(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The virtue of hope also is confident: “Hold fast the glory and confidence of hope unto the end” (Heb. iii. 6).
1014. Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a supernatural virtue.
(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it the will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing its lofty aspirations: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications for ever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112); “Trust in the Lord, and do good” (Ps, xxxvi. 3).
(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is sanctified and saved: “I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope” (Ecclus., xxiv. 24); God “hath regenerated us into a lively hope” (I Pet., i. 3); “We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Everyone that hath this hope in Him sanctifieth himself” (I John, iii. 3).
1015. Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all, and his neighbor as himself: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications forever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope of the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire charity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: “He that hopeth in the Lord shall be healed” (Prov., xxviii. 25).
1016. Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not so commanded—that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.
1017. The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not admissible:
(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good, and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope (which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could an act be meritorious.
(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone) and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).
1018. The Object of Hope.—By the object of hope we mean three things: (a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end which is intended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end for whom); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).