(a) If the operation is likely to be successful and there is no good reason for refusing it, it seems that one may not refuse it without the guilt of indirect suicide, although one might be excused on account of good faith.
(b) If the success of the operation is doubtful, or if there is a good reason for refusing, one who refuses is not guilty of suicide. Among the good reasons are spiritual ones (e.g., modesty, the fear of falling into blasphemy or despair under the pain are given by some writers) and temporal ones (e.g., the poverty that would be brought upon the patient’s family or the hardship that would result for the patient himself).
1861. Canonical Penalties for Suicide.—(a) Those who attempt suicide are irregular _ex delicto_ (Canon 985, n. 5). (b) If they die, they are not given ecclesiastical burial unless they gave signs of repentance before death (Canon 1240, n, 3), and, if they recover, they are subject to various penalties (Canon 2350, Sec. 2). (c) If it is doubtful whether a person committed suicide, or was responsible, the doubt is decided in his favor, provided no scandal is likely.
1862. Accidental Homicide.—Accidental homicide is that which happens without any direct purpose to kill. But the following cases should be distinguished:
(a) when the homicide is not voluntary, either in itself or in its cause (see 35, 94), that is, when the slayer had no intention to kill and could not foresee that death would result from his act or omission;
(b) when the homicide is voluntary only in its cause, inasmuch as the person who kills is guilty of negligence in a lawful thing, or of something unlawful, and death results from the negligence or from that which is unlawful, although there was no direct wish to kill.
1863. The Case of One From Whose Lawful Act or Omission Homicide Accidentally Results.—(a) If this person was not guilty of negligence, he is not responsible for the resultant homicide, since it was not voluntary, either directly or indirectly. Thus, if a man who was said to be dead, but who knows nothing about the report, calls at his home and his wife drops dead on seeing him, he is not responsible for her death.
(b) If the person in question was negligent, he is guilty of homicide in a greater or less degree according to the seriousness of his neglect. Thus, a sane man who flourishes a loaded revolver in a crowded room is responsible if the revolver goes off and kills someone present; but a nurse who leaves a sick room for just a moment with the result that her patient falls out of bed and is killed, is only slightly responsible at the most, if there was little reason to expect what happened.
1864. The Case of One From Whose Unlawful Act or Omission Homicide Accidentally Results.—(a) If this person was not negligent and his conduct was not dangerous to the lives of others, he is not guilty of homicide; for the death that ensued was not voluntary, either directly or indirectly. Thus, if a thief is driving away carefully with a stolen automobile and a reckless pedestrian gets in front of the car and is killed, the driver is guilty of theft, but not of homicide.
(b) If the person in question was not negligent but his conduct was nevertheless dangerous to the lives of others, he is guilty of homicide; for the death that followed was voluntary indirectly, since he could have foreseen the homicide and should have avoided the conduct. Thus, if a person strikes lightly a pregnant woman and she suffers an abortion, or if one who is not a surgeon tries to mutilate an innocent person and kills him, he is responsible for the death, since the acts committed remained dangerous to life, no matter how careful the offender may have been to avoid killing.