(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the conduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of their welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.
(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by appointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises, insisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks after the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all branches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.
1645. Neither should practical prudence or practicality (i.e., the knowing what to do and how to do it) be identified with merely material pursuits, since it is a quality that pervades all human activity, from the lowest to the highest, from the manual to the intellectual, from the temporal to the spiritual. Just as there are unpractical mechanics and business men who are not skilled at their work, so also there are practical students and church people who do their own work well and get good results.
1646. The Potential Parts of Prudence.—As was explained in 1636, the potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to which they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633). Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:
(a) wise deliberation (_eubulia_), which is a habit of debating with oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for virtuous choice;
(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for virtuous conduct.
1647. Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which is wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are subject to a commander. But is it possible for these three virtues to exist apart?
(a) If there is question only of natural dispositions to these virtues, they may exist apart. Thus, we find that certain persons have an imagination ready to discover ways and means; that others are not so inventive, but are remarkable for common sense in choosing the most suitable means; and that still others are so inclined to some virtue that they will promptly make use of means that tend to it. The first class are readily listened to in deliberations, the second in decisions, while the third are usefully employed in executing matters that suit their natural bent (e.g., the naturally generous in dispensing alms).
(b) If there is question of the virtues themselves, they do not exist apart; for a man is not prudent if he does not deliberate as he should (e.g., if he searches for evil means to effect his good purpose), or if he does not decide as he should (e.g., if he concludes to prefer evil means to the good ones his deliberation had shown him), or if he does not direct his actions as he should (e.g., if he neglects to carry out what he had decided on as a necessary duty or performs it in a careless or improper way). True prudence, then, is wise in deliberation, in decision, in direction. A good man may be excused if he is not resourceful, or if he lacks sound judgment in worldly matters, but one who is imprudent in the matter of a virtuous life is not a good man.
1648. The Persons Who Possess Prudence.—Political prudence, if understood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons, not even in all the good.