(b) If the property came to him by legal title (e.g., by gift or sale), but from a former possessor of doubtful or suspected faith (e.g., one who seemed to have the property through theft), he must attempt to settle the doubt. Should the doubt nevertheless continue, some think he should divide it with another probable claimant, but others believe he may retain all.

(e) If the property came to him by legal title and from a former possessor in good faith, he must attempt to settle the doubt; but if the doubt remains in spite of his inquiries, he may retain the property in good faith, as long as matters continue in the same state.

1778. Cooperators and Restitution.—Restitution is owed for cooperation in injustice when the cooperator becomes at least partially an unjust and efficacious cause of damage to another. It should be noted that this cooperation may be of a limited kind, as when it extends only to the mode of the damage, or when it is not indispensable to the commission of the injury.

(a) Thus, he who cooperates only as to the mode of injury is probably liable only for that damage which he added to the substantial damage. Thus, if Balbus intended to steal $10, and Claudius persuaded him to steal $20, it seems that the influence of Claudius extended only to the amount of $10.

(b) He who cooperates, but whose assistance is not necessary, is bound to restitution as a cooperator, since he is an unjust and efficacious cause of damage. Thus, if Caius steals for Sempronius, knowing that, should he refuse, Mercurius would carry out the orders of Sempronius, the readiness to steal on the part of Mercurius does not excuse Caius or make his act any less harmful.

1779. Positive cooperators in injury are bound to restitution when their act is the unjust and efficacious cause of the damage. The principal cases of positive cooperation are the following:

(a) a mandator is a superior who explicitly or implicitly commands an inferior subject to commit an act of injustice, as when a father bids his son to steal. The mandator bids another to act in his name, and therefore he is the principal and not the accessory or secondary cause of injury. He must indemnify both the victim and the agent for losses he caused them; but he is not liable if he effectively recalled his mandate before the damage was done;

(b) an advisor is one who through instruction or persuasion induces another person to commit an injury which is not done in the name of or for the benefit of the advisor himself. He must make restitution both to the person whose injury he recommended and to the person to whom he gave the advice for the damages he brought upon them. Those who give wrong advice in good faith, or who recall their advice before the damage is done, are generally excused from responsibility. Bad example does not seem to be equivalent to bad advice, and he who recommends a lesser evil only because he wishes to prevent a greater one is not an efficacious cause of the lesser evil (see 1502, 1503);

(c) an implicit advisor (_palpo_) is one who by flattery, excuse, blame, ridicule or other such indirect means leads another to commit injustice against a third party. The implicit advisor is bound to restitution for damages caused or reparation denied through his fault;

(d) a protector or encourager (_receptans_) is one who knowingly and willingly bestows upon a malefactor, as such, security or comfort, in order that the latter may do injury with greater confidence or omit restitution for evil already done. He is bound to restitution for the unjust damage or retention of property caused by him;