(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor), is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.
1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.
(a) Hence, interpretative hate—i.e., a feeling against another that makes one act in effect as if there were hatred—does precede the other sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.
(b) Formal hate—i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over one’s own inferiority—does not precede, but rather follows the other sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.
1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another, for revenge or on account of one’s own glory, prepares the way to desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred look upon the neighbor’s good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable, and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one’s neighbor’s good as one’s own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy, for, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of God.
1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.—(a) Hatred of God and hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as different species of sin.
(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is wished to a neighbor as evil—that is, one wishes another evil in general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils, such as damnation or death.
(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor’s property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on another, adds malediction to hate.
1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful at all.
(a) Thus, “hatred of God” is sometimes used to signify a want of resignation to the divine will.