(a) Thus, the cooperator may know from the declaration of the principal agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done, but he certainly does not approve of it.
(b) The cooperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the cooperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of some anarchist present who regards his cooperation as a mark of sympathy for the principles of the deceased.
1519. The second condition for lawful material cooperation is that the cooperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil connected with his cooperation. The standards for judging whether a reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on permission of an evil effect (see 105).
(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for cooperation in assault than for cooperation in theft.
(b) The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the publisher of obscene books cooperates remotely; he who sets the type or reads the proofs of such books cooperates proximately. A greater reason is necessary for the latter than for the former cooperation.
(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one’s cooperation, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a more serious reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants or other cooperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not of itself a sufficient reason for cooperation.
(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for cooperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals. Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to Balbus.
(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of cooperation or to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for cooperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful cooperation by those who are bound _ex officio_, from piety or justice, to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen) than on the part of those who are not so bound.
1520. Reasons for cooperation correspond in gravity with the importance of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).
(a) Hence, a grave reason for cooperation exists when, if one refuses it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day’s wages or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain, great anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.