1160. The Character of our Love of God.—(a) It must be supreme objectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss rather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our desire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need not be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought of a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will places God above all.
1161. Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note: (a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of one’s service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be preferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things their end, but in the sense that one hopes one’s service of God will be so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.
1162. Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our spiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others who are higher in sanctity than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity such progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may perfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.
1163. Is it lawful to sacrifice one’s own spiritual goods for the benefit of a neighbor?
(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in so doing one inflicts a wound on one’s own soul and prefers the good of others to one’s own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish to be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to prevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and proximate danger of sin for the sake of another’s spiritual progress.
(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by doing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not lessen but rather increases one’s own profit. Thus, a priest should interrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a daughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her parents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if an invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it is laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers the satisfactory value of one’s good works to the souls in purgatory; one may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a great service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account of irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one’s entrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls (Philip., i. 23, 24).
1164. The Love of the Body.—(a) One should prefer the spiritual welfare of one’s neighbor to one’s own bodily welfare, for our neighbor is called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the body will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one’s own bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal, for it has more of a claim on one.
1165. There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one’s bodily welfare for the other’s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a) extreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die without baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself, as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.
1166. For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the needy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help the many rather than the one.
1167. For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.