(c) To men of virtue we are unable to make a sufficient return for the good they do us by their instruction and example, and hence the honor we show them is less than the benefit we receive from them. The virtue of reverence (_observantia_) is then a potential part of justice.
2143. Degrees of Moral Debt.—The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.
(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.
(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all. Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.
2144. Epieikeia.—The above-mentioned potential parts of justice are adjuncts of particular justice. There remains one more virtue to be noted, that of epieikeia or equity, which pertains to legal justice. This is a subjective part of justice, since it is the superior function of legal justice, guiding it to follow what is substantial right, and preserving it from the danger of mere legalism or over-strict interpretation or application of Written law (see 358). With this, the crowning virtue of justice, the enumeration of its parts is brought to a close.
2145. The Virtue of Religion.—We shall now proceed to treat of the various parts of justice in the order in which they were given above (2142-2144), beginning with the virtue that renders to God His due. Religion (holiness) is defined as “a moral virtue that disposes us to offer to God the worship and honor that belong to Him as the supreme Author of all things.”
(a) Thus, religion is a moral virtue, for, though it tends towards God, it is not numbered among the theological virtues, but among the moral virtues, being one of the potential parts of justice.
(b) It is an inclination, that is, it is a habit of the soul or the exercise of that habit in some act. The acts of religion are either elicited by it or commanded by it, according as they are its own proper activities and proceed directly from it and are directed immediately to God (e.g., acts of adoration, sacrifice, prayer), or belong to some other virtue employed by religion for the honor of God; for example, to visit the widows and orphans in their tribulation is an act of mercy, to keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of temperance, but when used for the honor and glory of God these acts are also acts of religion (James, i. 27).
(e) It is paid to God, that is, being an act of justice, it renders to another what is His due. Religious honor given the saints or sacred images refers to God, for whose sake they are venerated.
(d) It is paid to God as the Supreme Being, that is, just as we are bound to tend to God and to serve Him, because He is our Last End, so are we bound to honor Him, because He is our Maker and Ruler.