The communication trench was filled with 9th Gordons, and it became necessary to advance over the open, which was a slow process, as the ground was being swept by machine guns. On reaching the front line it was found crowded with troops, in consequence of the Seaforths, who were in support, having moved forward into the front line when our Battalion had advanced to the attack. They were now mixed up with our men who had come back. The Seaforths were ordered to withdraw to the support line, with the exception of one Company which was retained to assist us in holding the front line. It was practically impossible to take the trenches east of the farm unless the strong point on the north side of the road was attacked and captured. Having therefore formed posts in the farm and to the right, to link up with the Black Watch, he proceeded to the 45th Brigade Company, who had failed to capture the strong point on the north side of the road, and from which position the enemy were able to fire into our rear when we had gone forward. They informed him that they did not intend to attack the strong point again. This made it impossible for us to continue the attack beyond the farm with any chance of success. That evening the Battalion was relieved by the Seaforths, and moved into support. The next day the Battalion was occupied in burying dead. This work was difficult, as the enemy, seeing the movement, kept up intermittent shelling. However, we managed to collect 64 bodies of Camerons, which we buried in one grave. The Commanding Officer took the service, but had to limit the number of men present owing to the danger of casualties from shelling.
In order to save space, the majority of men were buried lying on their side. A touching feature was the fact that someone had taken each man's arm and put it round the body lying next to him. From the top of the trench one could imagine that the men were sleeping, embraced in each other's arms, more especially as they were buried in their kilts just as they had fought, no blankets or other covering being available. Altogether it was a most moving scene. The machine gun, which has already been referred to, and which should have been knocked out before the attack, had taken its toll, as most of these bodies were found round about its emplacement. One could well appreciate the desperate gallantry of the men who rushed it. We had the satisfaction, however, of knowing that many of the enemy's gun crew had been bayoneted by our men.
A good example of the grit of the young officer and also the difficulty of obtaining accurate information regarding casualties was experienced. Lieut. Mackay was missing, and though several men were certain that they had seen him dead in a certain shell-hole, his body could not be found. One reliable N.C.O. was so certain of its position that he guaranteed, if he were allowed to go out, he would return directly with the body. His re-request was granted, but proved a failure. As a matter of fact, Mackay was found dead a considerable distance further on. He had been severely wounded where the men saw him, and they had been wrongly convinced that he was dead. He had been killed finally by a direct hit. He must have suffered severe wounds first of all, as his right hand, which had been blown off, and other wounds, had been dressed. Such wounds would have more than justified anyone going back to the dressing station, but this brave young officer, although stunned and wounded to such an extent that his own men thought he was dead, had evidently advanced with the remainder of the Battalion as soon as he had regained consciousness.
During the second phase of the operations, 4 Headquarter officers, 9 Company officers, and 570 men were engaged, of whom 7 Company officers and 369 men became casualties. Great praise is due to two young officers who went through the whole of the battle (their first engagement), and who individually led the Battalion in the attack on Cavalry Farm. We must refer to Captain W. G. Stuart, who was killed on this occasion—better known as "W.G." He came out with the Battalion in 1915, and had taken part in all the fighting in which the Division had been engaged. A quiet, unassuming man, with a strong personality, he was known and loved not only by the officers and men of his own Battalion, but throughout the Brigade. He seldom had a man of his Company before the C.O. In fact, the apparent pain which it gave to "W.G." to think that a man had done anything to bring disgrace on his beloved Company was the greatest punishment that man could have. The men would have done anything for him, and discipline was maintained out of love and regard for their Captain.
If the Battalion on our left had succeeded in obtaining their objective, or had at least silenced the enemy, the attack on the farm would probably have proved a success. On the night of the 28/29th of April the Battalion was relieved by the 3rd London Regiment, and withdrew into billets in the Grand Place. The fighting had been long and severe, and if fresh troops had been available to go through on the completion of the first "phase" the success might have been even greater. At the close of the fighting at that time one was able to move a considerable distance forward at night without encountering the enemy, who must have been holding his line very lightly and far back. He had recovered himself, however, when the second phase started. It is interesting to read with what surprise and despondency General Ludendorf, the Chief of the German Staff, writes concerning the battle. He says:—
"On that day (9th April) I celebrated my birthday. I looked forward to the expected offensive with confidence, and was now deeply depressed. Was this to be the result of all our care and trouble during the past half year? A day like April the 9th threw all calculations to the winds."
Such an expression of opinion is high praise to the troops whose vigour and bravery brought such a disaster to the enemy.
It may be remembered that at that time the latter part of the battle of Arras was almost over-shadowed in the press by the very gallant and successful attack by the Canadians when they took Vimy Ridge. It is instructive, however, to read in General Ludendorf's Memoirs the statement:—