(b) By Defect.—Disrespect for parents is felt when they are despised on account of their poverty, ignorance, or feebleness; it is shown by word (e.g., when they are addressed in bitter, reproachful, or contemptuous speech; or when they are ill spoken of to others), by signs (e.g., when mocking gestures or mimicry are used to ridicule them), by deeds (e.g., when they are threatened or struck), and by omissions (e.g., when their children are too proud to recognize them or to give them tokens of honor). Disrespect for one’s country is felt when one is imbued with anti-nationalistic doctrines (e.g., the principles of Internationalism which hold that loyalty is due to a class, namely, the workers of the world or a capitalistic group, and that country should be sacrificed to selfish interests; the principle of Humanitarianism, which holds that patriotism is incompatible with love of the race; the principle of Egoism which holds that the individual has no obligations to society); it is practised when one speaks contemptuously about country, disregards its good name or prestige, subordinates its rightful pre-eminence to a class, section, party, personal ambition, or greed, etc.
2350. Malice of Sins against Piety.—(a) The moral malice is distinct from that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt owed to the human principle of existence has a special character of wrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and matricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity among sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother are greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to honor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the circumstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circumstance that changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth cousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though an aggravating circumstance, does not give the injury the character of impiety.
(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin’s nature, since piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special commandment and promise from God. But the sin may be venial on account of lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or speak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of the lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother slaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes his parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their parents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation regularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only lead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents may generally be presumed when there is amendment.
2351. The Virtue of Reverence.—This virtue is known in Latin as _observantia_, because its object is persons of authority, whom it carefully observes in order to revere their dignity and to learn their commands. It is defined as “a moral virtue which inclines one to render to persons of higher position the tribute of honor and obedience that is due their authority.”
(a) It is a moral virtue, that is, one concerned immediately with the direction of human acts. Reverence belongs to justice because it renders to others what is due them.
(b) The persons to whom it does justice are those of higher position, that is, superiors who rule over us or over others, and men distinguished for virtue, knowledge or other excellent qualities that make them fit to govern. Superior here does not mean that the person who receives reverence must be in every way better than the person who shows reverence (e.g., he who is superior in jurisdiction owes some reverence to a subject who is more learned or virtuous than himself), or that there must be inequality between the one who gives and the one who receives reverence (e.g., two distinguished persons of equal rank and merit owe mutual reverence to each other on account of the superiority which each has to many others).
(c) The reason for reverence is the authority vested in these persons, that is, the excellence of their state, which gives them a higher dignity than others, and their office of ruling, which empowers them to direct a subject to his proper end. Here we see that reverence is a distinct virtue, for, while piety and reverence are both forms of veneration, the motive of each is different. Thus, a child owes to his father piety, because from the father was received the beginning of his life, and reverence, because from the father is received direction to his end. Again, a subject owes the rulers of his country both piety and reverence: piety, as regards their relation to the common good and the nation (e.g., when the ruler is given his special salute), reverence, as regards their personal rank and glory (e.g., when assistance is given the ruler to lessen the burden of his office).
(d) The first tribute paid by reverence is honor, which is a testimony given to worth, and is offered to the dignity or rank of the superior. Honor differs from reverence as the effect differs from the cause, or the means from the end; for it is reverence that prompts one to show honor, and honor is meant to excite in others reverence for the person honored. The debt of honor is due those who are superior in jurisdiction, from legal justice; it is due to those who are superiors, but not in jurisdiction, not from legal justice, since the law does not enforce it, but from moral obligation, since it is decent and becoming.
(e) The second tribute of reverence is obedience, which is submission to law, and is offered to the ruling power of the superior. This tribute of reverence is paid only to one’s own ruling superior, since others have no power to impose upon one their will or precept.
2352. Species of Honor.—(a) As to kinds, there is common honor which is shown to all and by all (e.g., God honors the Saints, and Tobias and Mardochaeus were honored by their sovereigns), and the special honor of homage which includes submission and is shown only by inferiors or servants to their superiors or masters.