(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it is more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to disobey a higher than a lower superior;
(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the lawgiver has more at heart.
2372. Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.—(a) Disobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God, for, _per se_ and other things being equal, a sin against God is more serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins against creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the other theft.
(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in contempt than to disregard his precept.
2373. The Virtue of Gratitude.—Religion, piety, reverence and obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as “a moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to repay with gladness the favors one has received.”
(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus, gratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony) or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get rid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed), though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives, even when it is not a favor.
(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).
2374. Two Kinds of Gratitude.—(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to God as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense, gratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from those mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and follows in order after reverence.
2375. Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for the gift of repentance?
(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has been preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, _per se_ and other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin than to be rescued from it.