(b) If this suspension of judgment results from some other motive of the will (e.g., from the wish to give attention here and now to other matters), the guilt of heresy is not incurred, for no positive judgment is formed. Neither does it seem, apart from the danger of consent to positive doubt or from the obligation of an affirmative precept of faith then and there (see 925), that any serious sin in matters of faith is committed by such a suspension of judgment. Examples: Titus, being scandalized by the sinful conduct of certain Catholics, is tempted to doubt the divinity of the Church. He does not yield to the temptation by deciding that the divinity of the Church is really doubtful, but the difficulty has so impressed him that he decides to hold his judgment in abeyance. It seems that there is here an implicit judgment (i.e., one contained in the motive of the doubt) in favor of the uncertainty of the divinity of the Church. Balbus has the same difficulty as Titus, and it prevents him from eliciting an act of faith on various occasions. But the reason for this is that an urgent business matter comes up and he turns his attention to it, or that he does not wish at the time to weary his brain by considering such an important question as that of faith, or that he thinks he can conquer a temptation more easily by diverting his thoughts to other subjects (see 257), or that he puts off till a more favorable moment the rejection of the difficulty. In these cases there is not heretical doubt, since Balbus forms no positive judgment, even implicitly, but there may be a sin against faith. Thus, Balbus would sin seriously if his suspension of assent should place him in immediate danger of positive doubt; he would sin venially, if that suspension be due to some slight carelessness.
845. Positive doubt is the state of mind in which one decides, on account of some difficulty against faith, that the latter is really doubtful and uncertain, and that assent cannot be given to either side. With regard to such a state of mind note: (a) If this judgment is formed by a Catholic, it is heretical; for his faith, as he knows and admits, is the true faith, revealed and proposed as absolutely certain. Hence, although he does not deny the faith, he does positively judge that what is revealed by God and proposed infallibly by the Church as certain, is not certain, and thus in his intellect there is pertinacious error.
(b) If this judgment is formed by a non-Catholic, it is likewise heretical, if the truth doubted belongs to divine or Catholic faith, for we are now considering the formal heretic who belongs to a non-Catholic sect against conviction; but it is not heretical, if the doctrine doubted belongs only to what is wrongly considered in his sect as divine faith, or to what may be called Protestant faith (i.e., the official confession of his religion), for he does not profess to accept his church as an infallible interpreter.
846. The doubts We have been just discussing are the passing doubts that come to those who are believers, or who consider themselves believers. There are also doubts that are permanent, and that are held by those who class themselves, not as believers, but as doubters or agnostics. Some of these sceptics doubt all religious creeds, holding that it is works and not beliefs that matter. This doctrine amounts to infidelity, since it rejects Christian faith entirely. Others profess Fundamentalism, which accepts a few Christian beliefs and considers the others as optional, pretending that the true faith cannot be recognized amid so much diversity of opinions. This doctrine is heretical, since it accepts some and rejects others of the articles of faith.
847. Credulity and Rationalism.—Opposed in special ways to the material and formal objects of faith are credulity and errors about the existence and nature of revelation.
(a) Other sins against faith are opposed to its material object (i.e., the articles of belief), inasmuch as they subtract from it by denying this or that article. Credulity, on the contrary, adds to the material object of faith by accepting a doctrine as revealed when there is no prudent reason for so doing, contrary to the teaching of scripture that “he who is hasty to believe is light of heart” (Ecclus., xix. 4). This sin is opposed rather to prudence, inasmuch as it causes one to neglect the consideration of the reasons on which a prudent judgment rests (see Vol. II), and hence it does not destroy the virtue of faith. It is, nevertheless, injurious to faith, since it brings Christianity into contempt, keeps others from embracing the teachings of the Church, and leads to superstition, the “twin-sister of unbelief.” Examples: Sempronia, who is not well educated, accepts as matters of faith every pious legend, every marvellous report of miracle no matter from what source it comes or how suspicious may be its appearance. Titus holds many views considered by good authorities as improbable or false, or as at best only opinions, but he gives them out as doctrines of the Church that must be accepted, or as infallible or revealed teaching. The credulity of Sempronia is excusable imprudence on account of her ignorance, if she has not neglected instruction; but that of Titus is blameworthy, for he ought to inform himself better before attempting to instruct others.
(b) Other kinds of unbelief are opposed to the formal object of faith (i.e., to the authority of revelation as the motive of belief); for implicitly at least they substitute private judgment for authority. The various systems of Naturalism, such as Deism, go farther and openly attack supernatural revelation as the ground of belief. Some of these systems deny the fact of revelation (e.g., Deism), others its character (e.g., Modernism, which makes revelation to consist in the internal experience of the believer), others its necessity (e.g., Rationalism). These heterodox teachings pertain, some to infidelity (e.g., Deism), some to heresy (c.g., Modernism). The great majority of Protestants nowadays cannot be said to have faith, declares Cardinal Newman, since they deduce from scripture, instead of believing a teacher. What looks like faith is mere hereditary persuasion.
848. Dangers to Faith.—One becomes guilty of heresy, infidelity, doubts against faith, etc., indirectly, by placing oneself in the danger of those sins (see 258 sqq., on the Dangers of Sin). Dangers of this kind are partly internal, partly external.
(a) Internal dangers to faith are especially the following: intellectual pride or an excessive spirit of independence, which makes one unwilling to accept authority; love of pleasure, which sets one at odds with the precepts of faith; neglect of prayer and piety, particularly in time of temptation.
(b) External dangers to faith are especially as follows: literature opposed to religion; schools where unbelief is defended; mixed marriages; association with unbelievers in religious matters; certain societies.