(a) A very grave reason.—In civitatibus in quibus majoris mali vitandi causa permissum est, licet locare domum meretricibus, dummodo non sequatur grave nocumentum vicinis honestis vel major ansa peccandi ob domus situm, et adsit ratio proportionate gravis, utputa quod alii locatorii non adsint, dominus notabile damnum patiatur si domus non occupetur, et meretrices facile alium locatarium obtinere possint. Hodie vero quum constet meretrices plerasque invite vitam turpem exercere (white slavery) et morbis pessimis morteque praematura affligi, meretricium vero nocumentum multigenum bono publico (the social evil) inferre, omnis vir probus abhorrebit a pretio locario ab administratoribus lupanarium oblato.
(b) A more grave reason.—Meetings whose purpose is contrary to the common good (e.g., anti-religious gatherings), even though permitted by civil law, should not be given the use of one’s premises except in a rare case of the greatest necessity.
1542. Unlawful Cooperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.—(a) Cooperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with which they cooperate, or if the act of cooperation is itself intrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does no wrong in merely keeping a record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of great frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in order that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a formal cooperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records in order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement of its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his motive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal cooperation are those of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains blasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his passengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get away by driving him through dark streets.
(b) Cooperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the act itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the cooperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: “Famulus qui submissis humeris scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo januam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat metu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur” (Denzinger, n. 1201). Though the acts of cooperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically evil, the cooperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the wrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of death, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.
1543. Lawful Cooperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.—(a) If cooperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be committed, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause will excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer about the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the intentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned to himself. Hence, the following kinds of cooperation are held permissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor or food to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the fast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read, giving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out to attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress of the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his patrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if he is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval of it, and they can go just as well without him.
(b) If cooperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is not sufficient as an excuse for cooperation; there must be some other reason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin and the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one’s employer to the place where he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under threat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius evitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam cum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiae nuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called on habitually to cooperate in these ways should secure another position, if possible.
1544. The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to other persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the difference of circumstances.
(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in cooperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position to remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the house who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his demijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order was given the wife.
(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike the servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to work at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer understand that they will not see or hear many things, or who habitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called “dirty work”), are guilty of formal cooperation, at least when they can secure good employment elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so dependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse cooperation without serious consequences to themselves.
1545. Duties of Confessors.—Instruction should be given to penitents who are guilty of sinful cooperation. (a) The confessor should instruct ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation, when there is a duty of justice to do this, as when the penitents ask to be instructed; or when there is a duty of charity, as when the sinfulness of the cooperation in question is known to many persons, or the penitents by reason of cooperation are giving great scandal or are in serious danger. (b) The confessor should not instruct ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation—at least, not for a time—if they are in good faith and if graver evils would result from the instruction than from silence.