(a) the party who consents must be able to surrender his right, since, if he is not able to do so, his cession is invalid. Hence, one who kills a person asking for death is unjust to God and to the State; one who commits adultery with a woman whose husband gives permission is unjust to the marriage state and the lawful children; one who strikes a cleric who waived his privilege of canon (_privilegium canonis_) is unjust to the clerical state; one who takes property from a ward with the latter’s consent, is unjust to the estate, since the ward has no authority to alienate it. Many of the martyrs, it is true, wished to lose their lives at the hands of persecutors, but this meant only that they consented to the will of God, not that they consented to their own murder by the tyrants, for they had not the right to give the latter dominion over their lives;
(b) the party who consents must really will to yield his right, and hence, if there is error, fraud, fear or violence, the cession is of no effect. Thus, a buyer who through ignorance takes a defective article or pays an exorbitant price, a workman who through necessity accepts less than a living wage, or a man who yields his purse to a burglar at the point of the revolver, does not surrender his rights, since true consent is wanting. Similarly, when one follows the counsel of Christ not to resist spoliation (Matt., v. 40) or when a saintly person rejoices over injury done him (Heb., x. 34), the intention is not to surrender rights to the unjust, nor to approve their conduct, but to practise heroic virtue by patience, humility, forgiveness, etc.
1726. Internal Injustice.—Does internal injustice (i.e., the intention of injuring another) make an external action unjust?
(a) If the intention makes the external act to be a violation of a strict right, it also makes the external act unjust. Thus, to take a book from another’s room is of itself an indifferent action, for there may be, no violation of right (e.g., when the intention is to borrow), or there may be such violation (e.g., when the intention is to steal).
(b) If the intention does not make the external act a violation of strict right, even though that act be harmful to the other party, it does not make the external act unjust. Hence, if the other party has no strict right against the external act (e.g., Titus sees the house of Balbus on fire, but he is not hired to take care of Balbus’ property, and he gives no alarm in order that the house may burn down) or if the agent has a strict right to perform the external act (e.g., Claudius, a judge, condemns Sempronius, according to law, but his chief intention is the harm he will inflict on the latter), the unjust intention does not make the external act unjust. But in these cases sin, and even grave sin, is committed against charity.
1727. Judgment.—Judgment, or the right determination of what is just and due to others, is the proper act of the virtue of justice, and hence Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 7) declares that people take their disputes to a judge as to justice personified. Judgment is either public or private. (a) Public judgment is passed by a judge who has the authority to compel disputing parties to abide by his decisions. (b) Private judgment is passed by individuals without public authority concerning the morals or conduct of others.
1728. Since judgment is an act of virtue, it is lawful, and we find that both in the Old and the New Testament men have been appointed with authority to judge others. Thus, God ordered that judges be chosen in all the cities of Israel (Deut., xvi. 18); St. Paul declares that the judge is the minister of God (Rom., xiii. 4), and from Apostolic times tribunals have been set up in the Church. But certain conditions are required for moral goodness, both in those who ask for judgment and in those who pass judgment.
(a) Thus, those who seek judgment must be actuated by proper motives and must conduct themselves in a virtuous manner. Our Lord in Matt., v, teaches that it is better to suffer temporal loss rather than to contend in judgment from a motive of revenge to the prejudice of one’s spiritual good, and St. Paul condemns the Corinthians because they gave scandal by reason of their lawsuits before heathen tribunals and had recourse to frauds and injuries in their litigation (I Cor., vi. 1 sqq.).
(b) Those who pass judgment must have a good intention, must proceed according to law, and must decide according to prudence. If the first condition is wanting, judgment is unjust or otherwise sinful, according as the judge chooses against the right or is merely prompted by some human motive (such as hatred, anger, vainglory, avarice); if the second condition is lacking, judgment, if public, is usurped or illegal, if the third condition is not had, judgment is rash. But it should be noted that the Church has condemned the teaching of Wicliff that office and authority are forfeited by sinners (Denzinger, 595, 597).
1729. First Condition of Righteous Judgment.—The first condition of righteous judgment is that the purpose of the judge be just and sincere. But is it possible for judgment to be righteous if the judge is a bad man—that is, if he is in the state of mortal sin?